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THE RANGE OF SOCIAL THEORY

A SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, LITERATURE, TENDENCIES AND FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

BY

FLOYD N. HOUSE

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THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

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To

MY WIFE

WITHOUT WHOSE COOPERATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT THE STUDIES WHICH MADE POSSIBLE THE PREPARATION OF THIS BOOK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED

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PREFACE

Although published in a series of social science text books, this volume is not designed for use as a text book in elementary courses. I have had in mind in preparing it the advanced student, who, it seems to be generally agreed, needs to acquire a more comprehensive acquaintance with the literature and history of the social sciences than the specialized courses and researches he is carrying on will tend to give him. If this book can serve teachers of the social sciences and others as a reference work on the literature and fundamental concepts of those studies, that will be so much more justification for its existence. It is with the latter purpose in mind, primarily, that I have taken pains to make the index as comprehensive as possible.

Obviously, the author of a book of this character must be indebted to a great many of his predecessors and contemporaries for his materials. I have sought to acknowledge the sources I have used, so far as I was aware of them, by footnotes. I know very well, however, that I am indebted in many ways, directly and indirectly, to my former teachers, colleagues, and students for ideas which are incorporated in this book and which I have not been able to acknowledge. To all such I hereby express my gratitude.

Specific mention should be made, however, of the contribution of Professor Howard W. Odum, who encouraged me to undertake the preparation of this book and who supplied the fundamental idea or plan which is reflected in its outline and division into chapters. I have however, since my original correspondence with him regarding the plan to be followed, adopted an entirely different list of specific chapter headings from that which he suggested; hence the responsibility for the present scheme is mine. Probably the book would have been a better one had I stuck closer to his suggestions. The extent of my indebtedness to Professor Robert E. Park, my former

teacher, faithful counselor, and friend, will be apparent to anyone who reads the following pages. The Institute for Research in the Social Sciences of the University of Virginia has aided me in the preparation of the manuscript by providing fair copies of my original typescript. Besides contributing in many ways, to an extent to which the dedication is a feeble attempt to express, my wife helped in the preparation of the manuscript for the press and made it possible for me to deliver it considerably sooner than would otherwise have been possible.

F. N. H.

University of Virginia,
November 13, 1928.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION. SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL THEORY

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Science and Social Policy 3

PART I. GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

II. Human Geography: Man and Environment 15
III. Theories of Population 27
IV. Race and Nationality 42
V. The Movements of Population . . . 52
VI. Natural Areas and Territorial Groups . 63
VII. The Study of the Community 74
VIII. Competition and Division of Labor . . 86
IX. Commerce and the Market 106

PART II. HUMAN NATURE AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

X. The Original Nature of Man . . . 121
XI. The Individual and the Primary Group . 137
XII. Habit and Custom 145
XIII. The Social Personality 156
XIV. Mobility and Individuality 174
XV. The Theory of Social Forces . . . 185
XVI. The Sociology of Crowds 200
XVII. Social Movements 212
XVIII. The Sociology of Religion 220
XIX. Religion and Morals 244
XX. Culture, Art, and Education . . . 263
XXI. Culture and Social Organization . . 287
XXII. Contact and Assimilation 305

CHAPTER PAGE

XXIII. Conflict and Disorganization . . . 322
XXIV. Conventionality and Fashion . . . 338
XXV. Sociological Theories of Recreation . . 351
XXVI. Theories of Cultural Evolution . . . 370

PART III. CONFLICT AND SOCIAL CONTROL

XXVII. The Social Struggle 389
XXVIII. Economic Interpretations of War . . 408
XXIX. The Process of Industrialization . . . 422
XXX. Public Opinion and Legislation . . . 435
XXXI. Civil and Criminal Law 454
XXXII. Revolution and Reform 472
XXXIII. The Geography of Politics 492
XXXIV. Social Politics 504
XXXV. The Politics of Industry 516
XXXVI. The Evolution of Government . . . 533

PART IV. THE TREND OF SOCIAL THEORY

XXXVII. Social Change and Social Science . . 545
XXXVIII. The Logic of the Social Sciences . . . 555

Index 571

CHAPTER I

SCIENCE AND SOCIAL POLICY

The Development of Social Problems and Social Science. In the general history of reflective thought and the accumulation of corresponding publications during the latest century, no feature has been more conspicuous than the development of social science. During the same period, also, few historic developments have loomed larger than the increase in the magnitude, complexity, and insistency of human *social* problems—those problems, in other words, which arise more or less directly from the efforts of human beings to carry on the business of life in communities and in a world characterized by an ever-increasing interdependence of persons and groups. Not only do we live in an era in which a great deal is written and said concerning crime and its repression, poverty, and similar "social problems" in the sense of social evils which we all agree to be in need of remedy, but the problems—in the sense of *tasks*—of government and diplomacy, of ecclesiastical, educational and other forms of social administration, and of business and industrial organization have become more and more difficult. It has been a commonplace idea in the past few years that relatively greater progress has been made within the latest century or more, in the solution of the material, technological problems of human existence than in the solution of the human social problems created by the rapid evolution of the material, economic and commercial setting in which life must be lived. Now it seems highly probable that the historical coincidence of these two circumstances, the rapid development of social theory and the increase of practical social problems, has been something more than a coincidence, and that the development of social science is causally related to the development of social problems.

Curiosity and the Development of Social Science. It is the purpose of the present study to describe, and so far as may be to interpret, the origins, development, and present trend of theoretic discussion of a number of the phases of social life which have been made, or seem about to be made, the object of reflective inquiry. The development of certain types or divisions of reflective thought may be studied, however, in at least two different ways, namely, as a simple problem in historical narrative, designed to make clear the sequential order of certain steps in the development and the manner in which one arose out of the preceding, or as a problem in social psychology, an inquiry into the presumptive processes of reasoning and intercommunication, and into the human motives, from which the theoretic constructions existing at any given time have arisen. Applying ourselves for a moment to the latter type of inquiry, we may observe that social science, like other types of reflective thought, doubtless has developed partly through the impulsion of the sheer desire to know and understand, the "idle curiosity" which Thorstein Veblen has postulated as the motive of scientific research.[1] Historically, however, it is very clear that the development of the social theory of today has been due largely to men's desire for practical and ethical social guidance. Plato's political dialogues and Aristotle's *Politics* were obviously written for the purpose of outlining the principles by which the statesman should be guided and defining the ends of social and political institutions. The practical motive underlying the development of late Roman political and legal theory is too evident to need demonstration. Similarly obvious is the practical and ethical animus in the social and political theory of the Middle Ages. In modern times, however, the social studies have displayed recurrent ambitions to become truly "scientific," and by some this has been held to mean that research in these fields should be motivated only by the desire for knowledge for its own sake. In the face of such an attitude, it is desirable to inquire into the nature of some of the conspicuous and undeniably influential beginnings of contemporary social theory.

[1] *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization,* and other essays (New York, 1919), Chaps. I and II.

Modern Origins of Contemporary Social Theory. As a matter of historical fact, the development of modern social science may be dated largely from the early part of the nineteenth century. To be sure, the social theory of that period did not arise out of nothing nor was it developed without any reference to, or utilization of, the literature already existing. Still, contemporary social theory may quite generally be traced back *through,* even though for some purposes it must be traced back beyond, nineteenth-century origins.[2] These historic origins we may, with sufficient accuracy for present purposes, classify under four headings: (1) the writings of August Comte, which of course may in turn be traced back through Saint-Simon to various currents of eighteenth-century social philosophy; (2) the works of Herbert Spencer, (3) various nineteenth-century developments in Germany in the fields of historical research, political science, and economics; and (4) the humanitarian tendencies which were so active in England and America in the nineteenth century, and which manifested themselves in efforts at social and legislative reform, and in charitable activities—the antecedents of modern "social work." As a matter of fact the last-mentioned of these was probably more directly responsible than any other influence for the rapid growth of sociology as a separate field of instruction and research in American universities,[3] and the practical and ethical animus in this particular development is too obvious to need comment. "Sociology" found its way into American university curricula largely through the introduction of courses in "social problems," which dealt with charitable and penal institutions and methods. It was only gradually, in the greater number of colleges and universities,[4] that courses of a more theoretic character were introduced, and in more than one institution "sociology" still means the study of practical social problems and their treatment.

As regards Comte's specifications for the formation of a new

[2] See Small, A. W., *Origins of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), Chap. I.

[3] See Small, A. W., "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," whole number of *American Journal of Sociology* for May, 1916. Small does not altogether accept the view set forth above, but the facts placed in exhibition by him tend to afford support for it.

[4] Yale University and the University of Virginia are exceptions.

general science to be called "sociology," it is true that he stressed the idea of "positive philosophy," or in other words, disinterested objective inquiry into facts, but it is also the case that he named as the most important of all the achievements to be expected from the development of sociology as a positive science, that it will offer "the only solid basis for that Social Reorganization which must succeed the critical condition in which the most civilized nations are now living." [5] Comte believed, in other words, that when a positive science of sociology was established, statesmen could not do otherwise than be guided by the insights afforded by it. As to Spencer, he too has commonly been thought of as the apostle of knowledge as an end in itself, but in *The Study of Sociology* he sets forth very definitely the need of an art of "social engineering." [6] Small has shown conclusively in his *Origins of Sociology,* first, that the nineteenth-century German historians, political scientists, and economists were actively concerned to make social science a guide in practical social affairs as well as an objective study, and, secondly, that these nineteenth-century developments in German universities had a considerable influence upon the subsequent development of the social studies in American universities.

On every side, then, we find the growing social sciences rooted in the quest for guidance in practical social affairs, particularly in social work and government. If additional proof were needed, one might consider the fact that Lester F. Ward, often regarded as the father of American sociology, though commonly considered a determinist, is also known for his emphasis of "social telesis" and the possibility of human betterment through education. Social theory is therefore a specialty, or a group of specialties, which have developed out of the demand for intelligence in social policy. This means that the literature of social theory, while it includes many treatises which have been planned along lines suggested by some scheme of a logical and abstract character, also consists in large part of studies of particular, concrete types of social phenomena

[5] Positive Philosophy (Martineau's translation, New York, 1855), pp. 32-36; quoted by Lichtenberger, J. P., in *Development of Social Theory* (New York, 1923), p. 249.

[6] *Op. cit.,* Chap. I.

and social problems. It is accordingly possible, in surveying the range of social theory, to follow an outline dictated by some presumably logical arrangement of fundamental theoretic concepts, or one which represents the author's classification of types of general social theories. It is also possible, however, to derive the plan for such a survey from the list of concrete topics and problems, the study of which has been pushed to the point of relating them to fundamental theoretic considerations. It will be obvious from the most cursory examination of the Table of Contents of this volume that the latter plan has been followed here.[7]

Social Science as Distinct from Practical and Ethical Rules. We may hope to find important contributions to contemporary social theory, then, in books and articles which have primarily a concrete and practical purpose, and to derive from the examination of such contributions, in part, a better insight than we should be able to acquire from purely theoretic treatises alone into the present trend of development in the various phases of social theory. It must be kept in mind, however, that the social sciences are tending to become, like the older sciences, something distinct from mere rules of social procedure or maxims of social morality. The situation has been well characterized by Thomas and Znaniecki, in a discussion of the limitations of "practical sociology."

> While . . . there is no doubt that actual situations must be handled immediately, we see that they cannot be solved adequately as long as theoretic reflection has their immediate solution in view. But there is evidently one issue from this dilemma, and it is the same as in material technique and physical science. We must be able to foresee future situations and prepare for them, and we must have in stock a large body of secure and objective knowledge capable of being applied to any situation, whether foreseen or unexpected. This means that we must have an empirical and exact social science ready for eventual application. And such a science can be constituted only if we treat it as an end in itself, not as a means to something else, and if we give it time and opportunity to develop along all the lines of investigation

[7] *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* by Pitirim A. Sorokin (New York, 1928), is a recent work of the first-mentioned type. Paul Barth's *Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie* is planned along somewhat similar lines.

possible, even if we do not see what may be the eventual applications of one or another of its results.[8]

The authors point out, in the course of their further discussion of the point, that the relation of practical art and science, if both are to be fruitful, must be a reciprocal one; social practice is dependent upon the illumination that can be provided by a body of abstract social science for the efficient performance of its functions, but if social science is to remain valid and useful as an interpretation of the facts of social life, instead of becoming a mere exercise in the logical elaboration of premises, it must be subjected to the test of practical application. "This demand of ultimate practical applicability is as important for science itself as for practice; it is a test, not only of the practical, but of the theoretical, value of the science." [9]

The foregoing paragraph will help to explain why, in the present volume, so much attention has been paid to literature which may not be dealing primarily with "social theory" in a narrow sense of the term. It is, however, with the content of that "body of secure and objective knowledge" which Thomas and Znaniecki have stated to be necessary, that the present study is ultimately concerned. At the present time, to be sure, no very large or exact body of social wisdom that can be called "secure" exists; the generalizations and abstractions which certain writers have proposed have frequently failed to win the approval of other social scientists of established reputation. Hence it has seemed necessary to be guided by two working rules in the selection of material to be quoted, summarized, or mentioned in the following chapters: (1) So far as practicable, the theoretic generalizations and working assumptions of the various writers referred to have been selected, and their practical conclusions concerning social procedure and social values have been passed over. (2) Since the consensus of social theorists on many matters of theoretic importance is so small, it has been necessary to place in exhibition rival theories which are in some instances mutually exclusive.

Social Science and Social Philosophy. To define the

[8] *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (two-volume edition, New York, 1927), Vol. I, p. 15. Used by permission.
[9] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 16.

field of social theory it is necessary not only to establish a clear distinction between social science on the one hand and, on the other hand, the maxims and aims of social policy and the working rules of social service, but it is also desirable to have in mind at least a rough distinction between social science and social philosophy. This is a question which has been dealt with in greater detail elsewhere in the following pages. For present purposes we may remark simply that social philosophy differs from social science in somewhat the same way that social science differs from the formulated procedure of the social worker. The term "social philosophy" is one that has been used in a variety of meanings; the meaning which is perhaps central and most authoritative, however, is that which makes social philosophy the form of reflective thought which seeks to criticize and refine the concepts of social science, as well as to define values for social ethics, with reference to the accepted generalizations and abstractions of other phases of contemporary reflective thought, and in particular the broadest and most fundamental generalizations by which the thought of our times is guided.[10] The lines between social science and social philosophy are extremely hazy; there is no rule by which one may determine in which classification to place a volume or an article which deals with very fundamental questions of social theory, however definitely it is claimed to apply to the interpretation of concrete cases.

A Classification of Problems of Social Theory. A comprehensive survey of social theories can hardly evade the obligation of placing the topics with which it deals in some sort of grouping which will assist the reader to grasp the relationships which tend to exist among them, particularly when so many topics are more or less independently considered as is the case in this volume. The logical value of the general arrangement of chapters which has been employed in the following pages will perhaps become evident in the course of the treatment of the various individual subjects. Any such grouping is naturally, like any other feature of social theory, in the nature of

[10] It is in some such sense as this that J. S. McKenzie uses the term "social philosophy" in his paper, "The Present Outlook in Social Philosophy," *Journal of Philosophical Studies,* Vol. I, No. I.

a working hypothesis, to be retained, modified, or discarded in the light of further experience and research. The working scheme of classification that has been employed here is based, however, on the assumption that the trend of contemporary social science is causing some five fundamental groups of theoretic problems to emerge. They are, (1) problems relating to human geography or "human ecology"—the relations of men and their physical environment, the spatial distribution and groupings, and the spatial movements of individuals and social groups; (2) problems relating to the economic process and economic organization—competition, division of labor, commerce, industrial and business combination, and the organization of markets; (3) problems of social psychology, which, as here defined, is concerned with human nature and culture, the social aspects of personality, and the motives or "forces" underlying human conduct in their social derivation and their social bearings; (4) problems of collective behavior or "collective psychology" and social control; (5) problems of political organization and political process.

These groups of problems are of course interrelated in many ways; each set of concepts and theories is in fact directly related to all the others. One cannot proceed from one to another of the special topics which can be made out within the broader fields without doing some violence to the logic of the larger whole. To meet some of the exigencies of a composition where one topic must follow another in some unilinear order without reference to other relationships, the chapters into which the material of this volume has been divided have been arranged under three general headings, (1) Geography and social differentiation, (2) Human nature and collective behavior, and (3) Conflict and social control, with particular reference to the political phases of social control.

Social Theory and "Methodology." With the content of these sections before us, it will be possible to return briefly to certain general questions of trend and of method in the social sciences. It has been said by many profound thinkers that a science is, from one point of view, a more or less unified body of methods of research more fundamentally than it is anything else. This is, however, a hard saying, especially when one

discovers, superficially, what it is that is designated as the "methodology" of a science. It is probably true in the last analysis that the scientist's interest in the range and development of the theory of his subject is ultimately a methodological interest. A guiding aim in the preparation of this volume has been to reveal the methodological values contained in the developing theories of social science.

PART I. GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION



CHAPTER II

HUMAN GEOGRAPHY: MAN AND ENVIRONMENT

Early Geographic Knowledge. The science of Human Geography, strictly so-called, tends to concern itself primarily with two sets of problems: (1) those involved in attempting to answer the question, How does the physical environment affect or condition human life, individual and social?; (2) those involved in describing, and, if possible, explaining the territorial or spatial distribution of the human population of the earth, and the movements of human beings in space. Through a study of the origins of science and other forms of reflective thought, we find that an intellectual interest in what we now know as the problems of human geography began to be manifested by Greek thinkers several centuries before our own era. Herodotus, Thucydides, the Pythagoreans, Hippocrates, Aristotle—all of these well-known classical writers, and doubtless many others, included in their works passages which show clearly that they realized that the activities of men and of States were conditioned by geographic factors. Franklin Thomas [1] has shown very clearly that, in tracing the development of contemporary theories of physical and geographic factors in human society, we must take into account such sources as ancient physiological lore, Pythagoreanism, the observations and conjectures of early historians, and the attempts of ancient and medieval geographers to give some intelligible explanation of the mixture of fact and legend which they set down in their writings and on their atlases. Almost the whole of the mass of speculations of this type which can be collected

[1] Thomas, Franklin, *The Environmental Basis of Society*—A Study in the History of Sociological Theory (New York and London, 1925). The writer is greatly indebted to this book, free use of which has reduced the work which would otherwise have been necessary in the preparation of this chapter. The same acknowledgment should be made for Jean Brunhes' chapter on "Human Geography" in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* edited by Harry Elmer Barnes. New York, 1925.

from ancient and medieval literature must, however, be discarded from any illuminating account of the development of present-day "human geography." Questions of the sort with which Hippocrates and Ibn Khaldun concerned themselves are today regarded as the province of the physiologist. Furthermore, the environmental theories of the ancients were so warped by magical presuppositions that they made little direct contribution to the formation of a science of human geography which could stand the test of criticism and pragmatic verification.

> Environmental theories of the ancient and medieval periods were colored and quite largely shaped by two curious sets of doctrines (1) Astrology, and (2) the Greek physical philosophy. The astrologers believed that the sun, moon, and stars exert a direct influence on the affairs of men and nations. . . . The physical philosophy of the Greeks was based upon Empedocles' doctrine of the four elements combined with the Pythagorean theory of the mystic nature of numbers, and that, along with astrology, it underlies practically all of the climatic theories held by ancient and medieval writers.[2]

In fact, an examination of ancient geographical speculations reveals that they were inspired, in the main, by two motives. One was that of finding arguments to support ethnocentric beliefs and practices. When Aristotle argues that most of the "barbarians" were slaves by nature, he simply expressed the common view of Greek gentlemen of his day, the view, namely, that Greece was the center of the universe and that the Greek people were destined by the gods to a superior and privileged existence. The attitude implied is of course that characteristic of most peoples at all stages of human history. Ethnographers have frequently referred to the fact that in a number of languages the word for "men" or "human beings" is identical with the term used to designate members of one's own tribe or nationality. The familiar Greek depreciation of "barbarians," then, sought support in some geographic theory which should explain why the best people were to be found in this particular part of the earth. Such explanations quite naturally took the form of theories concerning the relation between climate or other natural circumstances and race. From that day to this

[2] Thomas, Franklin, *loc. cit.*, pp. 17-19.

it has been held by numerous writers that temperate climates or "mild" climates were favorable to the development and survival of a superior type of people, but each writer has construed the doctrine so that his own land was regarded as the norm of temperateness in climate. Greece, Arabia, Italy, France, Germany, Great Britain, Scandinavia, and the United States—each has been taken by some writer to represent the desirable "temperate" or "mild" or "stimulating" climate.

Geographic Factors in History. There was, however, another motive which inspired some of the geographic theories of ancient writers. This was the desire for a comprehensive explanation of historical events. Here and there in the writings of historians we find common-sense observations concerning the physical settings of the events narrated, and in some instances these observations were accompanied by simple conjectures regarding the general influence of geographic factors in history. There are several such passages in the *General History* of Polybius.

It will be by no means a useless task, nor foreign to the design of this introduction, to give here a short account of this people (the Gauls) from the time of their first settlement in Italy. For besides that the subject itself is curious, and as such well deserves the pain of being particularly considered, it is also a point of the last importance that we should in this place previously be acquainted with it: in order to gain a right conception, what the country was, into which Annibal afterward led his army, and what the forces, by whose assistance he attempted to subvert the Roman empire. We shall first describe the nature of the country, and its situation with respect to the other parts of Italy: that when we have thus acquired a knowledge of the place, we may be able more easily to comprehend whatever was great and worthy of notice in the transactions that happened in them.

The whole of Italy resembles a triangle in its figure. The eastern side is bounded by the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic Gulph: the south and west by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas. The third, toward the north, is terminated by the chain of mountains called the Alps; which, beginning near Massilia, and the places above the Sardinian Sea, extend without any interruption to a very little distance of the inmost extremity of the Adriatic, and are considered as the base of the triangle. At the foot of the mountains, on the southern side, lie those plains, of which we now speak: which, both in their fertility and

wide extent, are far superior to any other parts of Europe that have yet been discovered. . . .

The fertility of this country is greater than can be well expressed. (Illustrated at length with figures showing the comparative prices of foodstuffs.) [3]

It is descriptions and implied causal explanations of this common-sense sort which we must suppose to have formed the basis and origin of the realistic and scientific human geography of the nineteenth century. The history of the subject for two thousand years may, however, be interpreted as a composite of several movements: (1) the gradual accumulation of geographic *data,* and their arrangement in a form convenient for the further use of scholars; (2) the development of satisfactory methods of delimiting *natural areas*—regions—for further study; (3) the emergence and refinement of working distinctions between three different geographic problems, namely, (a) the academic task of collecting and refining the geographic *data,* (b) explaining in physical and biological terms the causal processes connecting the crust of the earth, its climate, the distribution of its natural resources, with the life, distribution, and behavior of its living inhabitants, especially its human inhabitants, and (c) the task of explaining human social organization with reference to the spatial distribution and movements of human beings and the process of communication. The last-mentioned task appears to be the only portion of the general science of human geography which falls within the province of the science of sociology, strictly defined. It is illustrated, in the primitive stage in which it now exists by Simmel's chapter on spatial relations [4] and by certain passages in von Wiese's *Beziehungslehre.*[5]

The first development which had to take place, then, in order to make possible a scientific—*i.e.,* a systematic and objective or detached—treatment of the problems of human geography was the accumulation of a sufficient quantity of reasonably

[3] *Polybius, General History of,* translated by Mr. Hampton (London, 1811), Bk. II, Chap. II, p. 67.

[4] Simmel, Georg, *Soziologie*—Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung (Leipzig, 1908), 1922, Chap. IX. See also Spykman, Nicholas J., *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel,* Chicago, 1925, Bk. II, Chap. IV.

[5] Von Wiese, Leopold, *Allgemeine Soziologie,* Vol. I, *Beziehungslehre.*

accurate geographic *information.* One has but to examine a random selection of the maps in use at any time before Columbus set out on his famous voyages, to become aware how incomplete and distorted was the knowledge men had of the geography of the world in which they were living. Not only was the whole of the earth except for a small area about the Mediterranean practically unknown to the men of the western world, but their knowledge of that restricted area was comparatively slight. The notion of collecting accurate physiographic knowledge and representing that knowledge on maps dates in the main from Ritter and Kohl, of whose work we shall speak later. All sorts of fantastic myths and legends were taken at face value by the ancients; the Elysian Fields and the entrance to Hades were indicated on their maps. Travelers' tales based on voyages to distant parts were quickly distorted out of all recognition; so that the country of the Amazons and similar wonders were regarded as actual places. Sound theories of geographic causation could not develop until men had a reasonably accurate knowledge of the facts regarding the surface of the earth and the distribution of human population and institutions upon it.

Geography Affected by Exploration. Beginning with the fifteenth century, however, the necessary data began to accumulate rapidly, as a result of the progress of exploration and discovery and the development of the art of navigation and of commerce.[6] Scholars were no longer dependent for their knowledge of remote places upon the reports of single wanderers like Marco Polo; one report could be checked against another. Instruments were being devised and improved to make possible the more accurate determination of distances, directions, altitudes, and climatic facts. Although no one thinks of consulting Alexander von Humboldt's *Cosmos* today as a source of geographic information, the publication of this survey of universal geography in the early part of the nineteenth century represented the type of advance which had to take place before the work of Ratzel and Brunhes could be done. Brunhes himself, however, credits Karl Ritter and J. G. Kohl with the contributions to systematic geographic knowl-

[6] Thomas, Franklin, *loc. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

edge which constituted the climax in this process of accumulation and organization of the data on which scientific explanations of environmental causation could be based.[7]

Objective Anthropogeographic Research. It was also during the nineteenth century, moreover, that other intellectual developments were taking place which later served as the inspiration for anthropogeographic researches of a genuinely inductive and objective character. Henry Thomas Buckle, although insufficiently provided with facts, set forth in his *History of Civilization in England* an elaborate theory of environmental influence on human history which has been a stimulus and a challenge to all his successors down to the present day. As a matter of fact, the general trend in the direction of increased objectivity and even "materialism" which characterized the developments of all the special sciences from about the time of Roger Bacon favored the construction of theories of social causation in which the conditioning influence of the factors of physical environment was frankly recognized. Until the latter Middle Ages the dominant religious ideas in the western world were such as to preclude the recognition of any sort of physical factors as forces which could affect human affairs in any important way. Theology determined in advance that man should be studied either as the possessor of "free will" in some very naïve sense of the term, or as a being whose movements were directly ordered by some higher power.[8] Darwin's formulation of the hypothesis of natural selection, finally, gave the definite clew for the construction of a doctrine by the term of which the study of man was removed, in part, from the jurisdiction of the theologians and brought within the province of natural scientists. It is significant that Huxley, the disciple and friend of Darwin, became one of the pioneers in the field of physical anthropology, a specialty which may be said to have been founded by Darwin himself with the *Descent of Man*.[8a] Once it became plausible to regard man as an

[7] Barnes, Harry Elmer, *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, p. 59.

[8] Lange, F. A., *History of Materialism;* three volumes in one, translation by Ernest Chester Thomas (1875), New York and London, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 172-73 and 175-76. See also Thomas, Franklin, *loc. cit.*, pp. 21-24.

[8a] It is significant that the title of one of Huxley's books is *Man's Place in Nature.*

animal, it was no more than reasonable to think of him as a creature whose activities were conditioned by the physical environment. Indeed, the tide set in so strongly in favor of this point of view that it has been difficult from the time of Darwin until now to secure a hearing from biologists for any theory of human behavior which is not stated solely in terms of race and biological heredity, on the one hand, and physical environment, on the other.

Environment and Heredity. The volumes of Herbert Spencer's *Synthetic Philosophy* may be seen as the source of a tendency which has been widely influential in the realm of social theory until very recently. His *Principles of Sociology* begins, significantly enough, with a survey of the "factors of social phenomena," and his list of factors is headed by "original external factors" and "original internal factors," that is, environment and heredity. At the same time, in his discussions of the derived factors and in his account of "ceremonial government" he provided some indication of the qualifications which a comprehensive social theory must impose upon the more direct explanation of human behavior in terms of heredity and environment. Spencer's elaboration of the organic analogy is also a suggestive guide to the interpretation of some of the concrete data of human geography. His discussion of the differentiation of social structure and function and the consequent increase of interdependence seems to have been chronologically the first penetrating interpretation of the division of labor, although the same general idea had occurred at about the same time to Lilienfeld and others. It is the idea of division of labor which gives the clew for the interpretation of what may be termed "the geography of civilization." The social geography and economy of primitive peoples may perhaps be explained in terms of the direct reciprocal adaptations of groups and their environments, race differences being regarded as physical adaptations to physical environments brought about through natural selection, and culture being seen as the mechanism whereby groups secure further, but still direct, adaptation of their activities to the environment, and of their environment to their own needs and limitations. Such an interpretation of the relations of primitive human groups to their physical sur-

roundings is in fact set forth in Spencer's discussion of the factors of social phenomena. The economic geography of civilization, however, becomes intelligible only when the rôle of the "geographic division of labor" and of the resulting commercial and political relations of regions and nations is taken into account. A general guide for such an analysis is just what Spencer gives us in the section of *Principles of Sociology* which he calls "The Inductions of Sociology."

As was intimated in previous paragraphs, the outstanding names in the history of human geography down to the present are those of Friedrich Ratzel and Jean Brunhes. Brunhes acknowledges his indebtedness to his teacher, Paul Vidal de la Blache, but Vidal de la Blache has left comparatively little published work; hence his contribution has been made mainly through the agency of his most distinguished pupil. The *Anthropogeographie* of Ratzel and the *Human Geography* and other writings of Brunhes constitute at the time of writing the most important literature of the subject.

Ratzel's Contributions to Human Geography. Ratzel has left us in a passage in his greatest work a clear-cut and illuminating formulation of his conception of the scope of anthropogeography.

The three Groups of Anthropogeographic Problems.—If we classify humanity with the remaining forms of life on the earth, then there can guide us in the investigation of the place of human beings on the earth, the principles which we apply in studying the distribution of plants and animals. Anthropogeography will, like plant and animal geography, describe and indicate on maps those areas where human beings are found. It will delineate as *Oekumene* the parts of the earth inhabited by human beings, and set it off from those parts from which human beings are excluded. It will investigate the distribution of human beings within the *Oekumene,* and indicate it on maps of density, settlements, and routes. And since humanity consists of races, peoples, and smaller groups, which differ from one another by nature as a result of their history, it will investigate the distribution of these differences and represent them on race maps, language maps, and political maps. . . .

The science, however, does not rest content with the answering of the question Where? It proceeds rather, when this problem is solved, to deal with the question Whence? Anthropogeography has already, in its descriptive part, found a number of cases in which phe-

nomena of the land and phenomena of the distribution of people are repeated over and over. In asking concerning every area of race and folk, How has it come to be?, it is confronted with the movements of human beings *in their dependence upon the ground.* . . .

As a third group of questions there confront us *the operations of nature upon the bodies and souls of individuals and thereby upon whole peoples.*[9]

The foregoing passage seems to show that Ratzel had, when he attempted to form for himself a definition of his field of interest, a rather naïve idea about it. Anthropogeography is for him the science which studies the distribution and movements of human beings and cultural traits for the purpose of *establishing the facts,* and which attempts to explain those facts in terms of the action of the forces of nature upon the bodies and souls of human beings. From this statement it would not appear that the development of a science of human geography had made any advances in principle since the days of the ancients; for they also sought to discover "the operations of nature upon the bodies and souls of individuals and thereby of whole peoples."

The real contribution of Ratzel, however, aside from his services in the way of assembling and systematizing facts, lies in the geographic concepts which he invented and defined. Human geography is a science, properly so-called, to the extent to which it is able to deal with the phenomena with which it concerns itself as *types* and not as unique facts or events. If the phenomena of human geography can be seen as typical, they can be explained in terms of universal forces operating in processes which are capable of generalized description. The intellectual instruments by means of which this type of analysis is accomplished are the abstract and general concepts of the science, the general terms through the use of which the phenomena in question can be described and analyzed in such a manner as to become *comparable.* Ratzel, then, defined a number of terms from the vernacular so that they could be used as technical concepts for generalizing geographic description and analysis. Among these concepts, the significance of

[9] Ratzel, Friedrich, *Anthropogeographie* (Stuttgart, 1899). Vol. I, pp. 7-78.

which he emphasized, were *position, space, boundaries, natural areas* or *regions, migration, isolation* and *communication, natural barriers, population.* Typical of his treatment of numerous topics is his distinction between natural and vicinal position or location. That any particular house, settlement, or stopping place has *position* in the sense of a fixed relation to other points, capable of representation on a map by means of which one might guide his journey to that place—this was an old idea. But that the *position* of any particular settlement could be taken as the symbol and index of the relations of the people of that community to those of all other groups was a new contribution, and one the scientific value of which we are only now beginning to realize. The same sort of value inheres in Ratzel's definition of a *boundary* as the line which marks the farthest extent of phenomena of some certain class, type, or group. Biologically, a boundary is not a physical object, it is the line which marks the range of some set of phenomena.

The concept of the *region,* the natural as contrasted with the conventional and political area, gradually came into the consciousness of geographers and sociologists, being foreshadowed, perhaps, in the writings of Ritter and Kohl, and explicitly proposed by Ratzel in *Anthropogeographie.* It is to Vidal de la Blache and Brunhes, however, that the greatest credit is due for the refinement and experimental use of this concept. Because of the importance of the regional approach, a separate chapter will be devoted to the topic in this volume. It may be noted here, however, that Brunhes' use of the concept of the region is an indication of the conception which he has of the possibilities of human geography as a true science. His idea of the scope and purpose of the science is set forth in the following passage, among others:

> Modern geography aims at the comparison and classification of phenomena, and at their explanation in the widest sense of the word. The geography of yesterday was defined as the *description of the earth;* by contrast the new geography is really the *science of the earth.* It does not content itself with merely describing the phenomena—it explains them. It studies the development of the different forces which act upon the earth, their processes, and their consequences. In the second place, it studies these different forces in their relation to each other, and the consequences of these relations . . . scientific

geography—modern geography—is dominated by two leading ideas: the idea of *activity* on the one hand and the idea of *relationship* on the other. It is no longer an inventory, it is a history. It is no longer an enumeration, it is a system. It has the double purpose of observing, classifying, and explaining the direct effects of the acting forces and the complex effects of these forces acting together.[10]

Interaction in Human Geography. This idea of interrelated activities, or in other words *interaction,* is playing a central rôle in the development of all branches of social science, as indeed in all science. The history of the differentiation of natural *science* from history and description on the one hand, and from philosophy on the other, could almost be written around the idea of interaction. The precondition of making natural phenomena intelligible, *i.e.,* predictable and controllable, is the admission of the postulate that the world may be regarded as a realm within which there operates a *natural process of interaction.* The form in which this postulate has presented itself to the geographers is shown in the following quotation from Brunhes:

> We must not restrict our study to a single order of phenomena. Even the least ambitious geographical study, to be complete, cannot be limited to mere observation of isolated facts; the earth's surface cannot be divided into isolated areas; there may be broad natural divisions, but there are no small closed fields. A single mountain does not form a whole: neither is a city an independent unit area, for it depends upon the soil upon which it rests, upon the climate which plays upon it, upon the whole vast contributing area from which it draws its subsistence and life; nor is a river an individual thing which can be considered apart from the land through which it flows. . . .
>
> We thus reach the highest thought, the thought of the terrestrial whole—the conception of terrestrial unity. The different forces do not act upon each other only under fixed condition, nor do they exert a reciprocal action only in a few definite instances. The very opposite is true, for in a manner more or less remote, in a form more or less discernible, all these forces are closely bound together because of the endless interrelations of the conditions they bring about.[11]

Recent Tendencies. Ratzel and Vidal de la Blache also emphasized the conception of terrestrial unity; in fact these

[10] Brunhes, Jean, *Human Geography* (translated by I. C. LeComte), Chicago and New York, 1920, pp. 28-29.

[11] *Ibid.,* pp. 25-26.

three great human geographers seem to regard it as the one fundamental concept upon which their science rests. Sociologists who have considered the relation of geography and the factors of physical environment to the facts of human society in which they were primarily interested have, on the other hand, tended to regard this concept as in itself a rather sterile one. Most writers who would be classified primarily as sociologists have agreed that the physical environment has to be taken into account in the explanation of human social behavior, but their general tendency has been to state the relationship of geographical environment to society as a *conditioning* one.[12] Recent sociological writers have also pointed out, however, that social organization has a spatial aspect; the study of the geographic distribution and the movements in space of human beings is seen as one avenue of approach to the study of the subtler, more psychological aspects of human society. Geographic factors condition human social process primarily on the economic side; the study of human geography is therefore for the sociologist the study particularly of economic geography, and is closely connected with the study of economic process and organization in general. The geographic facts which are of greatest interest to the sociologist are those of the distribution and movements of population, the natural areas which constitute the habitats of human groups, and the social significance of location and mobility and communication. These topics will be dealt with in later chapters.

[12] Hayes, Edward C., *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1915), pp. 22-23.

CHAPTER III

THEORIES OF POPULATION

Population Theories Before Malthus. The history of theories of population may be described as a progressive integration of originally unrelated ideas, and an evolution from rationalizations of public policies and religio-moral dogmas in the direction of objective description and explanation. Reuter has pointed out that up to the time of Malthus, discussion of population took the form, largely, of attempts to formulate population policies in the interests of States, together with laws and moral precepts calculated to carry into effect the policy favored.[1] We are indebted to Reuter also for pointing out that the historical evidence reveals a persistent conflict between private inclination and practice and public policies.[2] The lively present-day interest in the so-called "population problem" is due in considerable part to this conflict, which still exists. It has generally been held to be to the interest of the State to have a large and growing population for military reasons; a large population is taken to represent a large supply of potential fighting men. Since the beginning of our era, the predominant religious belief has tended to support the same policy, although for essentially different reasons. The prevalent moral viewpoint of Christianity has been that which regards the physical appetites as bad; goodness is held to consist in restraining behavior which seems to arise directly from the appetites, and substituting some form of behavior calculated to fit the person for entrance into some transcendent, "spiritual" realm in which there is neither marrying nor giving in marriage. From this attitude it follows that any working scheme of population restriction, since in practice it would involve the indulgence of the sex appetite without the assumption of the natural physio-

[1] Reuter, E. B., *Population Problems* (1923), Chap. III.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 45.

logical consequences, has always been condemned by the Church. The Church has also favored fruitful marriages on the ground that a maximum birth-rate means the maximum of souls to be saved. Throughout the period which, for convenience, we may date from Plato to Malthus, States were forced to recognize, from time to time during intervals of peace, the existence of a surplus of population relative to the resources of the territory, a situation most commonly met by colonization or by military aggression against neighboring States. The latter remedy for temporary surplus of population had the added merit of consistency with a theory of the State based on the assumption that the native citizenship are a superior people, who ought to inherit the earth. Thus, while Plato and Aristotle saw the possibility of a surplus of population, and advocated control of numbers with reference to an ideal size, not too large and not too small, the predominant motive determining the long-run population policy of Western States before Malthus was that of maintaining a force of soldiers for use in time of war.

The rise of a number of great national States and the growth of commerce at the close of the Middle Ages led to the development of new political and economic doctrines, also to some unconscious revision of theologically grounded moral ideas. In the discussion of these matters the question of population naturally became involved, although at first it did not occupy a prominent place.[3] The Mercantilistic economic theory, centered in the idea of enriching the State through commerce and the exportation of manufactured goods, preserved the long-standing idea that a large and growing population is desirable, since to the Mercantilists population signified not only potential soldiers, but workers who could be employed in producing goods for export. On the other hand, when the Physiocrats came forward with the theory that the production of wealth depends fundamentally upon agriculture, economic thought was restated with reference to premises from which the danger of overpopulation could be inferred. It came to appear that agricultural production could not be expanded indefinitely; hence there

[3] Carr-Saunders, A. M., *The Population Problem:* A study in human population (Oxford, 1922), pp. 23-25. Reuter, *loc. cit.*, pp. 48-54.

must be some maximum beyond which the increase of the population of a country ought not to go. It was in fact essentially on this doctrine that Malthus founded his famous principle of population.

What the work of Malthus represents is an attack upon the problem of population from a newer, more detached and scientific point of view.[4] From this point of view, the problem of population is a question of the relation of size and density of population to the factors of physical environment. The question is, not what ought to be the population policy of the State and the Church? but what relation is there, if any, between the size and distribution of the population of a nation—or of the earth—and the facts of geographic environment. To this question, a series of answers have been proposed since the late eighteenth century, each of them based in part on the preceding ones.

Thomas Malthus. The population theory of Thomas Malthus is the point of departure for most discussions of the matter to this day. His doctrine is usually summarized briefly in the proposition, population presses upon subsistence. For a more detailed statement, we may refer to his own words:

> The ultimate check to population appears to be a want of food, arising necessarily from the different ratios according to which population and food increase. But this ultimate check is never the immediate check, except in cases of actual famine.
>
> The immediate check may be stated to consist in all those customs, and all those diseases, which seem to be generated by a scarcity of the means of subsistence; and all those causes, independent of this scarcity, whether of a moral or physical nature, which tend prematurely to weaken and destroy the human frame.
>
> These checks to population, which are constantly operating with more or less force in every society, and keep down the number to the level of the means of subsistence, may be classed under two heads, the positive and preventive checks. . . .
>
> The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include every cause, whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree contributes to shorten the natural duration of human life. Under this head, therefore, may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations,

[4] The most readable recent statement of the population problem, one which is very sympathetic in its presentation of the original theory of Malthus, is the volume entitled *Mankind at the Crossroads,* by E. M. East (New York, 1923).

severe labor and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine.

On examining these obstacles to the increase of population which I have classed under the head of preventive and positive checks, it will appear that they are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery.

Of the preventive checks, the restraint from marriage which is not followed by irregular gratifications may properly be termed moral restraint. (Footnote reads, in part: "By moral restraint I would be understood to mean a restraint from marriage from prudential motives, with a conduct strictly moral during the period of this restraint; and I have never intentionally deviated from this sense.")

Promiscuous intercourse, unnatural passions, violations of the marriage bed, and improper arts to conceal the consequences of irregular connections, are preventive checks that clearly come under the head of vice.[5]

Population and Food Supply. The writings of Malthus on population provoked of course a great deal of discussion, and of criticism from every possible point of view. The most obvious opportunity for unfavorable criticism of his theory was that afforded by his most fundamental premise, that concerning the relative capacities for increase of human population and the means of subsistence. It is not clear from his own writings that Malthus meant to base his argument, fundamentally, upon any more specific thesis than that the possibility of increasing the supply of the fundamental means of subsistence—*i.e.,* the food supply—is not unlimited; while there is given in the nature of the biological process of reproduction the possibility of an unlimited increase of the human population. If these propositions be granted, it follows so obviously as to amount to tautology that something must prevent population from realizing its theoretic maximum possibilities of increase. Malthus sought, however, to state some more definite hypothesis regarding the relation between the capacities for increase shown by the food supply and the population, respectively. The hypothesis which he formulated is alluded to in the reference to "the different ratios according to which population and food increase" in the foregoing quotation.

[5] *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (Everyman's Edition, reprinted from the seventh edition), Bk. I, Chap. II.

Population, he suggested, has the fundamental capacity, under favorable circumstances, for increase at a geometric ratio; food supply, during successive equal time intervals, can be increased only at an arithmetic ratio. The point concerning the theoretic possibility of a geometric increase of the population was probably well taken; the proposition that food supply could be increased only at an arithmetic ratio proved vulnerable under criticism.

Ricardo's Theory of Rent. Probably the first qualification of the theory of Malthus to be clearly formulated was effected by Ricardo and his successors in the so-called classical and Austrian schools of economic thought, in the form of the now familiar theory of diminishing return. This is, in effect, a more precise and at the same time more realistic statement of a condition which natural forces impose upon the increase of the annual food production of a country—or of the world. Ricardo pointed out that as the food production of a region is expanded, it is the most fertile and most accessible fields which are brought under cultivation first, and that after a certain minimum of efficiency has been passed, a greater output can be had only at the cost of a greater expenditure of labor per unit of output, a proposition which would tend to hold whether the added output was secured by bringing poorer or less accessible fields under cultivation, or by more intensive cultivation of the lands already used.[6] That this "law of diminishing return," or "Ricardian theory of rent," as it is variously termed, embodies a truth has not been seriously denied since it was first formulated. It was soon pointed out, however, that *historically* it does not appear to hold, any more than does Malthus' theory of the "arithmetic ratio." During the last century the world's production of food has expanded at a prodigious rate, and the population—of certain regions in particular—has expanded proportionately.

Population and the "State of the Industrial Arts." The study of these facts by economists—loosely speaking by those who are known as the "institutional economists"—led to the formulation of another qualification of the original theory of Malthus, usually expressed in terms of a given "state of the in-

[6] Ricardo, David, *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.*

dustrial arts." If some fundamental improvement is made in the arts of production, it is said, there is made possible an expansion in the total production of the world or of a given country which is not governed by the principle formulated by Malthus nor by the law of diminishing return, but a more careful analysis readily shows that the principle of increasing return applies, in general, only to manufacturing and transportation, not to any significant degree to the basic extractive industries including agriculture. It is theoretically possible by the application of machine methods, the use of artificial power, and by methods of large-scale production generally, to effect all the manipulative and transportative operations necessary to the production of commodities for the satisfaction of human wants with a relatively small amount of labor, and thus, in effect, to release labor for use in agriculture. Machine methods and the devices of large-scale production cannot be used, however, to effect any great economy of labor in the fundamental operations of agriculture. In any event there is a calculable theoretic maximum production of foodstuffs of which the surface of the earth is capable, and this maximum can be approached only at the cost of the reduction of standards of living to a subsistence minimum, and the lengthening of the working day and year to a maximum.[7] Still, during the historic period when the possibilities of large-scale methods and the applications of the discoveries of natural science to practical tasks of production are being worked out, it is clearly necessary to add to the revised Malthusian theory some reference to the "state of the industrial arts." In other words, the analysis of the process in which population and physical environment interact reveals, in addition to the two originally postulated sets of factors, a third, which is neither exclusively an organic tendency nor yet an original environmental factor but a product of their interaction, a cultural factor, which may be looked upon either as a modification of the tendencies of the human species or as a progressive modification effected in the environment which was assumed to limit the growth of the species. The actual size and growth tendency, if any, of a given population, is then

[7] East, *loc. cit., passim;* see especially Chap. IV, "Population and Food Supply."

seen as the result of the interplay of the three factors: the group of living, reproducing beings, the physical environment, and the technology through the use of which the group effects so far as possible the realization of the wishes of its members.

Populations and Standards of Living. There was already implicit in the Malthusian essay, however, another qualification of the fundamental theses which the author laid down. The tendency of the group population to increase up to the limits set by the subsistence capacity of its physical environment is held in check, as Malthus himself pointed out, not only through the death rate, but through the birth rate, which does not as a rule equal the theoretic maximum of which it is capable. Later writers have pointed out what is shown in fact by the material which Malthus himself collected,[8] that both death rates and birth rates are affected by the standard of living of the family, class, or other social group in question.[9] Families with high standards of living will tend to limit their increase by limiting the birth of children, though not exclusively by means of the "moral restraint" which Malthus advocated. Where standards of living are low, the birth rate tends to be relatively unrestricted, and the increase of population is checked through the death rate—the "positive check." We shall recur to this line of analysis in a later paragraph; here we mention it as a preface to the theory of Francis A. Walker.

Walker's Theory of Immigration. General Walker, who was particularly interested in concrete American problems, became interested in the study of the actual growth of the population of the United States, as shown by the successive decennial censuses.[10] He was struck by the fact that the *rate* of increase displayed through the earliest decades of the nineteenth century was not exceeded in later decades, in spite of the fact that there was an enormous immigration into the country from Europe during the later decades. His interpretation of these

[8] The famous *Essay* is composed largely of factual materials gathered by Malthus to support his theoretic propositions.

[9] Bushee, F. A., *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1923), Chaps. XIX and XX.

[10] Walker, Francis A., *Economics and Statistics* (New York, 1899), Vol. II, pp. 421-26. Summarized in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), pp. 538-43; also in other volumes.

facts, briefly stated, was that there was a certain relatively constant tendency of the population to increase—up to some limit at any rate—and that immigration had little effect on this rate of increase. Natives of this country, clinging to their standards of living, which they could not maintain at the wages which immigrants were willing to accept, postponed marriage and restricted their numbers in other ways rather than accept the lowering in their scale of life which would be involved in marrying and having children in the face of this new competition. The net result of this reaction was that the foreign immigration left the total population of the country about what it would have been had the immigration not taken place; the immigrants and their children had, in effect, displaced a certain proportion of the native stock which would otherwise exist. Walker's statement of this theory has been well-nigh as fruitful in the way of provoking discussion and criticism in this country as was the original essay of Malthus in the first few decades after its appearance. There can be little doubt that the widespread familiarity of scholars, statesmen, and educated people generally with Walker's theory, either directly or through the reading of later writings based on it, was largely instrumental in promoting the passage of the recent laws restricting immigration into the United States. It was doubtless inevitable that some effort to restrict foreign immigration would be made sooner or later, but it is scarcely thinkable that so radical a type of legislation should have been enacted with so little struggle, had not the way for it been prepared by the widespread effect of conscious and unconscious propaganda based on Walker's writings.

Vidal de la Blache. Walker's contribution to the theory of population tends to call attention to a phase of the population problem which was not much emphasized in earlier discussions of the matter,—the geographic aspect. Neither the earlier writers on population as a socio-economic problem nor the geographers who wrote before the middle of the nineteenth century seem to have been much impressed by the fact that population is very unevenly distributed over the land surface of the globe. It was long taken for granted, of course, that there were vast areas near the poles, high up on the mountain

ranges, and in the great deserts which were unfit for human habitation; many writers took it for granted without much discussion that regions existed which were fit only for the dwelling places of inferior races of human beings. The latter was in fact a feature of the orthodox attitude of the classical Greek writers toward the "barbarians." [11] It was left for the most part to Vidal de la Blache, however, to point out that in the uneven density of the population of the inhabited portions of the globe there was material for scientific investigation and analysis. At the beginning of the first main chapter in the posthumous manuscript, *Principles of Human Geography,* which one of his students has edited, Vidal de la Blache placed the following sentences: "In order to understand the relationships between earth and man, the first question to be answered is this: how is population distributed over the surface of the earth? Or, to be more exact, how dense is population in different regions?" [12]

When it came to the explanation of the facts of population density which he surveyed, Vidal de la Blache and his student and principal successor, Jean Brunhes, found materials already prepared for incorporation in their writings, thanks to the studies of economists who had more or less unconsciously worked on the same problem. In the light of the many researches which have been made by geographers, historians, political scientists, and economists, it is not difficult to state the most general principles which must be used in interpreting the facts of population density. The distribution of the human race over the earth is determined, first and in the earlier stages of cultural evolution, by the natural resources and climate of the different regions and by the modes of exploitation employed by the inhabitants of the regions. As the industrial arts develop and as exploration and communication and commerce extend, the most dense concentrations of population are no longer the direct results of the distribution of natural resources, but are the outcome of the aggregation of industry into large establishments and of the latter in great industrial towns, and of the concentration of commercial functions in metropolitan centers.

[11] Thomas, Franklin, *Environmental Basis of Society,* pp. 30-40.
[12] *Loc. cit.* (1926), p. 27.

The mechanism by which this elaborate structure of modern economic life is developed and perpetuated has been intensively studied and vividly described by writers on political economy and economic history.[13]

Population Regions. Vidal de la Blache has devised a concept which defines a point of view from which the more direct and elementary determinations of population density can be studied, the concept of the *mode of life,* or *species of life:*

> From what has been said it is apparent how close a relationship exists between density of population and modes of life. It is not enough to say in a general way that each mode of life has its own space requirements which are larger for the hunter or shepherd than for the agriculturist,—though this question is still a live issue today and fully as urgent as ever in the American West, in Australia and on the borders of the Tell and of the Sahara. As a matter of fact, every special occupation, every slightest change in modes of living, all progress and every change in economic relationships between nations have their effect on population. . . .
>
> It is particularly true with regard to population, that geographical causes act upon man only through the medium of social phenomena,—one explanation of the ebb and flow which has occurred in the past.[14]

Brunhes has supplied a term which suggests the point of view for the study of the determination of population density in the more evolved stage, the term *Verkehrsgebiete* or trade regions.[15] He also points out that the regions or natural areas into which the world may be divided can be classified into three types, exporting areas, importing areas, and transit regions. Probably this latter classification cannot be sustained without some qualifications; modern economists are never weary of pointing out that in general and in the long run, a given area must export as much as it imports, measured in current market values, and must import as much as it exports. It has been shown, however, by various writers, including Brunhes, that a region exporting foodstuffs and raw materials will tend to have a population per square mile not exceeding some limit, which limit, to be sure, is for us at present indeterminate. A

[13] See, for example, Gras, N. S. B., *Introduction to Economic History;* Bücher, Karl, *Industrial Evolution;* Sombart, Werner, *The Quintessence of Capitalism;* Hammond, J. L. and Barbara, *The Rise of Modern Industry.*

[14] *Loc. cit.,* pp. 155-57.

[15] Brunhes, Jean, *Human Geography,* translated by I. C. LeComte, p. 217.

region, on the other hand, which imports a considerable proportion of the raw materials and foodstuffs consumed by its inhabitants and exports manufactured goods may have a very dense population; while the empirical generalization, at any rate, would seem to be that an area the inhabitants of which are supported, essentially, by the wages and profits of the commercial functions which they perform for the rest of the world, tends to have the largest population in proportion to area of all the types. It is no doubt this threefold distinction which Brunhes was seeking to lay the theoretic foundation for in the passage just referred to.

Population and Social Differentiation. What the foregoing paragraphs tend to reveal, as regards the history and trend of population theory, is that it is in process of transformation from a single, rather simple hypothesis calculated to explain poverty and to afford reinforcement to the gospel of thrift and individualism, characteristic of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, into a relatively complex theory of social differentiation. Vidal de la Blache, Brunhes, and others have shown how population evolves toward an equilibrium with reference to the physical environment through the differentiation of economic functions—frequently termed the "geographic division of labor"—and through variation in density. As soon, however, as the theory of population is conceived as a theory of social differentiation, the way is opened for a further development of the theory. When you see population growth and adaptation to physical environment as something which takes place differentially, it is a natural step to the investigation of the differential operation of the factors determining population growth or constancy in different groups—the differential operation of birth and death rates.

It was already implicitly recognized in Malthus' essay that birth and death rates vary from class to class within a national population, also from one region to another. Ripley brought together and analyzed statistics of births for different regions and racial groups of western Europe.[16] The same thought is implicit in Walker's analysis of the relation of immigration into the United States to the growth of the native population.

[16] Ripley, Wm. Z., *The Races of Europe*, 515 ff.

In modern economic writings it has been brought out more and more clearly that the progressive adaptation of population to environment involves an elaborate differentiation into territorial groups and into social classes; and that the process in which equilibrium is approached or maintained involves a competitive division of labor among these groups. Standards of living have, as we have already seen, a significant relation to birth rates, death rates, and the resultant increase, decrease or constancy of numbers in a given group, but standards of living vary from locality to locality, and, most conspicuously of all, from one social class or stratum to another. The economists, however, through their analysis of the process by which wages and other incomes are determined, have shown that the relation between the numbers—*i.e.*, the population—of a given social class and the average or normal standard of living prevailing in that class is a *reciprocal* one.[17] The standard of living affects the birth rate and the death rate, and thereby it determines to a considerable extent the numbers of those composing that class. But the total number of those making up that class is a measure of the total supply of the general grade of labor which is available in that national market, and the supply of labor becomes the principal circumstance determining the wage it receives, and, therefore, the standard of living which members of that group are able to maintain. Of course the latter propositions will hold good only for a stage in the history of civilization characterized by the wide extension of competition and exchange, not for a stage in which wages and standards are determined more or less independently in each local area, commerce of the local area with the world outside being too insignificant to affect materially its internal affairs. The theoretic analysis of this last-mentioned aspect of the matter will be surveyed in later chapters of the present volume.

The Curve of Population Growth. By far the most subtle and sophisticated contributions to the general theory of population which have been made in recent years are those of Raymond Pearl. Starting from the actual available data of

[17] For a representative statement, see Edie, Lionel D., *Economics: Principles and Problems* (New York, 1926), pp. 353-58. F. W. Taussig and Thos. Nixon Carver have set forth the same doctrine in earlier publications.

population growth, birth rates, and death rates, on the one hand, and from the more obvious postulates of Neo-Malthusianism, Pearl has employed mathematical and biometric methods in the effort to obtain as accurate a statement as possible of the general laws of population growth as limited by the ultimate factors of physical environment.[18] Pearl's conclusions may be stated briefly and in nonmathematical terms as follows: The long-run tendency of any population unit, large or small, may be represented by a curve which, starting from zero or from a previously established stationary level which represents the supporting capacity of the physical environment of that group at the then stage of its culture—productive technique and standard of living,—rises at first slowly, then at an increasing rate, then at a decreasing rate as the curve approaches an upper asymptote which represents the total supporting capacity of the environment at the present stage of cultural development. For the population of the world as a whole, however, there is, as East has also pointed out, an absolute upper limit, determined by the maximum capacity of the surface of the globe for producing foodstuffs, a capacity which, in the last analysis, is independent, essentially, of the improvement of techniques of production. Pearl has computed the equation of such a curve and believes it can be used to predict the future growth or stability of the population of a given area with considerable accuracy over a period of a century or two. As the time for which a prediction is attempted increases, the probable accuracy and reliability of the prediction naturally diminishes. The principal service rendered to students of general social theory by Pearl is, perhaps, to have expressed the general tendency of population growth in a form which makes the principles involved easiest to grasp. Incidentally, his papers contain many suggestions concerning the relation of population growth to standards of living, and the differential rates of increase of various groups in a population.

[18] Professor Pearl's contributions to the theory of population have for the most part been published originally as articles in various scientific periodicals. They have been brought together, however, in three volumes, *The Biology of Death* (Philadelphia, 1922); *Studies in Human Biology* (Baltimore, 1924), and *The Biology of Population Growth* (Baltimore, 1925). The *Studies in Human Biology* constitute a collection of the most technical and most fundamental papers.

Up to this point, we have considered the subject of population as if it had been discussed in terms of quality only. For a half-century past, however, the literature dealing with the subject has embodied suggestions to the effect that between the different elements which make up the population of the earth there were not only quantitative and cultural differences, but qualitative differences, racial and individual. In so far as this is the case, it has been argued, the study of population must pay attention to quality as well as to quantitative equilibration. Darwin's natural selection hypothesis, which was suggested to him according to his own story from the reading of Malthus' *Essay on Population,* became in turn the starting-point for the formation of a theory which lends support to the idea of qualitative differentiation in a population. Down to date, the principal fruits of this idea have been two: the eugenics movement and the revival of racial consciousness. The eugenics movement has been led by several persons who think of themselves particularly as the successors of Darwin, including Karl Pearson and Major Leonard Darwin.[19] They, like other students of population, have been interested in differential birth and death rates, but since to them the tendency to shrinking numbers in the upper strata of the population is in general a tendency to the replacement of the qualitatively superior elements by inferior ones, they view the process with greater alarm, on the whole, than do those who see in differential growth tendencies of different classes of the population only a tendency for the standard of living to be crowded down, *i.e.,* for classes with superior standards to be progressively replaced by those with lower standards. The eugenicists derive from their doctrines a twofold propaganda; they advocate segregation and sterilization of the obviously unfit elements in a population, and they would like to see ways and means devised to encourage the reproduction of the superior elements in the total population. The outlook of the enthusiasts for race is very similar to that of the eugenicists; indeed they are often the same persons, but the former group of propagandists see in the operation of population tendencies the danger that the

[19] For a representative recent presentation of the eugenic point of view, see Popenoe, Paul and Johnson, R. H., *Applied Eugenics* (New York, 1918).

Nordic or Teutonic race, held to be in some sense a superior race, will be displaced by other racial groups.[20]

The subject of race, however, has occupied a prominent place in the field of social theory in the past, and we shall need a separate chapter to survey the development and trend of theories of race.

[20] The best-known statement of this attitude is Madison Grant's *The Passing of a Great Race*. Other writers on the same theme are Lothrop Stoddard and Wm. McDougall.

CHAPTER IV

RACE AND NATIONALITY

Ancient Theories. Until the nineteenth century, race differences were taken for granted, if not emphasized, in discussions of theoretic and practical social problems. The attitude of classical Greeks toward the "barbarians" has become proverbial, as has likewise the familiar argument by Aristotle that some peoples are slaves by nature. The development by Alexander the Great, and subsequently with more enduring success by the Romans, of an empire which included, at least theoretically, all of the known world, provided the historical background for a different view of race differences, a view which is definitely implied in the later Roman policy of extending the benefits of Roman citizenship to conquered peoples. Cæsar and Tacitus embodied in their chronicles certain observations regarding the manners and customs of the tribes living north of the empire. The circumstances of the Roman imperial period, however, were not such as to produce important contributions to social theory, save in the one field of legal theory. Medieval Europe, therefore, inherited from Rome no very significant doctrines regarding the races of man other than those transmitted from the Greeks. The teachings of primitive Christianity, with their stress upon the common fatherhood of God and the implied brotherhood of all men, were apparently opposed to the development of any social theory which should greatly emphasize race differences. St. Paul, however, had once advised a slave to return to his master,[1] and the whole tenor of the Pauline teachings was such as to afford a basis for the theory of status which became a feature of Christianity so soon as it became the state religion of the Empire. We may for convenience trace from the writings of St. Augustine the theory of the medieval church that it is the duty of Christians

[1] Letter to Philemon, vers. 10-18; see also Ephesians VI: 5-8.

to be content in the station in life to which God has ordained them, and, while this had no direct bearing on the question of race, it was a general point of view which operated against the doctrine that all men are equals and brothers. The demands of the latter conception were on the whole held to be satisfied by the giving of alms to the needy and by the temporal authority of the Pope over the whole of Christendom.

The Doctrine of Status. To be sure, the policy of the medieval church seems to embody a profound discrimination between the peoples of Christendom and all other peoples. In fact, however, the non-Christianized peoples were theoretically divided by ecclesiastical writers into two categories, the infidels and the heathen. Jews and Mohammedans, having knowledge of the gospel and yet not accepting it, were infidels, and to oppose them in every way was a Christian duty. Other non-Christian peoples were, in general, regarded as "heathen"; it was the business of the Church to propagandize them and bring them into the fold as rapidly as possible; they were potential children of God and brothers in the faith. The discrimination against the infidels, be it noted, was not based on any theoretic assumptions regarding their racial characteristics, but rather upon a theory of moral responsibility.

Montesquieu. Montesquieu, writing in the first half of the eighteenth century, pointed out very clearly that peoples differ from one another in "spirit" and in customs and manners, and that these differences are important and fundamental; rulers will be well advised to take account of them in devising laws for their people.[2] Although he did not discuss the question of the origin of these differences between peoples at length, Montesquieu seems to have believed them to be due to climatic differences.

> If it be true that the character of the mind and the passions of the heart are extremely different in different climates, the laws ought to be relative both to the difference of those passions, and to the difference of those characters.[2a]

In a later passage, however, there is some indication that the author appreciated the force of the point made by later writers,

[2] *The Spirit of the Laws,* Bk. XIV, *passim.*
[2a] *Loc. cit.,* Bk. XIV, Chap. I.

that cultural peculiarities, once established, tend to perpetuate themselves:

> Men are influenced by various causes, by the climate, the religion, the laws, the maxims of government, by precedents, morals and customs, from whence is formed a general spirit, which takes its rise from these.
>
> In proportion, as in every nation any one of these causes acts with more force, the others in the same degree become weak. Nature and the climate rule almost alone over the savages; customs govern the Chinese; the laws tyrannise in Japan; morals had formerly all their influence at Sparta; maxims of government, and the ancient simplicity of manners once prevailed at Rome.[2b]

One could almost imagine himself to be reading something written in the opening years of the twentieth century. It does not appear, however, that these observations of Montesquieu became the foundation for the further study of racial or national differences by his immediate successors. It was another aspect of his work which drew the attention of his contemporaries, as he probably intended it should.

Influence of Biology on Ideas of Race: Linnaeus. Perhaps the earliest impulse to the study of the human race question in a spirit of systematic and objective investigation came from the monumental contribution made by Linnæus to the nomenclature and the taxonomic phase of biological science, in the eighteenth century. When naturalists undertook the task of classifying all living organisms into genera and species, it was perfectly natural and inevitable that the attempt should be made to bring man within the scope of the system of classification proposed. A case could easily be made out for the assertion that it was Linnæus rather than Darwin who was originally responsible for the struggle of science with theology over the question of man's place in nature. If man can be classified in the Linnæan system, the inference that he is after all an animal is apparently inescapable. Be that as it may, the attempt to find a place for man in the Linnæan system at once raised the question of the unity of the human stock. Linnæus himself held that there was but one living human species—*Homo sapiens*—and that the so-called races of men were

[2b] *Loc. cit.*, Bk. XIV, Chaps. IV and V.

simply varieties or sub-species. This judgment was soon called into question; various nineteenth-century writers predicated the existence of a plurality of living human species, naming *Homo africanus,* for example, as a separate species from the white race, *Homo sapiens.*[3] Throughout the nineteenth century and down to the present time, a lively controversy has been waged concerning the criteria by which the races of man should be distinguished, the hereditary character and the possibility of modification of race differences, the monogenetic or polygenetic origin of the human genus, and, most interesting but most elusive of all, the differences in temperament and learning capacity, if any, which can be correlated with physical race differences.

The Philological Approach to the Problem of Race. An interesting but confusing element in the development of theories of race is what may be termed the philological episode. During the nineteenth century Germany became the principal seat of a very flourishing school of philologists—scholars who interested themselves in comparative and historical linguistics. So fascinating were the methods of analysis and deduction which they devised, that it was no more than was to be expected that the discussion of the question of human races should be affected by the philological point of view. For some decades it was frankly asserted by many scholars that language relations were the criteria of common ancestry, *i.e.,* of race. Working from philological evidence, nineteenth-century writers filled massive volumes with discussion of the Aryan race, the Celtic race, and similar postulated racial groups, the unity of which was inferred from demonstrable linguistic affinities. Thus we find R. G. Latham asserting, in a volume published in 1850, that philological characters are the most valuable of all characters for the purposes of classification:

> Ethnological classification deals with connexion in the way of descent and affiliation only. It has no such object as the arrangement of individuals or classes according to any common physical or moral characteristics, except in so far as these indicate community of

[3] For a late nineteenth-century statement of this opinion, see Le Bon, Gustav, *The Psychology of Peoples* (London, 1898), Bk. I, Chap. I.

origin. Facts used as signs or characteristics, and as such, mostly applied to the purposes of classification, are either physical or moral—physical, as when we determine a class from colour of the skin; moral, as when we determine one from the purity or impurity of the habits. Moral characteristics are either philological (*i.e.,* connected with the language), or non-philological (*i.e.,* not so connected). As elements of classification, the non-philological, moral, characters are of less value than the philological; since common conditions develop common habits; whereas nothing but imitation determines the use of similar combinations of articulate sounds in different languages. In the way, too, of physical characteristics, common conditions develop common points of conformation. Hence, as elements of classification, physical characters are of less value than the philological moral ones.[4]

Twenty-five years later, there is evidence that the influence of the philological method upon the study of races had greatly weakened, as is shown by the following passage from a treatise on the races of man by Oscar Peschel:

> It is true that a family likeness in language, or even a close analogy, is no infallible proof of a common bodily pedigree. . . . Yet identity or family likeness in language unquestionably proves that all nations included in it must once have been united by a social tie.[5]

Gumplowicz. The publication and widespread circulation of Darwin's *Origin of Species* and *Descent of Man* operated, of course, to add fresh fuel to the flames of the race controversy, and the closing years of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth witnessed the appearance of a number of books presenting systematic classifications, upon various bases, of the races of man. Ludwig Gumplowicz, generally regarded as one of the founders of modern sociology, based his theory of the social process largely on the assumption of race differences. It has, of course, been obvious to later commentators that Gumplowicz was simply seeking to rationalize the situation in which he found himself, a participant as an Austrian Pole, representative of a racial minority in a polyglot state.[5a] The preponderance of opinion among mod-

[4] Latham, R. G., *The Natural History of the Varieties of Man* (London, 1850), pp. 561-62.

[5] Peschel, Oscar, *The Races of Man and Their Geographical Distribution* (London, 1876), pp. 28-29.

[5a] See Lichtenberger, James P., *Development of Social Theory,* pp. 432-36.

ern writers seems to favor the view that there is but one human species, of monogenetic origin.[6] It is still held to be self-evident, however, that the hereditary differences between the human races are not only substantial, but socially significant. This opinion is in fact the basis of a great deal of racial propaganda which has been published in England and the United States within the latest ten or fifteen years, and which will form the topic of a later paragraph.

The "Folk Psychology" Movement. With the development of "folk psychology" and cultural anthropology by Lazarus, Steinthal, Wundt, Bastian, and Ratzel, emphasis was laid upon the demonstrable fact that nationalities or peoples might be sharply distinguishable from one another on the basis of cultural differences, without being of distinct racial composition. Since the development of this method of approach to the subject, the controversy over the importance of race differences has taken the form largely of a debate between those who believe that the more radical cultural differences between different peoples must be explained by reference to underlying racial differences, and those who are on the whole disposed to deny the necessity of this resort to racial explanations of cultural differences, holding that cultural differences are self-perpetuating and self-explanatory. Wm. Z. Ripley's scholarly work on the *Races of Europe* did much to clarify this discussion in so far as it relates to European peoples, but did not directly contribute to our knowledge of race differences which are marked by differences in skin color. Madison Grant, J. W. Gregory, Lothrop Stoddard, and Wm. McDougall have written volumes which have been very widely read in England and the United States, and which reaffirm the social importance of these differences between the races of Europe which Ripley summarized.[7] On the other hand, Professor Boas has re-

[6] For a recent statement of the contrary point of view, and a review of the evidence on the whole question, see Dixon, Roland B., *The Racial History of Man* (New York and London, 1923), *passim;* see especially pp. 503-05.

[7] Grant, Madison, *The Passing of a Great Race* (New York, 1916); Gregory, J. W., *The Menace of Colour;* Stoddard, Lothrop, *The Rising Tide of Colour* (New York, 1920); McDougall, Wm., *The Group Mind* (New York and London, 1920); *Is America Safe for Democracy?* (New York, 1921). For a review of the whole question, and, in general, of the literature more briefly reviewed in this chapter, see Hankins, F. H., *The Racial Basis of Civilization* (New York, 1926).

iterated from time to time during the past twenty years the evidence for the modifiability of traits ordinarily taken as criteria of race, even physical traits.[8]

Recent Studies of National Culture Traits. By the title of his volume on *Race Prejudice,* Jean Finot had at least suggested the possibility of studying the content and origin of inter-racial attitudes. It has been the perception of the possibilities of an objective study of race prejudice and race friction as such, and also the material and method provided by the cultural anthropologists, which have afforded a starting-point for the work of W. I. Thomas, Florian Znaniecki, Robert E. Park, Herbert A. Miller, and that of students influenced by them. Thomas and Znaniecki's massive work, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* has served as the pattern for a number of studies of the actual processes which are set in motion when peoples of differing manners, customs, and appearance come into contact with each other. These studies, by revealing the origin of many popular notions about race differences, have tended to modify those notions. A somewhat similar effect has been produced by the work of a number of writers who were interested primarily in questions of international politics. Together with other writers who were motivated by more philosophical and scientific interests, these men have made studies of particular cases of nationalistic and cultural revivals, such as those which have taken place among the Polish, the Irish, and various peoples of the Near East in recent times. Very recently, a similar movement in China has attracted the attention of students of social theory, as well as diplomats and politicians. L. Bernhard published in 1910 an interesting book called *Das Polnische Gemeinwesen im preussischen Staat,* which is typical of literature of this class. In this volume the author describes the process by which the Poles, who cannot be regarded as a race in the biological sense, developed under the leadership of their nobles a more and more effective sense of nationality to withstand the Germanizing efforts of the Prussian government in the closing years of the nineteenth and

[8] Boas, Franz, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York, 1911); "The Question of Racial Purity," *American Mercury,* Vol. III (October, 1924), pp. 163-69. "What Is a Race?", *The Nation,* Vol. CXX (January 28, 1925), pp. 89-91.

the opening years of the twentieth century.[9] What seems to be shown by the literature dealing with the sentiment of nationality as seen in relation to the social situations in which it arises, is that such sentiments are latent or present to a certain degree in any people which is separated from its neighbors by marked cultural differences. If because of circumstances arising, for instance, out of rival economic interests, such groups come into more or less active conflict with their neighbors, they will probably develop attitudes of prejudice and antagonism quite similar in every way to the attitude which we know as "race" prejudice.[10]

The "Negro Problem" in American Race Theory. In the United States, interest in questions of race and nationality has been strongly determined by the imminence of certain concrete situations—namely, the presence within the country of unassimilable Negro and Asiatic minorities, and the economic and political friction occasioned by the large, and until recently increasing, tide of immigration from Europe. Attempts to rationalize and defend particular attitudes and policies arising out of this situation have brought about the great popularity of writings embodying the theory of Nordic superiority, on the one hand, and the attempts of such writers as E. B. Reuter and F. H. Hankins to deal with the matter in a more disinterested fashion and to expose the fallacies of the Nordic "myth," on the other hand.[11]

The "Race Relations Cycle." The whole subject of race differences and race prejudice has been surveyed by Robert E. Park and others with reference particularly to the rôle of the Oriental peoples on the Pacific coast of North America.[12] The points emphasized in these papers are (1) the relation of eco-

[9] For an English account of the same case, see Thomas, W. I., "The Polish-Prussian Situation: An Experiment in Assimilation," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XIX (1913-14), pp. 624-39.

[10] Young, Erle Fiske, "What is Race Prejudice?", *Journal of Applied Sociology,* Vol. X (November-December, 1925), pp. 135-40. Park, Robert E., "The Concept of 'Social Distance,'" *Journal of Applied Sociology,* Vol. VIII (July-August, 1924), pp. 339-44.

[11] Hankins, F. H., *op. cit.* Reuter, E. B., *The American Race Problem* (New York, 1927); *The Mulatto* (Boston, 1918).

[12] The preliminary report of the survey is presented in the form of the major articles making up the May, 1926, number of *Survey Graphic,* which was prepared under the editorial supervision of Professor Park.

nomic competition to race friction and race prejudice; (2) the significance of conspicuous physical differences, such as those of color, as symbols with reference to which prejudices become stereotyped and strengthened; and (3) the tendency of the inter-racial processes set in motion by new contacts to pass through a more or less predictable cycle. Park has attempted to reduce the cycle of race relations to expression in the form of a rather simple formula:

> The impression which emerges from this review of international and race relations is that the forces which have brought about the existing interpenetration of peoples are so vast and irresistible that the resulting changes assume the character of a cosmic process. New means of communication enforce new contacts and result in new forms of competition and conflict. But out of this confusion and ferment, new and more intimate forms of association arise. . . . Everywhere there is competition and conflict; but everywhere the intimacies which participation in a common life enforces have created new accommodations, and relations which were merely formal or utilitarian have become personal and human.
>
> In the relations of races, there is a cycle of events which tends everywhere to repeat iself. Exploration invariably opens the new regions for commercial exploitation; the missionary, as has frequently been said, becomes the advance agent for the trader. The exchange of goods involves in the long run the competition of goods and persons. The result is a new distribution of population and a new and wider division of labor.
>
> The new economic organization, however, inevitably becomes the basis for a new political order. The relations of races and peoples are never for very long merely economic and utilitarian, and no efforts to conceive them in this way have ever been permanently successful. . . . The struggle for existence terminates in a struggle for status, for recognition, for position and prestige, within an existing political and moral order. Where such a political and moral order does not exist, war, which is the most elementary expression of political forces, creates one. For the ultimate effect of war has been, on the whole, to establish and extend law and order in regions where it did not previously exist.
>
> The race relations cycle which takes the form, to state it abstractly, of contacts, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation, is apparently progressive and irreversible. Customs regulations, immigration restrictions and racial barriers may slacken the tempo of the movement; may perhaps halt it altogether for a time; but cannot change its direction, cannot, at any rate, reverse it.[13]

[13] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 192-96. Quoted by permission.

The foregoing passage is not simply a summary statement of an hypothesis designed to explain the changes which take place whenever members of two distinct races or nationalities come together in considerable numbers; it is also by implication the definition of a point of view and a method of studying the social problems which arise out of such contacts. As such, the passage quoted indicates a method of studying the problems connected with race that takes the differences which may exist on the average between the two races simply as a point of departure, and proceeds to inquire concerning the consequences of their contact and interaction.[13a]

The Trend of Theory of Race and Nationality. The consensus of opinion among sociologists today appears to be that the problems of race and nationality fall into two categories: those questions concerning inborn race differences, questions which, however important, are questions for the biologists to deal with; and questions which concern cultural differences and the results of the contact and interaction of diverse culture groups.[14] The attempts which have been made to deal systematically and objectively with the social-psychological problems of culture will be reviewed in a later chapter. The concrete and practical problems of race and nationality, however, involve questions of territorial distribution and segregation, and of the reciprocal reactions of groups and their physical environments. These questions are dealt with in part, as we have seen, by those who study "human geography." They relate themselves also, however, to certain special fields of research with which we shall be concerned in the two following chapters, the study of natural areas, and the study of human migrations.

[13a] See Bogardus, Emory S., *The New Social Research* (Los Angeles, 1926).

[14] Hankins, F. H., *The Racial Basis of Civilization.*

CHAPTER V

THE MOVEMENTS OF POPULATION

Human Migration and Social Change. The study of human migration may be regarded as a special manifestation of the interest in social change which is so prominent in modern social studies. It is a commonplace among the students of the history of philosophy and of science that the ancients, and the Greeks in particular, conceived of the universe as a reality that was, or ought to be, fundamentally stable. This is of course the essence of the philosophy of Plato; his "ideas" were permanent, reliable, unchanging entities, and the business of the philosopher was to discover them and chart them so that individual conduct and social policy might be brought to approximate the eternal verities. This point of view, generally speaking, dominated the reflective thought of the Western world down to the eighteenth century, although the beginnings of an intellectual revolution can naturally be discerned in the literature of the preceding centuries. Eighteenth-century thought, however, is permeated by the idea of change, and we know that the idea has gained force during the century and a quarter which have transpired since 1800. In the field of social theory, this change is manifested in the desire, first to describe, and further to explain so far as may be, the changes which take place in human society—in government to be sure, but also in industrial and commercial relations, in the relations of social classes, and in those moral sentiments and prevalent customs which modern social scientists perceive to be the basis of the entire structure and process of society.

"Intrusive Factors" as Causes of Social Change. It is the natural and logical effort of the social scientists to be able to discover in the complex welter of changes which are constantly taking place in human society certain factors or forces which may be taken as the original and disturbing or intrusive

changes,[1] those which set the others in motion. Custom and tradition, religion and morals, important as they are admitted to be for the determination of the existing order of things in any society, appear to have the general character of conservative influences; it can be plausibly argued that if left to operate undisturbed by other forces, they would eventually establish an equilibrium which would thereafter persist unchanged. Perhaps the argument would not be sound, but in any event it reflects a point of view which has been the source of much of the energy with which scholars have pursued the investigation of some of the other factors of social phenomena in which the dynamic of social change might be found. In casting about for some elemental tendency in terms of which the fact of social change can be explained, then, the seeking imagination lights upon the growth of population. Here is a pressure or force which seems to be universal, inevitable, and understandable on the basis of pure biology. As a matter of fact, it cannot be proven that the tendency of the human population to increase is the cause of social change in any very fundamental sense; it can just as plausibly be argued that it is invention and discovery which make possible the growth of numbers, but at any rate the growth of population can be used as a starting point from which to arrange in systematic fashion what we can learn about the broader subject of social change. The growth of population inevitably produces movements of population, and hence next after the investigation of the growth of population comes the study of the movements of peoples. It is migration and other types of population movements which first bring about those contacts and cross-fertilizations in terms of which we find it possible to explain much of what we know about the evolution of cultures.

Early Contributions to the Explanation of Population Movements. Up to the present time, much more effort has been devoted to historical and descriptive studies of the movements of population than to the systematic analysis of the natural processes involved in them. There are to be found here and there in ancient and medieval literature, however,

[1] Teggart, Frederick J., *Theory of History,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1925.

simple, common-sense attempts at generalization of the observed facts. In the opening chapters of his history of the Peloponnesian Wars, Thucydides describes the effects of the traditional migrations of the ancestors of the Greeks of his own day, and the language in which he does so gives evidence of his belief that certain general principles governed the process described.

> It is evident that the country now called Hellas had in ancient times no settled population; on the contrary, migrations were of frequent occurrence, the several tribes frequently abandoning their homes under the pressure of superior numbers. Without commerce, without freedom of communication either by land or sea, cultivating no more of their territory than the exigencies of life required, destitute of capital, never planting their land (for they could not tell when an invader might not come and take it away, and when he did come they had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as another, they cared little for shifting their habitation, and consequently neither built large cities nor attained to any other form of greatness. The richest soils were always most subject to this change of masters; such as the district now called Thessaly, Bœotia, most of the Peloponnesus, Arcadia excepted, and the most fertile parts of the rest of Hellas. The goodness of the land favoured the aggrandisement of particular individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also invited invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of its soil enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction, never changed its inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification of my assertion, that the migrations were the cause of there being no correspondent growth in other parts. The most powerful victims of war or faction from the rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a safe retreat; and at an early period, becoming naturalized, swelled the already large population of the city to such a height that Attica at last became too small to hold them, and they had to send out colonies to Ionia.[2]

Here to be sure is no perfect or highly sophisticated sociological analysis; the author's assertion that Attica never changed its inhabitants is unconsciously qualified by the following sentences in which he points out how the population grew by accretion from without. The passage contains nevertheless at least one interesting generalization: That the richest soils are most subject to change of masters. It is doubtless because of

[2] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War,* English translation by Richard Crawley, Bk. I, Chap. I.

the slow accumulation of empirical generalizations and observations of this sort that we find that, late in the nineteenth century, Ratzel was able to bring together so elaborate a body of generalizations concerning the movements of population.

Recent Contributions to the Explanation of Population Movements. In comparatively recent times, historians have dealt with the migrations which have occurred in historic times, in the course of their general studies. What is probably of more importance for the general social scientist, however, is the great body of information and reconstructed narrative of the migrations of prehistoric times which has been pieced together from archæological, anthropometric, cultural, and philological evidence. Professor Dixon's closing chapters in his *Racial History of Man* constitute a representative recent contribution to this field of research. Many of the broader aspects of the story of prehistoric migrations are still very much in dispute, but there is sufficient well-authenticated evidence to afford considerable material for the study of human migration as a natural process. It has been from this anthropological research, for example, that the conception of natural barriers and natural roadways has been derived. The study of archæological and epigraphic evidence concerning the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea has provided the basis for a now well-established account of the historic and prehistoric rôle of the natural route from the Mesopotamian Valley to the delta of the Nile, along which many population movements have taken place in both directions.[3] The concepts of natural barriers and natural roadways were in turn made use of by Ratzel in outlining his general theory of anthropogeography.[4]

Friedrich Ratzel appears to have been the first to outline a point of view and a method for the systematic, comparative, and analytical study of human migrations. His *Anthropogeo-*

[3] An excellent simple version of this account is given by J. L. Myres in *The Dawn of History.*

[4] Ratzel, Friedrich, *Anthropogeographie.* See also Semple, Ellen C., *Influences of Geographic Environment,* pp. 5-6, 539-52, and *passim.* Because a copy of Ratzel's *Anthropogeographie* was not accessible to the author at the time this chapter was being actively prepared, quotations and citations from Miss Semple's book have been used to represent the contribution of both authors. Miss Semple, however, has not followed Ratzel closely in preparing her own book.

graphie contains an extended survey of the subject, which has been made the starting-point for a later treatment by his gifted pupil, Ellen C. Semple, in her *Influences of Geographic Environment.*[5] Both writers have adopted as the concept underlying the whole subject that of "historical movements" arising from the growth of population.

> Two things are vital in the history of every people, its ethnic composition and the wars it wages in defense or extension of its boundaries. Both rest upon historical movements,—intrusions, whether peaceful or hostile, into its own land, and encroachments upon neighboring territory necessitated by growth. Back of all such movements is natural increase of population beyond local means of subsistence, and the development of the war spirit in the effort to secure more abundant subsistence, either by raid or by the conquest of territory.[6]

The growth of population, in other words, involves the exploitation of new territory. Such invasion of new lands, however, can assume a variety of forms. The earlier students of human migrations erred in emphasizing the two most obvious forms, rapid movements like that of the Huns, and deliberate colonization of relatively remote points. Recent students have pointed out that the basic form of population movement is a very gradual, unconscious process of encroachment upon the frontier or boundary of previously unoccupied territory. Ellsworth Huntington has formulated one of the recent simple statements of this point, in the following passage:

> It must be remembered that the vast majority of migrations take place very slowly. A rapid movement like that of the Huns under Genghis Khan attracts wide attention, but such movements probably do not account for one per cent of the migrations even during historic times. Among primitive people the tendency is for migrations to be even slower than among the more advanced people who are helped by their superior knowledge and by their widespread command of the forces of nature. This is especially the case when wholly new lands are being penetrated, and still more so when the migrants do not know what lies before them. Most of all it must be true when the migrants are being forced against their will into regions less hospitable than those where they formerly dwelt.[7]

[5] See the foregoing note.
[6] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 75-76. See also pp. 79-80.
[7] Huntington, Ellsworth, *The Character of Races*, p. 65.

Evolution of Forms of Migration. If the most elemental manifestation of the movement of population is a gradual, unconscious encroachment on territory adjacent to that already occupied, it is clear that this movement undergoes differentiation in the course of centuries and millenniums, in response to changing circumstances, brought about, in part, by the migrations themselves. Miss Semple has discussed this differentiation at some length, speaking of it as an evolution in the mobility of peoples.[8] In the lower stages of culture, she points out, mobility was great, both because of the exigencies of the food-quest at a stage when there were only the crudest techniques of food-production, and because of the small amount of personal possessions which would hamper the movements of individuals and groups, as they do today. Furthermore, when people are habitually mobile through many generations, mobility gets into the mind as wanderlust, established as a mental trait by selection and tradition. The movements of primitive peoples, however, are checked by physical and mental barriers. In an early stage of the evolution of culture, not only mountains, deserts and seas, but also forests operate as physical barriers to movement. The important mental barrier was the restricted geographic outlook; "ignorance robs them of definite goals." These mental barriers were surmounted, historically, by the Romans, by the medieval merchants who developed trade with the Orient, and finally by the voyagers of the fifteenth century who explored the New World.

In the course of human social evolution, the conditions affecting the mobility of peoples are altered, and the prevalent forms of mobility are modified in response.

> Civilized man is at once more and less mobile than his primitive brother. Every advance in civilization multiplies and tightens the bonds uniting him with the soil; makes him a sedentary instead of a migratory being. On the other hand, every advance in civilization is attended by the rapid clearing of the forests, by the construction of bridges and interlacing roads, the invention of more effective vehicles for transportation whereby intercourse occurs, and the improvement of navigation to the same end. Civilized man progressively modifies the land which he occupies, removes or reduces obstacles to intercourse, and thereby approximates it to the open plain; thus far he

[8] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 80-82.

facilitates movements. But while doing this he also places upon the land a dense population, closely attached to the soil, strong enough to resist incursion, and for economic reasons inhospitable to any marked increase of population from without.[9]

Karl Bücher, Werner Sombart, and Georg Simmel have discussed in a more detailed way the forms which mobility takes in response to the pressure created by the spread of human settlement over the earth.[10] What they have pointed out is that when conditions no longer favor the mass migration of whole peoples or large groups, more and more specialized types of mobility arise, such as the travelling salesman and the casual laborers who follow the harvest northward in the states of the Mississippi Valley. As we shall see in a later chapter, it is at this point, essentially, that the study of population movements reveals the possibilities of studying mobility from another point of view—namely, in its relation to contact and communication.

Migration and War. In continuing her discussion of the various forms of population movements, Miss Semple returns to the question of population movement and war.[11] She points out that when such movement takes the form of an encroachment upon territory already occupied by another people, war is the natural result. War may therefore be regarded as an important form of the "historical movement."

Migration and Displacement of Populations. Population movements which are invasions of previously occupied territory, however, are likely to bring about the displacement of the previous population; in fact, invasion always involves some degree of displacement.[12] As soon as the hospitable and accessible parts of the earth are occupied by population, displacement tends to take form as a retreat of the displaced people into less accessible and less attractive locations, "districts of refuge," where they are likely thereafter to live in more or

[9] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

[10] Bücher, Karl, *Industrial Evolution*, pp. 345-69. Sombart, Werner, *The Quintessence of Capitalism* (London, 1915), pp. 292-307. Simmel, Georg, *Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1922), p. 460 ff.; see also for an English statement of Simmel's account, Spykman, Nicholas J., *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925), Bk. II, Chap. IV.

[11] *Loc. cit.*, p. 88.

[12] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 92-94.

less isolation. Districts of refuge which are located centrally to several natural regions, however, tend to receive immigrants from many sides, and become characterized by the conglomerate nature of their populations. Displacement of a population is also likely to have the character of a dispersion of the group, as in the classical example of the Jewish dispersion. Hence it is evident that population movements which involve invasion of occupied territory also involve in several ways the contact and fusion of once separate groups.

Commerce as Population Movement. Commerce is also included by Miss Semple in her outline of types of "historical movements," a classification which is indicative of the value of the concept for the determination of a fundamental point of view. From this point of view, in fact, as has been brought out by the cumulative contributions of a series of writers, it is possible to survey the entire range of human social activities; all are susceptible of being interpreted as manifestations of one fundamental tendency which leads to the growth and movements of population. Miss Semple shows that commerce may be looked upon as a highly specialized form of historical movement.[13] It is movement reduced to the bare essentials; the objectives of the movement are clearly defined and reached with an approximation to the minimum of exertion. This fact, that commerce is movement with a clearly defined objective, causes it to exercise a guiding, goal-defining influence over some of the other forms of movement, notably those of military invasion and colonization; the trader gives an aim to the efforts of the soldier and settler. Brunhes has added certain illuminating comments to the account of historic movements worked out by Ratzel and Miss Semple. He, among others, has pointed out that trade differs from migration essentially in simply the fact that trade moves commodities to the places where there is demand for them, while migration is a form of movement in which the population is distributed with reference to the supply of commodities.[14]

Colonization. The special form of population movement which we call colonization has been exploited as a delib-

[13] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 96-98.
[14] Brunhes, Jean, *Human Geography*, pp. 216, 228-29.

erate governmental policy by countries seeking to relieve the pressure of excess population or to increase the national wealth. It is this interest in the phenomenon of colonization which has inspired a number of research studies of the history of colonization, the best-known being those by Beers [15] and Keller.[16] Miss Semple has described colonization as a device used to promote commercial ends.[17] Recent writers have pointed out, however, that even where migration does not take the massed form, the natural leads them to settle in colonies for mutual aid and comfort. Colonization is therefore being studied as a natural phase of population movement, as well as a political expedient.

Influence of the Route. Edmond Demolins has written the only important treatise devoted exclusively to the subject of population movements.[18] His fundamental thesis is indicated by the title of his book, *How the Route Creates the Social Type.* He holds, in other words, that the principal cause of the diversity of peoples and races is the diverse routes which they have travelled in the course of their past history. This point of view, however, has the effect of carrying the study of migrations at once into another realm, the study of race and culture. The development of the study of culture and of the influences which have determined cultural change will be reviewed in a later chapter. Many writers have emphasized the tendency of migration to bring about racial differentiation through a selective process, among them Huntington in his recent volume, *The Pulse of Progress.*[19] Huntington has been known also, since the appearance of his first important book, *The Pulse of Asia,* as the exponent of an hypothesis which seeks the original cause of the great population movements in climatic changes which he believes to have occurred in crudely cyclical fashion during the recent geological epochs. If it can be shown that great regions of the surface of the earth have undergone changes of climate, especially in the direction of

[15] Beers, *The Old Colonial Policy.*

[16] Keller, A. G., *Colonization:* A Study of the Founding of New Societies (Boston, etc., 1908).

[17] *Loc. cit.,* p. 96.

[18] Demolins, Edmond, *Comment la Route Cree le Type Social* (2 vols., Paris, 1901-03).

[19] Huntington, Ellsworth, *The Pulse of Progress* (New York and London, 1926), pp. 167-68.

greater dryness, as Huntington contends, the fact would evidently account for the great outpourings of migration from Asia which are known to have occurred for a thousand years before and after the dawn of our era. Huntington's theory has commanded general attention and respect, but is not by any means generally accepted by others who have studied the problem.

Migration and Culture Distribution. Within the past few years, a number of cultural anthropologists, of whom W. H. R. Rivers and Clark Wissler are perhaps the most influential, have contributed to the development of a general method for the study of human migrations, in connection with their attempts to account for the distribution of culture traits. The general result to date of their efforts has been the formation of a critical technique for the evaluation of cultural data bearing on the problems of folk movements, to replace the uncritical and sanguine methods used by the earlier anthropologists of the period when philological evidence enjoyed an exaggerated prestige. Interest has also been directed toward the study of migration from another direction in recent years, namely, the practical economic and political problems arising out of modern international migrations and out of the drift of population to the cities. An elaborate project for research into the causes and effects of human migrations has been developed by American social scientists as a response to this interest. The apparent tendency of urban populations to diffuse into the suburban regions surrounding great cities has also come in for investigation, and will be further studied in the near future.[20]

One of the difficulties encountered in the study of population movements is that of disentangling the racial, economic, political, cultural, and ethical aspects of the larger problem. Books and articles offered as disinterested contributions to history or to scientific knowledge have frequently been in fact thinly disguised propaganda for or against some actual or proposed national policy, such as the restriction of foreign immigration into the United States, the "white man's burden," the right of extra-territoriality, and so on.

[20] The only book so far published dealing as a whole with this movement, so far as known to the writer, is Douglass, Harlan P., *The Suburban Trend* (New York, 1924).

Recent Tendencies. One conclusion seems to be warranted by the survey of the literature dealing with the general subject of migration: that its problems tend to become more intelligible when studied with reference to the single general viewpoint afforded by so-called "population theory," as expounded, for example, by Raymond Pearl. The same data, however, may also be studied, as we have seen in the foregoing pages, with regard to the contacts promoted by population movements. Questions suggest themselves as to the similarities and differences between the general mass migrations of whole peoples, on the one extreme, and the wide range of territory and the wider range of social contacts covered by many modern city-dwellers even while maintaining nominally fixed places of residence. At first sight there seems to be little in common between these extreme cases beyond the bare fact that both are forms of human "mobility." When other, intermediate types of cases are considered, however—the modern family which changes its residence many times in a single generation, the laborers who migrate with the seasons of the year, and the gipsy—we begin to notice evidences of a profound relationship which exists between the movements of human beings, whether considered individually or collectively, and their culture. Population movement is not only a process set in motion by biological and economic forces and calculated to reestablish or approximate an economic equilibrium; for human beings movement is almost synonymous with experience. Experience, in this sense, is of course a potent determinant of future behavior.

Thus in this particular field of social research as in many others, the continued study of social phenomena which are at first seen as physical and economic, indicates to us the necessity of carrying the investigation into the realm of psychology if we wish to understand the facts with which we meet.

CHAPTER VI

NATURAL AREAS AND TERRITORIAL GROUPS

The Discovery of Non-territorial Groups. The notion has been gaining ground within the past decade that one of the fundamental points of attack in social research is the study of natural areas, or regions, and of the corresponding territorial groups. The idea that social science has to do with territorial groups is in fact an old one; the two principal objects of interest to the earlier social theorists were the community and the national state, both of which are of course territorial groups in a very obvious sense of the term. In the nineteenth century, however, under the influence of Comte, Ratzenhofer, and later of Durkheim, there began to be discovered the fact that social processes involve the activity of groups which are not made up of the entire populations of given areas, and the way was opened for the development of a science of sociology arranged in a non-territorial frame of reference. Durkheim's study of the totemic groups in Australia has been cited by Febvre [1] as a particularly definite point of departure for the systematic study of non-territorial groups. This non-territorial sociology pursued, in general, the lines of investigation and reflective analysis which are familiar to us today as social psychology and collective psychology—the study of society on the basis of the investigation of the psychology of individual behavior as affecting and affected by social interaction, and the study of collective behavior as approached from the interesting and apparently simple data to be gained from the study of crowds, mobs, mass movements, and crazes. The geographic tendency introduced into social science by Buckle, Ratzel, and others, and the natural tendency of students of practical social problems to make the community and the state the primary objects of their attention, came into contact with

[1] Febvre, Lucien, *A Geographical Introduction to History* (New York, 1925), p. 39.

each other, with the general result of producing a more critical and sophisticated attitude on the part of the exponents of both the territorial, geographic, or "ecological," and the psychological techniques of social research. The present widespread but cautious employment of the concept of natural areas by social scientists reflects the influence of this rivalry.

Comparative Geography. Apparently the most important antecedent, logically and historically, of the present interest in natural areas was the attempt to study comparatively the influence of geographic and economic factors upon social conditions and events. In the beginnings of modern human geography, in the writings of Ibn Khaldun, Montesquieu, Buckle, and others, it was more or less uncritically assumed that the national state might be studied as a geographic unit. Although Ratzel and Miss Semple display adumbrations of the regional concept, the nationalistic approach to the comparative study of geography persists in their writings. It is significant that one of Ratzel's major publications was a book on *Political Geography.* In the *Anthropogeographie,* however, Ratzel has recorded many evidences of his perception that the study of the comparative geography of national states was a crude and inaccurate procedure, and more intensive methods of geographic research would have to be grounded on the determination of actual and natural boundaries;[2] that is, the unit of investigation in anthropogeography must be a natural, rather than a political, area. Some approach to this point of view had indeed been made by Ratzel as soon as he emphasized the possibility and the value of studying the state or any other social group with reference to the ground occupied by it.

> Whether the human being is thought of as an individual or as group: family, race (Stamm), state, a piece of ground is always to be considered with him or with it. . . . In all these cases we have organisms which enter into a more or less lasting connection with their land, in which the land operates upon the organism and the organism upon the land.[3]

Febvre has criticized the doctrine laid down by Ratzel in the foregoing passage on grounds of non-conformity with fact;

[2] *Op. cit.,* Vol. I, p. 259.
[3] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, pp. 66-67 (translated from the German).

as Durkheim had pointed out, there are social groups which do not depend in any very direct or obvious way upon particular territories.[4] Ratzel is here contributing, however, to the definition of a point of view and a method, a method of studying territorial groups in relation to the natural areas which they occupy.

The Regional Concept in Plant and Animal Ecology. A more direct and helpful foundation for the development of the regional concept in social theory is to be found in the work of the plant and animal ecologists. Ecology can be briefly defined as the study of organisms and their life and behavior with reference to the conditioning influence of the physical environment and the struggle with other organisms for existence and position. From the point of view of the plant ecologist, it is possible to define ecological areas or regions as districts more or less isolated from the surrounding territory by natural barriers or differences of soil and climate, and characterized by a tendency to the equilibration of organic life with reference to environmental conditions within the area.[5]

Human Ecology. When this conception had been worked out to a certain extent for plant and animal forms, it was an easy and logical step to the application of the method to the study of human life. Indeed, Ratzel, Vidal de la Blache, and Brunhes had already been asserting that what they were studying was really human ecology, some time before Park,[6] McKenzie,[7] and Mukerjee [8] began to advertise the possibilities of human ecology to the sociologists in the United States. Mukerjee proposes a more critical definition of ecology as the study of behavior with reference to conditioning environmental circumstances. The behavior of a particular

[4] *Op. cit., loc. cit.*

[5] Mukerjee, Radahakamal, *Regional Sociology* (New York, 1926), pp. 33, 83.

[6] Park, Robert E., and Burgess, Ernest W., *The City* (Chicago, 1925), pp. 1-2.

[7] McKenzie, R. D., "The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community," *American Journal of Sociology,* November, 1925; reprinted as Chapter III in Park and Burgess' *The City.* See also the same author's paper, "The Scope and Method of Human Ecology," Vol. XX, Proceedings of the American Sociological Society. (This volume of the Proceedings reprinted in substance as *The Urban Community,* edited by E. W. Burgess.)

[8] *Op. cit.*

species of animals, he points out, tends to be the same under all circumstances, but not exactly the same; different species may display the same tendencies and the same species may display different tendencies under the influence of unlike environments. This is of course much more the case with the human species than with any other animal species, and human ecology becomes therefore a much more ambitious undertaking than plant or animal ecology.[9] Human ecology is also distinctive in that the individuals of the human community effect an adjustment to environmental conditions by means of a larger repertoire of reactions than are characteristic of the individuals of a plant or animal species.[10] In other words, the division of labor is one of the fundamental concepts of human ecology.

The Region as a Closed System of Forces. It has long been a commonplace among the philosophical students of the general methods of natural science that, in order to arrive at propositions or concepts of general validity, it is necessary to study the operation of closed systems of forces, arrived at either by isolating them in the laboratory or by analysis and abstraction from the data provided by the observation of facts occurring in a state of nature. Jean Brunhes and one of his commentators have collaborated to state, more clearly perhaps than has anyone else, that this is a fundamental motive underlying the study of society with reference to natural areas.

> After finishing the survey of the essential facts and carefully distinguishing the different parts of his subject, M. Brunhes has wished to see them all at once, mingled in complex wholes, like those which can be readily seen and experienced. But it was necessary that these wholes should be clearly delimited and should be relatively simple, in order to lend themselves to a true methodical study in the present status of a science that is still in its beginnings. That is why M. Brunhes has chosen, in order to prepare monographs on them, small natural unities, veritable human islands; the island of the desert . . . and the island of the high mountain. . . . Regional geography is only an extension of the subject of small natural unities.[11]

[9] Mukerjee, *op. cit.*, p. 83.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.
[11] Burnhes, Jean, *Human Geography*, Preface, pp. xii-xiii (quoting with unqualified approval an article by Paul Mantoux in *Athena* for July, 1911, referring to the first French edition of this book).

When the ecological study of the region is conceived as the literal study of an isolated area, as it was provisionally for methodological reasons by Brunhes in some of his researches, the inference at once follows that we have to deal with social groups which are economically self-sufficient, or practically so. This is an idea which has long attracted the economists, who have based many of their analyses of exchange, production, and the determination of value in exchange upon the postulate of the closed system. The notion also lends itself to practical and ethical applications, and it is in this connection particularly that Patrick Geddes and his associate, Victor Branford, have written about the region. For them, the natural area and the corresponding territorial group is not so much a convenient methodological assumption as it is a symbol of a desirable social condition.[12]

Regional Geography of North America. Upon the foundation provided by these conceptions and postulates, then, there is gradually being erected by contemporary students of human society a methodology for the study of natural areas or regions and the territorial groups inhabiting them. Contributions to this methodology are being made both by writers who call themselves geographers and by those who prefer to be known as sociologists. One of the most prominent of the former among American writers is J. Russell Smith, known as the author of a number of textbooks and treatises in the field of economic geography, including a brilliant volume on the geography of North America, described from the regional point of view. Smith defends the concept of the region as the necessary basis for any geography that is to be genuinely scientific.

> Science classifies knowledge by putting together things that are alike. If we were thinking primarily of government when we study geography, then a county, a state, or a group of states would be a good unit. But we are thinking primarily about the earth as the home of man, and for that purpose the political unit is the wrong classification. Man living on the earth lives in relation to a corn belt, a wheat region, a trade or manufacturing region; to semi-arid pastures, or to some other natural region. Hence classification of regions

[12] Geddes, Patrick, "Cities and the Soils They Grow From," *Survey Graphic*, April, 1925, pp. 40-44. See also Branford, Victor E., *Interpretations and Forecasts, passim.*

by human use is the scientific method for the study of geography for the children of America.[13]

Physiographic Regions and (Human) Use Regions. In spite of what Professor Smith says about the desirability of classifying regions according to human use, however, one feels as one examines the map of North America showing natural regions which is provided as an insert with his *North America,* that the divisions there represented have been made with physiographic considerations primarily in mind. To be sure, regions mapped out according to the data provided by a physiographic study will correspond at least roughly to the larger, more inclusive use regions. It has been the service rendered in this connection by C. J. Galpin to have worked out a simple and objective method for locating the boundaries of smaller natural areas—communities—with reference to the actual social and economic interaction of their population.[14] By locating on large-scale maps the outlying patrons of the business and social institutions of a town or village, Galpin has shown how one can determine with great accuracy the boundaries of the area which has its center in the given settlement. Within the past few years there have been prepared for commercial purposes maps showing the marketing areas surrounding a number of the larger and smaller cities of the United States. These maps have been prepared for newspapers located in the cities in question for the purpose of impressing upon prospective advertisers the value of their respective publications as advertising media. The maps seem to have been prepared by a free use of Galpin's technique, however, and they illustrate very well one of the more obvious concrete implications of the method.

Regional Sociology. Up to the present time, so far as is known to the writer, only one general treatise devoted pri-

[13] Smith, Joseph Russell, *Human Geography,* Vol. II, p. v (a textbook for use in the graded schools; the passage quoted is taken from the introduction addressed to teachers); see also same author's *North America* (New York, 1925), p. 33.

[14] Galpin, Chas. Josiah, *Rural Life* (New York, 1918), Chaps. III and IV. Galpin first published a report on his method in a widely read paper, "The Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community," *Research Bulletin No. 34,* May, 1915, Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of Wisconsin.

marily to the study of regions as a sociological method has appeared in the English language, *Regional Sociology,* by Professor Mukerjee of the University of Lucknow, India. Mukerjee follows the same general line of argument in presenting his material which has been reviewed above. The ultimate scientific value of the regional approach to the study of sociology, he holds, lies in the basis it affords for the classificatory and comparative study of social phenomena. It leads to the identification and description of social types.

> To establish sociology on the basis of a scientific classification of social types, there is need of the consideration of local and regional data, particularly the minute observations of contrasted economic regions. Sociology will then proceed to formulate the principles of man's effort and modes of occupation and utilization of the earth independently of local and regional descriptions. It will thus unify two movements. First, it will always have a provincial, national, or regional tendency; second, it will aim at principles of universal validity.[15]

Brunhes has also emphasized the importance of the study of the type; he makes the point, furthermore, that the typical is the usual; it is just the aspect of the human geography of a given region which tends to escape the observation of the tourist.[16]

Areas of Geographic Uniformity. In criticism of such studies of isolated regions as those used for a particular purpose by Brunhes and his associates, various writers have pointed out that a large part of the earth's population lives under quite different conditions.[17] Miss Semple, for instance, has referred to the "broad, uniform continental areas" where nature has erected no obstacles to expansion or to accessions of population from without.[18] Such broad uniform areas, Miss Semple states, are the habitat of widespread peoples, monotonous in type. Statistical studies of the various areas into which these larger areas are divided, politically or for purposes of administration, show, however, that the uniformity of manners and customs which is commonly ascribed to them

[15] *Op. cit.,* p. 101.
[16] *Op. cit.,* p. 131.
[17] See Febvre, *op. cit.,* p. 173 ff.
[18] Semple, Ellen C., *Influences of Geographic Environment,* pp. 172-73.

may easily be exaggerated. In fact they are not uniform or homogeneous, either in climate, soil, and resources, or in economic life and culture. Yet there is no very obvious basis for dividing these broad regions into smaller "natural" territorial units. The straight lines and the rectangular plan outline by the public highways of the states west of the Mississippi River and east of the Cordilleran highlands are, as Brunhes has remarked, symbolic of the general character of the region; there are certainly no well marked physiographic features operating as barriers between smaller natural areas into which one would like to be able to divide the larger region for purposes of detailed study.

Human Ecology and the Statistical Method. A new method of ecological investigation which seems adaptable to the investigation of large regions of this sort is just in process of development by research workers at the University of Chicago.[19] This method involves the tabulation of statistical data for the smallest territorial units which may be available, such as the tracts which are used by the Bureau of the Census as the basis for the census enumerations and for the first tabulation of the data. If then the statistical data are reduced to the form of rates—*i.e.,* ratios and percentages—and the rates are then collected into classes, each class or type, representing a certain statistical interval, may then be represented by a certain color or a certain type of cross-hatching on a map showing the areas with reference to which the statistics were tabulated. Such a map is then likely to prove useful in one of two ways: either the distribution of colors or shadings will tend to show groupings of the small arbitrary units of area which may then be studied as natural areas, or the rates will perhaps prove to vary in a gradual or serial order as the eye moves across the larger region from one point to another. In the former case, not only is it true that a statistical procedure enables one to map out the smaller natural areas within the larger regions, but the areas so determined, like those which may be more directly located, serve as a useful framework for the further aggregation and analysis of all sorts of statistical

[19] These studies are as yet mainly unpublished.

data about the economic and social life of the larger region.

The Gradient. If, on the other hand, the plotting of statistical data by small, arbitrarily chosen territorial units reveals not so much a natural grouping of these units into areas as a gradual variation of rates from one point to another, then the concept of the *gradient* may be applied. The possible utility of this concept for research in the field of human ecology was suggested to sociological students by the perusal of Professor Child's treatise, *The Physiological Foundations of Behavior.* In this book he emphasizes the physiological significance of the gradient of metabolism which is found to exist in living organisms. The head end of a flatworm, for example, is the "high end" of a gradient of metabolism. Similarly Professor Burgess has been able to show, on the basis of investigations of census and other statistical data made by his students, that all sorts of social phenomena are correlated with the gradient of mobility of the urban population, as indexed by various statistically indicated data.[20] There appears to be no reason why the general procedure here illustrated is not widely applicable in the ecological study of large regions not clearly divisible into natural areas.

Regional Sociology and Division of Labor. In any event, what recent research has tended to bring out more and more clearly is that the study of human ecology is the sociological method which provides the natural frame of reference for the classification and analysis of statistical data. The general principle was definitely adumbrated by Brunhes in his *Human Geography:*

> In the light of the simple examples, carefully localized, which we have just given, it is easy to reach a conclusion such as Behn has already formulated and which Ratzel has taken up with much vigor: "The topographical map is the most exact and faithful expression in all of its details of the distribution of population."
>
> Outside of large-scale topographical maps some very happy attempts have been made, first, to substitute natural areas for conventional administrative areas and then to show the facts of population by suitable colors and signs. Earlier representations paid too little

[20] Burgess, Ernest W., "Determination of Gradients in the Growth of the City," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* Vol. XXI (1927), 178-84.

attention to the geographical reality. In general, progress is shown by a tendency to abandon the purely statistical representation and by a more or less successful effort toward showing definitely, with the aid of lines and colors, the actual geographical reality.

It is none the less true that the principle formulated by Ratzel is entirely sound. While the population of slight density is by nature unequally distributed, a very dense population tends to represent more and more the *statistical condition* and loses more and more its *geographical characteristics.*[21]

The manner in which Brunhes, following Ratzel, contrasts the "statistical condition" with a condition of population showing "geographic characteristics" in the foregoing passage would seem to indicate that he conceives of a tendency for human social life and activity to approach a simple mechanical and massed form as the density of population increases. In fact, however, as we shall see later, the general principle which has proven serviceable for the study of the ecological aspects of populations of highly evolved culture is the division of labor. Dense population is not necessarily correlated with uniformity or homogeneity, but rather with the so-called "geographic division of labor," a tendency with which many other social facts are correlated. This principle has in fact been stated by Brunhes in another passage.[22] It seems to be true, however, that, as different writers have pointed out, the growth of population which is correlated with and made possible by industrial specialization is accompanied by a tendency to the disintegration of the social solidarity of the smaller order of territorial groups,—neighborhoods and communities.[23]

In general, the study of natural areas and territorial groups, as prosecuted up to the present time, seems to be subject to two sorts of limitations if evaluated as a general approach to the study of human society. One is that suggested in the foregoing paragraph, namely, the tendency that appears, in the course of human social evolution, for the smaller territorial groups to dissolve, and for the more direct and intimate social relations of human beings to assume a less and less territorial

[21] *Op. cit.*, pp. 154-55.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 213.
[23] Burns, Allen T., "Effect of Modern Industry on Community Life," *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work, Forty-ninth Annual Meeting, Cincinnati, Ohio* (1922), pp. 77-82.

form. The other limitation to which the ecological method is subject is that which arises from the fact that, out of the natural groupings based on natural areas, there tends more and more to develop a mode of behavior which is collective and social in a very important degree. Out of collective behavior, in turn, there develops an ever-increasing accumulation of culture or tradition, which covers the physical environment as if with a superstructure or scaffolding. But culture is not closely correlated with the variations of the factors of physical environment; it is determined for any particular group by the past experience of that group, *i.e.,* by its history. It is therefore necessary, as Mukerjee has pointed out, to supplement the findings of regional studies as commonly conceived by the investigation of the cultural factor. "Man has a history in a sense in which animals and plants have not, and this history enters as a vital factor in the form of the social heritage into the evolution of races and their regions." [24]

[24] *Op. cit.,* pp. 91-92.

CHAPTER VII

THE STUDY OF THE COMMUNITY

Plato: The "Republic." Like most other topics which engage the attention of modern social scientists, the study of the community is a very old theme. In Plato's *Republic* and in his other political dialogues there occur elementary analyses of community organization and function which can scarcely be improved upon today. In a familiar passage in the *Republic* Plato states very clearly a principle which is still fundamental in studies of communities; namely, that community life and organization is based upon the division of labor:

> Now then, let us construct our imaginary city from the beginning. It will owe its construction, it appears, to our natural wants.
>
> Unquestionably.
>
> Well, but the first and most pressing of all wants is that of sustenance to enable us to exist as living creatures.
>
> Most decidedly.
>
> Our second want would be that of a house, and our third that of clothing and the like.
>
> True.
>
> Then let us know what will render our city adequate to the supply of so many things. Must we not begin with a husbandman for one, and a house-builder, and besides these a weaver? Will these perhaps suffice, or shall we add to them a shoemaker, and perhaps one or two more of the class of people who minister to our bodily wants?
>
> By all means.
>
> Then the smallest possible city will consist of four or five men.
>
> So we see.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> More than four citizens, then, Adeimantus, are needed to provide the requisites which we named. For the husbandman, it appears, will not make his own plough, if it is to be a good one, nor his own mattock, nor any of the tools employed in agriculture. No more will the builder make the numerous tools which he requires; and so of the weaver and shoemaker.
>
> True.
>
> Then we shall have carpenters and smiths, and many other artisans

of the kind, who shall become members of our little state, . . . and create a population.

Certainly.[1]

The City as a Natural Community. A similar insight and objectivity of treatment are found in Aristotle's *Politics,* although in this treatise Aristotle apparently assumes that his readers are familiar with the *Republic* and hence he does not repeat the elementary exposition which is presented in the earlier work. The Greek writers saw very clearly the relation of community to physical environment, and Aristotle's directions for laying out the city show an understanding of the necessity of adapting the artificial structure to the demands of natural function. Two features characteristic of modern community studies are, however, lacking in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. First, in their conception the city should be, and under favorable conditions may be, free from economic dependence upon all parts of the world except its own hinterland; hence they have little to say about the relation of the community organization and activity to a more inclusive economic organization. Secondly, their ideas about the community are distinguished from those of modern writers through the inclusive scope of the powers and functions which they ascribe to the city corporation. They had virtually no experience of social groups other than territorial groups, the household, the city, and the city-state. The "city," which was in fact simply a fair-sized town in everything but political institutions, was the dominant feature of the social order—dominant economically, geographically, and politically, and religion was largely a function of the city; contemporary discussion of the problems of social theory reflected this condition of fact. The city continued to play an important rôle in social life and a corresponding rôle in social theory for two thousand years after the time of Plato and Aristotle. We find the city serving as the ground pattern for St. Augustine's discussion of an ideal society; a thousand years later Campanella followed the same plan in his idealistic picture of the City of Sol.

[1] Plato: *Republic* (Vaughan and Davies' translation, Golden Treasury edition, London, 1916, pp. 54-55), Bk. II.

The City-State Replaced by the Empire. After Aristotle, however, the idea of the city ceased to serve as a basis for any very objective or scientific study of the human community. St. Augustine is not interested primarily in the community as an economic organization, based on the division of labor, but in an ideal of ecclesiastical unity and moral control. A partial explanation of the decay of the spirit of disinterested inquiry into social organization is found in the change in the political background against which we must project the more obvious facts of the history of social theory. The city-state had been replaced by the empire. Men's discussions of social and political questions were based upon the assumption of one universal sovereignty. The questions to be discussed concerned the relative privileges and duties of the various social classes, factions, and parties within the empire; later the respective rôles of church and civil authority were the subject of a prolonged debate.

Now there is one difference between an empire which included theoretically all of the known world and a political society made up of independent city-states, a difference which has an important influence upon the theoretic discussion of social questions. When the political and social unit is the city-state, those who interest themselves in its problems cannot fail to be influenced, consciously and unconsciously, by what they know of other city-states. There is opportunity for comparison, and comparison favors objectivity and scientific analysis. During the long period from Alexander the Great to Philip the Fair of France, when universal empire was the dominant political concept, there was nothing to compare the empire with, and this fact must have been the reason, in part, for the tendency to appeal to metaphysical absolutes for the solution of problems of political and social theory.

In the papers of Pierre du Bois and in Machiavelli's *Prince* we can begin to see the reflection of a changing, decentralizing political order upon social thought, but by this time the trend of social thought had acquired a certain direction which precluded recognition of the importance of the geographic and economic aspects of the social order. For several hundred years after Machiavelli, almost the only type of social theory

which was written dealt with questions of sovereignty and the strengthening of the State for self-preservation against military aggression. The struggle for existence was the predominant fact about the life of the medieval community.[2] It was only very gradually that the modern interest in the economic and geographic forces underlying territorial organization grew out of the attempt to deal more intelligently. This process of development is discussed in other chapters in this volume.

The modern interest in communities and other territorial groups, as such, is in fact of comparatively recent origin. While modern geographers, beginning with Ratzel, have been developing the concept of the region, social scientists have been rediscovering the community, the group which has the region for its habitat.

Maine. Modern writers on the community, influenced by existing traditions, saw this group at first as a political and cultural unit; only somewhat later did the geography and the economic organization of the community become the object of thoroughly objective study. One of the earliest contributions to the modern scientific literature of the community was Sir Henry Maine's *Village Communities in East and West;* in fact other nineteenth-century writers acknowledge their indebtedness to the stimulating and fundamental suggestions put forth by Maine, in his three well-known books, *Village Communities, Early Law and Custom,* and *Ancient Law.* Through all three of these volumes the same fundamental theme runs, but it is primarily an analysis of social control—moral or cultural and political—in the early community. In *Village Communities,* to be sure, he starts from the assumption that the community is an economic unit, and that in fact it was in early times a unit of greater solidarity than it is today; he supports the theory of early *communism* in the ownership and cultivation of land which had already been advanced by writers before him. Maine proceeds at once, however, to the investigation of the body of customary law which develops in such communities to regulate the cooperative agriculture which, he believes, was the basis of the community life; he makes his findings the basis for a theory concerning the general process whereby law,

[2] Clarke, *The Mediæval City State,* pp. 7-8.

in the modern sense, comes into being.[3] For Maine, therefore, the community is simply a convenient place in which to study the development of legal institutions.

Tönnies: "Community and Society." Another of the earliest modern writers to contribute to our contemporary method and point of view for the study of communities was Ferdinand Tönnies, a German writer who still survives as this chapter is being prepared, and the span of whose lifetime, therefore, might be taken to measure the period during which modern ideas about the community as a social unit have been developing. Tönnies' conception of community is set forth mainly in his first great book, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (*Community and Society*), the first edition of which dates from 1887, but a preliminary sketch for which appeared in 1881, ten years after the date of publication of Maine's *Village Communities.* Like Maine, Tönnies sees the community (*Gemeinschaft*) as a more or less abstract social unit and type. The community, for him, is simply the seat of a natural and intimate social organization, based on instincts, emotions, and deep-seated habits. In this respect there is a typical distinction between community and society (*Gesellschaft*), the latter being characterized by deliberation and conscious choice, bargaining and contractual relations of individuals. In the community, in the sense in which Tönnies uses the term, human relationships are personal and customary rather than contractual. It is obvious that the development of this thesis leads at once into the realm of psychological sociology, and in fact the community is not primarily a geographic and economic unity, so far as Tönnies' treatment of the subject indicates.[4] The same use of the community concept persists in popular discussion and literature, being found in our familiar expressions, "the good of the community," and "community of interest." It is in this broader sense of the term, in which community tends to be-

[3] Maine, Sir Henry Sumner, *Village Communities in East and West* (London, seventh edition, 1913), pp. 61-62, *et passim.*

[4] Tönnies, Ferdinand, *Entwurf* (1880-81) for the first edition of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft;* reprinted as Section I in *Soziologische Studien und Kritiken, Erste Sammlung,* by Ferdinand Tönnies (Jena, 1925). See also Wirth, Louis, "The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXXII (November, 1926), pp. 412-22.

come in practice a synonym for society, that Professor MacIver uses it in the title of his book, *Community: A Sociological Study.*

The Community as a Geographical Unit. Vidal de la Blache handed on to his students, in his account of "human establishments," [5] a definite point of view for the systematic study of communities as varieties of the same general, geographic and economic type. The "establishment" is a generic term for any unit of human settlement on the soil, large or small, from the single homestead to the great city, and the idea of Vidal de la Blache is that this whole range of social data may be studied comparatively, and the cases classified to reveal types, which may then be studied to determine the processes by which their form and organization are developed and maintained. From this point of view the community is a special type of human establishment, although a rather inclusive class. Brunhes, the student and successor-in-chief of Vidal de la Blache, has elaborated the suggestions of the latter concerning the possibilities of studying human society with reference to the settlements in which men live. He points out that it is practically impossible to make statistical studies of even the most elementary phenomena of human population except as the people involved are settled. "Where men are not thus fixed, they escape all control and all accurate numbering." [6] Brunhes also emphasizes the relation of the community and its growth to the means of communication and transportation. The intersection of main paths of communication tends to locate a community center, and, conversely, as habitations and other human "establishments"—factories, shops, mercantile enterprises—concentrate in a community, new roads tend to be laid out so as to converge in this settlement.[7] The community may in fact be described as an aggregation of population and institutions, gathered together and integrated through the influence of a center of dominance, which, in turn, is determined at a point of maximum mobility and communication. Related to this

[5] Vidal de la Blache, Paul, *Principles of Human Geography,* edited by Emmanuel de Martonne; translated from the French by Millicent Todd Bingham (New York, 1926) Pt. II, Chap. V.

[6] Brunhes, Jean, *Human Geography,* pp. 64-65.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 169.

conception is the point made by a number of modern writers, that the community tends to grow up where some physical feature causes a break in transportation—at a seaport, where a river enters a lake, or, in modern times, at a railroad center.[8] By calling attention to the value of studies of human settlements with reference to the map, best of all a topographical map, Vidal de la Blache and Brunhes have pointed the way for a great number of studies, the ultimate results of which are certain to be important, both in their practical values, and in the contributions to a general science of human ecology which they mediate.

American Studies of Rural Communities. In the latest general advance movement in the study of communities, the introduction of fresh interest in rural communities, and the development of new methods for studying them, antedated by about ten years, in the United States, the rise of new interest and new methods in the study of urban communities. Perhaps this was because the rural community is a smaller group, and therefore appears to be easier to study objectively. The work of Galpin, briefly described in the preceding chapter, was really essentially a contribution to the study of the community as a social and economic unit. Several appreciative though elementary books describing the rural community and the country village have been written in the past fifteen years. Anderson's *The Country Town* was a pioneer work in this field; *The Little Town,* by H. P. Douglass, is an interesting volume of somewhat later date. A number of brief research bulletins dealing with rural life and rural or small-town communities have been published by the agricultural experiment stations established at various state agricultural colleges in the United States; and since Galpin has been acting as chief of the Bureau of Rural Life Studies of the United States Department of Agriculture, similar research and popular bulletins dealing with various aspects of rural and village social life have been issued by that department. A considerable part of the academic activity resulting from this development of interest in rural

[8] The point is clearly made by N. S. Shaler in *Nature and Man in North America;* see also "Geographic Principles in the Study of Cities," by D. C. Ridgley, in *Journal of Geography,* Vol. XXIV (February, 1925), pp. 66-68.

communities has, however, gone into the preparation of more or less formal textbooks for use in college classes on "rural sociology," "rural problems," and the like. Such work, of course, contributes indirectly to the accumulation of scientific knowledge about the field in question. The students of rural communities are still working actively on the possibilities of map studies, and of the investigation of statistical and other facts which can be secured with reference to the large-scale map of the community. J. H. Kolb carried on for several years the work begun by Galpin at the University of Wisconsin, and has published several research studies.[9]

Relation of Community to Economic Organization. Some illuminating insights into the types of human communities and their development in relation to the physical environment and the larger economic order have been published by N. S. B. Gras in the form of an elementary interpretation of economic history.[10] It has been the peculiar service which Gras has rendered to have worked out a classification of functional types of communities which is somewhat more fundamental and logical than any which had previously been published. After a description of two early stages in the development of human economy in which there was little or no settlement, Gras proceeds to the discussion of village communities, which he classifies in two main categories with reference to ecological form: (1) compact or nucleated, and (2) non-nucleated. Each of these classes he subdivides, and points out further that not all of the settled population of the earth may be said to live in villages or larger communities at all; in Scandinavia and elsewhere there are regions characterized by scattered farmsteads, not integrated into any villages at all.[11] Following a fundamental economic principle, Gras then distinguishes the town from the village by reference to its more specialized marketing institutions:

[9] See for example "Rural Primary Groups: A Study of Agricultural Neighborhoods," by J. H. Kolb, *Research Bulletin 51, Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of Wisconsin* (in cooperation with U. S. Department of Agriculture), Madison, Wisconsin, 1921.

[10] Gras, N. S. B., *Introduction to Economic History* (New York, 1922).

[11] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 50-61.

When there came into being a class of traders who resided in a market village, and who had stores which not only supplemented the market place but became its rivals, then the economic town was born. . . . When the specialized trader came into existence, located in a market village and trading from his house, he introduced a new economic organization of vast importance, town economy. Such a trader might go (sometimes against town regulations) to the nearest market villages to buy and to sell, but his main business was to concentrate the exchange of goods in his store in his home town.[12]

Passing over the term "city" as an ambiguous one for his purposes, Gras then defines the *metropolis* with reference to a further differentiation of economic function:

The externals [the growth of population, expansion of the area of the metropolis itself and of the district from which it drew its supplies, and even the volume of trade] are significant only in so far as they point to the new function performed by the metropolis, the function of organizing business for a wide metropolitan area.[13]

In this organization of business for a large area there are ultimately four functions involved, according to Gras: (1) the organization of the market, *i.e.*, the development of storage, specialized wholesale dealers, and all the other mercantile facilities essential to the efficient handling of the trade of the area; (2) the industrial development of the metropolitan area—city and hinterland—with reference to the seller's market which is made accessible through the institutions of the metropolitan center; (3) the development of transportation to facilitate the movement of goods in and out of the metropolitan center and to foreign markets; and finally (4) the development of financial organization.

Division of Labor in the Community. All of this differentiation of function connected with the growth of the town and the metropolis involves, however, a corresponding differentiation of structure. As a matter of fact, Herbert Spencer stated in clear and logical fashion a half-century ago some of the basic principles which the work of Gras and other recent students does little more than illustrate and apply, when he traced what he called "the inductions of sociology," in which

[12] Gras, N. S. B., *Introduction to Economic History* (New York, 1922), p. 105.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

he elaborated his famous comparison of a society and an organism.[14] Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* is really much clearer where it deals, consciously or unconsciously, with the economic organization of human society, based on division of labor and cooperation, than where he attempts to formulate the principles of social psychology. It is this structural differentiation of the metropolis which forms the central object of attention of the group of students who have occupied themselves with "human ecology," and, in particular, with the ecological study of urban communities. Mention has been made in the preceding chapter of the contributions of Park, Burgess, and McKenzie, who have sought to study the city and its areas as a manifestation, primarily, of the adaptation of an economic society to the physical conditions set by environment, on the one hand, and to the wishes of human beings, on the other. In the measure in which these and other students have been able to work out fundamental ecological analyses of urban communities, they have found these analyses immediately useful in connection with the investigation of the cultural and political life of the metropolis. There appears to be no logical reason why this developing method may not be used, in its main outlines, to guide the study of regions other than metropolitan areas, and of communities other than metropolitan communities. In fact it has more than a little in common with the method devised by Galpin for studying the "rurban" community—the country village with its immediate hinterland. The program outlined by Park in his first paper on the study of the city,[15] was in fact suggested in part by the work of Galpin.

Social Differentiation in the Community. The present trend in the study of human communities may be said to be characterized by three main tendencies. In the first place, there is a tendency headed by Professor Park, who represents a renewed emphasis on the investigation of the economic phase of community life and organization. From Park's point of view, the community is a unit of human population based on division

[14] Spencer, Herbert, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Pt. II.

[15] Park, Robert E., "The City; Suggestions for the Study of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment," first printed in *American Journal of Sociology* for March, 1915; reprinted as Chapter I in *The City* (Chicago, 1925), by R. E. Park and others.

of labor and specialization of personal occupations; the urban community is a place where all sorts of extreme personality types are found, because it is in the great city that they can find a place to live and develop their peculiar bent. The city both develops and evokes, and attracts specialized types of persons, and this is a tendency based on its economic nature. Park has suggested that the efficiency of the community, at least its potential efficiency, may be measured by its equipment of specialists; the city may be thought of as an organism possessed of a "mind" which is composed of cooperating specialized personalities.[16] A second tendency in the study of the community is that growing out of the so-called "community organization movement." Under the leadership of social case workers, settlement workers, and those interested in various programs of reform and community betterment, there has arisen a more or less concerted attempt to improve the organization of the modern community. Old-fashioned local government forms are felt to be inadequate to deal with the problems of the modern community and the specialized functions undertaken by its leaders and by specialized groups on behalf of its citizens. These group forces have therefore united, in a measure, in an endeavor to set up "community organization" in a newer and richer sense of the term than is implied in its use by political scientists or by the sociologists who concern themselves primarily with the natural organization which grows up spontaneously in the community. The proponents of "community organization" have however found it necessary, in order to succeed in their efforts, to take time to study the natural organization of the community and the natural factors and forces which must be taken into account by the one who desires to achieve some ideal end by artificial means. Thus there has developed a group of experts who are also making contributions to our scientific knowledge of the human community, through their investigations of the factors which they find they have to take into account in the promotion of their practical programs.

City Planning and Its Reaction upon Social Research. In the third place, studies of communities are being made for

[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 113.

the purpose of providing scientific information and insight as a basis for city planning. The city-planning movement is, like the community organization movement, primarily a practical program for the improvement of the physical plan and equipment of towns and cities. Frequently it has been little more than an æsthetic endeavor, in some of its concrete manifestations. But whatever their motives, the city-planning enthusiasts have found as have the community organizers that a city cannot be planned or re-planned "out of whole cloth"; one must take natural factors and natural tendencies into account. Hence some very thoroughgoing, intensive studies of the economic life of communities, their traffic problems, the growth of their populations, and other phases of community life have been made by city-planning experts and organizations, as preliminaries to the formulation of plans for the reconstruction of city streets, the future development of parks and boulevards, and the guidance and limitation of future building.

It may be assumed that all of the forces and processes found anywhere in human society are represented in some form or other in almost any fair-sized community. Interest has therefore been lent to these studies of communities made by those whose proximate purposes were practical, for the students of human society who have been primarily interested in the development and refinement of a body of scientific and systematic knowledge. It may be plausibly argued that if we knew enough about any great modern city, and had our knowledge organized in a systematic and logical form, with the appropriate abstractions indicated, we should have all the content necessary for a general science of sociology. Certainly the study of the community has proved in recent years to be one of the most popular and effective foci for the interests and efforts of the students of social theory.

CHAPTER VIII

COMPETITION AND DIVISION OF LABOR

The idea of division of labor is, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, a comparatively ancient one, clearly grasped in its elementary form by Plato and Aristotle, although they had little appreciation of the possibilities of geographic specialization. Division of labor was for the ancients, however, a matter to be studied and interpreted with reference to that ideally-determined order of things which formed the center of nearly all of their thinking; there is no evidence in their writings that Plato, Aristotle, or any other ancient or medieval writer had any understanding of the relation of the division of labor or any other aspect of the economic structure of society to a natural process of competition in which economic institutions were fashioned and changed. Conflict has been of course a familiar topic of discussion since very early times, since war and factional strife were familiar facts of human experience. The disposition of philosophers and ecclesiastical writers was, however, to explain conflict by reference to the tendencies of human nature in rulers and subjects, rather than to look upon it as an outgrowth and sharpened form of a natural biological and economic struggle. It remained for Adam Smith, writing at the end of the eighteenth century, and reviewing what was then known concerning the division of labor, to point to competition as a natural process whereby the economic order was developed and maintained.

Adam Smith and "The Wealth of Nations." The date of the first edition of *The Wealth of Nations,* 1776, might in fact be taken as a convenient one to mark a shift of interest among the students of social problems, from social structure and the ideas or ideals by which it should be regulated, to social process—the process, that is, in which the structure is wrought out and changed, and of which, in fact, it is simply the cross-

section. If Adam Smith may be regarded as the pioneer writer on the natural process of economic society, Gumplowicz, writing late in the nineteenth century, may be named as the first to state clearly some of the broader and more abstract implications of the idea of social process. It was in the middle of the nineteenth century that the idea of a natural process determinative of the content of customs and morals began to appear in the writings of students of the history of law and of "folk psychology." The process concept is implicitly, if not explicitly, present in Walter Bagehot's *Physics and Politics* (1872).

Emphasis on Social Ideals. This late appearance of the concept of process in social theory was probably due in part to the fact that, as a matter of actual history, change in human institutions was on the whole very gradual down to the times which we call "modern." Such changes in the social order as did occur were for the most part connected with dramatic historic events, catastrophes, like the downfall of the Athenian power at the close of the Peloponnesian War, the conquests of Alexander the Great, and the barbarian invasions of Rome. In such times it was plausible to think of the social order as in essence static, and of the changes which did occur as due to the arbitrary action of human or divine agents, or of "Fate." In the ancient world, the typical explanation of this or that feature of the social order ran in terms of an ideal pattern, laid down by a god or a legendary hero. The task of the philosopher was to describe and to rationalize this ideal given pattern, rather than to describe and account for existing facts in terms of natural process. Even though, as in Plato's writings, the gods and heroes recede into the background of the exposition offered, the effort is still to discover by reflective analysis the ideal social pattern. "What is the best constitution?" is the central query in the political dialogues of Plato and in the *Politics* of Aristotle.

In the middle ages the case was not fundamentally different. So far as the general organization of society was concerned, the effect of the dissolution of the old Roman Empire in the period which may be taken as complete with the coronation of

Charlemagne in 800 A.D., was to facilitate the development of feudalism, the scheme hit upon for salvaging the remnants of the classical civilization and for providing a minimum of protection for the mass of the people. Feudalism was, however, a social order based on the idea of fixity of status, and it called forth from the scholastic writers, who were the only influential philosophers of the time, a theory or science of society calculated to justify and interpret the system as it was. Aside from certain disputes over the division of sovereignty between Emperor and Pope, the scholastic social theory resembles that of the ancients in that its purpose seems to be the description and rationalization of an existing pattern. The main trend of ecclesiastical social philosophy from the Fathers and Augustine through Thomas Aquinas is such as to support the existing order of both temporal and religious authority.[1] Only in Machiavelli's *Prince* do we find displayed some spirit of inquiry into the "process of government," and Machiavelli, it will be recalled, lived in a particularly turbulent, variable political society.

Early Modern Economic Theories. On the economic side of life, practically the only changes which occurred in the western world from the time of Plato to the eighteenth century were those which affected the character and extent of marketing relations, and the concomitant use of money and credit. Commercial intercourse had undergone considerable development under the protection of the classical *pax Romana,* and, after a setback in the time of the barbarian invasions, commerce continued to develop in extent from the time of Charlemagne.[2] It is natural, therefore, that medieval economic thought should have for its only topics the just price, the problem of usury, and the question of sound currency.[2a] After the explorations of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-

[1] Hearnshaw, F. J. C. (editor), *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediæval Thinkers:* see especially Hearnshaw and Carlyle, "St. Augustine and the City of God," *loc. cit.,* pp. 47-48; also Aveling, Rev. F., "St. Thomas Aquinas and the Papal Monarchy," *loc. cit.,* p. 94.

[2] Clarke, *The Mediæval City State,* pp. 18-19, 26-30.

[2a] Monroe, Arthur Eli: *Early Economic Thought, passim;* see especially selection from Nicholas Oresme, *Traictie de la Première Invention des Monnoies, op. cit.,* p. 80 ff. See also *ibid.,* pp. 123 ff., 134.

turies had enlarged the market relations of European cities, however, competition became rather suddenly an important feature of economic life. At first this competition took the form largely of rivalry between the rising national states, and the economic theory which developed to meet the need of guiding principles in this situation was of the sort which we know in general as mercantilism—the doctrine of strengthening the state for its struggle for existence and power. This interest persists through the time of Adam Smith and is displayed in the title of his *magnum opus, The Wealth of Nations.* The larger markets were responsible, however, for the development of larger-scale enterprises, and for the consequent extension of the advantages of division of labor or specialization. All this involved domestic as well as international competition. Enterprising merchants and manufacturers, desirous of taking advantage of the new opportunities for gain, clamored for the removal of medieval restrictions on trade and industry which interfered with the operations which they wished to carry on. They argued that the wealth of the nation could most effectively be maintained and enlarged under a *laissez-faire* régime. This tendency found its first scientific champions in the physiocratic school,[3] but it was the merit of Adam Smth to be the first to formulate an illuminating and intelligible statement of the new tendency in commerce and industry.

Adam Smith and the Division of Labor. In the opening chapters of *The Wealth of Nations* Adam Smith sets forth a descriptive analysis of the various forms of division of labor which was surprisingly penetrating for a pioneer effort, and which has been regarded as classical ever since, although it was not strictly original, but was taken in substance from Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767).[4] Concerning this feature of the economic order of society, Adam Smith has really just two interpretive generalizations to offer: (1) that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market, and (2) that it enhances the pro-

[3] Bigelow, Carl Worth, "Economics," in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, p. 346 ff.

[4] Wickett, S. Morley (translator), *Bücher's Industrial Evolution* (New York, 1904), p. 283.

ductivity of industry. In a later passage,[5] occurs the author's equally classical discussion of competition, in which he demonstrates that "as every individual . . . endeavors as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry and so to direct that industry that its product may be of the greatest value, every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. . . . He is led . . . by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention." As to the cause or origin of the division of labor, Adam Smith ascribes it to a natural propensity on the part of mankind to trade and barter. This explanation is so obviously inadequate that little attention has been paid to it since it was proposed; indeed the remark that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market has been felt to come much nearer to a causal explanation of the division of labor than does the formal explanation our author proposes.

Static Tendencies of Nineteenth Century. What really emerges from Adam Smith's discussion of competition and the division of labor, then, is the twofold perception that (1) in occupational specialization we may observe a very fundamental feature of the economic organization of human society, one which, under circumstances at least, makes possible greater production of utilities than could otherwise be had from the same amount of labor; and (2) that the extension of the division of labor is made possible by the enlargement of markets which had been taking place rapidly during the period preceding the writing of *The Wealth of Nations.* David Ricardo, the first important successor of Adam Smith in the line of economists, virtually assumes the validity of his predecessor's account of these basic features of economic life, and attempts no significant addition to it. In a similar way, the writers of the Austrian or psychological, and the so-called neoclassical school of economic thought have accepted with little comment the Smithian theory of competition, and have directed their efforts to the elucidation of the mechanism by which prices are determined in a competitive market. Modern critics

[5] *The Wealth of Nations* (London, 1904), pp. 419-21; adapted in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1922), pp. 551-53.

of the marginalist and neo-classical economists agree that the common characteristic of the writers of this school is their almost exclusive concern with the problems of a static economic society. In a static economic order, there is no need of a theory of process. Furthermore, the publication of Darwin's great biological works in the 1850's operated to confirm the classical economists in their adherence to the *laissez-faire* attitude. What the Darwinian theory was thought to imply for economic society was that free competition would inevitably work for the greatest welfare of all. Since it was a process which could be counted upon to work automatically, if it were only left unhampered by the government, there was no occasion to study it; the task of the economist was, essentially, to perfect his demonstration of the inevitability of "economic law," and the consequent folly of governmental interference in the interest of the unfortunate. Every student of economics has learned by experience that there is a certain esthetic satisfaction in the manipulation of the supply-and-demand diagrams and in their application to hypothetical situations from which all "disturbing" factors have been consciously or unconsciously omitted. Doubtless this esthetic satisfaction has had something to do with the long-continued popularity of the neo-classical economics and its variants.[6]

The German "Historical School" of Economic Thought. The theory of free competition derived by Ricardo and others from *The Wealth of Nations* was never very popular in Germany, probably because it seemed to have so little relation with their circumstances and traditions.[7] During the nineteenth century and even down to the present time, therefore, the efforts of the German economists have been directed in the main in other directions than to the elaboration and refinement of the marginalist theory of prices in a competitive market. Probably the most influential of the rival schools which developed in Germany was the Historical School. It is in the writings of the German Historical Economists that the foundations are laid for a revision and elaboration of the theory of competition and division of labor. The earlier members of this group re-

[6] Clark, J. M., "Recent Developments in Economics," in *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences,* edited by E. C. Hayes (Philadelphia and London, 1927), p. 237 ff.

[7] Small, Albion W., *Origins of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), pp. 132-33.

frained meticulously from the formulation of theories, holding that a great deal of historical and descriptive investigation must precede the development of theory.[8] Gustav Schmoller, Wilhelm Roscher, and others, however, did attempt some revision and amplification of Adam Smith's general description of the process of competition. Later Werner Sombart, starting from a brief review of their work, included a series of chapters on competition in his magnum opus, *Der Moderne Kapitalismus*.[9] He introduces this section with a carefully formulated analysis of economic competition in general, the argument of which it will be worth while to summarize.

In keeping with the general purpose of the study, Sombart interests himself in competition with particular reference to the question regarding the nature of the process by which the medieval industrial system, characterized by "handwork," and by productive efforts motivated simply by the desire to earn a living appropriate to one's station in life, has been so largely replaced by "capitalism" and by production and distribution motivated by the desire for profits. Production for sale at a profit, however, is not simply an economic system which has replaced an earlier one in the western world as the result of the competition of the later with the earlier system; it is a system which involves in itself a form of competition, and it is this familiar modern type of competition which tends to shape our conception of the nature of the competitive process. Under this modern form of competition a competitor succeeds either because he offers better wares or performance of service, or because he offers the same goods cheaper. He can offer a better, more satisfactory order of wares or services either by offering intrinsically better wares, or by delivering them more acceptably. A competitor can succeed in the struggle to offer goods at lower prices either by offering something which meets the same need but which is composed of cheaper materials, or by lowering his costs of production. What the foregoing analysis shows is, however, briefly stated, that success in the competitive struggle depends upon satisfying the demands of

[8] Small, Albion W., *Origins of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), p. 204 ff. See also Bigelow, *op. cit.*, p. 378 ff.; and Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-20.
[9] *Op. cit.*, Vol. II (Leipzig, 1902), p. 423 ff.

the public; that is, success in competition is a manifestation of greater adaptation for survival, in the language of the biologists, under the conditions determined by the general form of the socio-economic order. It is the general task which Sombart has set himself in this book, then, to show how the conditions of economic and cultural life changed at the beginning of the "modern" period, so as to offer a survival advantage to the capitalistic, profit-motivated form of industrial organization, with all that it involves of subdivision of labor and large-scale business establishments. This explanation he finds in the interaction of a number of factors, among others the increase of wealth, the increase of the supply of the precious metals, the decay of the attitude of acceptance of a customary class standard of living, increased mobility of certain elements in the population, development of new tastes and new forms of consumption, and the standardization of goods.

Competition and Socialization. Simmel has perhaps worked out a more refined analysis of the process of competition than has any other author, in a passage in his *Soziologie* in which he treats economic competition, together with other forms of rivalry, as a special type of conflict.[10] In the preceding discussion he lays down the general principle that conflict is not only a process whereby socialization may be promoted, but is in itself a form of socialization.[11] This thesis is possibly derived from one stated by Gumplowicz, who pointed out that any natural process is capable of resolution in the last analysis into two sets of factors, heterogeneous elements and some type of interaction taking place among these elements. In the case of human society Gumplowicz identified the many groups of which a society is composed as the heterogeneous elements—heterogeneous because ethnically dissimilar. With the aptness of this phase of his thesis we need not concern ourselves here; it might be argued that any natural process is analyzed ultimately by the scientist into an interaction of *homogeneous* elements. The form of interaction which is the essence of the human social process Gumplowicz

[10] *Op. cit.* (Leipzig, 1918); see also Spykman, Nicholas J., *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925), p. 121 ff.
[11] *Ibid.*, see also Spykman, *op. cit.*, p. 112 ff.

characterizes as follows: "Every stronger ethnic or social group strives to subjugate or make serviceable to its purposes every weaker element which exists or may come within the field of its influence." [12] Some such universal tendency of human beings to exploit or make use of one another, either individually or collectively, appears to be the assumption underlying Simmel's account of competition as a type of social conflict. Exploiting or making use of another person or group is obviously not a purely dissociative form of interaction, but one which operates in the long run to organize society through the selection and reciprocal adaptation of the human elements of which it is composed. This is essentially the line of reasoning which Simmel develops at great length. Competition, he points out, is an indirect form of struggle; its object is, as Sombart also shows, to gain something from a third party—not from the competitor—by serving him better or more cheaply.[13] Viewed in this light, competition is seen as a process which makes for the adaptation of means to ends; the ends, moreover, are determined by the society within which the competition takes place, or, at any rate, by persons and classes within that large society, not by the competitors.[14] This is of course a rationalized interpretation of Adam Smith's cryptic reference to the "invisible hand." Simmel also discusses the limitations placed upon competition by society. Since competition perforce takes place within an existing social order, and since it is a struggle which takes place with reference to ends determined by society, it is natural that there should arise in some cases a definite group consciousness of the ends in question, and a collective plan for the attainment of those ends. Such a collective plan for the attainment of social ends—a social technique—may involve the placing of limitations upon competition, or even its entire elimination. Socialism, strictly so-called, is an example of such a technique; custom and moral tradition likewise restrict or eliminate competition between members of the same family.[15] Law and morals are more deep-seated, pervasive, and spontaneously evolved social forces which likewise operate

[12] Gumplowicz, Ludwig, *Der Rassenkampf* (Innsbruck, 1893), pp. 158-61; translated and adapted in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 346 ff.
[13] Sombart, *op. cit., loc. cit.*
[14] Sombart, *loc. cit.;* Simmel, *loc. cit.;* Spykman, *loc. cit.*
[15] Simmel, *op. cit.*

to restrict competition, particularly as regards the means which competitors may use in their struggle.[16] Competition also generates in some cases forms of self-limitation on the part of the competitors, as in the case of price-fixing agreements and similar arrangements entered into by competing producers or merchants.

In the foregoing résumé of Simmel's interpretation of competition, we have seen that he develops a conception of a general relation existing between the forms of competition and the economic organization of a society. The same relation is discussed by Sombart. This relation is seen by recent economists to be a reciprocal one; competition sustains and changes the existing economic structure of society, but the forms of competition are also affected and changed by the existing social and economic organization. In some cases and to a certain extent competition tends to produce standardization or homogeneity in the organization of economic activity, as, for instance, when manufacturers of clothing compete for business and must follow the fashion, or when an automobile manufacturer builds up an enormous output through the sales advantage of a low price made possible by the fact that "it's all one model."

The Relation of Competition to the Division of Labor. Competition is, however, also the process by which the division of labor is determined and promoted. Adam Smith saw this; in fact it is his famous "invisible hand" interpretation which formed the starting-point for the development of the so-called "Manchester school" in British economic thought, the teaching that *laissez-faire* was the public policy calculated to produce the greatest economic welfare, since it would bring it about that each would seek out the occupation in which he could best serve the society in which he lives. Park has expressed the same thesis somewhat more explicitly in a recent paper:

> Within the limits of the ecological organization, so far as a free exchange of goods and services exists, there inevitably grows up another type of community organization based on the division of labor. This is what we may call the occupational organization of the community.

[16] *Ibid.*

The occupational organization, like the ecological, is a product of competition. Eventually, every individual member of the community is driven, as a result of competition with every other, to do the thing he *can do* rather than the thing he *would like to do*. Our secret ambitions are seldom realized on our actual occupations. The struggle to live determines finally not only where we shall live within the limits of the community, but what we shall do.[17]

Competition, then, may be studied as the process in which the economic structure of society is formed and changed. Since division of labor is the term which is used to refer to one of the most fundamental aspects of the economic structure, the history of recent economic thought may be regarded, in part, as the history of the progress which has been made in describing these two aspects of economic life, competition and the division of labor, in their inter-related development and functioning.

The "Organic Analogy." The division of labor appealed to nineteenth-century German economists of the Historical School, even as did the process of competition, as a topic calling for a more detailed description than had been given by Adam Smith. It is, however, a theme which occupies an important place in the writings of many economists and sociologists who have been active since the middle of the nineteenth century; the German Historical Economists are entitled to credit only for having scrutinized the actual facts somewhat more closely than did other writers. The division of labor is in fact, although not designated by that term, the basis of the so-called "organic analogy" which is so prominent in the sociology of Herbert Spencer, Paul von Lilienfeld, Guillaume De Greef, and René Worms. It had been discussed by Comte in the *Positive Philosophy,* and by John Stuart Mill in his *Political Economy.* It is one of the themes underlying the argument of Ferdinand Tönnies in *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft;* the same might be said for the sociological writings of Max Weber. Of the German economists Roscher, Knies, List, Brentano, Sombart, Schmoller, and Bücher may be mentioned as important contributors to the discussion of the division of

[17] Park, Robert E. and others, *The City* (Chicago, 1925), p. 116.

labor. Even a moderately comprehensive summary of the contributions of these writers would exceed the proportionate limits imposed by the scope of the present volume. Finally we must take some account of the work of Durkheim, who made the division of labor the subject of an entire volume, *De la Division du Travail Social.*

Division of Labor and Interdependence. For the sake of compactness, we may summarize these many contributions to the study of the division of labor as a theoretic social problem under three headings. (1) We have noted in previous chapters how the study of "human geography" led to an increasing appreciation of the significance of the "geographic division of labor." As markets widen and the means of transportation and communication are improved, the competition of more and more widely separated communities and regions develops, with the general consequence of establishing specialized industries and forms of business enterprise in localities where, in part for reasons of historic advantage, in part because of differences of natural resources and accessible location, the special functions can be most effectively or most cheaply carried on. This phase of the division of labor forms the basic theme of modern studies of international relations and diplomatic history.[18] (2) The division of labor in all its forms and manifestations is seen as the structure and process whereby the *adaptation* or *accommodation* is effected between human beings and their physical environment. From this point of view, which is that emphasized by Carl Bücher, division of labor is regarded primarily as a fundamental aspect of the technological organization of society.[19] (3) Auguste Comte emphasizes the fact that division of labor, as it increases, involves increased *interdependence;* it therefore necessitates a corresponding perfection of means and methods of cooperation, and the development of social control and common ideals and objectives in order that the divisive tendency may not operate purely as a centrifugal force in human society. This third

[18] See for example Greer, Guy, *The Ruhr-Lorraine Industrial Problem,* New York, 1925.

[19] Wickett, *Bücher's Industrial Evolution,* Chaps. VII and VIII.

phase of the problem has engaged the attention of nearly all the writers who have dealt with the division of labor; Comte's treatment of the topic is distinguished simply by his greater emphasis on the correlated problem of solidarity.[20] Durkheim's account of the "social division of labor," and, indeed, his whole body of sociological writings, can be interpreted as the elaboration of this third point of view. It is significant that Durkheim's study of the division of labor was his doctoral thesis and thus constituted the starting-point of his sociological studies. His interest in the religious life may be seen as a derivative of the earlier inquiry.[21]

Economic Competition and Social Differentiation. Since Darwin published his classical works in which he propounded the hypothesis of natural selection, the interests of students of human society have been directed toward an aspect of competition and the division of labor not specifically discussed in the previous pages of this chapter: namely, the possibility of using these concepts as a basis for the interpretation of social *differentiation,* that is, the existence within the human race of more or less distinct types of individuals, segregated to some extent in nationalities, races, castes, and social classes. We have surveyed briefly the development of theories of race and nationality in an earlier chapter of this book; it is, however, to a theory of class and caste that the study of competition and division of labor makes the more direct contribution. The earliest and most naïve reaction of sociologists to the Darwinian theory was the development which came to be known as "social Darwinism," the elaboration of arguments and data to show that individual differences, race differences, caste differences, and even class differences might be accounted for in terms of natural selection and biological inherited adaptation. The writings of Gumplowicz, Novicow, and Vacher de Lapouge are representative of this tendency, which has been continued, with some modifications, by such recent writers as

[20] *Positive Philosophy* (translated and adapted by Harriet Martineau; London, 1896), pp. 291-95.

[21] Durkheim, Emile, *De la Division de Travail Social* (Paris, many editions); *Les Regles de la Methode Sociologique* (Paris; several editions); *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London and New York, 1915, 1926). See especially pp. 32-34, 88-90, 391 ff. in the first-mentioned work.

J. W. Gregory, Lothrop Stoddard, Madison Grant, and William McDougall.[22]

Gustav Schmoller set forth in his monumental *Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre* a qualified application of the natural selection theory to the existing class structure of society in the countries of the western world.[23] The more recent tendency, however, has been that typified in Karl Bücher's chapter on "the formation of social classes," in which he points out that one need not postulate a strictly biological or germinal selection and inheritance to account for the formation and perpetuation of the human types which we think of as characteristic of the several social classes. That class differences exist is not questioned; Bücher contends, however, that the transmission of a tradition and a body of customs peculiar to the class, and the effect of a special type of rearing and education upon the children of members of a distinct social class are sufficient to account for most differences in personality type between members of different social classes.[24] The explanation has shifted, in other words, from natural selection and biological heredity to *social* or *cultural* selection and "social heritage." Since the opening of the present century, a number of writers have contributed to this discussion through studies of special aspects of the problem, and descriptive and historical studies of particular classes or types of social differentiation.[25] Professor C. C. North has summed up the whole question in a recent volume, *Social Differentiation,* in which he attempts to reduce to a systematic form the various considerations which

[22] See references given in notes of Chapter IV above.

[23] Bücher, *op. cit.,* p. 328 ff. Also Schmoller, Gustav, *Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkwirtschaftslehre,* Vol. I, Bk. II, Chap. VI (Leipzig, 1901), pp. 391-411.

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 333 ff.

[25] See for example, Nieboer, H. J., *Slavery as an Industrial System* (The Hague, 1900). See also selections quoted by Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* pp. 674-88; also Veblen, Thorstein, *Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York, 1909, and later editions); Cooley, C. H., *Social Organization* (New York, 1909), Pt. IV, "Social Classes"; and Gahlbeck, Pontus E., *Die Klassen und die Gesellschaft* (Jena, 1922). A German writer has published within the past few years a volume entitled *Klasse und Stand* (*Class and Status*), but I am unable to verify the reference as this manuscript is prepared for press.

must be taken into account in a comprehensive interpretation of the subject.[26]

Biological Aspects of Social Differentiation. The fundamental problems which arise in connection with the study of social differentiation turn out upon careful study and reflection to be somewhat different than was supposed by most writers of the late nineteenth century. That there are deep-seated differences between individuals corresponding to the differences in their class or caste status—differences which cannot be nullified by the mere exercise of "free will" or self-determination on the part of the individual—is no longer denied by the thoughtful students of the practical problems involved. It may also be regarded as established that a part at least of the differences which we observe to exist between individuals are inborn and hereditary in the biological sense of the term. The psychologist Edward L. Thorndike has perhaps done more than anyone else to systematize our fund of knowledge about these matters.[27]

There are, however, at least three more or less distinct possible explanations of the differences between individuals which we find to exist in fact, and it must be determined by careful investigation which of the three explanations applies to a given trait, even though that trait may be shown to be, in a given individual, very deep-rooted and difficult to modify in such a manner as to make him resemble certain other individuals in this particular respect. The first explanation, and the one which became popular with scientists and others immediately after the Darwinian hypothesis was widely familiar, is that differences of function and social status, created in part by the division of labor and in part by war and other political processes, have *selected* from the total population of a given society those individuals who were able to perform the functions or maintain themselves in the status in question most effectively under the existing circumstances. The distinct individual traits and capacities which enable the individual to fill a given place are ordinarily assumed, under this explana-

[26] North, Cecil C., *Social Differentiation* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1926).
[27] *The Original Nature of Man* (New York, 1913); *Individuality* (Boston, 1911).

tion, to be inborn and biologically inherited differences. Now, since it is a well-known fact that there has been, in the past, a historic tendency for children to follow the same type of occupations and to have the same social status as their parents, the long-run effect of this process of selection would be to cause class and caste differences to be based upon inborn individual differences; that is, class and caste differences would be hereditary in the biological as well as in the legal and cultural sense.[28]

The Cultural Interpretation. A second explanation of individual differences as we find them in actual society is stated in terms of "acquired characters," to use the biological term, or education and inculcation, to use terms which refer to the social processes by which adjustment of individuals to social functions and to differences of status is said by those who favor this explanation to take place. It is pointed out that persons who occupy a given rank or status in society are in a favorable position to acquire and to transmit to their children the ways of behaving which will tend to enable them to maintain themselves in this status. The father who exercises a given calling or trade is in a strategic position to see that his son is properly prepared to exercise that or some closely related trade, and also to secure for his son a "start" in that line of work. It is maintained that differences of inborn capacity, so far as they can be measured with certainty and accuracy, are not at all closely correlated with differences of occupation and social position. This type of explanation of class and caste differences, then, tends to account for the facts in question in terms of education and opportunity, or "social inheritance." [29] Few contemporary writers, however, hold that this explanation is valid absolutely, to the entire exclusion of the selective explanation. Professor North adopts, in his book referred to above, a moderate position. He takes it for granted, as the finding of psychologists and biologists, that inborn individual

[28] This is the general point of view set forth by Schmoller in the passage cited above and summarized by Bücher, *loc. cit.* It is also the general thesis sustained by Gumplowicz in his various writings, and by Vacher de Lapouge in *Les Selections Sociales.*

[29] This is the thesis advocated by Bücher in his critique of Schmoller. The term "social inheritance" has been popularized by Graham Wallas through his book, *Our Social Heritage.*

differences exist, and makes it his general task to inquire into the processes by which individuals are fitted into the existing social and economic structure.[30] He states that "the process by which the individual finds his particular specialty within a general class of occupations is not open to very careful analysis." This proposition, however, obviously applies only to the smaller differences between individuals which are connected with differences of occupation within the same general social class. As to the larger differences which appear, on the average to distinguish members of the laboring class from those of the professional class or the "business man" class, North suggests, rather cautiously, that these differences are transmitted by inculcation, from parents to children, so as to tend to perpetuate class lines through successive generations. To understand class traits one must take into account the status into which one was born, or in which he has been reared.[31] A similar line of thought has long been familiar to economists as Cairnes' theory of "non-competing groups." Cairnes, a Scotch economist, held that occupations may be divided into a few large groups, and that change of occupation from father to son *within one group* was easy and frequent, but that movement from one group to another was difficult, especially if it meant movement upward in the pecuniary scale.[32]

The Sociological Theory of Personality. Several writers have recently contributed to the formulation of a third type of explanation of individual differences, one which does not necessarily contradict, but which rather supplements, each of the other two. From the point of view adopted by this group of writers, "personality" is a term which as commonly used designates the sum total of those traits of the individual which determine his place or rôle in society. Social differentiation, as a name for the complex and variegated pattern which is presented upon close inspection by a society viewed as an aggregate of individuals, is then seen as a condition of fact which might be described by enumerating and describing the many

[30] *Op. cit.*, Chap. I.
[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 235-36, 254-66.
[32] Clark, J. B., "The Limits of Competition," in Clark and Giddings, *The Modern Distributive Process*, pp. 2-8; quoted (adapted) by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 545-551.

different personalities which are articulated in the social organism. But personality, thought of as a name for the social rôle of the individual, can be seen as something which is as much a result as a cause or source of human relationships. The personality of the individual, in other words, although it is indisputably somehow embodied in his physiological and anatomical make-up, is not something independent of his place in society, affecting it but not affected by it; personality changes when one's relationships and contacts change. This is a principle which has been developed largely owing to the studies of gifted social case workers; it has perhaps never been more clearly stated than by Mary E. Richmond, in her little volume, *What is Social Case Work?*

> A Scotch metaphysician of the eighteenth century wrote, "When a man loses his estate, his health, his strength, he is still the same person *and has lost nothing of his personality.*" Few social workers would agree with the italicized portion of this sentence. Loss of social status and health, if at the same time it revealed untapped resources within and without, might possibly develop a man's personality, but could hardly leave it unchanged. In fact such losses cripple personality far more often than they strengthen it.[33]

In so far, however, as the personality may be regarded as the sum total of the individual's habits and attitudes, or behavior tendencies, *i.e.,* as something internally determined, studies made by modern social workers and psychiatrists have revealed what is after all only a common-sense point the importance of which has only recently been appreciated by social scientists: namely, that the individual's personality is largely affected by his conception of himself, or of his rôle in society. The essential principle involved here has long been a popular theme with novelists and playwrights; Professor Cooley was probably the first to incorporate it in a scientific treatise.[34] More recently Park and Burgess have reemphasized the point in their general textbook.[35] It is vividly illustrated by a lengthy case study published by the Commonwealth Foundation for the

[33] *Op. cit.,* p. 90.
[34] Cooley, Charles Horton, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, 1902), pp. 151-53.
[35] *Op. cit.,* pp. 55, 70-71, 116-28.

Prevention of Delinquency.[36] This topic is further treated in a later chapter.

Economics as a Natural Science. Since the time of Adam Smith, the economists have made more vigorous and persistent attempts than any other group of social scientists to reduce the explanation of social phenomena to the form of an exact, systematic, and general science. It is inherent in the idea of such a science, however, to state its propositions in such a manner that they describe certain recurrent types of interaction among more or less homogeneous, unchanging units or elements. Chemistry reduces all of the phenomena with which it deals to an explanation which runs in terms of a few simple types of interaction among the uniform atoms of some thirty or forty elements, and lately there is a tendency to go beyond the atom to the electron, in which case we apparently have to do with only one, or at most two sorts of interacting units. Physics also goes back to the electron, when it does not stop provisionally with the molecule. Plant and animal biology carry their analyses back to a few types of cells and chromosomes. Theoretic mechanics assumes in general that the objects with which it deals differ from each other only in mass and shape. Economic theory has deliberately or surreptitiously and unconsciously attempted to carry its analysis of social phenomena back to similarly homogeneous and simple elements—the general type being the "economic man." As economists explored the facts in which they were interested, it became apparent that the economic structure was differentiated; it was composed of a number of types of human atoms; social physics must be regarded as a fairly complex science. But still the postulate was subconsciously made that the units active in the economic process, although of several species, were immutable. More recently, even in the study of the economic aspects of human social life, it is being found necessary to develop a body of scientific theory which shall take into account the modifiability of the human atom. This phase in the development of economic science is only well begun, and it is not yet clear how far it will go. A number of the younger Ameri-

[36] *Three Problem Children* (n.d.). Published by the Joint Committee on Methods of Preventing Delinquency, pp. 11-47, "Mildred."

can economists are proposing, to meet this newly discovered need, to incorporate into economic science some method of studying institutions; this would be of course a fusion of economics with social psychology.[37] Others seem to hold that the old-fashioned "marginalist" economic science is valid for certain purposes, and useful in proportion to its validity, giving a measure of prediction and control over a certain order of human phenomena. If this is the case the academic division of labor may continue to follow approximately the traditional lines in the field of the social sciences; the problems of competition and division of labor, and the resulting differentiation of the economic structure of human society, can be for working purposes differentiated from the problems of human nature and culture, and the latter from the problems of politics and government. That is at any rate the assumption which has been made in the arrangement of the survey of the literature and development of the social sciences which is attempted in this book.

[37] Bigelow, *loc. cit.*, pp. 392-94; Clark, J. M., *loc. cit.*, pp. 260-61, 271-83; *The Trend of Economics*, edited by Rexford Guy Tugwell, *passim.*

CHAPTER IX

COMMERCE AND THE MARKET

Competition and Division of Labor. In the preceding chapter we have traced the outstanding developments in the evolution of one of the fundamental concepts of economic theory, the concept of competition. It has been an initial postulate of most economists since Adam Smith that competition is a natural process by the working of which the economic structure of human society is created and maintained. The aspect of that economic structure which has most interested the economists until recently is the division of labor, and this, in turn, has been regarded for the most part as a matter of the specialization of the occupations carried on by individuals, and the consequent increase of social differentiation. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, the students of economic phenomena have become increasingly interested in another very fundamental aspect of the economic order, one which likewise has a structural and a functional aspect. Competition, in fact, is in its human economic manifestations inevitably correlated with exchange, or commerce, and commerce involves the organization of economic society into markets. People do not compete with one another, in the sense in which the term is ordinarily used by economists, unless they are seeking to dispose of their goods and services in a common market. Commerce might in fact be defined as the process of integration by the operation of which a society is enabled to survive in spite of the functional differentiation which we call the division of labor. The effect of commerce is to bind human persons together in economic groups which we sometimes call markets, although the market is more commonly regarded as a place rather than as a group. The market place is simply the center at which the specialized efforts of many persons and many communities are organized into a rough degree of unity with

reference to the needs and demands of the whole group, on the one hand, and the possibilities of commerce with other markets on the other hand. There can be found in modern economic literature a number of contributions to the elaboration and elucidation of this thesis, which was first stated in an elementary form by Adam Smith.

Aristotle's View of Commerce. As a matter of historical fact, Aristotle perceived quite clearly that the exchange of the products of different localities in an urban market was one of the means whereby human needs could be more easily and completely met than by the productive activities which might be carried on in a completely self-supporting city-state.

> Every one would agree in praising the state which is most entirely self-sufficing; and that must be the state which is all-producing, for to have all things and to want nothing is sufficiency. In size and extent it should be such as to enable the inhabitants to live temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of leisure. . . .
>
> Whether a communication with the sea is beneficial to a well-ordered state or not is a question which has often been asked. It is argued that the introduction of strangers brought up under other laws, and the increase of population, will be adverse to good order, and that intercourse by sea is inimical to good government. Apart from these considerations, it would undoubtedly be better, both with a view to safety and to the provision of necessaries, that the city and territory should be connected with the sea. . . . It is necessary that they should import from abroad what is not found in their own country and that they should export what they have in excess; for a city ought to be a market, not indeed for others, but for herself.[1]

As the foregoing passage and its context show, Aristotle shared the Greek prejudice against trade as a demoralizing influence. He held that the market should be restrained from developing into the dominant feature of the life of the city: "Those who make themselves a market for the world only do so for the sake of revenue, and if a state ought not to desire profit of this kind it ought not to have such an emporium." [2] That "a state ought not to desire profit of this kind" is assumed to be demonstrated at length in the argument which precedes the passage quoted.

[1] Aristotle: *The Politics* (Jowett's translation), Bk. VII, Chap. V.
[2] *Ibid.*, Chap. VI.

Attitude of Roman Writers Toward Commerce. One might expect to find in the works of Roman writers of the imperial period important contributions to a theory of commerce and the market, since such tremendous concrete developments in the field of commercial organization took place under the Empire. In fact, however, the only important contribution of the Romans to economic thought was an indirect one, contained in the elaborate body of law and legal theory which the later Roman writers produced.[3] Karl Bigelow states in a recent paper that "at no point in her full cycle of political and economic history did Rome produce a writer who passed beyond the conventional Greek praise of agriculture and deprecation of trade." [4] To be sure, various Roman writers recorded their observations and their hearsay knowledge concerning the facts of economic life and practice of the peoples of the Empire. These observations, however, were as a rule accompanied by remarks displaying the same depreciatory estimate of trade. Every schoolboy has met with Cæsar's explanation of the military vigor of the Belgæ in the opening paragraph of his *Gallic Wars,* "because the traders least frequently visit them and bring in those things which tend to weaken the mind."

The Church Fathers and the Schoolmen. This same attitude toward commerce persisted throughout the scholastic period in the Christian era. The disposition of the Church Fathers and the schoolmen until after Thomas Aquinas was to look upon trade and commerce as means to an end, to be kept within check by law and piety. The end and aim of trade, as of all other forms of work, was to provide for one's needs and for those of persons dependent upon one, according to their station in life, in order that they might be able to live virtuously.[5] If carried on for other reasons, or beyond the point required for this purpose, the pursuit of wealth was held to be sinful.[6] Trade should be carried on with honesty, and goods and services should be sold at a "just price," propor-

[3] Bigelow, Karl Worth, chapter on "Economics" in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, p. 337.
[4] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[5] Jarrett, Bede, *Social Theories of the Middle Ages,* p. 156.
[6] On this point, see Sombart's discussion of the distinction between the era of "handwork" and that of capitalism, in *Der Moderne Kapitalismus;* see also his *Quintessence of Capitalism.*

tioned to the cost of living according to the station in life of merchant or workman.[7] In general, the market was seen as a phase of the common life which should be carried on according to the precepts of morality and the laws of the church, rather than as a condition of fact to which personal conduct and public policy must in a measure be adjusted. This attitude persisted until about 1500.

Treatment of Commerce by Late Medieval Writers. As trade and commerce developed with the progress of exploration and the improvement of routes and means of communication and transportation from the fourteenth century onward, the writings of the period began to display an increasing tendency to rationalize the existing practice. The encouragement of trade and commerce came to be regarded as a worthy and proper object of governmental policy.[8] Nevertheless, the tendency for several centuries was to regard foreign trade as something which could be controlled by arbitrary regulations made in the interest of the wealth of the nation and of the sovereign. A great part of the economic writings of late medieval and early modern authors is unintelligible unless one appreciated the importance of the fact that the writers generally took it for granted that what one party gains in a commercial transaction, beyond a reasonable compensation for services rendered, the other must lose. The same principle was assumed to hold for the commercial intercourse of nations; it was this principle, in fact, which underlay the whole body of mercantilistic theory.

Mercantilism is the generic term applied to theories and projects calculated to show how a "favorable balance of trade" might be maintained. A favorable balance of trade was one which brought into a country a net cash income through the excess of exports over imports, so that the sovereign might have a store of "treasure" with which to purchase necessaries in time of war, when the normal channels of trade would be interrupted. The idea was in fact quite sound as applied to the purpose of enabling a State to meet military exigencies, but it was not an approach to the study of commerce and the

[7] Jarrett, Bede, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

market calculated to lead to a more and more detailed, realistic apprehension and understanding of the forces and processes actually determining the commercial organization and evolution of societies.

The Physiocrats. The economic theories of the physiocrats were not such as to lead to a more realistic treatment of commerce and the market. Indeed it might be plausibly maintained that the physiocratic economic doctrine was a reactionary one, since it stressed agriculture and the "extractive industries" as the only truly productive forms of human effort. These writers have been acclaimed as the first scientific economists, and evaluation based on their conception of natural law and their attack upon the paternalistic teachings of the Mercantilists; it was the physiocrats who coined the phrases *laissez faire, laissez passer.* It was doubtless a service to the cause of scientific method in the social studies to urge the applicability of the concept of natural law in the realm of human society; there is nothing any more scientific, however, in advocating free trade and freedom of manufacture than in advocating paternalistic regulation of industry and commerce. The custom which modern economists have of praising the physiocrats for their *laissez-faire* doctrine appears to be a survival of the nineteenth-century individualistic bias in economic thought.[9]

Significance of the Work of Economists Before Adam Smith. From one point of view the significant consequence for later social thought of the work of the economists who preceded Adam Smith is to be seen in the body of materials and insights which they accumulated. They were typically men interested in problems of government and administration, trying to discover principles which would serve to guide them in the problems and tasks with which they were confronted. Typically, in their attempts to formulate such principles, they assembled three sorts of material: (1) statistical and other factual data which seemed to illuminate the question in hand to some extent by analogy or similarity; (2) bits of popular philosophy and folk wisdom—fragmentary and isolated generalizations from experience, such as one finds in

[9] Compare Bigelow, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-49.

Machiavelli; and (3) some scheme of most general and inclusive ideas, propositions and concepts intended to integrate the whole, to bring it under some unified point of view and to derive from it some more or less unified ultimate aim or value to be striven for. When economic questions were considered by scholastic writers, the ultimate aims or values were assumed to begin with; they were defined in terms of salvation, the necessity of a political power adequate to maintain peace and order in Christendom, or the furtherance of the "glory of God." To the Mercantilists, a maximum of exports was the end to be promoted, a conception which at any rate led to some investigation of the nature of foreign commerce and the organization of markets. The Physiocrats regarded physical production as the end and aim of economic activity, and this view, while it perhaps contributed to the line of investigation of which *The Wealth of Nations* is a later product, the immediate effect of this shift of emphasis was to divert the attention of the economists from the study of commerce to the study of industry. It was not the least important service rendered by Adam Smith that he succeeded in combining the two interests.

Adam Smith's Interpretation of Commerce. Adam Smith was in fact the first economist to state in a form which was able to make a wide impression the proposition that both parties to an exchange may profit by it, and two countries may each profit by the commerce which takes place between their inhabitants.[10] To Adam Smith belongs the credit also for an illuminating interpretation of the development of towns and cities as marketing centers.

> The inhabitants of a city, it is true, must always ultimately derive their subsistence, and the whole materials and means of their industry, from the country. But those of a city, situated near either the sea coast or the banks of a navigable river, are not necessarily confined to derive them from the country in their neighborhood. They have a much wider range, and may draw them from the most manufactured produce of their own industry, or by performing the office of carriers between distant countries and exchanging the produce of one for that of the other. A city might in this manner grow up to great wealth and splendor, while not only the country in its neighborhood, but all those to which it trades, were in poverty and wretchedness.[11]

[10] *The Wealth of Nations*, Bk. IV, Chap. III.
[11] *Ibid.*, Bk. III, Chap. III; see also Chap. IV.

The passage quoted is followed by a description of the process by which, historically, industries grew up in the towns and cities, and, in the following chapter, an account is given of the manner in which the developing commerce of the towns reacted upon the rural regions to the improvement of the latter.

Most important of all the contributions of Adam Smith to the formation of a permanent and fundamental viewpoint for the study of commerce and the market is his famous dictum that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.[12] The implied proposition that the extension of marketing relations is the most important cause leading to the development and complication of the organization of industry runs through the whole text of *The Wealth of Nations.* To be sure, Adam Smith seeks to account for the extension of commerce in turn by the growth of capital, on the ground that men will turn to commerce as an investment only when they can no longer find profitable employment for their funds in agriculture or in domestic manufactures.[13] To his successors his argument that the extension of commerce is the change needed to make possible the development of the more complex forms of economic and industrial organization has appeared as the more helpful and the more widely applicable principle. There has grown up on the foundation provided by this principle, in fact, a market interpretation of the development and of the problems of industrial and economic organization, a viewpoint which pervades a large part of the literature of nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic theory. It serves as one of two more or less contradictory theories used to account for industrial and economic change, the other being the theory that the fundamental cause of such change is the progress of inventions, or the progress of the industrial arts. With the merits of this debate we need not concern ourselves; the most recent opinion would perhaps be that it is a sterile and unprofitable dispute.

It is important, however, to notice that the idea of expanding markets has proved to be, in the hands of modern economists, a point of view from which to survey a wide range

[12] *The Wealth of Nations,* Bk. I, Chap. III.
[13] *Ibid.,* Bk. III, Chap. I.

of economic and other social facts. One of the most conspicuous facts of modern economic history—indeed of modern history in general—is the growth in size and importance of towns and cities. The "market interpretation" derived from Adam Smith has given us the clew for the explanation of this phenomenon. The growth of a town or its development into a metropolis can usually be accounted for, largely at least, as a development which is simply one aspect of an expanding market organization. A great city is the dominant center of the commerce by means of which the economic activity of a wide area is integrated. We may for convenience take the writings of three modern economists as representative of the development of this point of view,—the works, namely, of Carl Bücher, Werner Sombart, and N. S. B. Gras.

Werner Sombart. Although his *magnum opus, Der Moderne Kapitalismus* (Leipzig, 1902) may perhaps be regarded as a study primarily concerned with capitalism as a form of organization of production, that is, of industry in its aspects of specialization and large-scale enterprise, Sombart assigned a great deal of space in this work to the discussion of the reorganization of marketing relations which was correlated with this development. In fact, as we have noted in the previous chapter, it is the most fundamental thesis defended by Sombart in this and other writings that the development of larger markets for goods was prerequisite to the development of large-scale or "capitalistic" forms of production. In *Der Moderne Kapitalismus* the whole of the second book of Volume II is devoted to the discussion of the reorganization of markets in the early modern period. Thus the first division of this Book describes the "Origin and Nature of the Modern City"; while the fourth division is a discussion of the "Reconstruction of the Market," with chapters on the decline of the roving peddler, the reorganization of fixed retail trade, the development of the auxiliaries of modern retail trade, and the struggle to eliminate the retailer. In these pages one finds sections on the trade press, the commercial traveler, the organization of intermediate trade (*Zwischenhandelsorganisation*—jobbing, wholesaling) between the producer and the retailer, and on consumers' cooperation. Sombart may be regarded as having ex-

panded, refined, and tested, by reference to historical data, Adam Smith's assertion that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. The extension of markets for products is not simply a matter of increasing consumption and improving transportation and communication, but also of standardization of demand and supply with reference to each other. Sombart has described the process by which this adaptation has been effected.

To Karl Bücher we are indebted for one of the first systematic classifications of "types of economy" based upon the size of the market area rather than upon the predominant form of production as in the classifications of economic stages made by nineteenth-century ethnologists. Bücher thinks of the stage of economic development in which the peoples of the western world were living when he wrote (1893) as the "national economy."

> *National economy is the product of a development extending over thousands of years, and is not older than the modern State; for long epochs before it emerged man lived and labored without any system of trade or under forms of exchange of products and services that cannot be designated national economy.*
>
> If we are to gain a survey of this whole development, it can only be from a standpoint that affords a direct view of the essential phenomena of national economy, and at the same time discloses the organizing element of the earlier economic periods. This standpoint is none other than the relation which exists between the production and consumption of goods; or, to be more exact, the length of the route which the goods traverse in passing from producer to consumer.[14]

Adopting this viewpoint, then, Bücher divides the development of economic organization into three stages: (1) the stage of independent domestic economy, in which production is solely for the needs of the individual or the single household and there is no exchange; (2) the stage of town economy, at which the goods pass directly from the producer to the consumer; and (3) the stage of national economy in which the goods tend to pass through many hands before they reach the consumer. Following this outline Bücher proceeds to discuss the forms

[14] Bücher, Karl, *Industrial Evolution* (Wickett's translation, New York, 1904), pp. 88-89.

of social control and political institutions corresponding to these stages of "economy." In a later section the author deals with migration as an economic process tending to bring about a more effective distribution of labor and capital over the world. Human migration is in fact regarded by Bücher as a substitute for and complement of the movement of goods in trade.[15]

Classification of Stages of Economy. Recently Professor N. S. B. Gras has developed an outline of economic history which involves the substitution of five stages of economic development for the three of Bücher's outline.[16] Gras' stages, like Bücher's, however, are characterized in each case by a type of "economy" which is distinguished from others primarily with reference to the extent and complexity of the market to which production is adapted. From this point of view Professor Gras names (1) the collectional economy, (2) the cultural nomadic economy, (3) the settled village economy, (4) the town economy, and (5) the metropolitan economy. The town economy is distinguished from the settled village economy in that "When there came into being a class of traders who resided in a market village, and who had stores which not only supplemented the market place but became its rivals, then the economic town was born." [17] The town economy, in other words, is characterized by the emergence of the functions of the specialized merchant or trader with a fixed place of business. The aggregation of a number of these traders' and craftsmen's places of business in one settlement made of that town a market center for an area typically much wider than that centering in a market village. Similarly, Gras distinguishes the metropolitan economy from the town economy by the fact that the metropolis performs a new function, that of "organizing business for a wide metropolitan area." [18] This writer further distinguishes four stages in the development of the metropolitan economy, still basing his analysis upon the organization of commerce and the market. The first

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 356.
[16] Gras, Norman Scott Brien, *An Introduction to Economic History* (New York, 1922).
[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 105.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

phase is the organization of the market as such, in which such institutions as wholesaling and the "exchanges" appeared. In this phase a new kind of trade rises to prominence, the "extended trade," to supplement the exchange carried on between the metropolis and its own hinterland. The second phase is the development of manufactures on a scale commensurate with the size of the market afforded by the metropolitan commercial organization. At first manufactures develop in the metropolis itself, but in a later stage they tend to remove to the towns and villages of the hinterland, a further manifestation of the principle that the metropolis is to be regarded as the symbol of a form of organization of an area, rather than as a separate and independent social entity. The third phase is the development of transportation, in the form of a network of highways, railroads, and waterways focussing in the metropolitan centers, and of routes connecting these centers with one another. The fourth phase is the development of financial organization—the evolution of specialized financial institutions for the facilitation of the commercial activities centering in the metropolis. This financial development added the finishing touch to a process of centralization, so that the metropolitan area, and ultimately the entire civilized world, began to behave as one unit because of the delicate correlation which the financial institutions brought about between the different parts of the economic world. Gras regards it as much more than a mere coincidence that the commercial, industrial, and financial crisis first began to assume its modern proportions after the metropolitan economy was far advanced in its evolution.[19] Gras points out, in summing up the implications of his survey, that the result of the process of development which he has described is that a "world economy" is replacing the "national economy" which has interested the German writers; the whole world is being organized into one market, and the economic activities and institutions of any person, firm, or locality are determined with reference to this maximum unit.[20]

In the course of the process of evolution which results in centralizing the economic life of our age in a few large cities,

[19] Gras, Norman Scott Brien, *An Introduction to Economic History* (New York, 1922), p. 250.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 316 ff., 334, 336.

it comes about that the cities become centers of *dominance* over the life and activities of the age, not only economically, but culturally. The main trend and values of our contemporary culture in the western world are urban. Oswald Spengler has described this tendency rather brilliantly in his *Untergang des Abendlandes,* a work which was very widely read in Europe in the years immediately following the close of the World War.[21] He characterizes the culture of today in the West as "megalopolitan."

Economics as the Science of Market Price. We have noted the emphasis laid by Gras upon the development of a more and more elaborate, specialized, and refined financial mechanism for the facilitation of the functions of the metropolitan commerce. It is perhaps from this angle that the large and persistent output of literature dealing with the problems of money and banking, credit and crises, and market prices should be viewed in relation to other phases of the development of social and economic theory. "Orthodox" economic thought has indeed been concerned with market prices as the central topic of inquiry. This may be regarded as a manifestation of the natural tendency of the scientist to focus his attention upon some universal, objective, and quantitative form of evidence of the forces and processes with which he is concerned. The study of the processes by which economic and geographic adjustment and change are effected in human society, and are studied as such.[22] In the works of such "mathematical economists" as Vilfredo Pareto and Pietro-Tonelli, this method of analysis is pushed to the maximum of refinement and rigorous exactness of which it is capable.[23] Meanwhile the "institutional" economists, under which category a number of leading

[21] Volume I of Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* has been translated as *The Decline of the West* (New York, 1925); more space is given to the megalopolitan culture and the description of the modern metropolis, however, in Volume II of the original German edition.

[22] Any recent textbook in "Principles of Economics" will serve to illustrate this point; *Economics—Principles and Problems,* by Lionel D. Edie (New York, 1926) is a typical example. See *The Trend of Economics,* edited by Rexford G. Tugwell, for an interesting presentation of the opinions of several different American economists concerning the scope and objectives of the science.

[23] Pareto, Vilfredo, *Cours d'economie politique* (Lausanna, 1896-97); Pietro-Tonelli, Alfonso de, *Traite d'economie rationnelle* (French translation, Paris, 1927).

American writers may be loosely classified, are endeavoring to formulate descriptions and explanations of the market and its processes which shall take into account the fact that the human beings who participate in the process are not fixed, unchanging units, but persons whose desires and responses are affected and changed by the cultural forces to which they are exposed. The question is still implicitly debated, whether economics is or is not a separate science, based on postulates separate from those of sociology and social psychology. The "orthodox" or classical economics and the mathematical economics tend to develop the assumption that it is; the "institutional economics," by implication, follows up the assumption that it is not.

PART II. HUMAN NATURE AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

CHAPTER X

THE ORIGINAL NATURE OF MAN

The Limitations of the Ecological and Economic Interpretation of Human Society. In the preceding chapters we have reviewed some of the attempts which have been made to describe and explain the organization and functioning of human societies, when society is regarded as a sort of gigantic machine, a physical structure having human beings, races, and classes as its more or less specialized parts. We have seen, for instance, what progress has been made at the task of explaining the distribution of human beings in space as the result of environmental pressure and of the struggle for existence and the satisfaction of elemental wants. Similarly, we have surveyed the literature in which writers have set forth what they have been able to formulate in the way of a description and explanation of the industrial and commercial organization of human society based on the postulates of individual self-interest, free competition, and selection. In all of these writings, or at any rate in the writings of their critics, there appears continually the evidence of limitations in the method and viewpoint.[1] Recent studies of the geography of cities have shown, for instance, to how great an extent the spatial distribution of institutions and social groups within the city can be accounted for in terms of the influence of economic forces. Yet other studies show that persons take up residence in certain parts of the city for reasons which are intelligible only when stated in psychological terms.[2] Thus the efforts which have been made to form a science which shall explain human society in physical terms, while they have been quite successful, have also indicated

[1] See the writer's paper, "The Limitations of Economic Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXXII (May, 1927), pp. 931-36.

[2] For a good illustration of the point, see Zorbaugh, Harvey W., "The Dweller in Furnished Rooms: an Urban Type," *Papers and Proceedings of the American Sociological Society,* Vol. XX, pp. 83-89.

the need of a social science based on psychological postulates and developed from a psychological point of view.

Three Sets of Factors Affecting Human Behavior. As a matter of fact, the perception that the explanation of human events must be based in part on what could be found out or assumed concerning "human nature" originated very early in the history of social thought. It is, indeed, as our daily experience shows, a spontaneously formed, common-sense point of view that leads us to seek for the explanation of human behavior, in part, in the nature or dispositions of human beings. The basic formula, "man and environment," is one which, in substance, was hit upon long before the time of Darwin. Recent psychological and sociological analysis has shown that the human tendencies which we habitually impute to "human nature" are in large part the manifestation of acquired habit and social custom rather than of biologically inherited human traits. Today, therefore, we think of human behavior as something which may be most conveniently accounted for by reference to some three sets of factors in addition to those of physical environment; namely, (1) factors of inborn nature, or "the original nature of man," (2) factors of culture, or social custom and tradition, and (3) factors of human intercourse, or of the organization of social contact and communication. These discriminations are, in the main, a very modern achievement; it will be convenient for our purposes, however, to trace separately the development of the knowledge and theory of each of the three sets of factors.

Greek Philosophers. As we shall see, the development of modern theories of original nature might very well be traced from Locke and Descartes. Social thought has been greatly influenced, however, by the generalizations concerning human nature made by thinkers of much earlier date. To Thales, commonly regarded as the first of the Greek philosophers, is ascribed the maxim, "Know thyself," a rule which may have been responsible in part for the interest of the sophists in the human factor in formal wisdom. Protagoras, the greatest of the sophists, is said to have taught his students that "man is the measure of all things," a remarkable anticipation of

seventeenth-century epistemology.[3] Plato worked out certain theories about the human soul, the best-known and most influential of which was his doctrine of the three levels—the appetitive, spirited, and cognitive faculties of the soul, thought to preponderate in the behavior of the three major classes of society, artisans, soldiers, and philosophers.[4] Plato's psychology impresses us today as speculative and metaphysical, manufactured to support his ethical and political doctrines; it did constitute, however, an attempt to make human behavior intelligible, and was to that extent a scientific effort. Aristotle set forth at considerable length in the *De Anima* a description of the human soul similar to that of Plato.[5] Social scientists from that day to this, however, have been more interested in the psychological propositions embodied in the opening chapters of the *Politics*. His assertion that man is by nature a political, or social, animal, that is, that the organization of human society rests upon a human nature tendency and capacity, was an inspiration to all subsequent social thought. A similar, though lesser interest attaches to his theory that some human beings are slaves by nature, a doctrine which smacks of Plato's classification of human beings into three groups.

Thomas Aquinas. Very little of lasting significance was contributed to psychological thought from the time of Aristotle to that of Thomas Aquinas.[6] The later Greek and Roman writers and the Church Fathers contented themselves with metaphysical discussions of the nature of the soul, designed to support theological or moral doctrines. Thomas Aquinas himself did very much the same thing, but in his attempt to construct a theoretic support for his doctrine of ecclesiastical power, he made certain assumptions concerning the original nature and instinctive tendencies of man, both as regards the tendency to association, following the precedent of Aristotle's

[3] See Plato's *Theætetus,* quoted at length in Rand, Benjamin, *The Classical Psychologists* (Boston, 1912), pp. 11-26. This volume edited by Professor Rand is an excellent collection of source materials for the student of the history of psychology.

[4] *The Republic,* Bk. IV. Quoted by Rand, *op. cit.,* pp. 26-27.

[5] Rand, *op. cit.,* pp. 1-10, 45-83.

[6] For representative psychological or pseudo-psychological writings of the period, see Rand, *op. cit.,* pp. 84-137.

assertion that man is a political animal, and as regards the basic human nature needs or dispositions which must be provided for by the social organization.[7] Aquinas is credited with having substituted for the term "political," in the famous dictum of Aristotle, the term "social"; the importance of this substitution is, however, easily exaggerated; since Aristotle had in the Greek language of his day no term which he could use which would have expressed any more accurately our modern idea of the "social"; while the "political" was for the classical Greeks a very inclusive category.

Psychological Theory after Hobbes and Descartes. Modern psychological theory and points of view may be dated from Hobbes' dictum that knowledge is based entirely on sense experience, and from Descartes' formulation of the doctrine of innate ideas.[8] The debate thus initiated was the immediate source of eighteenth-century interest in the so-called problem of knowledge, which found its best known expression in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* with its thesis that all ideas originate in experience, but that the nature of the human intuition and understanding, which is *a priori,* determines the form and organization which our thought must assume. The Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas proved to be less influential over the subsequent development of scientific psychology than was the theory of Hobbes and his successors among the British empiricists. The notion that certain fundamental ideas are inborn found, however, an expression in the "faculty psychology," promulgated by Christian Wolff,[9] Charles Bonnet,[10] and other continental psychologists. Edward Westermarck has also fallen back upon the hypothesis of innate ideas in his *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.*

[7] See Lichtenberger, *The Development of Social Theory,* pp. 110-11. There is an extended account of the theories of Thomas Aquinas in Vaughan, R. B., *The Life and Labors of Thomas Aquinas* (London, 1871).

[8] See the passage from Hobbes' *Humane Nature,* reprinted by Rand, *op. cit.,* pp. 147-67. Hobbes' empirical theory of knowledge is also presented in the opening chapters of the *Leviathan.* Descartes' theory of innate ideas is ordinarily considered to be present inferentially in his *Meditations on First Philosophy* and his *Discourse on Method,* in his exposition of the ideas which cannot be doubted. See also, however, the selection from his *Les Passions de l'Ame,* in Rand, *op. cit.,* pp. 168-90.

[9] Rand, *op. cit.,* pp. 229-31.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 331-40.

The "Tabula Rasa" Theory of Original Nature. The British empiricist theory of knowledge, manifested indirectly in the *Novum Organum and Advancement of Learning* of Francis Bacon, and definitely expressed by Hobbes, became the starting point for the direction of psychological theory and research which continued to be predominant in the western world until William James initiated a new movement with his formulation of the theory of human instincts and his famous theory of emotion. John Locke emphasized and refined the theory of Hobbes that all ideas are built up from sense experience. According to Locke, the mind at birth is a *tabula rasa,* a smooth wax tablet on which sense experiences engrave permanent impressions. General and abstract ideas are formed by a process of reflection, which is a matter essentially of the association and comparison of the more elemental ideas derived from sense experience.[11] This doctrine caught the attention of scholars, and for over a hundred years the study of psychology, in its most objective and scientific aspects, took the form of an inquiry into the nature of sensation and the process of the association of ideas. A by-product of the psychological theory that all ideas are derived from sense experience was the revival and restatement of an old metaphysical conception of the will. If all human beings start on the same plane, with a white sheet of paper for a mind, their differences of achievement are presumably due to differences in experience, *i.e.,* in opportunity. But in cases where opportunity seems to be substantially the same for all members of a group, as in the case of pupils of the same master, differences of achievement must be due to differences in effort, in the functioning of the "will." This view of the matter afforded a justification for the very natural pedagogical practice of whipping backward children to make them study more diligently; it was also a theory acceptable to the theologians because it seemed to be in harmony with the idea of "free will," which was supposed to be a necessary basis for salvation by faith.

[11] *Ibid.,* pp. 232-55; quoting at length Locke's *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding* (London, 1690, and later editions).

Physiological Psychology. It was to be expected that the doctrine that all ideas come from without, through sense experience, would sooner or later stimulate the investigation of sensation from an anatomical and physiological point of view. This development took place in fact at the hands of men who wrote in the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century, among them Johannes Mueller, Rudolph Hermann Lotze, Ernst Heinrich Weber, Gustav Theodor Fechner, and Herman von Helmholz.[12] At first the discussion of sensation was highly speculative, being based almost solely upon the introspection of the individual writer. Finally, however, Wilhelm Wundt is credited with having established the first psychological laboratory, which was essentially a place for the investigation and measurement of minimum stimuli, thresholds of stimulation, minimum differences perceivable between stimuli of different intensities, and the like.

It is beginning to be evident to contemporary psychologists and sociologists, though it was not seen clearly until very recently, that the fundamental goal of psychological research is the explanation or description of the manner in which the internal equipment or mechanism of the living individual and the factors or circumstances of environment *interact* to determine behavior. In practice, as noted in an earlier paragraph, sociologists find it convenient today to use two more sets of factors in the explanation of behavior—factors of culture or social custom, and factors of communication or the forms of social interaction. This refinement need not greatly concern us in the present chapter, however; we could perhaps reduce our explanation of behavior to terms of original nature and environment alone, were there any utility in doing so. Now the general tendency of the psychology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which we have been discussing was to locate the active causes of behavior entirely in the external environment. The human individual was regarded as a relatively passive mechanism, which is acted upon by external stimuli, and which retains from such experience impressions—memory images and ideas—which affect the course of subsequent responses to stimuli.

[12] Rand, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-618.

Instinct in Animal Behavior. One result of the impact of Darwin's writings upon psychological thought was the expenditure of a great deal of research effort in the study of animal behavior. If man stands in a relation of genetic kinship with other members of the animal kingdom, it may be assumed that some light will be shed upon the problems of human behavior by the study of animals, where the data are presumably simpler, and where, in any event, the conditions can be controlled. The outcome of these studies was, among other things, the development of a general theory of instinctive behavior. It was observed that some animals, notably the insects, display patterns of activity which go on spontaneously, as if from internal impulsion. To these instinctive activities of insects and other animals external stimuli seem to be related, at the most, only as the pulling of a trigger is related to the discharge of a gun; the stimulus releases or sets in motion a mechanism which then operates by its own power and is self-directing. In some cases, indeed, it appears that the only stimulus needed to set an instinctive process in motion is an internal one, involved in the normal metabolism of the organism. Place an organism endowed with an appropriate repertory of instincts in a favorable, but perfectly stable, unchanging environment, and it seems that the organism might be expected to live out a normal life without the aid of any external stimuli.[13] Such is, in abstract, the theory of instinct as formulated by students of animal behavior in the early years of the twentieth century.

Instincts in the Psychology of Human Behavior. It was no more than natural that, sooner or later, someone would seek to make use of the theory of instinct in the interpretation of human behavior. Indeed, something of the sort had been attempted by Darwin in *The Descent of Man* and *The Expression of the Emotions.* William James seems to have been the first, however, to incorporate an extended discussion of human instincts in a general treatise on human psychology. In his

[13] For the purposes of this discussion it is unimportant whether the explanation is correct or not; it is believed to be an adequate summary of the argument of the writers who seek to ground a theory of human behavior mainly on the concept of instinct. See particularly the opening chapters of McDougall's *Social Psychology.*

two-volume *Principles of Psychology* he included a chapter on instincts which soon became classical. In this chapter James first finds a place for the theory of instincts in the explanations of human behavior by means of the postulate that an instinct need not be a rigid, invariable pattern, as the instincts of insects ordinarily are, but may be simply a plastic, modifiable tendency. Nor are instincts necessarily present at birth; they may "ripen" at some later stage in the life-history of the individual. Having given rise to habits, instincts may then disappear as separate behavior patterns. Having outlined this approach to the subject, James then enumerates some thirty-seven or more separate human instincts, a larger number, as he remarks, than has been observed in any other animal species.[14] James' chapter on instincts is followed by that in which he sets forth his closely related and now famous theory of the emotions. Emotions, he says, cannot be sharply distinguished from instincts; both are inborn behavior tendencies.

McDougall. William James' discussion of human instincts and emotions served as the inspiration and guide for William McDougall's *Social Psychology,* which has been one of the most widely circulated and influential of all twentieth-century contributions to the literature of the social sciences.[15] By emphasizing certain ones of the instincts which he ascribes to human beings, notably gregariousness, self-abasement, and self-assertion, McDougall was able to represent instincts as the springs, not only of human behavior in general, but of the process of association or socialization. A feature of the author's analysis was his correlation of (a) will, tendency to act in a certain manner, or *conation,* (b) thought, awareness, or *cognition,* and (c) feeling or *emotion.* He held that each instinctive tendency has the three aspects, conative, cognitive, and emotional or affective.

> We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from instinct), every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is

[14] *Op. cit.,* Vol. II (1890, 1918), Chap. XXIV.

[15] McDougall's *Social Psychology* first appeared in London in 1908. During subsequent years it has run to many editions.

borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activity and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the highly complex mental apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but the instrument by which these instruments seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means.

Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed or a steam engine whose fires had been drawn.[16]

To use Simmel's phraseology, which was apparently unfamiliar to McDougall as he prepared the later editions of his book,[17] our author finds in instincts the active causes not only of the content but of the *form* of socialization; instincts are assumed to determine primarily not only what human beings do in and through their social organizations, but also the fact that they become associated. In this book McDougall incorporated also an interpretation of sentiment, based on Shand's earlier account in *Foundations of Character*.[18] This emphasis of the concept of sentiment is noteworthy since various recent sociologists and political scientists have likewise emphasized the sentiments as fundamental factors in social process. In later publications, McDougall has attempted to account for race differences in terms of differences in the strength or intensity of the different instincts, which are assumed to be, as units, common to all human beings.[19]

The Influence of the Instinct Theory upon Economics. McDougall's presentation of the doctrine of instincts has evoked many responses on the part of writers on theoretical and

[16] *Op. cit.* (Boston, 1918), p. 45.

[17] Simmel, Georg, *Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1908, and later editions), Kap. I. See also Spykman, Nicholas J., *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925), *passim;* and Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), pp. 348-49. The first edition of Simmel's *Soziologie* appeared in the same year as the first edition of McDougall's *Social Psychology,* namely 1908. Simmel's distinction between the *form* and *content* of socialization had, however, been expressed much earlier, in articles in periodicals.

[18] McDougall, *op. cit.,* pp. 121-64.

[19] This thought is expressed in an anticipatory form in *Social Psychology.* It is expanded in *The Group Mind* and particularly in *Is America Safe for Democracy?*

practical social, economic, and political problems. It made a very favorable impression upon a number of political scientists and economists. The economists had in fact been conscious for some time, when this book appeared, of a need for some more fundamental explanation of "why human beings act as they do" than that explicitly contained in the "orthodox" economic theory. This so-called orthodox, or "neo-classical," economics had become in essence an analysis of the mechanism by which the prices of goods and services, the rent of land, and the interest and profits of the capitalist are determined in a market, *assuming* that human beings have certain wants and that they pursue their wants in a selfish and rational manner. It was also tacitly assumed, for the purposes of the orthodox economics, that the wants and behavior tendencies of human beings are constant. These assumptions had long been criticized on the ground that they were at variance with the observable facts.[20] McDougall's theory of instincts was welcomed, therefore, by some of the economists because it seemed to provide the needed explanation of human wants and tendencies. Carlton H. Parker found a wide and favorably disposed circle of readers for the papers in which he outlined in an elementary way the possibilities of applying the instinct doctrine to economic problems, especially to some of the problems of industrial relations, which had already been recognized as a stumbling block for the orthodox economics.[21] Ordway Tead has discussed at greater length the significance of instincts in industrial relations, but from the viewpoint of the industrial management, rather than of the worker. Among recent and contemporary political scientists, Graham Wallas has perhaps done more than any other writer to incorporate into the science a theory of instincts, or, as he prefers to call them, "dispositions." In *Human Nature and Politics* he at-

[20] See J. M. Clark's paper, "Recent Developments in Economics," printed as Chapter V in *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences,* edited by E. C. Hayes (Philadelphia, 1927). See also the paper by Raymond T. Bye, "Some Recent Developments in Economic Theory," printed as Chapter VIII in *The Trend of Economics,* edited by Rexford G. Tugwell (New York, 1924); see especially pp. 275-79.

[21] These papers were collected after Professor Parker's death by Cornelia Stratton Parker, in the volume *The Casual Laborer and Other Essays,* by Carlton H. Parker (New York, 1920) which is the convenient source for the student.

tempted to show that the statesman must take instinct into account; legislative and administrative devices based on the assumption that men can be controlled by ordering and forbidding as a lifeless object is moved this way and that by pressure are likely to fail of their purpose. In *The Great Society* Wallas has qualified the doctrine set forth in the earlier volume by including in his list of native dispositions the disposition to think,[22] that is, in which our ideas of things arrange themselves in organized relations with resulting modification of overt behavior. Wallas himself has said, in the Preface of *The Great Society,* that "the earlier book was an analysis of representative government, which turned into an argument against nineteenth-century intellectualism; and . . . this book is an analysis of the general social organization of a large modern state, which has turned, at times, into an argument against certain forms of twentieth-century anti-intellectualism." This latter tendency is continued in Wallas' two more recent volumes, which we shall have occasion to consider in a subsequent chapter.

The Freudian Contribution. Almost without exception, the writers who have made use of the concept of human instincts in discussions of concrete economic and political problems have been influenced also by the writings of Sigmund Freud or other writers who have been more or less influenced by him. The Freudian psychology, or some variant of it such as the "inferiority" theory of Alfred Adler, may in fact be regarded as the necessary complement of the instinct theory, since it affords the justification for paying any attention at all, in concrete social studies, to human instincts or other supposedly innate behavior tendencies, whatever they may be called. It is patent to all students of these problems that human beings do not have instincts at all, if by an instinct we mean a definite, unlearned behavior pattern; since all human behavior, outside of the most elemental impulses, is obviously plastic and modifiable. Critics of McDougall have made much of this as a weakness of his social psychology, but he had already conceded the point, in effect. Indeed William James, as we have

[22] *Op. cit.* (1914), pp. 48-54. *Human Nature and Politics* was first published in 1908.

seen, attempted to forestall this criticism in his chapter on instinct in his *Principles of Psychology.* What was supplied by Freud, Jung, and Alfred Adler was a body of evidence and a line of reasoning from which it might be deduced that human instincts may be moulded, and they may even fail of overt expression, but in the latter case there is "repression" or "balking" with resulting disturbance of the integrity and efficiency of other phases of the behavior of the person.[23]

The foregoing paragraph outlines a part of the present frontier of investigation and interpretation of the theoretic problems of original nature and its relation to social life. There are significant problems in the field, besides the fundamental ones just indicated, which still engage the attention of psychologists and sociologists. Heredity evidently must mean something for human life; since it seems to be quite impossible to educate animals of any other species to behave in a manner even remotely approaching the human. But exactly what heredity, or "the original nature of man," consists of, and exactly what limitations original nature places upon response to social copies,[24] it still puzzles us to state. Professor Edward L. Thorndike, in a small volume on *Individuality* (1911), and a larger treatise called *The Original Nature of Man,* from which the title of this chapter was taken, has summed up very clearly and comprehensively what was known at the dates when he wrote, from experimental evidence and close observation, of human traits which might be assumed to be innate and biologically inherited. Incidentally he contributed two useful technical terms to the scientific vocabulary for the discussion of these matters—"original nature," and "individuality" or "individual differences." Since then it has become standard to use the terms "individuality" and "individual" to refer to the characteristics, presumably innate, by which persons differ from one another. Thorndike also helped to standardize the use of three other terms: "reflex," "instinct," and "capacity."

Behaviorism; the Study of Infants. J. B. Watson, in several volumes published since 1914, has developed a method

[23] Wallas has given a simple interpretation of the socio-psychological significance of the Freudian doctrine in *The Great Society,* pp. 64-68.

[24] See Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* p. 69.

and a point of view for the study of human behavior, and particularly of those traits which may be assumed to be inherited. The part of his work which seems to have attracted the most widespread and favorable comment is his study of newly born infants, a technique which affords one very concrete and objective answer to the question of the indisputable content of original nature. One thing which Watson observed in the babies which he studied is so obvious that one wonders why its possible significance was not noted long before; namely, that the baby makes, during its waking hours, a great many "random movements." The random movements are now regarded by many psychologists as a part of the raw material, if it may be so termed, which gets organized into definite and purposive behavior or habits in the course of experience, by means of trial and selection and with the aid of social or cultural copies.[25]

Quantitative Measurements. The larger number and perhaps the more interesting of the recent contributions to the literature of psychology and social psychology have dealt with the processes by which habits, attitudes, wishes and ideas are formed in the course of individual experience and social interaction; these studies will be reviewed in later chapters. A great deal of research effort has been devoted, however, to the invention, refinement, and utilization of quantitative tests—tests of "intelligence," of "will profile," of "temperament," and of special aptitudes. The examination of the large numbers of men brought into the United States Army by the operation of the draft in 1917 and 1918 gave occasion for the accumulation of a great body of data based on intelligence tests. Since then a lively argument has been carried on concerning the significance of the data obtained by means of such tests. On the one hand there have been those who have contended that the measurements of intelligence and other traits secured by such tests are, when taken in large numbers at any rate, closely correlated

[25] Professor Walter C. Reckless of Vanderbilt University, to whom this chapter was read when in manuscript, objects to this paragraph. He holds, as I understand him, that contemporary social psychologists are not able to show any significant continuity between the random movements of the infant and the controlled behavior of later life. I am allowing the paragraph to stand with slight revision, however, because I believe it represents an influential trend in current psychological thought, whether the trend is to result in an established principle or not.

with native and inherited individual differences. On the other hand, many writers have pointed out that group differences in performance on mental tests, however much they may be correlated with common differences in ancestry, are also correlated with common differences in culture background. Even the psychologists who hold that mental traits do measure differences in original nature, admit that a language handicap, as in the case of immigrants and their children, makes a considerable difference in intelligence quotients computed from the results of the tests. The prevailing current attitude, on the question of the relation of original nature to performance in mental tests, may be characterized as one of lively interest, but of inconclusive findings.

"Universal" Human Traits as Elements of Original Nature. In so far as they are held to measure original nature, mental tests are based, of course, on the general hypothesis that it is possible, by means of appropriate tests, to penetrate beneath what has been learned and to evaluate innate capacity. Mention has been made also of Watson's method of studying infants. In addition to these two techniques, the past two or three decades have witnessed more or less experimentation with three other methods of securing systematic knowledge about the original nature of man. Of these three we may consider briefly first the one which, according to the most rigorous canons of scientific thought, is probably the least valid. It is based on the assumption that whatever traits or behavior tendencies are common to virtually all members of the human race must be inborn; and it consists, essentially, of attempts to enumerate, on the basis of common knowledge since there is no other way, lists of such traits. This seems to have been the method used in arriving at the lists of "desires," "interests," "social forces," and the like which have been a feature of so many twentieth-century sociological treatises.[26] Inasmuch as these efforts have a significance in another connection as well as in reference to original nature, they will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter.

[26] These lists of desires have been brought together in the writer's paper, "The Concept 'Social Forces' in American Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXI (1925-26), pp. 145, 347, 507, 763.

Attempts have been made to increase our knowledge of original nature by studying the "mind of primitive man." We have noted in an earlier paragraph the attempts made by Spencer, Westermarck, and others to use ethnological materials to reveal the "innate ideas" of various things held by savages. Levy-Bruhl used similar data to support his thesis that "primitive" mentality is different from that of civilized man, being "prelogical." [27] These and similar writings inspired Franz Boas to write his little book, *The Mind of Primitive Man,*[28] which contained what was perhaps the first clear statement of the view now widely maintained by American anthropologists: that the mind of the savage is not essentially or inherently different from that of civilized man, and that cultural facts can be understood only by direct study, a particular trait being intelligible only in relation to the whole culture of which it is a part.

A fifth method of research which may be said to be directed in part toward the problem of original nature is mainly of very recent development, namely, the method of first-hand, painstaking observation of the behavior of apes. Studies of this sort made by W. Koehler and others [29] have added to our inferential knowledge of the original nature of man by revealing in the higher apes evidences of the elements, at any rate, of purposive thought and imagination. One result of such studies is the confirmation which they tend to afford for the theory that human behavior can be understood only in relation to the situations to which it is a response and the social customs which give it specific forms. No original nature tendencies can be shown to have separate and distinct existence in a sense which would justify sociologists or psychologists in drawing upon them for explanations of the most distinctly human forms of activity. There has lately been widely circulated a volume entitled, "Why We Behave Like Human Beings." One reviewer characterized the book, in guarded terms, as an attempt to explain why we behave like animals. The conclusion of all

[27] Levy-Bruhl, Lucien, *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Societes Inferieures* (Paris, 1910).

[28] New York, 1911.

[29] Koehler, W., *The Mentality of Apes* (New York, 1925); see also Koffka, K., *The Growth of the Mind* (New York, 1925).

researches into the nature of original nature, down to date, seems to be that we are able to find out very little about the original or inherited nature of man which is of use to us in dealing with concrete human behavior problems.

CHAPTER XI

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PRIMARY GROUP

Knowledge about the original nature of man, in so far as it can be authenticated or made useful as working hypothesis, must be and has been taken into account by sociologists, as data and as foundation for their own studies. Propositions concerning the original nature of man, however, are not yet sociological propositions. The only justification for a science of sociology which is something more than economics, or for a social psychology which is more or less distinct from the psychology of the psychologists, is the possibility of arriving at systematic and verifiable knowledge of the manner in which, and the processes by which, "human nature," "personality," and attitudes are formed and modified in social interaction.

Man Not Born Human. To develop and formulate such knowledge several different methods of approach have been used. The general problem is the one to which a number of the following chapters are devoted. In the present chapter we are to review the efforts which have been made to study the shaping of human nature and personality through social interaction in the early years of life and in the more intimate relationships of person to person. It is the working hypothesis of a number of recent and contemporary writers on social psychology that the human being is born into the world a physical organism, endowed with certain general undefined behavior tendencies and capacities, but lacking in personality and in all that is commonly regarded as human nature. His personality, his attitudes, and his wishes are acquired by the individual, in this view of the matter, during the course of his social experience. Some of the most significant steps in this process of development are, naturally, those which take place in childhood. Research supports the thesis, also, that some of the most potent of the influences forming personality and human nature are exercised in those

groups in which the relationships of person to person are most intimate, direct, and "personal." Conspicuous among such groups are the family, the neighborhood, and the play group. These are in fact the first groups in which the individual gets social experience, as well as the ones in which very fundamental processes of personal development take place; hence Professor C. H. Cooley has called them the "primary groups," a term which has become a standard element of the American sociological vocabulary. The purpose of the present chapter may accordingly be restated as the review of some of the more important contributions to our knowledge of the development of personality in the primary groups.

The concept of the primary group and the appreciation of the peculiar significance of intimate relationships in the growth of personality are essentially of recent origin. Common-sense anticipations of these ideas are of course to be found here and there in the literature of ancient and medieval times. For present purposes, a distinction should be made between the sophisticated use of the concept of the primary groups as a tool of scientific analysis, and the repetition of moral precepts or empirical generalizations concerning the relation of family or community to the individual. The latter are widespread in the folklore that has been handed down among nearly all peoples from times when the home and the local neighborhood constituted the principal elements of group life. That childhood is a time of character building, and that the home and the neighborhood are the situations in which the process of character building takes place, are conclusions handed down from very early times. "Train a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it"; "As the twig is bent so the tree is inclined"; and "What will the neighbors think?" are relatively modern formulations of a folk wisdom which is probably about as old as the human race.

Studies of Children. Although the theory of the relation of human nature and personality to the primary group which is current today among sociologists in the United States was first definitely formulated by Cooley, certain antecedents can be found in scientific literature for his point of view and method. Cooley's theory was the product in large part of his

study of his own children. In this he seems to have been definitely influenced by the work of J. Mark Baldwin, who made extensive use of data obtained by the study of his own children in two volumes which have become classics, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (1895), and *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development* (1897). In an introductory chapter of his more recent work, *The Psychology of Early Childhood,* first published in Germany in 1914, Professor William Stern has collected bibliographic data showing that interest in the objective study of child behavior dates from as early as the middle of the nineteenth century.[1] Although the first students in this field seem to have concerned themselves in every case with questions regarding particular traits and their first appearance in the course of the life-history of the child, it was to be expected that sooner or later such studies would reveal the influence of children's associations with other individuals, and of the patterns set by older persons, upon the child's development. It was in fact just this aspect of the formation of the child's personality that was most emphasized by Baldwin. In his account of the "dialectic of personal growth" he distinguishes three steps or stages in the formation of the child's sense of his own personality. In the *projective* stage the child is occupied solely with responses to the behavior and appearance of other persons in his environment. In the *subjective* stage the child becomes interested in his own body, and learns to discriminate between his own feelings and sensations and the properties of bodies in the external environment. In the *ejective* stage the child begins to impute to other persons the traits, feelings, and impulses which he has first learned, subjectively, that he himself has. "They are also me's; let them be assimilated to my me copy." In this third stage the social self is born.

> The outcome serves to afford a point of departure for the view which we may entertain of the person as he appears to himself in society. If it be true, as much evidence goes to show, that what the person thinks as himself is a pole or terminus at one end of an opposition in the sense of personality generally, and that the other pole or terminus is the thought he has of the other person, the "alter," then it is impossible to isolate his thought of himself at any time and say

[1] *Op. cit.* (English translation, London and New York, 1924), Chap. I.

that in thinking of himself he is not essentially thinking of the alter also. What he calls himself now is in large measure an incorporation of elements that, at an earlier period of his thought of personality, he called some one else. The acts now possible to himself, and so used by him to describe himself in thought to himself, were formerly possible only to the other; but by imitating that other he has brought them over to the opposite pole, and found them applicable, with a richer meaning and a modified value, as true predicates of himself also.[2]

The remainder of the volume may be considered, essentially, as the elaboration of the thesis set forth in the foregoing paragraph. Baldwin has been criticized by Kimball Young for his too rationalistic explanation,[3] and this criticism seems justified; yet we must also agree with Young when he holds that Baldwin's early work "was fundamental to the development of social psychology."

Westermarck. In so far as Cooley's theory of the primary group implies also the study of the family, it has here again a considerable line of nineteenth-century antecedents.[4] Almost without exception, however, books dealing with the family which appeared before 1909, the date of the first edition of Cooley's *Social Organization,* were either propagandist tracts, attacking or defending aspects of existing family life, or purely descriptive ethnological and historical studies of the family as found in various cultures. In his monumental *History of Human Marriage,* Edward Westermarck attempted to discuss the family sociologically, but the principal emphasis of this treatise is laid upon the natural character and the instinctive basis of the monogamic family. The one outstanding book published before 1909 which attempts the task of describing the interaction of the members of the family as a process affecting the personality of each of them is *The Family,* by Helen Bosanquet. This work appeared in 1909, the same year which saw the first edition of Cooley's *Social Organization.*

[2] *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development,* p. 15. Used by permission of Macmillan and Co.

[3] Paper on "Social Psychology" in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, p. 191.

[4] There is an extended bibliographical note on works dealing with the family in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), pp. 213-16; see also references, *ibid.,* pp. 219-223.

Mrs. Bosanquet describes the family as a social unit made up of interrelated personalities. Each family, according to her account, has to some extent its own organization and customs, and nearly every family has something of a private language, the terms of which are unintelligible to outsiders.

> But whether it finds expression in peculiarities of language or not, few will question the fact of the greater ease of intercourse between members of the same family. Perhaps we realize it most strongly on the frequent occasions when what seems to us quite a straightforward expression of feeling or statement of fact is met by the blankness of incomprehension on the part of our acquaintance, and all the embarrassments and difficulties of explanation have to be faced. Within the Family none of these are needed; thought leaps to meet thought, half a sentence is enough to indicate what we are feeling or thinking; at times indeed we feel ruefully the actual impossibility of concealing our thoughts or feelings. Exaggerations, again, can be indulged in freely, for they will unfailingly be discounted at their true value, or something less; expressions of momentary irritation will not be taken for expressions of deep-seated resentment; and a glance of the eye or movement of the hand is enough to guard against misinterpretation.[5]

So closely does this treatment of the life of the family parallel Cooley's discussion of the "primary groups," that it is surprising to discover from the index of Cooley's *Social Organization* that Mrs. Bosanquet's work was apparently unfamiliar to him when he wrote the latter volume. Of course, the fact that both books appeared in the same year excludes the possibility of plagiarism on either side; and we may infer that the appearance of two discussions of so similar character at the same time is an indication that previous studies, for example that of Baldwin, had prepared the way for this sort of thing.[6]

Cooley's Definition of the "Primary Group." The idea of the primary group is vaguely anticipated by Cooley in his *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), but it is first

[5] *Op. cit.* (London, 1909), pp. 254-55.

[6] There is in the Small and Vincent *Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York, 1894) a chapter entitled "The Primary Social Group: The Family," but this chapter is not mentioned by Cooley in *Social Organization.* Small and Vincent state that they call the family "primary" because it is "the simplest permanent group which is discoverable in Society," and not because it is historically the original structure. The discussion is similar to that of Mrs. Bosanquet in *The Family,* but more formal and relatively lacking in insight. The chapter in question is Chapter II in Book III, "Social Anatomy."

clearly set forth, and the term "primary group" first made use of, in *Social Organization* (1909).

> By primary-groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.[7]

The author makes haste to add, however, that "the unity of the primary group is not one of mere harmony and love. It is always a differentiated and competitive unity, admitting of self-assertion and various appropriative passions; but these passions are socialized by sympathy, and come, or tend to come, under the discipline of a common spirit." The primary groups are primary in the sense that they are the *first* groups in which the individual has membership; they give him his first experience of social unity. Furthermore, they are relatively permanent in form.[8] It is in them that we get our human nature, which is not something exclusively private and individual, but a group nature or a phase of society.[9] It is in these primary groups that certain primary ideals, common to the entire human race, are formed.[10]

Some time after the first appearance of Cooley's *Social Organization,* Professor R. E. Park, in a paper on the sociology of the city, coined the term "secondary groups" to refer to all social groups which are not primary groups—those, in other words, in which the interrelations of the members are less direct and "personal."[11] Park and Burgess have suggested also in their textbook that the family is a "primary group" in a more extreme sense than is the neighborhood, being char-

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 23.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
[9] *Ibid., passim;* see also *Human Nature and the Social Order, passim.*
[10] *Ibid.*, Chaps. IV and V.
[11] "Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* Vol. VIII (1914), pp. 66-72.

acterized by the most intimate of all relationships.[12] Dr. Ernest R. Mowrer, in his recent volume on *Family Disorganization* (1927), has restated with greater precision and discrimination the general theory of the family developed by Bosanquet and Cooley. Mowrer's account has been largely influenced by unpublished studies made by Professor E. W. Burgess.[13]

In their little volume, *Three Problem Children,*[14] the Joint Committee on Methods of Preventing Delinquency have made available to the general public three interesting case narratives, all of which tend to reveal the manner in which personality becomes maladjusted and distorted on account of peculiarities in the relationship of the child to other persons, in particular with his parents and other members of his parental family. The same general theme is developed with many variations by Queen and Mann in their *Social Pathology;* while in *The Gang* (1927) Professor Frederic M. Thrasher has shown how completely the boy's personality may be shaped by his participation in the life of a gang and by his struggle to acquire and preserve status in a gang. It is in fact in the attempt to develop practical wisdom for the purposes of dealing with cases of individual maladjustment and delinquency that the social-psychological theory of the primary group and its relation to personality has been tested and modified.

As was noted in another connection, Galpin and Kolb have made use of the primary group concept in their studies of rural communities.[15] The psychological significance of the intimate familial and communal relationships characteristic of rural life has, however, been much more adequately stated by J. M. Williams in two recent volumes.[16] Williams has described very concretely and vividly the actual interplay of attitudes which goes on in the rural household and the rural neighborhood, and through which the individual is moulded into a personality adapted to life under the given circumstances. We must still turn to the work of some of our recent novelists for

[12] *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* p. 216.

[13] Burgess, Ernest W., "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family,* March, 1926, pp. 3-9.

[14] Published at 50 East Forty-second Street, New York, no date.

[15] *Supra,* Chap. VI.

[16] *Our Rural Heritage,* New York, 1925; *The Expansion of Rural Life,* New York, 1926.

the best verbal pictures of intimate social interaction. Arnold Bennett's *Clayhanger* trilogy, and Knut Hamsun's *Growth of the Soil* are, in a sense, better case studies of personality in relation to social interaction than one can find in any sociological treatise.

The Primary Group as a Type of Social Control. The concept of the primary group has possibilities, as a tool of scientific sociological analysis and explanation, which have scarcely been developed as yet in any published writings. Professor Ellsworth Faris points out[17] that the primary group concept really stands for a type of social control, one which is quite distinct from the forms of control operative in other groups. Control in the primary group is based upon intimacy of personal relationships and the direct response of person to person. It is therefore distinguishable both from the control exercised by governments and officers of the law, and from the control which depends upon the acceptance of a common code of morals. Primary groups have not, however, been extensively studied from this point of view. Thomas and Znaniecki have made some approach to the problem from this point of view in their elaborate research study of Polish peasant life in Europe and America, but it is the control which rests upon common moral ideas and customs, rather than the control which arises directly out of the interaction of person with person, which they have emphasized. To be sure, the primary group as here defined is an abstraction; it perhaps does not exist anywhere on earth as a pure case uncontaminated by political, legal, and moral factors. As a type of social control which often functions alongside of other forms in small groups and in the more intimate relationships of life, however, it merits further investigation and analysis. Thrasher has characterized boy's gangs as "interstitial" groups; they grow up, he finds, in the interstices of the formal and established social order. In a similar sense, we might look upon primary group control as an interstitial type of social control, a form of adjustment of person to person which both exists as the matrix within which formal social organization is formed, and is developed anew wherever gaps are left in the formal structure of society determined by government, law, and morals.

[17] In unpublished lectures.

CHAPTER XII

HABIT AND CUSTOM

It may be regarded as the task of social science to analyze social phenomena into a few types of constant and homogeneous elements, of known qualities, so that on the basis of what is known about the qualities of the elements of a given social process, together with such systematic knowledge as we can gain of the way in which such elements interact, we may be able to understand, to anticipate, and perhaps in some measure to control the further course of the process.[1] The elements or units into which it seems most natural to analyze social phenomena are, however, human groups or human individuals, presumably ultimately the latter in all cases. Unfortunately for the purposes of the social scientist, however, human individuals are neither constant nor homogeneous units; persons differ materially from one another, and every individual has a constantly changing personality. We are therefore constrained to look elsewhere for the social element or atom. Two general types of solutions have in fact been proposed by those who have sought to deal with this problem. We have noted, and we shall further consider in a later chapter, the efforts which have been made to discover in the original nature or "heredity" of man certain tendencies to action which are more constant and more universal than is the compound which we call personality. Much has been gained for the practical purposes of sociological research by proceeding on the basis of assumed forces of this kind, notably by W. I. Thomas in his research studies of immigrant groups and delinquent girls.

Habits or Customs. As we saw in a previous chapter, however, other researches which have been made tend to show that not much that is definite can be found out about original nature. The individual gets his personality largely from his

[1] Cf. Tönnies, Ferdinand, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,* "Vorrede" in first edition; reprinted as separate paper in author's *Studien und Kritiken.*

experience in those groups in which he lives first and most intimately. This line of inquiry has led to the formation of the theory that the important concrete elements of social behavior are, not instincts or some other sort of inborn behavior patterns, but actively functioning tendencies which in their individual aspect we call habits, in their social aspect customs. The present chapter is accordingly devoted to a review of some of the more significant passages in scientific literature in which habit and custom have been discussed in their relation to other aspects of human social activity.

Cultural Anthropology. In modern scientific writings, habit and custom, respectively, have until very lately been treated as a rule as the research problems of two separate groups of specialists. Habit was regarded as a matter for the student of psychology to investigate; while custom was of interest to the jurist and political scientist, as in the case of Montesquieu and Sir Henry Maine, the student of geography and ethnography, like Bastian and Ratzel, and, more recently, the cultural anthropologist. Attempts on the part of anthropologists to account for the distribution, spread, and transmission of culture traits seem to have been, historically, the beginning of interest in the psychology of custom. Adolphe Bastian (1826-1905), starting from an interest in the geographical distribution of folk traits, developed the idea of folk ideas, *Völkergedanken,* which accompanied and gave meaning and direction to the customs of particular peoples.[2] Underneath the folk ideas, he thought one might discern the existence of elemental ideas, *Elementargedanken,* common to all mankind. Bastian and his contemporary, Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) were alike relatively indifferent to fundamental theoretic questions;[3] both held in general that the characteristics of particular bodies of custom or cultures were determined by the influence of environmental factors and by the contact of cultural groups with one another.

Evolutionary Anthropology. Bastian's concept of *Elementargedanken* may, however, be taken at least as a symbol

[2] See Goldenweiser, A. A., "Cultural Anthropology," in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* edited by Harry Elmer Barnes.
[3] *Ibid.,* pp. 210-13.

of the start of the so-called evolutionary school of anthropologists, represented by Herbert Spencer, E. B. Tylor, L. H. Morgan, H. S. Maine, and others, writers who sought to explain the wide distribution of certain customs more or less exclusively in terms of parallel evolution through inevitable stages from a common basis in human nature.[4] This doctrine of the anthropologists appears to be logically related to the conception of a series of instincts, desires, or "social forces" common to all members of the human race, a conception which has been entertained by many American sociologists, as is brought out elsewhere in this volume. The evolutionary school of anthropology and the sociological conception of desires as social forces seem, however, to have developed more or less independently of each other, although the two movements may be traced historically to a common origin or early point of contact in the early chapters of Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Sociology,* where he discusses the "Factors of Social Phenomena." It is significant that Spencer proceeds directly, in this book, from his enumeration of "factors" to a discussion of some "primitive ideas," meaning by the term the ideas of primitive peoples, but apparently with the implication that these ideas are primitive in the sense of being elemental.

The "Diffusion" of Customs. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, a rival explanation of the wide distribution of cultural traits has been developed among some of the anthropologists, an explanation in terms of "diffusion," that is, the spread over wide areas of customs which have a definite origin in restricted localities, through the agencies of travellers, traders, military invaders, and through the medium of visiting between groups. The debate of the anthropologists over the relative merits of "evolution" and "diffusion" as explanations of cultural uniformities has been a fruitful one in that it has stimulated the proponents of both views to energetic efforts directed toward the amassing of further evidence from field studies of all sorts. What is probably of even greater importance to the student of social theory, however, is the elaboration of theories of social psychology corresponding to both anthropological doctrines, which has been carried out by vari-

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 219.

ous writers. Anthropology has tended in fact to function as a historical science, concerning itself with the task of depicting the process by which present cultural traits have come to be what they are, and have come to be distributed, as they are.[5] Sociology, on the other hand, in so far as it can be distinguished from anthropology, has attempted to isolate natural forces and to formulate generalized descriptions of natural processes, in terms of which typical social facts and events can be understood, anticipated, and in a measure controlled, whenever and wherever they occur. Sociologists have therefore been interested in the studies of the evolution and diffusion of culture which have been made by the anthropologists, but they have been more particularly concerned to make out the mechanism of cultural evolution and diffusion.

Tarde. Gabriel Tarde may be taken, with sufficient historical accuracy for our purposes, as the forerunner of all those sociologists who have particularly concerned themselves with the sociological equivalent of the anthropological problem of diffusion. For Tarde, cultural likeness was the basic social fact, and imitation, the process whereby cultural likeness was created, was the basic social process. In the course of his studies he found it desirable to make use of another fundamental concept of social process, the concept of opposition, but his great contribution to sociological theory was his description of the various typical forms taken, and results produced, by the process of imitation.[6] Tarde's theories have been effectively presented to American readers by Professor E. A. Ross in his *Social Psychology* and *Social Control.*

Durkheim's "Collective Representations." The sociological theories of Emile Durkheim have often been incorrectly classed together with those of Tarde, but in fact the two authors resemble each other only superficially. Like Tarde, Durkheim has concerned himself with the problem of accounting for the participation in common or like customs, morals,

[5] Cf. Teggart, Frederick J., *Theory of History,* pp. 164-65, 168, 171, 187-89.

[6] Tarde's principal works to be read in this connection are his *Laws of Imitation* and his *Social Laws,* both available in English translation. Late in his life he wrote what is, in the judgment of the present writer, the best of his works, *L'Opinion et la Foule,* but this latter work is concerned with a somewhat different problem.

and traditions by large numbers of widely distributed individuals, but Durkheim's theory is primarily a tentative explanation of the manner in which the members of one group, through a process of interaction, come to have customs, ideas, and sentiments in common. For him, customs, such as the savage dance and the ritual of primitive religion, are shared by many individuals because they are the products of the collective activity of the group; group traditions and particularly myths are "collective representations," arising out of common activity and experience. In his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* very little is said about imitation; his theory corresponds rather to the "evolutionary" anthropology.[7] His sociological theories are, however, by no means entirely incompatible with the anthropological conception of diffusion; Durkheim seeks to account for the genesis and for the authority of group customs; Tarde for their spread and transmission to successive generations.

Custom as a "Psychological" Problem. Tarde has been criticized for the loose and indiscriminate way in which he uses the notion of imitation, which, in his sense of the term, appears to be in reality an abstraction from an observable social result or state; while he treats it as a causal explanation of cultural uniformities and similarities.[8] In similar manner it might be argued that Durkheim has really given us no fundamental psychological explanation of the process by which the individual acquires the customs of the group. It may be legitimately questioned, on the other hand, whether this is, after all, a problem of sociology or one of psychology. In either case, sociologists need to be well acquainted with the best explanations or descriptions from a psychological point of view, of these processes of inculcation, copying, suggestion, imitation, and whatever else we may find it desirable to call the different psychological mechanisms by which customs become and remain the common possession of many individuals. To this end the contributions to a theory of social psychology made by

[7] *Op. cit.*, Chap. VII.

[8] Cf. Faris, Ellsworth, "The Concept of Imitation," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXII (November, 1926), pp. 367-78.

John Dewey, and those of J. Mark Baldwin, mentioned in a previous chapter, are of particular significance.

Dewey's Theory of Habit and Custom. In *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922) Professor Dewey's central theme is the relation of habit to original nature, to custom, and to the moral rules and moral conflicts of individuals and groups. In this book Dewey has stated, more clearly perhaps than any other writer, the essential interrelation of impulse, habit, and custom. He holds that, while innate impulses are antecedent to the formation of habit in the life-history of any given individual, a body of group customs is already there when any particular individual appears on the scene.[9] Furthermore, the individual is born a very helpless, dependent being; he must conform to the habits of those around him in order to live anywhere outside of an institution for the feeble-minded.[10] The individual therefore acquires habits which are, in substance, the habits of the people around him; that is, they are the customs of the group in which he is born.

> The problem of origin and development of the various groupings, or definite customs, in existence at any particular place is not solved by reference to psychic causes, elements, forces. It is to be solved by reference to facts of action, demand for food, for houses, for a mate, for some one to talk to one and listen to one talk, demands which are intensified by the fact already mentioned that each person begins a helpless, dependent creature. . . . These ways of behaving involve interaction, that is to say, and prior groupings. And to understand the existence of organized ways or habits we surely need to go to physics, chemistry and physiology rather than to psychology.[11]

As to the relation of custom to morals, Dewey repeats in effect Sumner's treatment of the *mores,* to be reviewed briefly below, supported, however, by an extensive discussion of habits as tendencies to action,[12] and as the determiners of ends.[13] "For practical purposes," he points out, "morals are customs. . . . Always and everywhere customs supply the standards for personal activities." Customs and habits are given a moral

[9] *Op. cit.,* pp. 58-59, 84 ff.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 58.
[11] *Ibid.,* pp. 61-62.
[12] *Ibid.,* pp. 24-25.
[13] *Ibid.,* pp. 25, 31, *et passim.*

significance by individuals and groups because they are always tendencies to action, not mere passive mechanisms waiting to be called into play by an act of the "will," and when interfered with, they generate a sense of need for some compensatory activity. Customs are supported by intellectual arguments as to their reasonableness, but reasonableness is in the last analysis no more than the appropriateness of means to ends, and this adaptation of means to ends must be experienced before it is imagined. The ends, likewise, are derived from the habits; they are simply those ends which one has reached by engaging in habitual activities; and they are recalled and represented to imagination when the automatic, unthinking repetition of the habit is in any way impeded or prevented. This volume by Dewey, bearing the appropriate secondary title, "An Introduction to Social Psychology," is beyond doubt the most provocative contribution to the theory of habit and custom which has yet appeared in the English language.

Sumner's Theory of Folkways and Mores. A survey of the outstanding contributions to a scientific treatment of habit and custom and their interrelations would be seriously incomplete without some mention of the work of the late Professor William Graham Sumner. It can be said without exaggeration that, while the work of Tarde, Baldwin, Dewey, Durkheim, and Thomas may be taken to represent the development of the psychological theory of habit and custom, the writings of Sumner, his pupil and successor, A. G. Keller, and William F. Ogburn represent the sociological development of the same theme.

Professor Sumner has the distinction of having introduced three new terms into the sociological vocabulary,—"folkways," "mores," and "the in-group and the out-group." His theoretic analysis of the sociology of custom, which was until lately to be found only in his one great book, *Folkways* (1906), can be summarized in a few concise propositions, as follows:[14]

(1) Habits are developed out of the struggle to satisfy needs, by a process of trial and selection which has resulted in the establishment

[14] *Folkways,* Chap. I. Recently there have appeared the four volumes of the monumental *Science of Society* (New Haven, 1927), which Professor Sumner began before he wrote *Folkways,* and which has been completed since his death by Professor Keller.

of ways of doing things which are found more expedient than the other ways which have been tried.

(2) The struggle for existence has been carried on by human beings not individually, but in groups. The members of a group profit by one another's experience, and "there was concurrence toward that which proved to be most expedient." In this way there arose customs or folkways. "The folkways are not creations of human purpose and wit; they are like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation."

(3) The folkways are, however, "subject to a strain of improvement toward better adaptation of means to ends, as long as the adaptation is so imperfect that pain is produced. They are also subject to a strain of consistency with each other, because they all answer their several purposes with less friction and antagonism when they cooperate and support each other."

(4) The folkways become reenforced by supernatural sanctions originating in ghost-fear. They are then regarded by the group as the right ways; they become the "prosperity policy" of the group and must be observed by all members of the group lest some retribution be visited upon all by supernatural powers. Folkways which have reached this stage of development are the *mores* of the group, that is, its morals.

(5) The primitive society in which folkways and mores were first formed consisted of numerous small groups widely scattered in space. In such a system each group is for its own members the in-group or we-group; all other persons belong to others-groups or out-groups. The relation of members of the in-group to each other is one of peace and order; toward members of out-groups the typical relationship is one of war and plunder. The mores and folkways are in fact attributes of the in-group in their origin, rather than of any larger society; they prescribe both the relations of members of the in-group to one another and the policy to be pursued toward outsiders. In other words, the mores are not in their origin universal moral laws, but rules based on a classification of men into two general categories.

(6) The mores, being simply customs which have grown up in a particular group and have been made authoritative by group sanction, are sufficient to make anything right. Rightness, in the eyes of the members of a given group, is simply the quality of conformity to the mores of the group.

Keller's Theory of Societal Evolution. It is patent to any thoughtful student of society that Sumner worked out in the foregoing argument an illuminating and suggestive account of the manner in which customs are related to human thought and behavior and to the group structure of society. As a matter of historical fact, his *Folkways* has probably had

as much influence upon sociological thought in the United States as any single work that could be named. Manifestly the book was a contribution to sociology rather than to social psychology; it is concerned primarily with customs rather than with habits, and what little the author does have to say about habit, as the individual aspect of custom, is superficial and has been superseded by later accounts. In this respect *Folkways* can be classed with the little book *Societal Evolution* (1915), written by Sumner's pupil and successor, Professor A. G. Keller. Keller has taken as a point of departure Sumner's thesis that the mores are subject to a twofold "strain of improvement," and has developed from this a description of the mechanism of cultural change. His conclusion is, in brief, that social evolution is not, in historic times, a matter of natural selection, strictly so called. It is a cultural process, a process of variation, selection, and adaptation in the mores, which function like a scaffolding erected between human beings and the physical environment. This process of cultural evolution has been in the past largely automatic and unplanned, but it tends to become more conscious and purposive. Rational selection is accompanying and replacing automatic selection.

Kidd's Theory of the "Superrational Sanctions." A theory of social evolution somewhat like that of Keller had been previously published by Benjamin Kidd in his *Social Evolution* (1895). Kidd saw social evolution as change in the institutions of a society, but he was particularly impressed with the fact that there is no "rational sanction," as he put it, for the increasing subordination of individuals to group purposes which he saw as an essential feature of social change. He therefore concluded that religious beliefs have been a very important element in the mechanism of social evolution; individuals subordinate themselves to group rules because they see those rules as the laws of God, subject to rewards and punishments in another existence after the death of the body. Kidd thus anticipated in substance a part of Sumner's theory of the mores, although it is not demonstrable that Sumner derived his own version of the matter from Kidd. Probably we may say simply that the prevailing intellectual currents in the western world at the close of the nineteenth century—par-

ticularly the application of the new ideas of historical criticism to the study of the Bible—were favorable to an objective consideration of the rôle of religion in human affairs.[15]

Ogburn's "Cultural Lag." The doctrine that social evolution is largely a matter of change in the customs of a group is today one of the accepted notions of scientific sociology. Professor W. F. Ogburn has restated the theory and introduced another technical term into the sociological vocabulary by his discussion of "cultural lag" in *Social Change* (1922). By cultural lag Ogburn means the antithesis of Sumner's "strain of the mores toward consistency with each other," in other words, the tendency of the mores to get out of adjustment with each other on account of the fact that some change more rapidly than others. The "subsistence mores," or the economic customs of a group, tend to change most readily because, in the language of Sumner, they constitute the most obvious adaptation of means to ends; they are the means of survival in the face of the pressure of a growing population upon the resources of the earth. Other mores, those determining the organization of the family and, in general, the relations and responsibilities of persons to one another, do not change so readily. These mores not so directly and obviously affecting subsistence have a typically supernatural character because of the supernatural sanctions and the group approval which is attached to them. Hence maladjustment develops between the subsistence mores and the other elements of the group culture; there is a cultural lag on the part of the non-subsistence mores. This conception has been used by a number of recent writers to explain special phases and aspects of social disorganization, notably the disorganization of the modern family, manifested in a rising divorce rate and in the decline of control of children by parents. Park and Miller's *Old World Traits Transplanted* (1921), Thomas and Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918), and Thomas' *The Unadjusted Girl* are works which describe the processes which go on and the conflicts which arise when, through international migration, groups having very different cultures are brought into close contact with each other. Professor J. M. Williams, in *The Expansion*

[15] See Small, Albion W., *Origins of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), pp. 89-92.

of Rural Life, has described the maladjustments and the conflicts which arose late in the nineteenth century in the United States through the lag in the adaptation of farmers' attitudes to changing economic conditions and expanding markets.

From the foregoing it will be apparent that it is no exaggeration to say that one main trend in the development of scientific sociology is manifested in the tendency on the part of many writers and teachers to define sociology more and more as the study of culture.[16] Those who are disposed to define sociology as the study of social organization are constrained to point out that the particular forms of group organization which exist in fact are determined primarily by custom. The study of the relation of culture traits to group organization will be further discussed in a later chapter of this volume.

[16] Sumner and Keller's *Science of Society* (see Note 14 above) is essentially a treatment of sociology as the study of culture. At least one recent textbook for use in elementary college classes in sociology has been written by a man trained as a cultural anthropologist,—*An Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1927), by Wilson D. Wallis. Professor Wallis naturally derives his categories largely from the study of culture traits and culture patterns. Professor Max Scheler, of the University of Cologne, Germany, has been discussing the field and purpose of "cultural sociology" in his recent writings, but he uses the term in a somewhat different sense than would be implied by the writings of American cultural anthropologists.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SOCIAL PERSONALITY

The common-sense view of social phenomena is that they are made up of the activities of human individuals. From this it appears to follow that in order to understand social happenings and conditions we must study human beings. For some time, however, two more or less distinct ideas have been widely held as to the characteristics of human beings which must be taken into account by the one who would understand, anticipate, and perhaps control social events. One idea is that human nature is everywhere fundamentally the same; a variant of this idea is the view which supposes human nature to be made up of the same qualities and tendencies in all persons, but with variation of the qualities in intensity and degree from person to person and from race to race. The other idea is that every human being enters into social activity as a distinct unit, and, in some degree, a unique one. If this latter assumption be granted, it is necessary in order to understand social phenomena to have a method of studying the behavior tendencies of the particular individuals who are involved in a given social happening. The former view leads to the investigation of human *traits*—instincts, attitudes, and desires. The latter view leads to the study of *personality* and of individuality. As a matter of fact, both lines of research have been industriously pursued by recent students of the social sciences and psychology, and by both methods of approach important contributions have been made to our present understanding of social behavior. Chapters X and XV of this volume are devoted to the subject of human traits; the two chapters immediately preceding this one may be regarded as a survey of certain marginal ground, in which we are concerned with the moulding of human traits in social interaction, and with the process by which traits not a part of the biological heritage of

man nevertheless become common to the members of a given group. In the present chapter and the following one we shall be concerned with the attempts which have been made, and the success which has been enjoyed, in studying human beings as distinct, somehow independent units in the social process.

Individuality and Personality. In the present stage of development of social and psychological science it is practicable, as we shall see, to make a distinction between *individuality,* as the pattern of traits and characteristics by which any one human being differs from others, and *personality,* as the organization of traits, attitudes, and ideas which determine the rôle of the individual in human society. Each term is used loosely and variously by contemporary writers; we shall consider this range of usage further in the following pages. For the purposes of a concise review of the development and range of the literature dealing with these subjects, however, it will be convenient to consider first the history and trend of the idea of personality, and to defer the more detailed consideration of the concept of individuality to the following chapter, although the logical order would perhaps be the reverse one.

Personality as "Soul." As a matter of history, it may be said that the concept of personality is older than that of individuality. If one starts to investigate the development of these ideas before the opening of the nineteenth century, he will be struck at once by the fact that neither personality nor individuality was a technical term until very recently. Both terms are almost entirely lacking from the index and table of contents of every volume of sociological and psychological literature published before 1900, and these terms, together with all clearly equivalent expressions, are likewise largely absent from the text of all such books. When nineteenth-century writers do mention personality or individuality, it is with the obvious assumption that they are common-sense ideas which will be understood by all readers sufficiently well for the purpose in hand. One can easily imagine, however, that if a monk who had taught in a thirteenth-century university could be transported to our era and familiarized with the term personality as we use it in ordinary discussions, his mind would automatically turn to the discussions of the "soul" and its attributes

which occupied so much of the attention of the Greek philosophers and of the medieval scholastic teachers and writers. It is in fact largely in early discussions of the soul that we shall find such contributions to the idea of personality as were made before 1600. If our hypothetical monk were asked what warrant there is for calling a human being a person and not an animal, it is likely that he would say, man has a soul, or, perhaps, man *is* a soul.

Classical Greek Ideas. A German writer, Rhode, has summarized in a scholarly volume what he has been able to find out regarding Greek ideas of the soul.[1] He finds that ideas of the soul were common among the Greeks, the concept then being not so very different from that which is current in theological circles today, in other words, that of a spiritual entity which dwells in, and in some manner gives life and value to, the human body. The soul, then as now, was also assumed to survive the death of the body. E. B. Tylor, Herbert Spencer, and other nineteenth-century writers have traced this idea back to primitive attempts to account for sleep and dreams; however, that is a matter which need not concern us here. We know that Plato, for one, thought of the soul as a more or less compound structure, the qualities of which could be known through reflective analysis of common knowledge. Plato's views concerning the soul are set forth in a number of the dialogues, but particularly in the *Phædo,* the *Phædrus,* and the *Republic.* He deals with the problem of the soul, on the one hand, from the standpoint afforded by his so-called idealism; we might paraphrase his theory by saying that the soul is the *idea,* or the essence, of the human personality, and it partakes of the being of some transcendent order of things. On the other hand, Plato concludes that the soul has three parts or levels, the appetitive, the spirited or emotional, and the rational or intellectual; and certain characteristic virtues and vices of human beings are functions or defects, as the case may be, of the several levels or souls. What is of greater interest for our purposes is the fact that Plato believed that the social rôle of

[1] Rhode, Erwin, *Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality Among the Greeks.* Translated from the eighth German edition by W. B. Hillis. London and New York, 1925.

the individual ought to conform, and perhaps in the long run does tend to conform, to the relative measure in which the higher, spirited and rational levels of his soul predominate in his make-up.[2]

Although Plato was greatly interested in the problems and possibilities of education, and although it was probably in large part from his teachings that Aristotle's interest in the matter was derived, nowhere in his writings does Plato arrive at a conception of the relation of culture to personality so objective as that developed by his talented pupil. At the very outset of his *Politics,* following the famous statement that man is a political animal, Aristotle states that, although a social instinct is implanted in man by nature, and although man when perfected is the best of animals, he is the worst when separated from law and justice; injustice when armed is the more dangerous for the fact, and man is equipped by nature with the arms of intelligence which he may use for bad ends.[3] He had already formulated a fuller statement in the *Ethics,* however; for commentators are generally agreed that the *Ethics* was written as Part One of a general treatise of which the *Politics* was intended to be Part Two.

> Well: Human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral: now the Intellectual springs originally, and is increased from teaching (for the most part, that is), and needs therefore experience and time; whereas the Moral comes from custom, and so the Greek term denoting it is but a slight deflection from the one denoting custom in that language.
>
> From this fact it is plain that not one of the moral virtues comes to be in us by nature: because of such things as exist by nature, none can be changed by custom: a stone, for instance, by nature gravitating downwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could fire again be brought to descend, nor in fact could anything whose nature is in one way be brought to another.[4]

The passage might very well be paraphrased to read, "Personality is the product of culture and teaching impressed upon

[2] *The Republic,* Books VIII and IX, *passim.*

[3] *The Politics of Aristotle,* Jowett's translation, Bk. I, Chap. II.

[4] *Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle,* Everyman's Library edition, 1911, 1915, opening paragraphs of Bk. II; see also the *Politics,* Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII.

the nature of man." This is really a very modern view of the matter, and was not fully appreciated by the generations of scholars following Aristotle for the next two thousand years. In this respect, as in many others, modern scholarship and research have had to rediscover what Aristotle clearly anticipated.

Medieval Ideas of Personality. For medieval scholasticism, the idea of personality was of no particular importance; the attitude on this question being on the whole simply one more manifestation of the other-worldliness of medieval theology. To the scholastic writer, human nature was essentially bad, so much so that man could not be "saved" except by Divine Grace. Human personality, therefore, was scarcely thought of as a subject worth serious study, except in so far as attempts were made to buttress theological dogmas by lines of reasoning intended to show that religious teaching finds confirmation in the native ideas of man, presumably implanted in him by God. Father Moroney, a modern Catholic scholar, has made an intensive study of the idea of personality as presented in scholastic writings, and, while he gives a definition of "social personality" as "the consciousness of our relationship to other men as persons," [5] he found nothing corresponding to this conception in the literature which he explored. Medieval speculation, he says, dealt with personality largely in connection with the exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. It was necessary for theological purposes to formulate a working definition of personality which would seem to be consistent with the dogma that God is three persons in one.[6]

Early Modern Contributions. In the early modern period, with the beginnings of that metaphysical speculation and inquiry out of which modern psychology as well as modern epistemology arose, interest was developed in the attributes of the human personality. For some time the interest took the form of a dispute over innate ideas, Descartes and his successors on the Continent holding that certain fundamental ideas were inborn; while Bacon and the English Empiricists generally held to the *tabula rasa* point of view. At first this

[5] Moroney, Rev. Timothy B., *The Idea of Personality* (Washington, D. C., 1919), p. 87.
[6] *Ibid.*, Chaps. I and II.

discussion had the effect of drawing attention away from any question of the nature of the personality as a unit, or of the differences between persons which are perhaps the principal source of the belief of contemporary sociologists that personality is at any rate a name for something which must be taken into account. The innate ideas of the Continental rationalists were assumed to be the same for all human beings, and evidently there is no difference between one *tabula rasa* and another. When Kant propounded his doctrine of the forms of the human intuition and understanding, however, he found it necessary to posit an "ego" to which the forms could be attributed, and the modern interest in personality might well be dated from Kant's theory of the "transcendental ego of apperception." Kant himself never developed his concept of the ego beyond the point of purely metaphysical construction, although there are interesting implications in the doctrine that goodness and badness are attributes of the human will, laid down in his *Metaphysic of Morals* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason.* To say that the will of one man is good while the will of another is not, seems to imply that there are traits of personality which might be studied, compared, and measured. Nevertheless the theory of personality made no progress in any sense that is of direct interest to modern social scientists until a century after Kant. This was perhaps mainly because such scientific psychology as the nineteenth century possessed was based on the whole on the *tabula rasa* theory of English Empiricism, rather than on the Kantian concept of the will.

The Study of the Will. It was, in fact, when attention was redirected toward the concept of the will as an empirical attribute of the individual that real gains began to be made in the study of personality. This shift took place, as might perhaps be anticipated, in connection with attempts to grapple with eminently practical psychological problems arising out of the study of mental diseases. It was natural to think of an insane person as one with a disorganized personality, and this at once called for an inquiry into the sort of organization characteristic of the personalities which we call normal. The writer has not succeeded in discovering exactly when or by whom the term "personality" was first used in connection with the study of

psychopathic states and processes. It is of interest, however, that Ribot, a French physician and alienist, gave to one of three works which he wrote on these topics in the eighties the title *The Diseases of the Personality* (first American copyright 1887), while another was entitled *The Diseases of the Will.* It is in the former volume that we find one of the first extended discussions of the term "personality" used in a sense in which it is still used by scientists. Ribot defines the personality, provisionally, as "the individual as clearly conscious of itself . . . the highest form of individuality." [7] He proceeds at once to point out that the metaphysical concept of the ego will not serve as an explanation of personality for the purposes of pathological psychology; it is necessary to explain how the ego is formed.

The Organism as Personality. In search, then, of a sounder and more useful explanation of personality, Ribot devotes a large part of his little book to an elaboration of the thesis that the organism, and in particular the brain, constitutes the real personality. "Conscious personality is never more than a feeble portion of physical personality." [8] He develops ingeniously, but not with entirely convincing success, an interpretation of consciousness and its disorders which is apparently intended to resolve the old mind-and-body problem. To this end he presents an interpretation of self-consciousness which, under the name of *cœnœsthesia,* runs through much of the current literature of psychology; "it is the organic sense, the sense of the body, usually vague and obscure, but sometimes very clear in all of us, that constitutes for each animal the basis of its psychic individuality." [9]

Obviously the fundamental task which Ribot sets himself in the volume we have been considering is to explain in some objective manner the *unity* of personality which we are forced to think of when we try to understand its disintegration in pathological mental states. Later, as we shall see, psychiatrists began to emphasize the conception of insanity as maladjust-

[7] *Op. cit.* (Chicago, 1910), p. 1.
[8] *Ibid.,* pp. 154-55.
[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 18-19. Author cites Henle, *Allgemeine Anatomia* (1841), and same writer's *Pathologische Untersuchungen* (1848) on "cœnæsthesia"; several other predecessors are also cited.

ment to a psycho-social environment, but Ribot gives only one slight intimation of this.[10] It is his main contention that personality is a unity formed through the coordination of incessantly renascent mental states, having for their support the vague sense which the individual has of his own body. "This unity does not pass from above to below, but from below to above; it is not an initial, but a terminal, point." [11] He calls attention in the same passage to the fact that consciousness of self is reduced to a minimum when the coordination is most complete, as in the case of a skilled surgeon performing a difficult operation.

"Divided" and "Multiple" Personality. Since the time when Ribot lived and wrote, more and more interest in the study and treatment of insanity has developed. The phenomenon of divided or multiple personality, with the exposition of which the name of Morton Prince has been particularly associated, has come in for a great deal of investigation which resulted in supporting Ribot's contention that one must have a working definition and interpretation of the normal, unified personality as a point of departure for the understanding and treatment of the disorganized personality. Prince's own definition of personality is, "the sum total of all the biological innate dispositions, impulses, tendencies, appetites and instincts of the individual and of all the *acquired* dispositions and tendencies—acquired by experience." [12] This is essentially the same definition that is given by a number of other recent writers; [13] it has been criticized in that the expression "sum total" gives after all no indication of the nature or basis of the unity of

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 142. "We might also say that the human individual is conscious of itself both as a person and as a member of society, but I shall avoid comparisons that may be contested."

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 154-55.

[12] Prince, Morton, *The Unconscious* (New York: second edition, revised, 1921), p. 532.

[13] See for example Paton, Stewart, *Human Behavior* (New York, 1921), p. 94; Kantor, J. R., *Principles of Psychology* (New York, 1924), p. 75; Ogden, C. K., *The Meaning of Psychology* (New York, 1926), p. 3. Bibliographical articles on personality have been recently published by Vernon M. Cady ("The Psychology of Personality," *Journal of Delinquency,* Vol. VII—September, 1922, pp. 225-48) and by Kimball Young ("Personality Studies," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXXII—May, 1927, pp. 953-71). A bibliographic volume on similar lines prepared by A. A. Roback to supplement his *Psychology of Character* is announced as this manuscript is being prepared.

the personality. This criticism has been anticipated to some extent by Prince in another passage, in which he defines personality as "the survival of organized antecedent experiences." "Those complexes of experience which persist," he says, "not only provide the material for our memories, but tend, consciously or unconsciously, to shape the judgments, beliefs, convictions, habits, and tendencies of our mental lives." [14] The theory that personality is shaped through the processes of memory is widely held by contemporary psychologists; the literature abounds also in neurological and physiological hypotheses intended to account for the facts of memory, recall, and the modification of habits, ideas, and tendencies by experience.

Culture and Personality. Of greater direct interest to the social scientist is the recognition, more and more frequently and extensively mentioned in psychological literature, of the influence of the social or cultural environment in the shaping of the complex of traits which is defined as the personality.[15] The relation of personality to culture naturally is emphasized by writers who rank primarily as sociologists. Emile Durkheim, for instance, has sought to make a distinction between individuality and personality, defining personality as that which makes one a man, not that which distinguishes one from other men. "A person," he holds, "is not merely a single subject distinguished from all the others. It is especially a being to which is attributed a relative autonomy in relation to the environment with which it is most immediately in contact." [16] It is this problem of the relation of the individual to his environment, and in particular to his social environment, which has served as the point of departure for the sociological investigation of personality. Modern psychiatry, however, especially since the first publications of Sigmund Freud, has contributed materially to the formation of the same conceptions. The essence of Freud's theory of the neuroses, in fact, stated abstractly, is that the unity of the personality tends to become

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 306. See also Wells, F. L., *Mental Adjustments* (New York, 1921), p. 156, on personality as the sum of memories.

[15] See for example Prince, Morton, *op. cit.*, pp. 532-53.

[16] Durkheim, Emile, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London, 1926), p. 271. See also the same author's *Division du Travail Social*, third edition, p. 267 ff.

destroyed in conflicts which originate in the incompatibility of native behavior tendencies with the patterns set in the culture of the group.[17] Alfred Adler and Jung have developed doctrines which vary from that of Freud only in respects which need not concern us here. It should be remarked, however, that other writers have suggested that personality conflicts may reflect the divergent influences exercised by different parts of the social environment of the individual, rather than a conflict of innate impulse with social pattern. After all, it is difficult to see how any psychological tendency to conform to the standards of the cultural environment could arise, did not such conformity promise satisfaction for some of the impulses of the individual.

Personality Defined. In studying and analyzing the interaction of the individual with his social environment, it has been found convenient to introduce the concept of the individual's *general attitude,* or attitudes, toward himself and toward other persons. In a later chapter we shall consider more systematically the development of the concept "social attitudes"; in this connection, however, we must anticipate that discussion to a certain extent. Thus Thomas, among others, has defined personality in terms of attitude:

> The individual's attitude toward the totality of his attitudes constitutes his conscious "personality." The conscious personality represents the conception of self, the individual's appreciation of his own character.[18]

In a previous paragraph Thomas has defined "character" as something determined by the nature of the organization of the individual's wishes; in other words, character, for Thomas, is the organization of the individual's attitudes. Bechterew, the Russian psychologist, has defined personality in terms of "a definite attitude toward the outer world," also as "an indi-

[17] The best general presentation of Freud's theory is to be found in his *General Introduction to Psycho-analysis* (New York, 1920). See also Holt, E. B., *The Freudian Wish: A Treatise in Ethics.*

[18] Thomas, William I., "The Persistence of Primary Group Norms in Present-Day Society," in *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education,* by H. S. Jennings and others (1917), quoted in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), p. 470.

vidual in free association with his social milieu."[19] R. G. Gordon, in his recent book, *Personality,* defines his concept so as to include both the individual's conception of himself, which he derives from the self-regarding sentiment posited by McDougall as a part of the instinctive equipment of man, and his attitude toward his environment. The self-regarding sentiment is indicated by Gordon as the basis of what he terms the *ego;* while *character* is defined as "the dominant sentiments and beliefs of the individual at a given time, whereby his attitude to his environment is determined." *Personality* is then seen as a broader complex, including both the ego and the character, and much else besides.[20] It is questionable, however, whether so broad a definition of the concept personality does not largely deprive it of scientific value.

The distinction between personality and character has been made by other writers. We shall review in a later chapter Thomas and Znaniecki's discussion of attitudes, values, and wishes.[21] In the course of the same discussions they have defined character as the organization of the individual's attitudes, or tendencies to act. They then correlate the character with the life-organization, which is the organization of the individual's values, that is, of the objects in his environment as known to him.[22] These writers have emphasized the theory that personality is not to be regarded as an original datum, but as the product of a never-ending evolutionary process, to which every new experience contributes something. Dewey has emphasized in a somewhat similar manner the thought that the personality is a changing entity,[23] bound up with the life of the community in which the individual is placed.[24]

A survey of such literature as is cited in the foregoing paragraphs might lead one to believe that many psychologists are coming today to hold that personality is a term which can be

[19] Bechterew, W. V. (V. M. Bekhterev), *Personality of Individuals and Peoples,* quoted by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.,* pp. 126-27.
[20] *Op. cit.,* pp. 1-6.
[21] Chapter XV.
[22] *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (second edition, 1927), Vol. I, "Methodological Note"; Vol. II, "Introduction" to the "Life-Record of an Immigrant."
[23] *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1922), p. 158.
[24] *Ibid.,* p. 314.

given objective meaning only with reference to the social environment of the individual. As a matter of fact, however, few professional psychologists are willing to go so far. Thus F. H. Allport, who is a psychologist rather than a sociologist by training, expresses himself as follows (the italics are supplies by the writer):

> *With the exception of a few traits, personality* may be defined as the individual's characteristic reactions to social stimuli, and the quality of his adaptation to the social features of his environment.
>
> In its genetic development, also, personality is dependent upon social contacts.[25]

This is the most sociological definition of personality which the writer has been able to find in the works of any psychologist.

The Sociological Theory of Personality. When we turn to the writings of certain sociologists, on the other hand, including those of Thomas and Znaniecki mentioned above, we find that they have defined personality, and described its formation and adaptation, in terms which make the concept really a sociological one. J. M. Baldwin's account of the "dialectic of personal growth," outlined in a previous chapter of this volume, is the starting-point for much of this discussion of the social aspects of personality; in other respects it grows out of the interpretation of culture made by Sumner, Dewey, and others. From still another direction the theory of personality has been influenced by the sociological interpretation of mind and of knowledge developed by Durkheim and his successors and by certain German writers, among them Franz Jerusalem, Max Scheler, and Theodor Litt.[26] To anticipate in a measure for the sake of clearness the points to be brought out in the remainder of this chapter, we may say that the following theses are beginning to emerge from current sociological investigations and discussions of the personality:

[25] Allport, Floyd H., *Social Psychology* (Boston, 1924), p. 101.

[26] See especially Durkheim, Emile, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 421 ff.; Halbwachs, Maurice, *Les Cadres Sociaux de la Memoire* (Paris, 1924); Scheler, Max (editor), *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens* (Munich and Leipzig, 1924); and same author's *Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, 1926).

(1) Thinking is largely a social process. The categories by means of which thought is carried on, by which the objects of the environment are defined, and with reference to which personal attitudes are formed, are fashioned in a process of social interaction or communication. The very concepts which are the essential instruments of the most characteristically human kind of thought are "collective representations" (Durkheim).

(2) In any concrete sense of the term, personality refers to the organization or complex of traits (in the broad sense of the term) which determine the position of the individual in society. Indeed, one can almost say that personality *is* our name for the general status of the individual in society.

(3) Though the personality is formed on a core or foundation of "original nature," it is fashioned largely out of materials provided in the culture of the groups in which the individual has participated.

(4) An important element in personality is the self, that is, the individual's attitude toward himself, or his conception of his position in society. Common sense has long recognized that we tend to become what we conceive ourselves to be.

(5) The individual's conception of himself, however, is largely determined by the attitudes which others have toward him; he tends to conform to the group expectation, to play the rôle which social consensus assigns to him.

Mind as a Special Phenomenon. As has been intimated, Durkheim was a pioneer in the development of the idea that thought and mind are as much social as individual phenomena. It is to him that we owe the term "collective representations," which he used to emphasize the analogy which exists between the perceptions of the individual, which are referred to in the French psychological vocabulary as individual representations (representations individuels), and the objects, ceremonies, words, and the like which have a common meaning for the members of a group and which are therefore collective representations.[27] Among American writers John Dewey and C. H. Cooley have given effective expression to similar doctrines.

> Mind is an organic whole, made up of cooperating individualities, in somewhat the same way that the music of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds. No one would think it necessary to divide the music into two kinds, that made by the whole and that of particular instruments, and no more are there two kinds of mind, the social mind and the individual mind. When we study the social mind

[27] Durkheim, Emile, *op. cit.*, p. 432 ff.

we merely fix our attention on larger aspects and relations rather than on the narrower ones of ordinary psychology.[28]

Mind can be social, however, only in so far as the ideas and concepts by means of which it operates can be communicated,[29] but ideas and concepts can enter into communication only as they are or become customary in the group, that is, they must be part of the group culture. The materials of which personality is formed are therefore, in part, at any rate, cultural materials. We can better appreciate a man and can better predict what he is likely to do under given circumstances if we know the groups to which he has belonged and their customs. Personality has accordingly been defined by Professor Ellsworth Faris as "the subjective aspect of culture." [30]

We cannot lose sight, on the other hand, of the fact that the term "personality" is used to refer to the human individual in his capacity as a distinct or separate entity or unit. R. G. Gordon has pointed out that the new "Gestalt" theory of psychology developed by several German writers, which holds that structural totalities are the units of mental activity, lends support to the old metaphysical idea of personality as a unity.[31] As the same writer has remarked in another connection, the problem of personality is the problem of explaining, not only how the individual comes to have the traits found in the culture of his group, but "why one child, out of several in a family or a community, fails to adapt himself and to grow up a normal law-abiding citizen." He concludes that "the variation must be in the child, since the other factor is nearly constant." [32] The questions implied here may be postponed in part to the following chapter. We may consider here, however, a solution of the problem of the unity and distinctness of the per-

[28] Cooley, Charles Horton, *Social Organization* (New York, 1909), p. 3.
[29] Dewey, John, *Democracy and Education,* Chap. I.
[30] Faris, Ellsworth, "The Concept of Social Attitudes," *Journal of Applied Sociology,* Vol. IX (1925), 405-08. Professor Faris informs me that he has always attributed this expression to W. I. Thomas, but neither he nor I can locate it in any of Thomas' published writings.
[31] *Op. cit.,* p. 12.
[32] *Ibid.,* p. 251. See also Burgess, Ernest W., "The Study of the Delinquent as a Person," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXVIII (May, 1923), pp. 657-80.

sonality which has been developed by Professors Park and Burgess and by Cooley.

Personality as the Social Rôle of the Individual. Park and Burgess have shown that, although the individual is indeed a member of society and as such must form his personality from the cultural materials which society affords, every individual has a more or less distinct rôle in each of the groups in which he participates; his personality must therefore correspond somehow to the social rôle he has to play.

The word personality is derived from the Latin *persona,* a mask used by actors. The etymology of the term suggests that its meaning is to be found in the rôle of the individual in the social group. By usage, personality carried the implication of the social expression of behavior. Personality may then be defined as the sum and organization of those traits which determine the rôle of the individual in the group.[33]

The person, according to Park, is an individual with status;[34] the individual with no status in society is in a condition corresponding to the theological idea of the "lost soul."[35] When personality is defined in terms of status, however, we see that the individual's conception of himself is an important force contributing to the formation of the personality.

The individual's conception of himself, however, is based on his status in the social group or groups of which he is a member. The individual whose conception of himself does not conform to his status is an isolated individual. The completely isolated individual, whose conception of himself is in no sense an adequate reflection of his status, is probably insane.[36]

The theory of the social self has been extensively treated by Professor C. H. Cooley, on the foundation, partly, of Baldwin's suggestions. Cooley has defined as a technical term "the looking-glass self," that is, the image of one's self as he sees it reflected in the attitudes of his associates towards him. "A self-idea of this sort," he says, "seems to have three principal elements: The imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance;

[33] *Op. cit.,* p. 70.
[34] *Ibid.,* p. 55.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 341.
[36] *Ibid.,* p. 55.

and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification." [37] Professor George H. Mead has expressed in various papers a similar interpretation of the social self, with greater refinement of analysis. The most important of the contributions made by Mead to this subject is found in his account of the process of "taking the rôle of the other."

> The self arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitude or uses the gesture which another individual would use and responds to it himself, or tends so to respond. It is a development that arises gradually in the life of the infant and presumably arose gradually in the life of the race. . . . In the process the child gradually becomes a social being in his own experience, and he acts toward himself in a manner analogous to that in which he acts toward others.[38]

It is interesting to observe that this theory was anticipated by Adam Smith to a certain extent in his account of "rational sympathy" in the *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*.[39]

Not the least important feature of the development of a sociological theory of personality has been the attention paid by sociologists to the problem of personality types. Modern schemes for classifying types of personalities have been largely influenced by Jung's distinction between introverts and extroverts. Another interesting contribution is Thomas and Znaniecki's threefold division into Bohemian, Philistine, and Creative Personalities, based by them on the distinction which they have made between the "desire for stability" and the "desire for new experience." [40] Kretschmer, in *Physique and Character* (New York, 1925), has published the findings and conclusions of a study made to determine whether there was any correlation between two fundamental types of psychoses, the manic-depressive and the schizophrenic, and the physical make-

[37] *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, 1902), pp. 151-52. See also *ibid.*, pp. 61-62, 68-69, 84, 90-91.

[38] Mead, George H., "The Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIX (1922), pp. 159-63; quoted by Young in *Source-Book for Social Psychology* (New York, 1927), p. 342. See also same author's "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXXV (April, 1925), pp. 251-77.

[39] Quoted by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 397-401.

[40] *Op. cit.* (second edition, 1927), Vol. II, "Introduction" to the "Life-Record of an Immigrant."

up of the individual. He arrived at a classification into six physical types believed to have psychological significance.[41] Professor E. R. Harper, in a recent paper, has sought to develop a true sociological classification of personality types; he suggests as a tentative and superficial scheme the fourfold division of personalities into unadjustable, unadjusted, adjusted, and maladjusted.[42] Inasmuch as classification is an indispensable feature of any scientific method for dealing with a certain order of empirical phenomena, it appears likely that further effort will be devoted to this problem.

The writer has been unable to discover in European sociological literature any reflection of the American thesis that personality is a concept having reference to the social rôle of the individual. Several writers, among them William Stern, have emphasized the necessity of taking into account the personality as a unity. Professor Leopold von Wiese, in a recent paper, has attempted to restate from a sociological point of view the relation of the individual and the group. He concludes that "the group often gives for the first time certain possibilities of action, which did not previously exist; it wakes slumbering powers. One sees himself in the group from a new, perhaps hitherto unsuspected side. Only now does personality arise." [43]

In summary of the ground covered in this chapter we may say (1) that, despite the feeling that social phenomena are compounded of attitudes and wishes, units which are at once larger and smaller than the human personality, the personality persistently forces itself upon the attention of the sociologist as a unit which he must take into account; (2) personalities are formed largely from cultural materials, and personality may in fact be regarded, for certain purposes, as the subjective aspect of culture; but finally (3) various types of personalities are to be found as a rule in any social group, and these are correlated with the specialized rôles taken by the individuals in the group activity. Personalities are differentiated from each

[41] See Young's *Source-Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 132-39.

[42] "Personality Types," *Social Science*, Vol. I (November, 1925), pp. 26-29.

[43] "Allgemeine Theorie der Gruppe," *Jahrbuch für Soziologie*, Vol. III (1927), p. 13.

other owing in part to the various attitudes taken by individuals toward one another, which in turn affect individuals' conceptions of themselves. On the other hand, certain lines of inquiry have led to other explanations of the differentiation of individual types, and for convenience some of these have been reserved for consideration in the shorter chapter which follows.

CHAPTER XIV

MOBILITY AND INDIVIDUALITY

Individuality as a Problem in Science. As we have noted in an earlier chapter,[1] the objective study of individuality began early in the present century as an investigation of individual differences, which were generally assumed to be innate. The progress of biological science which is commonly dated from the work of Darwin served to focus the attention of natural scientists upon the idea of individuality. It is a significant fact that one of the first American publications to be devoted primarily to this subject, *The Individual* (1901), was the work of Nathaniel Shaler, who was a professor of geology. He approached his problem from the viewpoint of physical science with its postulate of universal, impersonal forces, and arrived at a metaphysical-sounding definition of an individual as "a plexus where natural impulses are combined to produce new results which are likely suddenly to come about." [2] There is in this definition more than a little anticipation of an idea which was developed in several philosophical works of later date, among them being Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity,* and C. Lloyd Morgan's *Emergent Evolution.* With the development of the conception that biological organisms are produced and differentiated from one another in a natural process, it inevitably became a problem for scientists to show how an entity with the attributes of the biological individual could have evolved through the interaction of simple, impersonal forces. Lloyd Morgan has expressed with especial clearness the hypothesis that the convergence of forces leads, at certain stages, to the "emergence" of phenomena of a new order. Life, in the biological sense, is seen by him as the product of one such emergence; mind is presumably another. J. E. Boodin, in his

[1] Chap. X.
[2] *Op. cit.,* p. 75.

Cosmic Evolution (1925), has given a somewhat similar account of the appearance of *social* organisms, or societies.

As a Problem in Empirical Psychology. This philosophical speculation is very helpful in certain connections. It was no more than natural, however, that attempts should be made sooner or later to apply to the problem of individuality the methods of empirical observation and measurement which had proven so fruitful in other fields of inquiry. One of the first treatises dealing with individuality which was based on studies of this latter type was Professor E. L. Thorndike's little monograph, *Individuality,* which appeared in 1911. Thorndike defined the term "individuality" as one referring to differences between human beings, and formulated the thesis that all such differences are ultimately to be conceived of as quantitative differences. "A qualitative difference in intelligence or character is . . . really a quantitative difference wherein one term is zero, or a compound of two or more quantitative differences." [3] Thorndike thus laid the foundation for the stimulating hypothesis that, granted sufficient knowledge gained by the empirical measurement of specific traits and characteristics, the character of an individual might be expressed in a great equation. "John Smith would equal so many units of this, plus so many units of that, and so on." He admitted, however, that "no such list of traits has been made for any man, much less have the exact amounts of each trait possessed by him been measured." [4] Still he felt that considerable progress had been made, when he wrote, toward such an investigation of individualities, and the bulk of his little book is devoted to a summary of the findings of such studies.

Acquired Individual Differences. It will at once be apparent to those familiar with current psychological research that contemporary methods for giving comprehensive mental tests—tests of intelligence, emotion, "will profile," and so on—frequently constitute ambitious attempts to write the equation of the individual as Thorndike conceived it. In fact, much of what has been written in the past few years on "personality"

[3] *Op. cit.* (Boston, 1911, Riverside Educational Monographs), pp. 2-5.
[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 5-6.

has had reference to the results and implications of such examinations of the mental qualities of human individuals. Thorndike seems to have assumed that the individual differences in which he was interested, and which had already been measured to some extent when he wrote, were inborn, and that they reflected in part the influence of "heredity," perhaps also the biological fact of variation. From time to time, however, it was pointed out that many of the traits in which individuals differ were unquestionably acquired by the individuals after birth. Morton Prince emphasized this when he added chapters on personality to the revised edition of his work on *The Unconscious,* in 1921.

> In the domain of acquired dispositions personality includes the ideals, "sentiments," desires, points of view, attitudes, etc., of the individual in respect to himself, to life and the environment. These being acquired by educational, social, and environmental experiences differ largely in every individual. Some become common or substantially common to all or to many. But those that are peculiar to, or acquire a dominating position and influence in the personality, play their part—and even a greater part than the primitive instinctive dispositions—in distinguishing the character of one personality from that of another.[5]

We noted in the preceding chapter a number of definitions and discussions of "personality" in which much the same point was explicitly made. As we saw in that chapter, Park and Burgess' description of personality as the social rôle of the individual, and Cooley's theory of the looking-glass self afford one explanation of the fact that personalities are so commonly individualized in a human society; an explanation, that is, of the marked differences which exist between one personality and another in the same group.

Individuality in Modern Society. Individuality in the sense of uniqueness is a well-marked characteristic of members of modern, highly civilized societies as contrasted with more primitive societies. Ribot has pointed out that individuality in the biological sense is a quality which increases as we move up the scale of animal life. Etymologically, the term "individual" refers to that which cannot be divided without de-

[5] *Op. cit.,* pp. 532-33.

stroying its essential nature, from the Latin *individuus*. In this sense of the term, as Ribot has remarked, the only individual which can be pointed out with certainty in the lower orders of animal life is the cell; the individual organism, nominally so called, is most intelligibly represented as a colony of cells. The evolution of animal species may then be regarded as a process in the course of which a colonial individuality emerges through an integration of the activities of a group of cells.[6] Similarly, it has been pointed out by anthropologists and others that the individual member of a human community is much more independent and autonomous in a highly developed society than in a simpler one.

> In America we think of the "feeling of personality" as associated with individually determined acts and policies. The individual acts "on his own," takes great risks, and takes the consequences. But in the case of our immigrants the whole struggle for self-expression has been made as a member of an organization, and the individual has felt himself to be a person to the degree that he was incorporated in an organization. The primary group maintains the security of the whole community at the sacrifice of the wishes of its individual members.[7]

Herbert Spencer has given expression to a similar generalization in his well-known account of the diverse interests of parents, species, and offspring, in his *Principles of Biology* and in *Principles of Sociology.*

Individuality as a Self-determination. In more highly developed human societies, on the other hand, we find numerous and important instances of individual choice. This is true to such an extent that the mechanism of individual self-determination has been the object of considerable inquiry on the part of psychologists. J. R. Kantor has described what he calls "idiosyncratic responses" as those which "represent the individual's critical and analytical contacts with surrounding objects and conditions, . . . the deliberate, constructive, transformative, introspective, and retrospective adaptations of individuals to their surroundings." These responses, he holds, are the most typically human of all societal responses.[8] He

[6] Ribot, Th., *The Diseases of Personality,* pp. 138-40.
[7] Park, Robert E. and Miller, Herbert A., *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York, 1921), p. 38.
[8] *Principles of Psychology* (New York, 1925), p. 206.

further suggests that idiosyncratic responses are in general of two kinds: those based on past experiences, and those based on introspective or retrospective analysis of one's own behavior equipment and one's past experience of similar situations. In either case, of course, Kantor's interpretation implies that individuality is due to some extent to the fact that no two individuals have had an identical experience, a fact which, as we shall see, has been made the basis of a theory of individuality by other writers.

The Social Determination of Individuality. John Dewey finds the original ground of individuality in physiological differences, which he does not consider it his business as a social psychologist to account for.[9] Individuality as we know it empirically, however, he explains in terms of a process of interaction between individual impulse and group custom.

> What then is meant by individual mind, by mind *as* individual? . . . Conflict of habits releases impulsive activities which in their manifestation require a modification of habit, of custom and convention. That which was at first the individualized color or quality of habitual activity is abstracted, and becomes a center of activity aiming to reconstruct customs in accordance with some desire which is rejected by the immediate situation and which therefore is felt to belong to one's self, to be the mark and possession of an individual in partial and temporary opposition to his environment. . . . For impulse when it asserts itself deliberately against an existing custom is the beginning of individuality in mind.[10]

Dewey has been one of the pioneers in the formulation of what is sometimes called *functional* psychology.[11] The terms "function" and "functional" have not always been used in this connection with exactly the same reference. Sometimes writers flatly assert the postulate that mind is a function of the physical organism; which may be contrasted, to some extent, with the theory which L. L. Bernard has made the basis of his *Introduction to Social Psychology,* namely, that behavior is a function of the environment. It is implied in either case, however, that behavior is functional in the sense that it involves a co-

[9] *Human Nature and Conduct,* p. 84.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 87; see also *ibid.,* pp. 216-17.
[11] Dewey, John, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," *Psychological Review,* July, 1896.

ordination of stimulus and response. Ellwood, in an early summary of Dewey's psychological theory, takes as the fundamental psychological fact the organism *doing something.* "Summarizing, . . . we may say that Professor Dewey's psychological point of view is that of a life-process or life-activity, functioning to secure control over its own life-conditions, and thereby its own development." [12] In other words, human behavior is a function of the physiological organism *and* of the environment; it involves an adaptation between them. There are doubtless bases for individual differences in the physical organism. If, however, environments were quite identical for all members of a given social group, our knowledge of simple human societies gives ground for the generalization that individual differences between members of any one group would not be great.

Social Mobility. The members of a modern human community, however, do not have identical environments, at least not from a psychological point of view. They perform different functions in the group economy; there is division of labor, and occupational types arise.[13] If this were all, we might still expect that all those following the same occupation in the same group would resemble one another very closely; and in some instances they do; one can with some justification allude to the farmer of the Middle West as a type. But modern society is characterized by a great deal of mobility, both spatial and occupational. Human beings move from group to group and from one stratum of society to another. Cooley has referred to our own national society as one of "open classes," meaning that movement from one social level to another is frequent, and that it is relatively easy to move upward in the social scale. In a recent article in a German sociological journal, Alfred Meusel has called attention to the frequency of voluntary movement downward in the social scale.[14] Professor Sorokin has worked out a systematic description of the various forms and aspects of "social mobility" in a recent

[12] Ellwood, Charles A., *Prolegomena to Social Psychology* (University of Chicago Ph.D. Thesis, 1901), pp. 11-13.
[13] Cooley, Charles H., *Social Process* (New York, 1922), p. 19.
[14] Meusel, Alfred, "Die Abtrünnigen," *Kolner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie,* Vol. III (Heft 2-3, 1923), pp. 152-69.

volume.[15] When individuals change their group surroundings, they are subjected to the molding influences of a succession of social environments, which further differentiates them from each other.

It would seem that the relation of individuality to mobility might be investigated at the lower levels of life by biologists. The problem is from one point of view a biological one, and Ribot has called attention to the observation of Perrier, one of his predecessors, that a migratory life seems to favor the development of biological individuality; colonies of one-celled organisms become adapted to one another in structure and function in order to meet the demands imposed by locomotion, and "a kind of colonial consciousness arises." [16] The present writer is unacquainted with other biological literature bearing on this question.

Several modern social scientists have described the relations of mobility and individuality on the human social level, among them Georg Simmel and Werner Sombart. Both of these writers have commented on the rôle of the stranger in the community. (By the stranger they mean the person who comes with the intention of staying for some time if it proves to his advantage to do so, but not the typical "settler." Such a "stranger," they point out, is peculiarly detached from the control of the community; indeed he is more or less emancipated from all social control except the control that is exerted through the courts and the police. He is not restrained by the mores of the community in which he has taken up residence, except in so far as he may consider it politic for ulterior reasons to conform to them. The stranger in a community, especially if he be of a foreign nationality, is, therefore, likely to be very much of an individualist, in the sense that he pursues his own self-interest, unhampered either by the mores of the group from which he has emancipated himself by leaving it, or by those of the group into which he has come, since he has not the sense of membership or participation in either to urge him to comply with its customs.) Sombart concludes that this is,

[15] Sorokin, Pitirim, *Social Mobility*, New York, 1927.
[16] Ribot, Th., *op. cit.*, p. 141.

in part, the explanation of the fact that the Jew, proverbially a wanderer in the Western world, has so typically been the capitalist and the originator of economic and commercial innovations; he could do things, such as taking interest for the use of money, or engrossing the supply of a commodity for resale at a profit, which custom forbade to members of the group. Simmel enumerates a series of generalizations which can be made concerning the peculiar rôle played by the stranger in the life of a community.[17]

Individual and Group as a Research Problem. From the foregoing paragraphs it will be evident that one of the fundamental problems confronting sociologists in the present stage of development of the science is that of explaining individuality in terms which are consistent with what is known as to the social determination of personality. Various contributions have been made toward the formation of a systematic and comprehensive theory of individuality in the social order, but such a theory is by no means thoroughly worked out. It is a significant fact of sociological history that W. I. Thomas, as president of the American Sociological Society for the year 1927, announced as the general topic for the annual meeting "The Individual and the Group," this official act being an expression, no doubt, of his conviction that it would be desirable to bring together the findings and viewpoints of current research on this important question.

It is likewise clear from the materials reviewed above that the concept "mobility" may be taken as an important element in the definition of the sociological research problem of individuality. Where there is little mobility, the term "individual" can be applied to human beings only in a very restricted sense. The more or less isolated rural community has a collective life which is strikingly analogous to that of the plant community; it may be termed vegetative, and the destiny of the individual is closely bound up with that of the group. When, however, the individual moves from one locality to

[17] Sombart, Werner, *The Quintessence of Capitalism*, pp. 292-307; adapted in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 317-22. Simmel, Georg, *Soziologie* (1908), pp. 685-91; translation in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-27.

another, he enters the boundaries of a group which, to some extent at least, has different customs and standards from that which he has left behind him. The customs and standards of the old group, on the other hand, live on in his memory and habits. This exposure of the person to divergent mores has to a degree the effect of revealing to him the relativity of both sets of rules; he is compelled to choose between different courses of action, and he comes to see them as customs simply, and not as inevitable moral laws. This tendency to the emancipation of the individual from group mores is the greater, naturally, when the mobility becomes habitual, as in the case of the stranger described as a type by Sombart and Simmel.

Mind and Locomotion. Professor Park has summarized this view of the relationship of individuality to mobility very effectively in a recent paper on the hobo.

> The characteristic of the animal, and of the higher types of animal . . . is that they are made for locomotion and for action. Furthermore, it is in the processes of locomotion—involving, as they do, change of scene and change of location—that mankind is enabled to develop just those mental aptitudes most characteristic of man, namely, the aptitude and habit of abstract thought.
>
> It is in locomotion, also, that the peculiar type of organization that we call "social" develops. The characteristic of a social organism—if we may call it an organism—is the fact that it is made up of individuals capable of independent locomotion. If society were, as some individuals have sought to conceive it, an organism in the biological sense—if it were made up of little cells all neatly and safely inclosed in an outer integument, or skin, in which all cells were so controlled and protected that no single cell could by any chance have any new adventures or new experiences of its own—there would be no need for men in society to have minds, for it is not because men are alike that they are social, but because they are different.[18]

Recent studies of the city and its areas have revealed many interesting correlations between mobility and other social

[18] Park, Robert E., "The Mind of the Hobo: Reflections upon the Relation Between Mentality and Locomotion," reprinted in *The City*, by R. E. Park *et al.*, from *The World Tomorrow*, September, 1923. Used by permission.

phenomena.[19] The city is a region characterized by highly developed individualities, because, as Park points out, it "encourages the fascinating but dangerous experiment of living at the same time in several different contiguous, but otherwise widely separated worlds." [20] Not only does mobility become habitual with certain individuals, and even traditional in certain ethnic groups, with a consequent development of a marked detachment of the individual from his temporary social *milieu,* but, in the city, there are developed certain areas characterized by the mobile habits of the temporary inhabitants found there at any given time.[21] These are areas of great individuality, neighborhoods remarkable for the large number of freakish persons to be found in them. Nevertheless, so dependent are human beings upon other human beings for the satisfaction of their desires, the cultural process repeats itself in these areas of mobility, which accordingly develop their own customs and standards—their own peculiar forms of social control.

The trend of recent research and the consensus of recent writers on the sociological aspects of individuality seems to be that individuality and group control are the two poles between which social currents flow. Mobility may be regarded as the solvent through the action of which individuals are emancipated from the control of the group, but it is also the means by which larger social structures are formed. Mobility involves contacts, and contacts tend to bring about reciprocal adjustment and to make possible understanding and collective action in social groups of a larger order, which did not previously exist. Mobility is a form of interaction, and interaction always implies interdependence. Interdependence, in turn, in so far as it is realized, brings about the sense of need for social

[19] Burgess, Ernest W., "The Determination of Gradients in the Growth of the City," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* Vol. XXI (Proceedings of the meeting of December, 1926), pp. 178-84. A brief report of research showing the correlation of various phenomena with distances from the center of the city, which is in turn closely correlated with mobility.

[20] *The City,* p. 41.

[21] See Zorbaugh, Harvey W., "The Natural Areas of the City," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* Vol. XX (Proceedings of the meeting of December, 1925), pp. 188-97. See also same writer's "The Dweller in Furnished Rooms, An Urban Type," in the same volume, pp. 83-89; also Anderson, Nels, *The Hobo* (Chicago, 1923), Pt. I, "Hobohemia, the Home of the Homeless Man."

control; for when human beings are interdependent, they are *dependent* for the realization of their wishes upon one another. They feel the need for knowing what they can expect from one another, and this end is reached by the action of very subtle and inevitable social forces, as well as through formal legislation.

CHAPTER XV

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES

DESIRES, INTERESTS, WISHES, AND ATTITUDES

The Task of Scientific Sociological Analysis. References have been made in previous chapters to the fact that one of the principal objectives of modern students of social science has been the development of methods of sociological analysis. The analysis of social phenomena presupposes the existence of elements or units into which these phenomena may, in thought at least, be resolved. As we have also noted, two sorts of units are suggested in this connection, namely, individuals or persons, and smaller elements discoverable within "personality." Both of these concepts of the social unit have their uses in scientific analysis; although the persons of whom groups are composed are evidently neither simple nor uniform entities, the sociological theory which does not take into account personality as a functional unity will certainly go astray in dealing with some types of concrete problems. The two chapters immediately preceding this one have accordingly been devoted to a review of some of the contributions which have been to a theoretic understanding of personality and individuality.

"Social Forces." Because human persons are not simple, homogeneous units, however, it is a distinct advantage for many purposes to think of the personality as a complex of simpler elements called variously instincts, impulses, desires, habits, attitudes, interests, and wishes. "Social forces" is the generic term which has been most generally used to designate these hypothetical elements of social behavior. If social phenomena be regarded as the manifestations of a process of interaction, as sociologists are coming more and more to recognize that they should be, it is implied that there are forces to interact. The notion that a relatively small number of dy-

namic tendencies or energies were to be discovered or posited as the sources of social activity, is, however, historically older than the idea of social interaction. It appears in fact that a twofold advantage is gained by the procedure of analyzing social phenomena into social forces; for while on the one hand the desire or attitude seems to be a more elemental factor than the personality, on the other hand, there is a possibility of arriving in this way at more universal elements, concerning which more general laws can be stated than can be said to apply to personalities. Every person, as we have seen in the previous chapters, is felt to be in some degree unique, *sui generis,* not duplicated anywhere in the universe. It is also believed, however, contradictory though it may seem to be, that all persons have much the same fundamental desires. Indeed, if something of the sort were not the case, it would apparently be impossible to predict what people in the mass would do in a given type of situation; whereas such prediction is in fact possible to a very considerable extent, as the success of politicians, military commanders, labor leaders, professional evangelists, and other types of leaders of mass activity shows. It is not surprising, therefore, that social theorists should have devoted considerable attention to the problem of identifying and naming the universal motives or desires underlying human behavior, and, more recently, to the problem of describing the manner in which the immediate, concrete wishes and attitudes of human beings are formed from the materials supplied by original nature and culture in the course of social experience.

Instincts as Social Forces. It is practically impossible to say just where in the history of social theory interest in the topics with which we are now concerned first appeared. In a certain sense it is true that Plato and Aristotle based their writings on the assumption that all men have the same desires, but with them it is something taken for granted, rather than a matter to be carefully studied. Thomas Aquinas is said to have based his theory of the state upon the postulate that all men have certain instincts.[1] Indeed, as we saw in the discussion of "original nature," [2] the attempts to describe the manner

[1] See Lichtenberger, Jas. P., *Development of Social Theory,* p. 110.
[2] Chap. X.

in which human nature tendencies operate as factors of social phenomena which were on the whole earlier and more naïve took the general form of theories concerning the inborn dispositions of mankind. In early modern literature, produced before the middle of the nineteenth century, these dispositions are generally referred to as "passions." Darwin set the fashion of calling them "emotions" by presenting an early form of what came to be known as the James-Lange theory of the emotions. A generation later William James and William McDougall popularized the concept of instinct, and McDougall developed the theory that the human instincts are the springs of all behavior. We have previously summarized the later developments of this theory.

Meanwhile, at the beginning of our century, Herbert Spencer had attracted widespread attention with his *Principles of Sociology* (1876), in the opening chapters of which he enumerated and discussed briefly the "factors of social phenomena," including internal and external factors, in other words, factors of human nature and factors of environment. These chapters seem to have set a pattern for the development of theories of sociological analysis during the next four decades, and the concept "social forces" which bulks so large in American sociological literature may perhaps be traced, in part, to this source. Be that as it may, we find Lester F. Ward asserting definitely in his *Dynamic Sociology* (1885) and again in his *Pure Sociology* (1903) that "the social forces are the desires of men." Following up this thesis, Ward developed a classification of social forces, which space limits forbid our reproducing here.[3] From this time on for twenty-five years American textbooks of sociology have abounded in classifications of social forces.[4]

It would not be profitable to give here an account of the minute steps and variations in the development of the theory of desires as social forces. Certain contributions to the present state of the theory are, however, worth special examination. Probably the most influential interpretations have been those

[3] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, p. 472. A slightly revised classification appears in *Pure Sociology,* p. 261.

[4] See the writer's paper, "The Social Forces Concept in American Sociology," previously cited, for an elaborate review of this literature.

initiated by Professors A. W. Small, William I. Thomas, and R. E. Park.

Interests as Social Forces. In his *General Sociology* (1918), Professor Small of the University of Chicago developed the concept "interests," which he adapted from Ratzenhofer, and which was actually, though not ostensibly, offered as a substitute for Ward's treatment of desires. It is in this book that we find what is possibly the first clear statement of the relation of the "social forces" concept to the task of sociological analysis. After an allusion to "essential human interests," the author continues:

> The problem of sociology is then to analyze in detail all that is involved in this general proposition. What are the literal particulars in this community of men throughout the ages? Of what sort are the forces that join men's destinies? What are the conditions, the modes, the laws, of their action? How may we distinguish between the constants and the variables among these forces? How may we report the equilibrium of these forces in a given situation, and how may we foresee resultants of forces? How may we detect, and discriminate, and measure, and if possible control, the particular combinations of forces in our own society? Regarding human experience as a whole, how may we mentally resolve it into its factors, and at the same time keep effectively in view the vital interaction of the factors in the one process? [5]

As we shall have occasion to see again in a later chapter, Gustav Ratzenhofer, an officer of high rank in the Austrian army, saw the science of sociology as the study of social process, and the process as one, essentially, of conflict. This idea that conflict or struggle is the fundamental social process Ratzenhofer doubtless took over, in part, from his acquaintance and older contemporary, Ludwig Gumplowicz, but where Gumplowicz saw simply or primarily struggling ethnic groups, Ratzenhofer, with his position favorable to the acquisition of inside knowledge of governmental affairs, saw a struggle of more or less incompatible "interests." [6] His most elaborate

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 105; see also *ibid.*, pp. 425-26.

[6] Ratzenhofer's sociological theories have been summarized at length by Small in *General Sociology;* see especially Chap. XIII; also by Lichtenberger in *Development of Social Theory,* Chap. XV. The social theory of Ludwig Gumplowicz is also summarized by Lichtenberger in the same chapter. Gumplowicz's sociological theory may also be conveniently studied in his *Outlines of Sociology,* an American translation.

classification of these interests suggests that he originally conceived the term as a refinement of the notion so commonly expressed in political discussions in our own country by references to "the big interests," "the banking interests," "vested interests," and the like.

TYPICAL INTERESTS WITHIN STATES[7]

A. The universal interest: sustenance.
B. The kinship interest.
C. The national interest.
D. The creedal interests.
E. The pecuniary interests.
F. The class interests:
    1. Extraction.
    2. Artisanship.
    3. Manufacture.
    4. Wage labor.
    5. Trade.
    6. Professional and personal services.
    7. Parasitism.
    8. Pseudo-classes:
        (a) Capital.
        (b) Massed capital.
        (c) Massed industry.
        (d) Massed agriculture.
G. The rank interests.
H. The corporate interests.

Ratzenhofer finds an explanation of these specialized interests in the cultural differentiation arising through the conquest and subjugation of groups by other groups, and the resulting differentiation and stratification of the social order. Two human nature tendencies, he thinks, are fundamental and original, rivalry for food, *Brotneid,* and the blood-bond, *Blutliebe,* arising out of the sex instinct. The blood-bond tends to create a sense of community of interest, but the multiplication of numbers, the quest for food, and the multiplication of wants lead to the struggle of group with group, and, ultimately, to social articulation, to the formation of the modern state, and to the differentiation of class, caste, and individual interests from one another.

[7] Quoted by Small, *op. cit.,* pp. 251-52; see also *ibid.,* pp. 197-98.

"Interests" Defined. It is perhaps fairly clear from the foregoing summary that for Ratzenhofer the term "interests" denotes a concept which is primarily a *datum* for sociological use. His method was to describe in a highly objective, if conjectural, fashion the social process of inter-group struggle and conquest, in the course of which specialized group and individual interests are differentiated from the elemental struggle for food and blood-bond. His procedure is what we should perhaps now call behavioristic, rather than psychological connotations; he took these for granted and did not consider it his business to investigate psychological processes from a subjective point of view. It is in this respect, in part, that Small goes beyond the theory of interests which he took from Ratzenhofer; for although he says that the notion of interests is a convenient sociological starting-point, and thus implies that it is in some sense an assumption,[8] he also attempts a psychological definition of the term.

> In general *an interest is an unsatisfied capacity, corresponding to an unrealized condition, and it is predisposition to such rearrangement as would tend to realize the indicated condition.* Human needs and human wants are incidents in the series of events between the latent existence of human interests and the achievement of partial satisfaction. Human interests, then, are the ultimate terms of calculation in sociology. *The whole life-process, so far as we know it, whether viewed in its individual or in its social phase, is at last the process of developing, adjusting, and satisfying interests.*[9]

The conception of interests as social forces has met with approval in other quarters in recent years. Professor Ross makes use of the term in his *Principles of Sociology* (1920), with the added comment that the interests are "great complexes which contribute to satisfy a number of our cravings." [10] In other words, Ross views the interests as compounds of smaller elements, which are innate. Still more recently the interest concept has been used in an elementary textbook by

[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 425-26.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 433.
[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 51. The term "interests" also appears in Ross' "Moot Points in Sociology," published serially in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vols. VIII, IX, and X. The same treatment, in substance, reappears in his *Foundations of Sociology* (1905).

Professor H. P. Fairchild, who defines an interest as "the relation that exists between an individual and an object which he believes will gratify a desire of his." "This object," he continues, "may be a thing or an act." [11]

In his discussion Fairchild has touched upon an aspect of the interest concept which was not emphasized by Small, namely that in a classification of "interests" one finds himself disposed to use terms which have reference primarily to types or classes of objects in the environment, rather than to original human cravings. This idea is implied also in Ross' statement that the interests are "complexes." Small's list of the fundamental interests was Health, Wealth, Sociability, Knowledge, Beauty, and Rightness. Now of these categories, the first three seem to be objective rather than subjective; they are classes of objective satisfactions, and not subjective desires or tendencies. Somewhat the same point is made in a recent German article by Eduard Bernstein.[12] The difficulty encountered here has been met, in a measure, as we shall see presently, by Thomas and Znaniecki.

While Small and others were discussing the utility of the interest concept as an instrument of sociological analysis, Professors Thomas, Znaniecki, and Park were engaged in developing and testing another set of categories, referred to mainly as *attitudes* and *wishes.*

In their chapter on "Social Forces" Park and Burgess have indicated the concept "attitudes" as one which sociologists arrived at before the term "wish" was used in sociological discussion.[13] There is ground for this statement to the extent that, whereas Thomas and Znaniecki introduced the terms "attitude," "values," and "wishes" simultaneously in Volume I of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* in 1917, Park had previously suggested the term "attitude" in a privately published pamphlet, *Principles of Human Behavior,* in 1915.

We may think of opinions merely as representative of a psychophysical mechanism, which we may call the sentiment-attitude. These

[11] Fairchild, Henry Pratt, *Foundations of Social Life* (New York, 1927), pp. 173-74.

[12] "Idee und Interesse in der Geschichte," *Ethos,* Vol. I, No. 1 (1925), pp. 68-80.

[13] *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), p. 437.

sentiment-attitudes are to be regarded in turn as organizations of the original tendencies, the instinct-emotions, about some memory, idea, or object which is, or once was, the focus and the end for which the original tendencies thus organized exist.[14]

Neither in this passage nor in Thomas and Znaniecki's discussion of the attitudes and values is there to be found expressly stated the definition of an attitude which has subsequently come to be more or less generally accepted, namely, "an attitude is a tendency to act in a certain manner with reference to some object."

Social Values. In their extended methodological discussion of this whole matter in Volume I of *The Polish Peasant,* Thomas and Znaniecki start with "social values," that is, objects, situations, and activities which have common meanings for the members of any particular group.

By a social value we understand any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of some social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of activity. Thus a foodstuff, an instrument, a coin, a piece of poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific theory, are social values. . . . The meaning of these values becomes explicit when we take them in connection with human actions. . . . The social value is thus opposed to the natural thing, which has a content, but, as a part of nature, has no meaning for human activity, is treated as "valueless"; when the natural thing assumes a meaning, it becomes thereby a social value. And naturally, a social value may have many meanings, for it may refer to many different kinds of action.[15]

Social values, which several later writers have proposed to call simply "objects," or "social objects," are then the data, or the stereotyped experiences, which the members of some particular social group have in common. For the purposes of this line of discussion they are considered to be what they are for the members of that group, what they mean to those persons. The meaning of anything for any given person, however, as William James and John Dewey had pointed out long before, is what that person conceived that he can do to it, with it, or with reference to it.

[14] *Op. cit.,* p. 34; see also Park and Burgess, *op. cit.,* p. 78.

[15] *Op. cit.* (edition of 1917; a later edition in two large volumes is now available—1927), pp. 21-22. These quotations used by permission.

Social Attitudes. From this definition of social values, Thomas and Znaniecki quite logically derived a correlated concept, the concept of the social attitude. The social attitude is simply what the persons of the given group are set to do with reference to the given value. They are latent tendencies to act, which we are constrained to think of as present somehow in the personality even when they are not visibly active, since they appear so promptly when the proper value is presented.

> By attitude we understand a process of individual consciousness which determines real or possible activity of the individual in the social world. Thus, hunger that compels the consumption of the foodstuff; the workman's decision to use the tool; the tendency of the spendthrift to spend the coin; the poet's feelings and ideas expressed in the poem and the reader's sympathy and admiration; the needs which the institution tries to satisfy and the response which it provokes; the fear and devotion manifested in the cult of the divinity; the interest in creating, understanding, or applying a scientific theory and the ways of thinking implied in it—all these are attitudes. The attitude is thus the individual counterpart of the social value; activity, in whatever form, is the bond between them.[16]

Thomas and Znaniecki have further pointed out that attitudes vary widely as to their generality and importance; some attitudes are relatively unimportant to the social scientist and to the general public, and some attitudes, while vigorous in individual cases, are common to only few persons.

> Now, as the main body of the materials of social psychology is constituted by *cultural* attitudes, corresponding to variable and multiform *cultural* values, such elementary *natural* attitudes as correspond to stable and uniform physical conditions—for example attitudes manifested in sensual perception or in the action of eating—in spite of their generality and practical importance for the human race, can be usefully investigated within the limits of this science only if a connection can be found between them and the cultural attitudes—if, for example, it can be shown that sensual perception or the organic attitude of disgust varies with the variation of social conditions.[17]

Cultural attitudes which are the truly *social* attitudes, are thus distinguished from *natural* attitudes which may not be social at all. The material which we have reviewed in the fore-

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

going chapters tends to suggest, however, a somewhat more elaborate classification of attitudes along similar lines. If it be true that every adult person has a more or less distinct rôle in society which is equivalent to, or correlated with, his "personality," then it appears that we can distinguish some three or four kinds of social attitudes with reference to their generality and their relation to a social setting and origin. From this point of view there are (1) *personal* attitudes, correlated with the individual's peculiar status in society; (2) *natural* attitudes, as Thomas and Znaniecki use the term in the passage quoted above; (3) cultural attitudes; and perhaps (4) fashions, fads, crazes, and the like—attitudes undeniably shared by the members of given groups, but not included in what we ordinarily think of as culture. In this classification, the *natural* attitudes would, as Thomas and Znaniecki point out, not necessarily be *social* attitudes, but *personal* attitudes are truly social in that they affect social interaction and collective behavior.[18]

In their original discussion Thomas and Znaniecki set forth the suggestive doctrine that "The cause of a value or an attitude is never an attitude or a value alone, but always a combination of an attitude and a value."[19] In a recent paper Ellsworth Faris has restated this thesis, with some gain in clearness:

> The problem of the genesis of attitudes is one aspect of the general problem of emotional disorganization and rational reorganization concerning which there is a very large literature. New objects do not arise merely as effects of social values and preceding attitudes but as a result of conflict, crisis, and reintegration, wherein social and individual forces and antecedents are in some form of opposition. The present need here for investigation is for the study of types of crises and the collecting of new attitudes in their genesis. But the new phenomenon is always an attitude-object or object-attitude. When the draft law made the declaration of war mean something, millions of people redefined the United States. The results were a new country (new object) and a new patriotism (new attitude).[20]

[18] So far as is known to the writer, this suggestion is an original one. It is included here although not entirely in keeping with the general character of the volume, to fill out what appeared to be a gap in the material to be found in the literature.

[19] *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 44.

[20] "The Concept of Social Attitudes," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. IX (July-August, 1925), pp. 405-09. Quoted by Kimball Young in *Source-Book for Social Psychology* (New York, 1927), pp. 433-34.

The relation of this explanation to passages in Dewey's account of habits, summarized in an earlier chapter, is readily seen.

Attitudes and Wishes. The concept "wish" was introduced by Thomas and Znaniecki in the course of further discussion of the process by which attitudes and values are produced and changed. It is possible, they hold, to produce any attitudes and values which may be desired, but only if there can be found in the individual attitudes which cannot but appear as responses to the kinds of stimulations society is able to supply. Every individual has innumerable wishes, but four "general patterns of wishes" may be enumerated, namely, (1) the desire for new experience or fresh stimulations, (2) the desire for recognition and social appreciation, (3) the desire for mastery or power, and (4) the desire for security.[21] In a later volume of the same work, the desire for mastery disappears from the classification offered, and the "desire for response," including sexual and other intimacies, is introduced;[22] the classification then becomes, briefly, (1) recognition, (2) response, (3) new experience, and (4) security. Commenting on this general theory Park and Burgess have suggested that "the wishes enter into the attitudes as components."[23] Faris holds, however, that an attitude is the result of organization coming at the end of the satisfaction of some wishes and remaining to initiate other wishes.[24] In other words, he believes that attitudes may be said to determine wishes as truly as wishes may be said to enter into attitudes as components. In either case it is coming to be agreed, on the basis of common-sense usage, that a wish may be defined as a tendency to act plus an image or idea of some object, act, or satisfaction which is seen as the end of the tendency.[25]

In his later volume, *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923), Thomas seems to have abandoned the attempt to correlate attitudes with values, and to have substituted the correlation of wishes with

[21] *Op. cit.* (1917 edition), Vol. I, pp. 72-73.
[22] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, "Introduction," *passim.*
[23] *Op. cit.*, pp. 438-39.
[24] *Op. cit., loc. cit.*
[25] I am indebted to Professor Faris for this definition. Dewey has elaborated the idea of "ends" in *Human Nature and Conduct* and in *Experience and Nature.*

values, which appears to be in some respects a more logical position to maintain, both of the latter two concepts being in some sense subjective. The value and the wish may in fact be seen as different aspects of the same thing.[26] From this point of view, the concept "attitude" may be regarded as a behavioristic one, the attitude being defined simply as a tendency to act—a tendency which, whenever it is mobilized, is observable by others than the person to whom the attitude is imputed. This, as will be shown in a later paragraph, is essentially the definition of "attitude" adopted by Znaniecki in his later volume, *The Laws of Social Psychology*. Park and Burgess have suggested, rather vaguely, a fourfold classification of attitudes as "behavior patterns" which seems to be based on this later definition of the concept. They define an attitude as "the tendency of the person to react positively or negatively to the total situation," [27] and indicate four fundamental attitudes: (1) tendency to approach, (2) tendency to withdraw, (3) tendency to dominance or superordination, and (4) tendency to submission.[28] So far as is known to the writer, no very systematic attempt has yet been made to use this scheme as the basis for a definite piece of concrete research, although it is used in a general way as the foundation of the studies of race relations on the Pacific coast made under the direction of Professor Park.[29] It is also pointed out that the two opposing tendencies of approach and withdrawal, or the tendencies of dominance and submission, may hold one another in balance, in which case we have the phenomenon of "social distance," that is, the tendency of certain persons or groups to preserve a fixed and defined status as regards their relationship to other persons or groups.[30]

Probably the most refined, closely reasoned treatment of the problem of the social-psychological analysis of human behavior which has yet appeared in the English language is that found in Professor Znaniecki's recent volume, *The Laws of Social Psychology* (1925). Starting from the premise that the ob-

[26] *Op. cit.*, pp. 232-33.
[27] *Op. cit.*, p. 438.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 439-41.
[29] See the various papers based on this study in *Survey Graphic* for May, 1926, also *The New Social Research* by Professor E. S. Bogardus (Los Angeles, 1926), with preface by R. E. Park.
[30] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 282, 440-41.

ject-matter of social psychology is *social experiences*—the experiences which human beings have of other human beings as persons to whom intentions and feelings are imputed—and *social acts*—those acts the purpose of which is to influence other human beings—Znaniecki defines the *social action* as that combination of social experience and social act "in which certain changes . . . appear to the subject as the purposed result of his own behavior." [31] Having developed the proposition that scientific laws can be derived only through the study of closed systems of interacting factors or forces, he asserts that the "social action" is a relatively closed system, a proposition which he supports, in part, by the argument that such actions tend to display a continuity which persists through interruptions and which usually results in the carrying of the action to some sort of logical conclusion.[32] This character of being a relatively closed system which the social action has affords the basis for the determination of scientific laws of the changes which take place in such actions, or rather of the changes which take place in the impulses or *social tendencies* with which the social actions begin. In his subsequent discussion Znaniecki follows a line of reasoning closely resembling that upon which he collaborated with Thomas, correlating the social tendency with the "definition of the situation," in which the situation is resolved into more or less stable "social objects." The social situation may in fact, he states, be analyzed into (1) social objects, (2) expected results or *reactions* which the subject intends to produce in the social objects, and (3) an *instrumental process* by which the reaction is to be produced. It is apparently the presupposition underlying the whole course of Znaniecki's reasoning that all of the elements into which he analyzes social activity—social tendencies, social objects, anticipated social reactions, and instrumental processes—become stabilized as elements of the culture of the group and the habits of the individual members of the group. He does not specifically state whether or not he believes that there are certain universal kinds or classes of social tendencies which would correspond to Thomas' four classes of wishes, although his discussion strongly implies that

[31] *Op. cit.*, pp. 55-61.
[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 62-64.

there are such universal tendencies.[33] He defines an attitude as a social tendency viewed, not from the standpoint of the subject or agent, but of another person, that is, anyone else's tendencies are, from my point of view, his attitudes.

As the foregoing summary would tend to suggest, the whole discussion of desires, interests, attitudes, values, and wishes has been essentially a preoccupation of American sociologists. Recently, however, Professor Leopold von Wiese of the University of Cologne, Germany, has been developing a system of sociology which is very similar to the doctrine of attitudes and wishes developed by American sociologists, and which was in fact partly influenced by the latter. Professor von Wiese starts, essentially, from Georg Simmel's thesis that sociology is the study of the forms of social interaction, and attempts to list and classify the forms of human relationship (*Beziehungen*). His *Beziehungen* may, however, be regarded also as attitudes, since he finds them all to be compounded of tendencies to approach and to withdraw. He cites with approval Thomas' fourfold classification of wishes, and says, "Even if we cannot agree to confine ourselves to these four principal wishes of the human being as starting-points for social behavior, still it corresponds thoroughly with our own conception to recommend these four wish tendencies (*Wunschrichtungen*) for special attention in the study of social behavior." [34] Elsewhere in the same volume he points out that "not human needs, but human wishes—the things which the person looks upon as corresponding to his needs—are determinative of human association." [35] In a paper of more recent date, designed for inclusion in the second volume of his *General Sociology,* he includes a classification of main wish-tendencies (*Hauptwunscrichtungen*) which is essentially that of Thomas, in a discussion of the basis of group coherence.[36]

In closing this chapter it is appropriate to refer to a paper by Professor E. C. Hayes in which he attacked the use of the

[33] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.,* pp. 67-79.
[34] *Allgemeine Soziologie, Teil I, Beziehungslehre* (Munich and Leipzig, 1924), p. 123.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 73.
[36] "Allgemeine Theorie der Gruppe," *Jahrbuch für Soziologie,* Vol. III (1927), p. 17.

term "social forces" as he had found it in sociological literature published up to that time (1911).[37] The real conclusion supported by Hayes' reasoning, however, seems to be that classifications of "social forces" are valid if, and to the extent that, they are useful as tools of sociological analysis, and only to that extent. Presumably he would argue along the same lines as regards the recent classifications of wishes and social attitudes. Certainly it must be admitted in any case that the lines of reasoning reviewed in the pages of this chapter have constituted a prominent and persistent element in the development of sociological theory in the United States.

[37] "The 'Social Forces' Error," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVI (1911), p. 613 ff.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SOCIOLOGY OF CROWDS

Sociology as the Science of "Collective Behavior." It has become increasingly clear in the past few years that the natural objective of social theorists should be to study the processes and structures through which human beings are united in the performance of collective or corporate activities. In fact, sociology has been frequently defined of late as the study of social groups. This task, however, has proven to lead in two directions so far as specific research endeavors are concerned. On the one hand, it involves the investigation of the nature and conditioning of the social personality, which is the obvious functional unit in social interaction. Likewise it involves inquiry concerning the less obvious but more universal elements of the social interaction, such as interests, attitudes, and wishes, which may be assumed to be present in social processes if genuinely scientific analysis is possible, and if the experience in one case is to be made to reveal with any clarity what may be expected in another. On the other hand, however, the task of social theory involves the direct investigation of the manner in which collective purposes, collective definitions of common situations, and the resulting collective or group behavior are brought about. This latter phase of social theory, the description, classification, and explanation of types of group behavior as such, and of the processes of social interaction and forms of social organization by which collective behavior is made possible, should seemingly constitute the very core or central problem with which the science is concerned, and it is somewhat surprising, in view of this consideration, that more attention has not been paid to this order of inquiries in recent sociological literature. In fact, much more intensive research work has been done on the individual-psychological foundations and aspects of social phenomena than on the collective aspects.

"Group Psychology." Pursuing the same line of thought a little further, let us note that it has been found convenient and logical to divide the province of social theory into two main parts, first, the study of the physical—geographic and biological—aspects of human society, and, second, the study of the psychological aspects of the same fundamental order of facts. The study of the psychological aspects of social phenomena is what has been termed "social psychology," in the broadest sense of the term. Using the term in this broadest sense, Professor McDougall has made some interesting suggestions concerning the subdivision of the field of social psychology. His purpose is to justify the use of the expression "The Group Mind" as the title of one of his books, rather than the term "collective psychology," which had already been employed in a similar connection by several French writers.

> I conceive Group Psychology to be a part only, though a very large part, of the total field of Social Psychology; for, while the former has to deal only with the life of groups, the latter has also to describe and account for the influence of the group on the growth and activities of the individual. This is the most concrete part of psychology and naturally comes last in the order of development of the science; for, like other sciences, psychology began with the most abstract notions, the forms of activity of mind in general, and, by the aid of the abstract conceptions achieved by the earlier writers, progresses to the consideration of more concrete problems, the problems presented by actual living persons in all their inexhaustible richness and complexity.[1]

Other writers would no doubt hold that social psychology is concerned not only with the life of groups and the influence of the group on the individual, but also with the conditioning of group activity by the original nature of individuals; and they would point to the content of McDougall's own earlier book in confirmation of their position. Elsewhere in the chapter from which we have quoted, however, McDougall states that he intended to use the title of that earlier book, "Introduction to Social Psychology," in the sense of "Prolegomena to Social Psychology," and not in the sense of "Elements of Social Psychology," and that he does not conceive most of the content of the volume to be social psychology at all. Be that as it may, we are concerned here primarily with his

[1] McDougall, William, *The Group Mind* (New York, 1920), pp. 2-3.

thesis that there are two main aspects of the psychological study of society, one of which is devoted to the study of the life of groups. In several recent papers, Professor Allport has elaborated the thesis that, strictly speaking, there are no such things as "groups," or "institutions," or any other kind of entities which are social, but only aggregates of individuals having more or less similar or interrelated habits.[2] His thesis constitutes a more or less direct attack upon the viewpoint and method of sociological analysis to be reviewed in this and later chapters, and is deserving of careful consideration as such. To some of us, it appears that the controversy which he has raised is largely a verbal one, and that, even though we grant what scarcely any sociologist denies, that groups are composed solely of individuals and that therefore the activities might be exhaustively described in terms of the activities of their members, there is still an interest in the results and synthetic aspects of their joint activity, which is after all often susceptible of being regarded as collective or corporate. Perhaps the best method of settling the question, in so far as it can be settled, is the method we shall use in the following pages, namely, that of reviewing the insights into the nature of social phenomena which have been gained by taking groups and their activities as the primary objects of attention. Indeed it is not difficult to turn the argument of Professor Allport's paper read before the 1927 meeting of the American Sociological Society against him, and to contend that there *is* a social level on which interaction takes place; the phenomena seen on that level of observation have an interest on their own account; and they may be studied, and have to some extent been studied, directly.

The Study of Crowds. Now, the direct study of social groups and their behavior has been approached in several ways. The attempt to conceive and study the political group, the State, as a unit has been made with varying degrees of success since

[2] Allport, Floyd H., "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Culture," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology,* Vol. XIX, pp. 185-91; "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science," *ibid.,* Vol. XIX, pp. 60-73; "The Nature of Institutions," *Social Forces,* Vol. VI (December, 1927), pp. 167-79; "'Group' and 'Institution' as Concepts in a Natural Science of Social Phenomena," a paper read before the Division of Social Psychology of the American Sociological Society at Washington, D. C., December 27, 1927—to be published in the annual *Proceedings* of the Society.

the time of Plato or earlier. In the past half-century many attempts have been made, as we have seen, to study communities directly as corporate wholes. Similarly the family has for some time been regarded as a corporate entity which might be studied as such; and more recently Professor Cooley has defined the more abstract concept of the "primary group," a concept which has been used tentatively by a number of writers for a guiding line in social researches. One of the most fruitful of all the approaches which have been made to the study of collective behavior as such, however, is the approach through the study of the crowd, or the "psychological crowd," as Le Bon has termed it for greater accuracy. Apparently the fruitfulness of the approach to the study of collective behavior through the study of the behavior of crowds is due to the facts that (1) the unity or organic character of the group behavior is especially striking in the crowd and the mob; and (2) by the observation of crowds we are able, as has frequently been pointed out, to see with especial clearness the processes by which existent groups are dissolved, so to speak, into their raw materials, and new though usually transitory groups are formed out of the materials so made available.

Like many of the other concepts which attract contemporary sociologists, the concept of the crowd was handled by those who wrote before the latter part of the nineteenth century almost exclusively as a common-sense notion. Greek writers of the classical age were by no means ignorant of the nature of what we sometimes call "crowd psychology"; indeed it was a major preconception with Plato and Aristotle that the ideal form of government must be one which would enable the city-state to avoid the dangers of mob rule. Thucydides wrote in his *History of the Peloponnesian War* a passage which exhibits very convincingly his appreciation of the manner in which men in a crowd are led to commit themselves to a program which they would not agree to under other circumstances.[3] Still we may say that almost nothing which the contemporary student of the crowd needs to take into account for his purposes was published until late in the nineteenth century. In-

[3] *Op. cit.* (Everyman's Library edition, translated by Richard Crawley, London and New York, 1914), Bk. VI, Chap. XVIII, p. 419.

deed, a considerable proportion of the works dealing with the crowd which have appeared in recent decades are of superficial character and make little or no contribution to a scientific knowledge of the subject.[4]

The Chance Crowd and the Psychological Crowd. One of the first distinctions which has had to be introduced into the discussion of crowd behavior is that which is now made between the chance crowd—the mere aggregation of people which happens to be together on the street or elsewhere at a given time, and the "crowd" in the sense of the aggregation of people who share for the time being a certain excitement. It is the latter which has been of the greatest interest to sociologists; the chance crowd, however, is not entirely lacking in sociological interest. Sighele, among others, has pointed out that a great deal of sociological insight is to be had by the study of phenomena which fall under our eyes almost daily and which ordinarily pass unnoticed because they are so frequent.[5] As Professor Park, also, has said, "even in the most casual relations of life, people do not behave in the presence of others as if they were living alone like Robinson Crusoe, each on his desert island." Sighele, by a similar line of thought, arrives at the generalization that a chance crowd may contain the potentiality of a "psychological crowd."

> The passers-by in a street, the peasants gathered at a fair, the travellers on a railway train, all of these are simple physical groupings, to which we may not accurately give the name of crowd, still less that of an association. Still these groupings always contain in themselves the potentiality (virtualite) of a social group. A cry, a conflagration, a bomb bursting on the street or on the fair grounds, a derailment of the train, and these *associable* people have in an instant become *associated* for a common purpose; a simple physical proximity has given birth to a psychological union; here is, in a word, the crowd, which, by an infinite series of steps, may develop into a corporation, even into a State.[6]

Even the chance crowd or the "crowd" on a street corner on a busy day, in other words, is a social group in some real sense

[4] For a representative and fairly inclusive bibliography which names some of the best and some of the least valuable titles, see Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), p. 939.

[5] Sighele, Scipio, *Psychologie des Sectes* (Paris, 1898), p. 40.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41 (translated from the French).

of the term, and is susceptible of being studied from the viewpoint of collective psychology.

It is Le Bon's definition of the "psychological crowd," however, which has been in fact the starting-point of most of the recent discussion and investigation in the field of collective behavior.

> Under certain circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from those of the individuals composing it. The sentiments and ideas of all the persons in the gathering take one and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics. The gathering has become what, in the absence of a better expression, I will call an organized crowd, or, if the term is considered preferable, a psychological crowd. It forms a single being, and is subjected to the law of the mental unity of crowds.[7]

We owe to Le Bon also a suggestive explanation of the causes for the "mental unity" and other characteristics which he imputes to crowds. He points out that, in the first place, the individual acquires in the crowd a sense of irresistible power, due to his awareness of the numbers of those acting with him, and a feeling of irresponsibility, due to the fact that in the crowd the individual is anonymous. In the second place, crowds are affected by contagion, which determines their special characteristics, and also the particular trend the behavior of a given crowd may take. In the third place, crowds display great suggestibility, which is in fact the explanation of the contagion.[8] The psychological crowd, according to Le Bon, is always mentally inferior to the individuals of whom it is composed. This is because crowds can only act or decide on the basis of the qualities and knowledge which its members have in common, and these are their "ordinary" qualities and ideas, particularly their instinctive traits, not their most distinctive individual traits and abilities.[9] From the viewpoint of social values, however, the crowd may be better or worse than the single individual, because of its suggestibility, which makes it

[7] Le Bon, Gustav, *The Crowd—A Study of the Popular Mind* (London, 1920), p. 1. Quoted by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 887.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 890-91.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 888-90.

susceptible of being influenced to the most criminal and the most heroic acts.[10] What we derive from Le Bon that is of greatest importance for the further development of the study of collective behavior, however, is an impressive presentation of the idea that a psychological crowd is a real unity, which may be studied as such.

Park has worked out an interpretation of the crowd which is somewhat different from that of Le Bon, and which it is of interest to compare with the latter. Park's fundamental category for use in the explanation of crowd behavior is *rapport,* which he defines as "a condition of mutual responsiveness, such that every member of the group reacts immediately, spontaneously, and sympathetically, to the sentiments and attitudes of every other member." [11] The effect of the existence of this *rapport* in a crowd, according to his interpretation, is to produce in all the members a state of consciousness in which all seem to share, but which is at the same time relatively independent of any one of them for its continuance; it owes its existence, in other words, not simply to the responses of the members of the crowd to the external situation in which they are placed together, but also to the reciprocal stimulation and suggestion which they exercise upon one another. This state of consciousness shared by all may be termed "group consciousness," in a sense analogous to that in which doctrinaire socialist writers use the term "class consciousness"; it is consciousness of participation in, and self-identification with, the group, in this case the crowd. It implies a certain loss of self-control on the part of the individuals in the crowd, the control lost by the individual members being transferred to the group as a whole or to the leader.[12] In Park's conception, the development of this *rapport* and group consciousness in the crowd may be thought of as a process in which the crowd becomes in a sense and to a certain extent "organized." Le Bon, it will be remembered, had suggested that we might use the term "organized crowd" instead of "psychological crowd." The culminating stage in the organization of the crowd, according to Park,

[10] Le Bon, Gustav, *The Crowd—A Study of the Popular Mind* (London, 1920), pp. 892-93.

[11] Park, Robert E., unpublished manuscript, quoted by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.,* p. 893.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 893.

is the emergence of a *collective representation.*[13] "It becomes the representation and symbol of what the crowd feels and wills at the moment when all members are suffused with a common collective excitement and dominated by a common and collective idea." [14]

The concept of the "collective representation," which was introduced into sociological literature by Durkheim, was used by him in an analysis of religion as a social phenomenon, and is in fact a concept of very general utility in social science. It is largely through the instrumentality of collective representations that groups are enabled to act collectively with some degree of continuity and consistency. A collective representation, in this broader sense, is any object, word or phrase, personality, song, ritual, or the like, which has a common reference for all or many of the members of a given group, due to the part it has had in past collective experiences. Durkheim makes the point that the words of a language are all collective representations; they are so, in part, because they are collective products; they develop and change their meanings in communication; and communication, as Dewey has pointed out, is the social process *par excellence.*

The Theory of the Crowd Extended. A consideration of the rôle of collective representations in crowd behavior is, then, one of several avenues by which we may proceed from the study of the crowd in the simplest sense of the term to the examination of other forms of collective behavior. Another way in which this transition may be made is through the examination of cases in which groups not gathered together in immediate spatial proximity nevertheless display some of the characteristics of the crowd. Park's concept of *rapport* can obviously be applied to other groups than crowds, literally so-called. Indeed, a number of books have been published in the past two decades which ostensibly deal with crowd behavior, but which apply their terminology rather indiscriminately to all sorts of social groups in which the authors in question have believed they could discern evidences of lack of

[13] In a footnote Park gives credit to Durkheim for this term; see *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London, 1926), pp. 432-37.
[14] *Op. cit., loc. cit.,* p. 894.

individual self-determination.[15] Le Bon set the precedent for this extension of the theory of the crowd in his pioneer treatise.

> The disappearance of conscious personality and the turning of feelings and thoughts in a definite direction, which are the primary characteristics of a crowd about to become organized, do not always involve the simultaneous presence of a number of individuals on one spot. Thousands of isolated individuals may acquire at certain moments, and under the influence of certain violent emotions—such for example as a great national event—the characteristics of a psychological crowd. It will be sufficient in that case that a mere chance should bring them together for their acts to assume the characteristics peculiar to the acts of the crowd.[16]

One needs only to read Le Bon's treatise on the crowd to be aware that his interest in the topic arose out of an interest in the French Revolution. It has been frequently noted since *The Crowd* appeared that Le Bon was inclined to confuse the crowd with the masses, and to assume that the mass of the people of any country always constitutes a potential or virtual crowd, needing only opportunity to be formed into actual crowds and to commit all sorts of socially destructive acts. Sighele, on the other hand, was more inclined to regard the crowd as an essentially transitory, ephemeral group, the product of chance or of the immediate occasion.[17]

The Classification of Crowds. Both Le Bon and Sighele, however, have employed the term "crowd" as a fundamental sociological category, in somewhat the same manner in which several American sociologists, and Leopold von Wiese among European writers, have used the term "group." Both of these writers offer classifications of "crowds" which are in effect classifications of social groups or of societies. Le Bon's two fundamental classes are homogeneous crowds and heterogeneous crowds, classes which he further subdivides. Sighele follows him in the general plan, but with revisions in the detail of the classification. Sighele's classification of crowds may be summarized as follows:

[15] One of the most intelligent of these books is *The Behavior of Crowds*, by Everett Dean Martin (New York, 1920). Martin uses psychiatric concepts in the analysis of the crowd and other forms of collective behavior.

[16] Le Bon, *op. cit.*, quoted by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 887.

[17] *Psychologie des Sectes*, p. 44.

A. Heterogeneous crowds:
   1. Anonymous crowds (the theater audience, the members of a club—the latter less heterogeneous than the former, being somewhat acquainted with one another, and having certain common customs).
   2. Duplex crowds (juries, assemblies, etc.—duplex because they contain in each case a majority and one or more minorities, and are thus lacking in that unanimity which is the most menacing characteristic of crowds; they display the sentiment of responsibility. These may also be termed *parliamentary crowds.*).

B. Homogeneous and non-anonymous crowds:
   1. Sects (united by a common ideal or faith—religious, scientific, or political. These are tested and permanent crowds. The sect is the chronic, the crowd the acute form.).
   2. Castes (a caste is a *forced* crowd; the individual does not have the option of leaving it. They are characterized by *esprit de corps.* "The caste represents the highest form of organization of which the homogeneous crowd is susceptible.").

C. The State. (The most perfect form of organization of the crowd.)[18]

Somewhat less objectionable as to terminology, at any rate, is the classification of social groups, distinguished with regard to the form in which they are organized for action, which Park and Burgess have suggested, taking the crowd as the starting point. They begin with a distinction between the crowd which *acts,* the mob, in other words, and the orgiastic crowd, the crowd which discharges its excitement in singing and dancing. The mob may be regarded as the first item in a series which includes the gang, the secret society, and the political party; while the crowd which dances and sings may be seen as the matrix out of which a sect may develop; another term in this series is the religious denomination.[19]

The "Group Mind." Papers which have been written on the behavior of crowds have occasioned considerable discussion as to the validity of the term "group mind," which has been used in this connection. Durkheim, a pioneer writer in this general field, has commonly been understood to hold that a society or social group can and does have what might be

[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 44-51. Summarized from the French.
[19] *Op. cit.,* pp. 865-74; see also *ibid.,* pp. 50, 646, 721-22.

called a "mind"; the basic social fact is the control which imposed itself upon the members of a group as if from without.[20] Professor McDougall, in his general treatise on collective behavior, *The Group Mind,* has defended his title in the following words:

> We may fairly define mind as an organized system of mental or purposive forces; and, in the sense so defined every highly organized human society may be said to possess a collective mind. For the collective actions which constitute the history of any society are conditioned by an organization which can only be described in terms of mind, and which yet is not organized within the mind of any individual; the society is rather constituted by the system of relations obtaining between the individual minds which are its units of composition.[21]

In other words, "mind" is not a term which denotes a strictly objective fact; it is an inference which we draw from observed facts of behavior which become intelligible only in terms of some sort of unified and more or less consistent purpose on the part of the actor, an inference which is strengthened by what each of us knows introspectively of his own activities. None of us can observe, directly, the mind of any other person, but each of us knows his own mental processes more intimately, if not more accurately, than he knows anything else. Mind is a conceptual tool which is proving very useful in the analysis of concrete cases of sociological interest. Taken in this sense, and defended on this ground, the term mind appears to be one which may legitimately be used in the description and interpretation of observed facts of collective behavior.[22]

Collective Behavior and the Primary Group. Inasmuch as the present chapter is being used not only as a survey of the history and literature of "crowd psychology," but also as an introduction to the broader topic of collective psychology or collective behavior, opportunity may be taken to inquire how the concept of the primary group, introduced by Professor

[20] Durkheim, Emile, *Les Regles de la Methode Sociologique, passim;* see also *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* p. 206 ff. See also Park, R. E., in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.,* pp. 33-35.

[21] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1920), p. 13. (Quoting author's own earlier work, *Psychology—The Study of Behavior,* 1912.)

[22] See also Park, R. E., "The Mind of the Hobo," in *The City,* by Park and others (Chicago, 1925), pp. 156-60.

Cooley and discussed in an earlier chapter, is to be related to such general theory of collective behavior as has been developed on the foundation of the study of the crowd. Little has been done to relate the concept of the primary group to the concept of the crowd in social theory.[23] It appears to be a fruitful field for research to investigate the possibilities of describing and analyzing the primary group with reference to the manner in which it is organized for collective action, and the similarities and differences between the primary group and, for example, the religious sect. Is the sect a primary group, in the sense in which the term is now understood, and if so, how does it differ from other primary groups, such as families and neighborhoods?

One direction which the study of collective behavior is beginning to take is the study of social movements. It has been noted that there is more than a little in common between the "mass" which moves or is moved in what we term a "mass movement," and the psychological crowd described by Le Bon and others. For convenience of treatment, the literature dealing with this subject has been relegated for discussion and review to the short separate chapter which follows.

[23] In a paper entitled "Migration, and the Marginal Man," read before the American Sociological Society in Washington, D. C., December 29, 1927, Professor R. E. Park called attention to a passage in Gilbert Murray's *Rise of the Greek Epic,* Chap. II, which seems relevant in this connection.

CHAPTER XVII

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

"Social Movements" as a Common-sense Notion. The most obvious way in which our theoretic insight into crowd behavior can be extended so as to apply more generally, in the study of other types of social phenomena than crowd and mob action, literally so called, is through the adaptation of our sociological theory of the crowd to the explanation of social movements. The notion of social movements, or "mass movements," has existed as a common-sense notion for some time; we imply the general concept in our use of various special terms such as "the modern women's movement," "the German youth movement," and "the temperance movement." The use of the word "movement" as a common factor in this class of names for historical episodes implies that they are species, or individual cases, of the same genus—the genus "social movements"; although the latter term is not firmly established in the vocabulary of formal social science.

Particular Social Movements. A great deal has been written in the past few decades in description and historical interpretation of particular social movements, and in many of these narratives the author's treatment of his subject-matter is such as to show that he has thought of the movement which he was describing as a natural phenomenon which might be studied in an objective and disinterested way, just as a pathologist may study a particular case of disease to gain knowledge of the type, without reference to the therapeutic treatment to be applied in the given case. This description of mass movements in a manner which implies that the particular case is an example of a general class of natural phenomena is not a development of the past few years exclusively. The writer had occasion a few years ago to examine a book published in 1842, in which the author describes with remarkable

objectivity and insight, though not without bias, a mass movement which went on among the cotton mill operatives of Lancashire in 1837.[1] His treatment is such as to indicate clearly that he saw the episodes of which he was writing as something other than a mere manifestation of human perversity or "original sin." Similarly, it may be pointed out that the events of the French Revolution attracted a great deal of attention, naturally, in all the countries of Western Europe; and before 1900 a number of writers had made their studies of this great event the basis for more or less revealing discussions of revolutions and mass movements in general. The Chartist movement was compared with the French Revolution by several British writers, in such a way as to imply that the features common to both might furnish the clue for a generalized explanation of popular uprisings. Down to the present time, however, no attempt has been made to collect and classify accounts of a large number of social movements. The literature of social theory includes no general treatise on social movements.[2] To discover from existing literature the place which the theory of social movements may occupy within the general range of social theory, therefore, we are compelled to bring together and to attempt to correlate the brief and incidental contributions to our knowledge of the subject which have been made by various writers in the course of their treatment of other matters.

"Revolutions" as Social Movements. The first important contribution to a general theory of social movements seems to have been that made by Le Bon in *The Psychology of Revolution*.[3] In the first part of this book he has a chapter on "religious revolutions," and another on "scientific and political revolutions," a terminology which of course implies that significant and sudden changes in religion and in science are special types of phenomena of the same general class of which

[1] Taylor, W. Cooke, *Notes of a Tour in the Manufacturing Districts of Lancashire;* in a series of letters to His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin, London, second edition, 1842.

[2] Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), p. 927. The authors have collected an excellent bibliography for the study of social movements; see *ibid.*, pp. 941-42; also pp. 935-38 and 942-48.

[3] Le Bon, Gustav, *The Psychology of Revolution,* translated by Bernard Miall, New York, 1913.

political revolutions have been considered the most significant type. He says, "We generally apply the term *revolution* to sudden political changes, but the expression may be employed to denote all sudden transformations, or transformations apparently sudden, whether of beliefs, ideas, or doctrines." [4] More than one writer has pointed out that social changes may be considered to be of two general sorts, *evolutionary* and *revolutionary.* If all changes which are not due to slow, continuous evolutions are to be called "revolutionary," then "revolution" is a synonym for "social movement" in the sense in which we are using the term.

Social Movements and Social Evolution. Pursuing this line of thought a little further, we arrive at the possibility of viewing the process of social evolution or social change as one susceptible of analysis, wholly or in part, into a great number of more or less independent transformations which might be studies as social movements. In fact it was absolutely necessary that some such viewpoint be adopted if social change were to be brought within the range of scientific explanation. So long as social change, or social evolution, is thought of only as a continuous, ongoing *trend,* that is, as one continuous movement, it can be depicted in the form of historical narrative, but cannot be explained scientifically. It is necessary to think of *change* as made up of *changes,* which can be lifted out of their place in historic time, so to speak, and placed alongside each other for comparison, in order to arrive at a natural science of social phenomena. The study of social movements may therefore be considered as a step toward the scientific explanation of social evolution.[5]

Tarde's Theory of Social Change. Something of the sort had in fact been pointed out by Tarde in his *Laws of Imitation.*[6] Tarde's methodology involved the analysis of all distinctively human social phenomena in such a manner as would reveal *beliefs* and *desires* as the ultimate factors—a view

[4] *Op. cit.,* p. 23.

[5] See Edwards, Lyford P., *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago, 1927), pp. 1-2.

[6] *Tarde's Laws of Imitation* (New York, 1903), translated by Elsie Clews Parsons from the second French edition, 1895; first edition, 1890. See especially Chap. IV, "What is History? Archaeology and Statistics."

strikingly similar to Thomas and Znaniecki's treatment of "attitudes" and "values," and one which may have had a part in inspiring the latter.[7] Beliefs and desires, according to Tarde, have a reciprocal relation to each other; our desires are determined, in part, by what we believe concerning the objects of our desire, and we are also likely to adopt a belief which lends support to some strong desire which we already have. Beliefs and desires, however, are not inborn, but are the product of experience; hence the similarity of beliefs and desires which characterizes members of the same society cannot be accounted for in terms of race or common heredity. They must therefore have been communicated from person to person in a process which Tarde called "imitation." More specifically, Tarde believed it possible to analyze social change into a series of impulses or tendencies, radiating from points of origin or invention.

> If we look beneath the names and dates of history, beneath its battles and revolutions, what do we see? We see specific desires that have been excited or sharpened by certain inventions or practical initiatives, each of which appears at a certain point from which, like a luminous body, it shoots out incessant radiations which harmoniously intersect with thousands of analogous vibrations in whose multiplicity there is an entire lack of confusion. We also see specific beliefs that have been produced by certain discoveries or hypotheses that also radiate at a variable rate and within variable limits.[8]

Analysis of this sort tends, of course, to reduce social change to smaller elements than those to which we would ordinarily apply the term "mass movements"; Tarde develops, however, a plausible line of reasoning in support of the proposition—which he nowhere expressly states—that social evolution regarded as a whole is the sum of both small, gradual innovations and those more spectacular and sudden transformations. This view of the matter gains support from his classical discussion of fashions, which with fads, crazes, and "psychic epidemics" may be regarded as types of social change or social process intermediate between the slow spread of minor innovations and those major overturnings which we call revolutions.[9]

[7] *Ibid.*, Author's Preface to the Second Edition, p. xvi; see also p. 24 ff.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 109.
[9] *Ibid.*, Chap. VII, "Custom and Fashion."

Fashions and the like may in fact be thought of as a species of social movements.

It is to Tarde that we are indebted also for a suggestive formulation of the thesis that social changes display a typical pattern or profile in time.

> A slow advance in the beginning, followed by rapid and uniformly accelerated progress, followed again by progress that continues to slacken until it finally stops: these . . . are the three stages of those real social beings which I call inventions or discoveries. None of them is exempt from this experience any more than a living being from an analogous, or, rather, identical, necessity. A slight incline, a relatively sharp rise, and then a fresh modification of the slope until the plateau is reached: This is also, in abridgment, the profile of every hill, its characteristic curve. This is the law which, if taken as a guide by the statistician and, in general, by the sociologist, would save them from many illusions.[10]

Types of Social Movements. We should expect something like this as the next step beyond the analysis of social evolution into more or less distinct elements or "movements," if the scientific method is to be successfully applied to the elucidation of the process. It should be possible to classify social movements so as to reveal characteristic types; and then each type should be susceptible of description in more or less generalized terms—shown to run a more or less typical course. Park has suggested a simple classification of social movements, as follows: (a) crowd movements, such as mobs, strikes, etc.; (b) cultural revivals, religious and linguistic; (c) fashion; (d) reforms—*i.e.,* political and administrative changes; and (e) revolutions—changes in institutions and mores.[11]

Cooley's Theory of Social Cycles. Professor C. H. Cooley has contributed some illuminating suggestions concerning the typical course of social changes: it is to be expected, he thinks, that such changes should have a roughly cyclical form, since they are movements in the direction of adaptation to changed conditions; whereas the conditions in their turn change in the course of time, "and so the whole

[10] *Tarde's Laws of Imitation* (New York, 1903), p. 127.

[11] "Sociology and the Social Sciences," paper reprinted as Chapter I in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.,* p. 55.

structure crumbles and is resolved into new elements from which new structures are nourished." [12] He does not believe, however, that the process is so rigidly cyclical that we are justified in referring to it as a "rhythm."

> The word "rhythm" which has been used in this connection by Herbert Spencer and others is questionable as implying a mechanical character that does not exist. . . . The same sort of objection holds good against the idea that social organisms of any sort, and more especially nations, are subject to a *definite* law of growth and decay, which enables us to predict their fate in advance. No doubt they must all "have their closes" sooner or later, but the process is complex and in part within the sphere of will, so that there is no exact way of predicting how it will work out.[13]

Cooley's remark that in the course of time "the whole structure crumbles" contains the germ of an idea which has been elaborated elsewhere in his writings,[14] and which has been developed also by other sociologists: the idea, namely, that social change tends to involve more or less disorganization. If social evolution can be thought of as we have suggested, that is, as a compound of small, gradual changes and of larger changes or movements, then the latter sort of changes will almost inevitably be correlated with the disorganization of existing groups and institutions.[15] Professor Ogburn's theory of "cultural lag" is a simple explanation of the manner in which such maladjustments arise.

"Unrest" in Social Movements. From this point of view, as Park has suggested, "social unrest" may be regarded as the incipient form of a mass movement. Social unrest doubtless consists, in its simplest form, of an increase in the tempo of social activity; it is often manifested, in part, in greater physical mobility of the persons involved. In the account of a mass movement among the cotton workers of Lancashire, referred to above, the author reports that upon visiting the district affected, he met with many workers who were wandering about the country, ostensibly in search of employment. Similarly it is reported that the social movements of the Mid-

[12] Cooley, Charles Horton, *Social Process* (New York, 1918), p. 20.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 33.
[14] *Social Organization* (New York, 1909), Chaps. XXIX and XXX.
[15] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

dle Ages were accompanied by an abnormal mobility of the population. From this point of view, likewise, it appears that popular writers are quite correct in referring to our modern cities as places characterized by chronic "unrest."

Mass Migrations as Social Movements. Following the same line of thought, it has been suggested that the great mass migrations known to history may be regarded as a special form of social movements.[16] Social unrest is converted into a social movement when some collective or common definition of the situation captures the imagination of those involved in the movement, and they enter upon some concerted course of action corresponding to this conception of what the situation is. In times and places in which the land is not too fully occupied with people, and in groups whose culture does not make them too greatly dependent upon the devices of civilization which are rooted in fixed spots, the vision of relief from the tension is likely to take the form of a dream of some "promised land" where conditions are better. Students of the great migrations which took place at about the opening of the Christian Era have believed that some of the tribes of central Europe and Asia had virtually reduced this plan of mass migration to the status of an established technique for relieving the pressure of population. When the surrounding conditions are not such as to make the idea of mass migration seem plausible, even under the stimulus of the collective excitement, then some other program of joint action will be adopted, and the movement takes the form of a war, a political uprising, a strike, the riotous destruction of property, a religious revival, or the like.[17]

A survey of accounts of particular social movements shows that any one of them is likely to involve a series of *tentative* movements, each correlated with some particular "collective representation," one supplanting another until one is hit upon which has the effect of restoring equilibrium in some manner, be it only by the exhaustion of the forces from which the movement arose. We ought probably, therefore, to modify

[16] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 877.

[17] The line of thought presented in this paragraph is more or less original with the writer, being introduced here to improve the continuity of the discussion. It is based on reading and other sources too numerous and too remote to be cited.

Tarde's picture of the typical profile of a social movement to include several sharply rising slopes, separated by as many plateaus or valleys. The latter is in fact what Kolb has found to be characteristic of farmers' organizational movements.[18]

The Quantitative Analysis of Social Movements. At present, the study of social movements, as of the larger subject of social evolution, is in a highly empirical, formative stage of development. Further collections and classifications of cases are much to be desired. There is also need of the determination of objective indices by which social unrest may be measured, at least approximately. Likewise it appears to be desirable that ultimately we should be able to describe the course of a social movement in a more objective and quantitative manner than is usually now possible. In cases where the movement takes the form of participation in a definite organization, such as a religious sect or a farmers' cooperative association, it is sometimes possible to get a rough quantitative measure of the movement from figures of membership.[19] It is obvious, however, that even in the absence of quantitative measures of the phenomena in question, the study of social movements promises to add an important element to our objective, scientific knowledge of collective behavior.

[18] Paper read before the American Sociological Society, December 28, 1927, "Special Interest Groups in Rural Society."

[19] See for instance the account of a tobacco-grower's cooperative movement in *Rural Organizations in Relation to Rural Life in Virginia*, by William E. Garnett. Bulletin 256, Virginia Agricultural Experiment Station. Blacksburg, Virginia, May, 1927.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

The Study of Beliefs and Activities. The history of the sociological study of religion down to the present time is largely the story of the progress that has been made away from the definition of religion, and the description of particular religions, primarily in terms of beliefs; and of the substitution for this approach of one which defines religion in terms of religious *activities and beliefs,* and which seeks for the social-psychological origins of both activities and beliefs. There is in the newer viewpoint more than a little that is suggestive of Thomas and Znaniecki's treatment of "attitudes and values," reviewed in an earlier chapter. In other words, the earlier method of studying religion was primarily *theological;* the newer method is, in a broad sense of the term, *behavioristic.* The most significant contributions to a sociological theory of religion which have been made in the past three decades, some of which are to be examined in the following pages, have placed a great deal of emphasis upon the ritualistic and ceremonial aspects of religion, and have treated religious beliefs largely as an outgrowth of the rites. The moral rules and ideals which are correlated with particular religions appear to constitute still another aspect of the subject-matter which is to be studied, but those writers who in the past have been most successful in their analyses of religious rites in relation to beliefs have not on the whole been equally successful in interpreting the relation of the moral aspect to the other two. We may accordingly for convenience postpone the examination of the literature which deals with the relation of religion to morals for the most part to the following chapter.

Auguste Comte may be taken as a typical representative of the earlier, more intellectualistic approach to the sociological study of religion. His now famous "law of the three stages"

is manifestly a depiction of human social evolution exclusively in terms of changes in the prevalent conceptions of things, rather than in the forms of social behavior or in the patterns of social organization. The term "religion" connotes for him primarily an interpretation of phenomena in terms of supernatural powers; and as such it is contrasted with metaphysics, which imputes causal efficacy to abstract forces, and with science, which has abandoned the search for causal explanations of things, and seeks only to state the laws which express the general tendencies of natural change. Lester F. Ward, the pioneer American sociologist, follows Comte closely in this respect. Herbert Spencer was sufficiently imbued with the intellectual spirit of his times to be predisposed to make the same approach, and it is a significant fact about his *Principles of Sociology* that the analysis of the non-economic aspects of social organization which it contains runs so largely in terms of "ideas." In elaboration of his conception of the "original internal factors" of social phenomena, he uses such headings as "*ideas* of sleep and dreams," "*ideas* of a future life," and the like. It was perhaps his examination of great masses of ethnological data, however, which led him to place emphasis also on the rôle of ceremonial as an elementary form of social control, or "government." We must credit Spencer in any case with being a pioneer in distinguishing the two fundamental aspects of social organization, namely, economic specialization and interdependence, and "government" or social control.[1] It is in fact as a form of social control that he discusses religion, and we may accordingly postpone reviewing his contribution to the following chapter.

The Greek View of Religion. It should be mentioned in passing that some of the great medieval Catholic theologians deserve credit for having had a fairly realistic view of the rôle of ritual and morals in religion. St. Augustine, in particular, is known for his unacknowledged tendency to derive theology from the exigencies of church government. Still it remains true that the medieval Catholic conception of religion was predominantly theological, and indeed it is from these antecedents that we inherit our modern difficulties in studying

[1] *Op. cit.*, opening chapters of Vol. II.

religion objectively. The classical Greek writers intuitively made the distinction between religious rites and religious beliefs, which latter had in their time almost exclusively the form of obvious myths. Plato's *Dialogues* are studded with allusions to the established rites, which he evidently believed it proper to perform; while at the same time he criticized very openly the content of the Homeric myths. Nevertheless, the rationalistic tendency in Plato's thought, and in the Greek thought of the times generally, served to give the Greek philosophy at the height of its development a distinct theological bias wherever it touched religious problems. Still more important for our purposes is the rationalizing direction which Greek philosophy was influential in giving to medieval theology. Greek history contains very few stories of punishment imposed on individuals for religious non-conformity, the well-known case of Socrates notwithstanding; but the fact remains that the emphasis in Greek discussions was always laid on ideas, and not on practices. We shall have occasion to recur to the subject of Greek religion in the following pages, since some of the most important modern contributions to a sociological theory of religion have been based upon the study of Greek religion in its earlier stages of development.

The "Higher Criticism" of the Bible. The viewpoints in the study of religion to be reviewed here may be traced for their origin, in part at any rate, to the critical movement in historiography which developed, mainly, in the nineteenth century. After the idea that historical sources should be treated critically had become firmly established, nothing was more natural than that these methods should be employed in the study of the historical narratives contained in the Old Testament, and, to a degree only slightly less, of those found in the New Testament. This step was in fact taken in the middle of the nineteenth century by Strauss, Ewald, Kuenen, Welhausen, and others.[2] The work done by these nineteenth-century "higher critics" may be considered as the foundation for a book which has had a peculiar influence upon sociological studies of religion, W. Robertson Smith's *The Religion of the Semites* the first edition of which appeared in 1894 in London. Robertson

[2] Small, Albion W., *Origins of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), pp. 89-92.

Smith seems to have been the first to formulate clearly the theory that religious ritual is related to myth and dogma as cause to effect.

As a result of his studies, Robertson Smith reached the conclusion that early religions, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, consisted much more of rites and ceremonies than of doctrines.

> The antique religions had for the most part no creed; they consisted entirely of institutions and practices. No doubt men will not habitually follow certain practices without attaching a meaning to them; but as a rule we find that while the practice was rigorously fixed, the meaning attached to it was extremely vague, and the same rite was explained by different people in different ways, without any question of orthodoxy or heterodoxy arising in consequence.[3]

As the foregoing passage suggests, the "practices" which the author found to be of predominant importance in ancient religions were not, for the most part, what we should call "morals," but matters of ritual. Associated with rites in primitive religion, to be sure, one ordinarily finds myths, which may be thought of as the theological phase of these religions, but our author points out that "So far as myths consist of explanations of ritual, their value is altogether secondary, and it may be affirmed with confidence that in almost every case the myth was derived from the ritual, and not the ritual from the myth; for the ritual was fixed and the myth was variable, the ritual was obligatory and faith in the myth was at the discretion of the worshipper." [4] Robertson Smith finds that it is true that the Old Testament documents were rich in allusions to the "knowledge of God," but the reference in such cases, he thinks, was clearly not to some theological view of the nature of the deity, but to a knowledge of the moral rules upon which the deity expects his followers to frame their conduct, in other words, the customary morality of the land.[5]

From the beginnings typified by Robertson Smith's treatise, the social theory of religion may be thought of as having evolved concurrently in several directions. For one thing, his

[3] *Op. cit.* (new edition, London, 1907), pp. 16-24; quoted by Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924 edition), p. 822.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 822; see also p. 824.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 825.

analysis suggests a further investigation of the nature and function of myths; it also calls for research into the nature, variations, and evolution of religious ceremonies; and, indirectly, it indicates the desirability of inquiry into the relation between religious institutions and social organization. All three of these lines of research have in fact been prosecuted during the past three decades, and it will be profitable for us to examine some of the contributions which have been made under each heading.

Sorel's Theory of the Social Rôle of Myths. For convenience, we may turn our attention first to a recent discussion of the social rôle of myth, for which we are indebted to the French syndicalist, Georges Sorel. This contribution is introduced somewhat out of its logical place in the present survey, for the reason that Sorel's analysis leads in a direction somewhat divergent from the central interest of the present chapter; his primary concern was with the philosophy of the "social revolution." He has, however, made the significant point that a myth, which as a rule is ostensibly an historical narrative, often has for those who place faith in it an important future reference. We shall note in a later paragraph that other writers have shown how this future reference arises. The important point made by Sorel is, however, that *when it has a future reference,* a myth is likely to be a powerful instrument of social control and a means whereby collective action is facilitated.

> Experience shows that the *framing of a future, in some indeterminate time,* may, when it is done in a certain way, be very effective, and have very few inconveniences; this happens when the anticipations of the future take the form of those myths, which enclose within them all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party, or of a class, inclinations which recur to the mind with the insistence of instincts in all the circumstances of life; and which give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which, more easily than by any other method, men can reform their desires, passions, and mental activity. We know, moreover, that these social myths in no way prevent a man from profiting by the observations which he makes in the course of his life, and form no obstacle to the pursuit of his normal occupations.[6]

[6] Sorel, Georges, *Reflections on Violence* (New York, 1912. Translated from the French by T. E. Hulme); quoted by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 816.

Considered in this connection, the myth, he thinks, is important as a whole, rather than as to its details, which need not have any value as a depiction of future history.[7] This reasoning is of course designed especially to justify the revolutionary "myth" cherished and exploited by radical political sects and organizations. The fact remains, however, that in this little book Sorel has contributed something to our understanding of the strange vitality which myths often display, and the fierceness with which religious and political sects come to insist upon their acceptance. (The myth is cultivated and belief in it is demanded, in other words, because of the consciousness that by means of it the group is enabled to preserve its solidarity and unity of action.)

Durkheim's Sociological Interpretation of Religion. Of much greater importance and broader influence in the development of sociological theory are the contributions which have been made by Emile Durkheim to a general theory of religion as a form of collective behavior. Although some of his contributions were first published as separate papers, they have been brought together in his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*.[8] If we think of Robertson Smith as the scholar who pointed out the relative importance of ritual in early religion, then we ought to recognize Durkheim as the one who worked out the first definite explanation of the process by which institutional religions, with their systematic bodies of doctrine, forms of worship, and codes of morals arose from the most primitive types of ritual, namely the group dances of the savage. How much Durkheim was influenced by Robertson Smith we do not know; he gives little credit to the latter in the footnotes of his book, but one of these notes shows that Durkheim was familiar with *The Religion of the Semites,* and we may assume that he had read it carefully. In fact the two works are mutually complementary, rather than items in a series of more and more refined statements of the same body of theory.

It was Durkheim's fundamental purpose to interpret re-

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 818.

[8] London, 1915 and 1926. Translated from the French by Joseph Ward Swain. The 1926 edition is cited in the following notes.

ligion in all its forms as an outgrowth of basic human nature forces.

> The most barbarous and the most fantastic rites and the strangest myths translate some human need, some aspect of life, either individual or social. The reasons with which the faithful justify them may be, and generally are, erroneous; but the true reasons do not cease to exist, and it is the duty of science to discover them.[9]

How is science to discover these true causes of religious behavior? Durkheim's answer is, in effect, by the analysis of concrete cases. We may expect to find at the bottom of all religions certain "fundamental representations or conceptions," and certain "ritual attitudes"; these have the same essential meaning and function in all religions, in spite of the diversity of forms which they display. They are the permanent elements of religion, "the objective contents of the idea which is expressed when one speaks of *religion* in general."[10] It is through the study of the religions of savages that we may most easily discover these permanent elements; the facts of these religions are simpler than those of more developed religions, and the relations between practices and the motives which have occasioned them are closer, hence more easily made out by the investigator.[11] Durkheim accordingly draws the concrete material for his study of religion mainly from published accounts of the native tribes of Australia, although he supports his generalizations and abstractions also with other ethnological evidence.

Since his project calls for a scientific, that is, systematic and analytical study, rather than for mere ethnological description, our author finds it necessary first of all to define the scope of his field. What is religion? He rejects, to begin with, the idea that religion is always characterized by notions of the supernatural, of the mysterious; these notions, he states, are a product rather than a cause of religious activity and belief. The idea of the mysterious is in fact found in only a few of the more advanced religions.[12] Similarly, he refuses

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 2.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-29.

to accept a definition of religion in terms of the belief in gods or "spiritual beings"; there are great religions, notably Buddhism, from which the idea of spirits is either lacking or nearly so. Furthermore there are, within deistic systems of religion, obligations laid upon the faithful which are not at all connected with the ideas of spiritual beings which those religions include. "Thus there are rites without gods, and even rites from which gods are derived." [13] Religious phenomena are of two fundamental orders, beliefs and rites.[14] The rites, however, can be defined and distinguished from other human practices which are not rites only by reference to their objects, and their objects must be described and defined in terms of beliefs. Thus Durkheim comes back after all to beliefs as the ground for his definition of religion, although he does so as a matter of expediency rather than because of his conception of the fundamental nature of the subject-matter to be dealt with in his study. All religious beliefs, he finds, involve a classification of all the objects of men's thought and action into two groups, which may be designated in modern terminology as the profane and the sacred. "When a certain number of sacred things sustain relations of coordination or subordination with each other in such a way as to form a system having a certain unity, but which is not comprised within any other system of the same sort, the totality of these beliefs and their corresponding rites constitutes a religion." [15]

Religion and Magic. It still remains, however, to distinguish religion from magic. Magic also is made up of beliefs and rites, and it deals with things which are not only of the same order as the objects of religion, real and ideal, but which are often the self-same forces and beings. The difference between magic and religion, however, lies in the fact that magic is essentially individualistic; even though its beliefs are shared by many members of a community, these common beliefs do not have the effect of binding them together into a *communion* or church. The church, in a broad sense of the term, that is, the congregation of believers who

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 29-35.
[14] *Ibid.* Compare Tarde's reduction of all *social* phenomena to *beliefs* and *desires*, mentioned in an earlier chapter.
[15] *Op. cit.*, pp. 36-42.

are united into one body by their common beliefs and the practice of their common rites, is an essential feature of religion in the sense in which Durkheim chooses to employ the term.[16] Still, are there not *private* religious faiths? Our author grants that in a sense there are, but he concludes that these are, in such cases as he has studied in the concrete, merely aspects of the common cult of a group. Hence his final definition of a religion is as follows:

> A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.[17]

This definition, as the author points out, makes religion a form of collective behavior, a view which is fundamental to his analysis in every way.[18]

The Concept of "Mana." The preliminaries reviewed above having been developed, Durkheim addresses himself to the actual task of analysis of the ethnological material which he has chosen. Space limits forbid a complete summary of that analysis here; a few features of it, however, are of great importance. First among these we may consider the concept of *mana*. This term is used in the Polynesian islands to denote a pervasive force, power, or energy, which is supposed to inhere in various objects, plants, animals, and persons, and to be susceptible of evocation and manipulation by means of various rites. It may also operate destructively upon human beings if certain taboos are not observed. Similar terms are similarly employed in the religious vocabularies of other peoples, however, and the term *mana* has been taken by some ethnologists as the name of the general category of ideas of which the Polynesian is an instance. Durkheim finds a similar notion existent among the native Australians, and he takes it as the point of departure for the analysis of totemism, which latter is the particular form of savage religion which he chooses as the representative types of simple religion to be made the special object of his study. He concludes that *mana* is in the

[16] *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, pp. 42-44.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 45-47.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

beginning a more or less matter-of-fact concept, no more religious than it is scientific, the center of the savage idea of causation, wherever there is need for some sort of theory or explanation of the causes of things. The rites of totemism have in general the purpose of evoking or manipulating *mana,* particularly that *mana* which is conceived by the savage to be concentrated in certain objects, animals, and places.[19]

A next important query concerns the psychological sources of the concept of *mana.* How do savages so generally come to have this notion of a super-human or extra-human power which they can evoke or manipulate by means of certain rites? Durkheim's answer to this query is that the idea of *mana* is derived from the sense which the savage has upon certain occasions of extraordinary power behind his *own* efforts and actions. This sense of power is, however, in fact derived from the group of which the individual is a member.[20] Such spiritual reenforcement, however, is experienced by the individual only or mainly on special occasions. In Australian societies there may be distinguished two quite different phases of the group life. At times the group is broken up into smaller social units which wander about in search of food; on other occasions the larger unit comes together by special arrangement and invitation for ceremonies and celebrations of certain kinds, one such type of gathering being known to ethnologists as the *corrobbori.* In the dispersed, food-gathering phase of the life of the Australian tribes, everything is humdrum and dull. In a *corrobbori,* on the other hand, it is just the opposite.[21]

> The very fact of the concentration acts as an exceptionally powerful stimulant. When they are once come together, a sort of electricity is formed by their collecting which quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation. Every sentiment expressed finds a place without resistance in all the minds, which are very open to outside impressions; each re-echoes all the others, and is re-echoed by the others. The initial impulse thus proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows in its advance. And as such active passions so free from all control could not fail to burst out, on every side one sees nothing but violent gestures, cries, veritable howls, and deafening noises of every sort, which aid in intensifying still more the state of

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 188 ff.
[20] *Ibid.,* pp. 200-09.
[21] *Ibid.,* pp. 214-15.

mind which they manifest. And since a collective sentiment cannot express itself except on condition of observing a certain order permitting cooperation and movements in unison, these gestures and cries naturally tend to become rhythmic and regular; hence come songs and dances.[22]

These savage dances and songs are of course taken in turn by our author as the obvious starting-points of religious rituals; this step in the analysis of the development of religion has, however, been more effectively described by another writer, to whose work we shall presently turn.

Durkheim's main contribution to the formation of a scientific, sociological theory of religion is now before us. In brief, he sees as the central feature of religion, or at any rate, as its most elementary feature, a conception of power or energy, known to the ethnologists as *mana*. The notion of *mana*, he believes, is derived by the savage, unconsciously, from the experiences of exaltation and the reenforcement of his individual powers which he has when he participates in common, excited dances and rites with his fellows. Religion, in other words, is for Durkheim, a social phenomenon which has its origin in collective behavior of intensive types, particularly in the savage dance. Durkheim himself probably regarded as the most important conclusion drawn from his study of this field the theory of "collective representations," which we have noticed in an earlier chapter. In these group dances and group ceremonies, according to Durkheim, various objects, gestures, and symbols of all sorts first come to have a common meaning for the members of the group; they become "collective representations." But in the same way the symbolic value of all the words of a language, all the concepts which the words denote, is established and perpetuated. Hence our author makes his theory of collective representations the starting-point for a theory of science as well as of religion; in a word, he derives from this concept a social theory of knowledge.[23] To this phase of the work of Durkheim we shall recur in a later chapter.

Mention should be made at this point of the fact that the

[22] *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 216. Quoted by permission of Macmillan and Co.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 203, 238, 325, 362 ff.

emphasis which Durkheim placed on the savage dance was not original with him. Grosse, among others, had pointed out at an earlier date that "In the heat of the dance the several participants are fused together as into a single being, which is stirred and moved as by one feeling." In just this phenomenon, he said, lies the significance of the primitive dance.[24]

Jane Harrison's "Themis." Because her work is grounded both upon that of Robertson Smith and on that of Durkheim, we may turn next to the writings of Miss Jane Harrison. Several of her books might profitably be examined in connection with the topic of the present chapter,[25] but the central features of her contribution to a social theory of religion are so adequately represented in *Themis* that we may for convenience limit ourselves to material drawn from that volume. The peculiar merit of Miss Harrison's writings, aside from the charm of style which they possess, lies in the light which they shed upon the *process* in which religious rites and beliefs originate, interact with one another and with other elements of the social *milieu,* and are thereby changed. It might be said that whereas Robertson Smith places before us certain historical facts concerning early religions, together with some indication of their importance, and Durkheim, by a more or less intuitive procedure, constructs a theory calculated to explain the development and socio-psychological function of religious activities and beliefs, Miss Harrison has been able by the intelligent analysis of archæological and epigraphic materials to reconstruct a description of the process in which religious phenomena are formed and changed, and thus to give us insight into the mechanism of social interaction underlying these phenomena.

In introducing her study of early Greek religion in *Themis,* Miss Harrison indicates her agreement with the dictum of Robertson Smith, that ritual is the relatively stable element in religion; myth the shifting, protean feature. She differs from his interpretation of these facts, however; in her view, myth

[24] Grosse, Ernst, *The Beginnings of Art* (New York, 1897), pp. 228-29; quoted by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.,* p. 790.

[25] See *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion; Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion;* and *Ancient Art and Ritual.*

is just as primitive as ritual.[26] If we can manage to grasp the essence of her line of reasoning on this point, we shall have a fair idea of her central contribution to our subject. The process of religious development begins, in her account, with the group dance, which was also emphasized by Durkheim and others. When it had become somewhat standardized and stylized, such a choric dance was called by the Greeks a Dithyramb, but the Dithyramb was a dance with an accompanying song; it consisted of a *dromenon*—something *done*—*and* of a *legomenon*—something uttered or said. *Dromena* are things done which cause or are caused by a keen emotion. Such emotions are evoked largely by the great crises of life, such as birth, adolescence, marriage, and death. These events cause tension, which finds expression in excited movement. Out of such emotion felt and enhanced *collectively,* there arises a consciousness of power, as Durkheim pointed out. The *dromenon* therefore becomes not only a thing done, but a thing *re-done,* and then a thing *pre-done*—predone for the sake of the emotions which were associated with it in the past.

> Save for the *Choros,* the band, there would be no drama and no dromenon. Emotion socialized and felt collectively is emotion intensified and rendered permanent. . . . A dromenon, however, is not simply a thing done, not even a thing excitedly and socially done. . . . It is a thing *re*-done or *pre*-done, a thing enacted or represented. It is sometimes *re*-done, commemorative, sometimes *pre*-done, anticipatory, and both elements seem to go to its religiousness. . . . Psychologists tell us that representations, ideas, imaginations, all the intellectual factors in our life are mainly due to deferred reactions. If an impulse finds instantly its appropriate satisfaction, there is no representation. It is out of the delay, just the space between the impulse and the reaction, that all our mental life, our images, ideas, our consciousness, our will, most of our religion, arise.[27]

If the commemorative performance of an activity be often repeated, the analysis continues, the activity tends to become generalized and abstracted. A mere series of leaps, or a dance,

[26] *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion,* with an excursus on the ritual forms preserved in Greek tragedy, by Gilbert Murray, and a chapter on the origin of the Olympic Games, by F. M. Cornford. Cambridge, at the University Press, Second Edition, revised, 1927, pp. 16, 329.

[27] *Op. cit.,* pp. 42-44.

comes to replace the re-enaction of the original experience which is commemorated. It is then no longer simply what *happened,* it is what *happens;* it is now pre-done in preparation for the next hunt, battle, or other critical event.

Somewhat the same sort of transformation is undergone by the *legomenon,* or *mythos,* the thing uttered. Originally it was simply the oral expression of the same emotional recollection or anticipation which was otherwise expressed in the *dromenon.* Miss Harrison thinks that in some cases it may have been no more than the mere excited repetition of one syllable, but in any case it tended to assume the form of a narrative accompanying the action of the dance or mimetic representation. In general, the *mythos* may be thought of as the "plot" of the *dromenon,* which was in fact the primitive forerunner of the Greek drama.[28]

The Projection of the God from the Rite. In such rites, as thus far described, there is no need of a god, and nothing equivalent to what we think of as worship. But the emotion, as Durkheim had pointed out, is felt as something dominant and external to the individual, and it becomes personified, externalized, as the idea of a god, who, in this case, gradually develops out of the figure of the leader of the chorus.

> Having chosen as spokesman, leader, and representative a *Protokouros, a praesul* or chief dancer, they differentiate him to the utmost, make him their vicar and then draw off. Their attitude gradually becomes one of contemplation and respect; community of emotion ceases. More and more the chorus become interested spectators, at first wholly sympathetic, later critical. Theatrically speaking they become an audience, religiously the worshippers of a god. . . . Gradually the chorus loses all sense that the god is themselves, he is utterly projected, no longer chief dæmon, but unique and aloof, a perfected Deos.[29]

As this process of transformation of the leader of the chorus into the representative of a deity goes forward, it is facilitated by developments which take place in the myth. Instead of a verbal expression of the action of the *dromenon,* it becomes re-interpreted as an episode, or a series of episodes,

[28] *Ibid.,* pp. 327-31.
[29] *Ibid.,* p. 46.

in the life-history of the god. Thus Miss Harrison is able to trace the god Dionysus back to the dance and hymn of the *Kouretes,* or mountain dancers of Crete. This ritual was, at the time the hymn which she analyzes was written, a fertility rite, combined with other elements to form an initiation ceremony, or else an initiation ceremony put to use as a fertility rite. As such it had, like others of its class which she briefly canvasses, certain typical elements of death, burial, and rebirth. In the course of the process of projection and personification, these become episodes in the life-history of Dionysus.

> The process of projection, of deification, is much helped by what we may perhaps call the story-telling instinct. The god like his worshippers must have a life-history. We hear much of the sufferings of Dionysos. They are of course primarily the projected *pathe* of his worshippers; the worshippers have passed through the rite of the Second Birth, have endured the death that issues in resurrection; therefore the god is twice-born. But once the life history is projected, it tends to consolidate the figure of the god and to define his personality, to crystallize it and clear it of all demonic vagueness.[30]

The foregoing quotations and summaries will perhaps serve for present purposes as an indication of the method by which Miss Harrison derives from the intensive study of a few bits of material—largely in fact a single case—a revealing account of the process or mechanism whereby religion evolves from its primitive beginnings to its more familiar, "civilized" forms. She frankly builds on the work of Durkheim, accepting, among other elements, his theory of *mana* as the primitive conception from which more specialized religious beliefs are derived.[31] We shall recur presently to the interpretation of the later "Olympian" stage of Greek religion which Gilbert Murray has erected on her foundations.

The Sociological Study of the Bible. Nearly all of the important contributions which have been made down to the present time to a sociological theory of religion have, however, been based upon the study of the relatively primitive, elemental forms of religion. Louis Wallis has been able by the aid of the foundations laid by Robertson Smith and the biblical

[30] *Themis,* p. 47.
[31] *Ibid.,* p. 68.

critics to shed light on the relation of religious origins and development to the social organization of the people among whom the religion exists.[32] In his *Sociological Study of the Bible,* which antedates both Durkheim's and Miss Harrison's studies, we find little attention paid to the rites and beliefs which may have existed among the ancestors of the historic Hebrew people before they had ideas of gods; he takes their notions about the gods, in an early form, for granted. Religion is, in fact, for him, a relation between the clan or tribe and God, or the gods, as conceived by them.[33] His real point of departure is the distinction which earlier historical critics of the Old Testament narratives had made between the books of Judges, Samuel, and Kings, believed by these critics to be the oldest in actual date of composition of all the Old Testament narratives, and the books of the Hexateuch, believed to have been composed considerably later under the influence of an established priestly caste, with a definite theology. From this point of view, the first-mentioned books become the most trustworthy sources of information as to the early forms and development of the religion of the Hebrews, and the task which Wallis sets himself is the analysis of these early narratives.[34]

Religion Evolving Out of Social Conflict. The keynote of his discussion is his thesis that the more theological parts of the Old Testament are to be interpreted in the light of the knowledge which may be derived from the older historical books, concerning a struggle which went on for several centuries in Palestine. At first this struggle had the form of an inter-tribal warfare with the Israelites, a nomadic people of the hill country aligned in general on one side, and the Amorites, or Canaanites, a people of walled cities previously settled in the land, on the defensive. Later, when the Israelites had conquered or assimilated the Amorites the struggle persisted as a class struggle between the poor descendants of the hill-dwellers and the wealthier town-dwellers—merchants and money-lenders. Wallis interprets the ultimate adoption by the

[32] Wallis, Louis, *Sociological Study of the Bible,* Chicago, 1912, and later reprints. Citations here are to the edition of 1927.

[33] *Op. cit.,* p. 62.

[34] *Ibid.,* Preface, p. xxiv f.

Hebrews of the monotheistic cult of Yahweh (Jehovah) as the reflection of the outcome of this social struggle.

In the period covered by the Book of Judges, according to this author, the Israelites living in the highlands of Palestine were roughly but powerfully organized into groups of patriarchal families which may be referred to as "clans." The head of the clan served as a kind of "judge" in disputes between the families, and in this capacity he was supposed to administer *mishpat,* "justice" in the sense of the customary law of the clan. The question in such cases was "What was wont to be done by them of old time?" [35] During this era, the Israelites had a complex, polytheistic set of religious beliefs and practices, involving the worship of family gods, known as *teraphim,* and also the worship by each clan of clan deities. Furthermore, after they entered Canaan, many of the Israelite clans took over the cult of the *Baals,* or *Baalim,* Baal being a generic term among the Amorites for the local deities worshipped in particular localities. Finally, after the Israelites had become united into a national group under the early kings, the cult of Yahweh, formerly worshipped as a local deity, became the supreme national religion.[36] The relationship of Israel to Yahweh was, however, a peculiar one, as compared to the relationship existing according to group tradition between most early deities and their worshippers. In the latter cases, the god was ordinarily regarded as the ancestor of his people, but the conception of the fatherhood of God developed quite late in the history of Hebrew religion. Earlier stories represent Yahweh as a god acquired by Israel by a compact or covenant, made some time during the traditional period of wandering in the desert. Wallis concludes that the actual historical event represented by this tradition is impossible of ascertainment from present available sources, but that it was no doubt an alliance entered into between some tribe or clan of the Israelites and some other desert tribe, whose deity Yahweh originally was. The significant feature of the later tradition, however, was the imputation which ultimately came to be made of certain terms to this compact: namely that Yahweh would protect and

[35] *Sociological Study of the Bible,* p. 47.
[36] *Ibid.,* pp. 70-73.

guide his people if they would keep his law. The law of Yahweh came to be identified with the *mishpat,* the customary law of the land.[37]

Now the Amorites, who dwelt in the walled towns, also had a customary law, which they no doubt conceived to be endorsed by their *Baalim,* but their laws were the typical laws of an early city folk; the society was a pyramidal one, with a few wealthy owners of land and other property at the top, and the mass of the people living in a condition of virtual or actual slavery, and the law of the Amorites was that law which tended to sanction these social-economic arrangements. It secured the claim of the property owner to his chattels and land, and confirmed the creditor in his right to seize the goods, the land, or even the person of a delinquent debtor.[38] On the other hand, the Israelites, having the traditions and customs of an unsettled people, had a quite different law.

> The integrity of a wandering clan depends upon the good treatment of its individual members. Hence the idea of "brotherhood" stands in the forefront of the social consciousness of migratory, unsettled races. While ancient civilization holds manhood at a discount, the nomadic barbarism takes manhood at its par value. . . . Now, the Israelites, prior to the invasion of Canaan, were a migratory people, broken up into small clans. Their economic and social standpoint was expressed in their customary usage or law, known as *mishpat.* This is translated in our English Bibles as "justice," "judgment," "that which is lawful," etc.[39]

This nomadic *mishpat* was particularly concerned with the rights of individuals and families in their land. In general the land was not regarded as something which could be permanently alienated by the family, and the hill people therefore regarded with peculiar abhorrence the practice sanctioned by the law of the Amorites, and later of the wealthy town-dwellers generally, of taking the land of a debtor in satisfaction of an unpaid mortgage. When the struggle between the two elements in the nation took on the form of a religious struggle, under the leadership of the "prophets," it appears to have been

[37] *Ibid.,* pp. 80-82.
[38] *Ibid.,* Preface, pp. xxvi-xxvii.
[39] *Ibid.,* p. xxvii; see also pp. 88-89.

the appropriation of the land of a peasant by the king which occasioned the first prophetic warning.

Thus the social struggle was gradually dramatized as a conflict between Yahweh and the *Baalim,* each being in fact the symbol of the customs and usages of one element in the national population. The warfare against "injustice" waged by the hill people and their prophets was interpreted as a struggle to restore the pure worship of Yahweh.[40] The struggle terminated, on the whole, in favor of the forces of Yahweh. Yahweh was identified more and more as the supreme deity of the Israelites, a "jealous God" who would tolerate no other cults; and as the national rule over the land of Canaan was ultimately formed by Israelite kings, Yahweh became the supreme god of the land. Wallis points out that the religious belief of the people did in fact aid in victory in battle, "Soldiers were rallied to battle in the name of a god; and the stronger the common enthusiasm for the god, the more effective the army became." [41]

The Messianic Hope. The last significant step in the evolution of the Hebrew religion which is discussed by Wallis is the development of the Messianic hope. As Yahweh became more and more identified as the god of "justice," there gradually appeared in the utterances of the prophets the idea of Yahweh's "day," a day on which Yahweh would right all wrongs, lead Israel to triumph over all foes, and release all captives. This idea of the coming of a "saviour," a Messiah from Yahweh to redeem his people, was in turn gradually elevated and refined, but here too there was a struggle between the rich and the poor, the hill people and the well-to-do townsmen. The townsmen thought of the day of Yahweh as a time when the land would be delivered from the rule of outsiders, and their wealth would thus be relieved of the burden placed upon it by the tribute money. They were willing to "wait on God" for the Day, however, rather than see their present status imperiled by any disturbance in the internal affairs of the land. To the poor and in general to the hill people, on the other hand, the Day of Yahweh was seen as a

[40] *Sociological Study of the Bible,* pp. xxvi-xxix.
[41] *Ibid.,* pp. 130-31.

deliverance from the oppressions of the upper classes.[42] In both cases, however, there was agreement as to the miraculous, apocalyptic character of the day of delivery that was to come, and in this way the Messianic hope served as a force making for national *morale*. It was a collective symbol, a focus of attention for all the Hebrew tribes and classes. In this respect Wallis contributes to an interpretation of "myth" in the sense in which the term was developed later by Sorel.

Gilbert Murray's Interpretation of the Cult of the Olympians. Professor Gilbert Murray, friend and collaborator of Miss Harrison, has in several interesting volumes, but most systematically in his *Five Stages of Greek Religion,* developed an account of some of the later stages in the evolution of a religion, which serves to unite some of the insights developed by Miss Harrison with the correlation between religion and social organization pointed out by Wallis.[43] Murray disapproves, to some extent, of the theory of Durkheim that religious belief is the naïve interpretation of group pressure felt by primitive peoples; he thinks the sense of obligation of "conscience" may often be more accurately interpreted in terms of divided personality.[44] Still he adopts in substance as the starting-point of his treatment substantially the account of the origins of Greek religion given by Miss Harrison in *Themis,* which he reviews briefly.[45] The feature of his treatment which is of greatest interest to the sociologist, however, is perhaps his interpretation of the social development and function of the Olympian gods. It is in this connection that he develops his own theory of the relation of religious beliefs to the social organization and social conflicts of a people.

It is his general theory that the Olympian gods represent in some way the influence of the prehistoric conquest of the Greek aborigines by invading tribes from the north. He agrees with Miss Harrison that the primitive faith of the land had been of the Daimonic type described and analyzed by her in

[42] *Ibid.,* pp. 220-21.

[43] *Op. cit.,* New York, 1925. (First edition published as *Four Stages of Greek Religion.*)

[44] *Op. cit.,* pp. 19-20.

[45] *Ibid.,* see especially pp. 42-45. It is not quite clear to the writer whether this theory was first developed by Miss Harrison or by Professor Murray; see the opening chapters of the latter's *Rise of the Greek Epic.*

Themis. This was, however, the religion of a settled, peaceful, agricultural people, interested largely in the fertility of their fields and flocks. The northern invaders transformed this stage of Greek society into the city-state stage. The principal concern was no longer fertility, but safety, security of person, wife and children, and property against warlike neighbors, whether they were barbarian invaders or the original inhabitants of the land changed in their habits through a process of adjustment to the conditions set by the invasions. This latter was the civilization of the city-state, the *polis,* and the gods which were adaptable to such a civilization were, first of all, gods of battle. In fact, as he points out, they were more or less idealized conquering chieftains.

> The gods of most other nations claim to have created the world. The Olympians make no such claim. The most they ever did was to conquer it. . . . And when they have conquered their kingdoms what do they do? Do they attend to the government? Do they promote agriculture? Do they practise trades and industries? Not a bit of it. Why should they do any honest work? They find it easier to live on the revenues and blast with thunderbolts the people who do not pay. They are conquering chieftains, royal buccaneers. They fight, and feast, and play, and make music; they drink deep, and roar with laughter at the lame smith who waits on them. They are never afraid, except of their own king. They never tell lies, except in love and war.[46]

Murray concludes that, while these gods were not such as to command great faith or religious reverence, even in the classical period, they had been greatly transformed, and *re*formed, from their earliest form, in the Homeric poems.

> The power of romance is great. In the memory of Greece the kings and gods of the Heroic Age were transfigured. What had been really an age of buccaneering violence became in memory an age of chivalry and splendid adventure. The traits that were at all tolerable were idealized; those that were intolerable were either expurgated, or, if that was impossible, were mysticized and explained away. And the savage old Olympians became to Athens and the mainland of Greece from the sixth century onward emblems of high humanity and religious reform.[47]

[46] *Five Stages of Greek Religion,* pp. 67-68.
[47] *Ibid.,* p. 79.

The Olympian religion, then, as we know it from the Homeric poems and other late versions, is from this point of view regarded as the product of a religious reformation. Professor Murray analyzes this reformation into three movements: (1) a moral expurgation of the old rites, by which the indecencies of the old fertility rites were in part eliminated and the remainder explained symbolically. It was (2) an intellectual integration; the gods were assimilated into a few type figures, although doubtless they had originally been a legion of local and tribal deities. Finally (3) there had been an attempt to make the religion satisfy the needs of a new social order, as we have seen; it was adapted to the functions of a *polis,* a state dominated and centered by a walled city. The Olympian gods had one advantage for this latter function; they were not tribal or local, rooted in the soil, but national or even international, as a result of the process of generalization and coalescence they had undergone. "They were ready to be made 'Poliouchoi,' 'city-holders,' of any particular city, still more to be 'Hellanoi,' patrons of all Hellas." [48]

Murray concludes his discussion of the Olympian religion with an evaluation of the cult, which, interesting and revealing as it is, we may omit here since it diverges from what may be considered a scientific treatment of the subject. For somewhat similar reasons we may omit any review of his account of the later stages in the story of Greek religion. It should be noted, however, that his evaluation of the cult of the Olympian deities serves indirectly as a very suggestive analysis of the social function of a religion with anthropomorphic deities, the reaction of anthropomorphic conceptions of the gods upon the religious and moral attitudes of the worshippers, and the consequent modification of the status of the gods themselves in the scale of social values. One may seek to propitiate by appropriate rites and ceremonies a mere power of nature, vaguely and indefinitely conceived, without having one's own moral ideas influenced thereby, but when it is a *personal* deity that is worshipped, the myths that have attached themselves to his name and the behavior that is attributed to him may be such as to raise puzzling moral issues in the minds of the wor-

[48] *Ibid.,* pp. 82-89.

shippers, and lead ultimately to the decadence of religion itself at least in the regard of the more intelligent class in the community.[49] By some such process as this, Murray intimates, the religious attitudes of the Greeks interacted with their religious beliefs, to the end that Olympianism gave way to the quasi-religious cults of the later Græco-Roman period—Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism.

Whitehead's Metaphysical Study of Religion. By way of contrast and completion we may consider briefly, in completion of this survey, a little book recently published which represents the view of a modern philosopher concerning religion, and his reaction to the type of studies which we have been considering. Professor Alfred North Whitehead, in *Religion in the Making* (1926), has set forth a very systematic and logical theory of religion which is grounded primarily on metaphysical and epistemological considerations, but which seeks to take account of the reasoning developed by those who have based their studies on concrete material. Professor Whitehead takes issue more sharply than does Murray with the contention that religion is a social phenomenon. In his view, religion is essentially a phenomenon of solitariness. "Collective enthusiasms, revivals, institutions, churches, rituals, bibles, codes of behavior, are the trappings of religion, its passing forms. They may be useful, or harmful; they may be authoritatively ordained, or merely temporary expedients. But the end of religion is beyond all this." [50] The difference between Whitehead and the sociological students of religion appears to turn largely on the meaning assigned to the word "religion." Sociologists are interested in a type of social phenomena which may be referred to as religious; while Whitehead is seeking to form a logical theory to account for the introspective aspect of religious faith. His interpretation might in fact be called an individual-psychological one; he defines religion as "a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended." [51] That the truths come to be apprehended largely as the result of social interaction, that they

[49] *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, pp. 89-96.
[50] *Op. cit.*, p. 17.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

are transmitted to the individual in social intercourse, from a stock of traditions held by a culture group, does not appear to interest him greatly.

It is interesting to observe, however, that Whitehead finds in religion, "so far as it receives external expression in human history," four factors, ritual, emotion, belief, and rationalization. These are named in the order of their importance, culminating with the most important, but this, he states, is also the order of their historical emergence.[52] From this beginning, he develops an explanation of the process of their emergence which is strikingly consistent with the findings of the writers whose work we have been reviewing in this chapter.

> Ritual is the primitive outcome of superfluous energy and leisure. It exemplifies the tendency of living bodies to repeat their own actions. Thus the actions necessary in hunting for food, or in other useful pursuits, are repeated for their own sakes, and their repetition also repeats the joy of exercise and the emotion of success.
>
> In this way emotion waits upon ritual; and then the ritual is repeated and elaborated for the sake of its attendant emotions. Mankind became artists in ritual. . . . But emotions sensitize the organism. Thus the unintended effect was produced of sensitizing the human organism in a variety of ways diverse from what would have been produced by the necessary work of life.[53]

From this point the author proceeds to a discussion of myth and rationalized beliefs, apparently leaving a clue dangling—a clue which some other student may profitably follow up. To what is the organism sensitized by the ritual? Perhaps this may prove to be the point of departure for a revealing analysis of the relation of religion to morals. As Durkheim has pointed out, in ritualistic activities the group attains a very great mutual responsiveness, a process which has also been treated by the students of the behavior of crowds. Mutual responsiveness may, however, under favorable circumstances, develop into a sympathetic apprehension of the response of the other person, a "taking of the rôle of the other," which appears to be the basis of the more refined, socialized types of morality. We may postpone further discussion of this point to the following chapter.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-22.

CHAPTER XIX

RELIGION AND MORALS

Forms of Group Control. In a certain theoretic sense, it may be contended that control over the members of an isolated "primary group" would not be a matter of religion, morals, law, or politics, as we ordinarily understand those terms. In actual fact such a generalization is relatively true of some modern families, as Burgess has brought out;[1] group control and capacity for collective action are brought about by the direct, "personal" interaction and reciprocal adjustment of the members of the group to one another. Social control of this type has been described by Herbert Spencer as the matrix from which "ceremonial government" is evolved.[2] The consideration of this elemental form of social control helps to define for us a viewpoint from which we may study religion, on the one hand, and politics on the other, as the two general methods by which control is maintained, and collective action facilitated, in "secondary groups," that is, those groups in which size or the influence of outside contacts has made ineffective that adjustment which in small, isolated groups is secured by the direct response of person to person. Whatever the historical validity of the conception, it gives us, also, a point of view from which to study the relation of religious belief and ritual to moral rules. Politics may be defined as the general term for forms of social process which eventuate, or are intended to eventuate, in a form of social order and control which rests upon an equilibration of diverse or conflicting group interests which have developed within a larger social situation. In such cases, the control is characterized by a quality of "externality" and impersonality. Religion, on the other hand, may be defined as a form of social interaction

[1] Burgess, Ernest W., "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, March, 1926, pp. 3-9; see especially p. 5.

[2] *The Principles of Sociology* (London, 1893), Vol. II, p. 6.

which tends to secure unity of group action by molding to a common or interlocking pattern the personal attitudes, sentiments, and wishes of the members.

This view of the matter is not after all so very different from the time-honored conception of the relation of morals to religion. Wallis' interpretation of the appeal to Yahweh as the authority for the *mishpat,* or customary law of the Hebrews, reviewed in the preceding chapter, seems to be a plausible interpretation of the idea which many of the Hebrew leaders held, in quite an objective manner, as to the relation of religious belief to moral conformity. In fact our Bible abounds in utterances to the effect that "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," "wisdom" apparently referring to the knowledge of that conduct which is calculated to keep one out of trouble with one's fellows. The king who met with political disaster was said to have done "that which was evil in the sight of Yahweh." Plato indicated, in the *Republic,* his opinion that for the maintenance of his ideal commonwealth it would be desirable to teach to the common people a pious myth, to the effect that the gods had seen fit to fashion different individuals of different materials, some silver, some gold, and some iron, as a result of which they were adapted to various functions and duties in the State.

A vigorous group of leaders in the Protestant churches have recently been depicting the teachings of Jesus in much the same light. It is pointed out that he regarded a purified common faith as the basis upon which right conduct toward one's fellows might be grounded.[3] Under the theological leadership of St. Paul the religious thought of the Christian church was directed away from questions of morality, which was decried as mere "works," and directed toward "faith," that is, belief. This trend has been preponderant in Christian theology ever since, and was of course given fresh emphasis by Luther at the time of the Protestant Reformation. There is some reason to believe, however, that St. Augustine held, although it may be sub-consciously, the view that religion is a means to the perfection of moral conduct; and this attitude is imputed by

[3] See Lichtenberger, J. P., *Development of Social Theory,* pp. 83-85 for a summary of this point of view.

some commentators to Roman Catholic teachers generally. It was medieval theologians, on the other hand, who perfected the doctrine that divine revelation is the only adequate source of the law which should govern the conduct of men.[4]

Turning now to modern writers, we may note that Comte's theory of the "three stages" naturally led him to minimize the rôle of religion, and to regard "positive" knowledge as the ground on which conduct should be, if it was not in fact, based. There occur in the *Positive Philosophy,* however, passages which indicate clearly enough Comte's appreciation of the relation which religion had had to morals in the "theological" stages of human history. He points out for each type of religious belief how the morality existing at the same time is compatible with and sanctioned by the faith.[5] Comte did not, on the other hand, appear to regard this relationship as one to be investigated, nor did he support his statement of it with any great display of factual evidence. In this respect as in so many others, he was rather a prophet pointing to the possibility of sociological science, than a maker of that science.

Maine's Theory of Religious Law and Morality. Sir Henry Sumner Maine was among the nineteenth-century pioneers in the development of a definite theory of the relation of law to morality. In his *Ancient Law* there are a number of suggestions concerning the sanctions of early rules of conduct, and probably no writer of the period was more influential in stimulating others to undertake further research in the field. He finds the origins of ancient Greek and Roman law in the judgments handed down by early chieftains in cases brought before them. These judgments were known to the early Greeks as *Themistes,* and the chieftain was supposed to have been inspired in uttering them by Themis, later incorporated in the pantheon as goddess of justice, but in the beginning simply the personification of the general concept of justice, or right action. Jane Harrison later developed this interpretation of the personality of Themis more thoroughly, but to Maine she is simply an expression of the supposed tendency of primitive

[4] *Lichtenberger, op. cit.,* pp. 109-13.

[5] *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte,* translated and freely condensed by Harriet Martineau (London, 1896), Vol. III, pp. 10-11, 48-49.

man to account for every type of "sustained or recurring action" by imputing it to a divine person. According to his version of the matter, the individual judgments preceded the idea of a custom which ought to be followed; the custom, he thinks, arose later through the repetition of similar judgments in similar cases.[6] This feature of Maine's theory would probably be generally repudiated today by ethnologists; it is pointed out that the king or chieftain would be guided, even though unconsciously, in his judgments by the custom of the tribe, in so far as it could be made applicable to the case at issue. The feature of Maine's theory which has attracted most notice is the correlation which he sought to establish between certain elements of early law, which of course was much the same as the morality of the age, and a patriarchal social order, regulated and sanctioned by religious ideas and ceremonial. He has been attacked by his later contemporaries and successors for his supposed contention that the patriarchal order was the primitive order of human society, but a careful reading of the text of *Ancient Law* shows that he simply held that the patriarchal order was at any rate the earliest *stable* form of social organization in the western world.[7] His theory of the relation of religion to this form of social organization occurs in his chapter on Wills.

> The original Will or Testament was . . . an instrument or (for it was probably not at first in writing) a proceeding by which the devolution of the *Family* was regulated. It was a mode of declaring who was to have the chieftainship, in succession to the Testator. When Wills are understood to have this for their original object, we see at once how it is that they came to be connected with one of the most curious relics of ancient religion and law, the *sacra,* or Family Rites. These *sacra* were the Roman form of an institution which shows itself wherever society has not wholly shaken itself free from its primitive clothing. They are the sacrifices and ceremonies by which the brotherhood of the family is commemorated, the pledge and witness of its perpetuity. Whatever their nature,—whether it be true or not that in all cases they are the worship of some mythical ancestor,—they are everywhere employed to attest the sacredness of the family-relation; and therefore they acquire prominent significance and

[6] *Op. cit.* (Everyman's Library edition, London and New York, n. d.), pp. 2-3.
[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 73-74.

importance, whenever the continuous existence of the family is endangered by a change in the person of its chief. . . . Among the Hindoos, the right to inherit a dead man's property is exactly coextensive with the duty of performing his obsequies.[8]

Maine thus laid down, in substance, the theory of religious law and morality which has become most common in the literature dealing with the subject ever since. With later writers, as we shall see, this theory runs about as follows: The customary law and morality of early societies are sanctioned by religion, which takes the form in the beginning of a fear and ceremonious worship of the spirits of deceased ancestors, and originated, probably, in the fear and awe in which the early patriarch was held by the other members of his household.

Government and Law in the Struggle for Existence. The theory reappears, with added refinements, in the *Physics and Politics* of Walter Bagehot, which is another of the classics of modern social theory. Bagehot had the advantage of writing after the Darwinian theory of natural selection had been published, and he was probably the pioneer in the development of the theory, since so common, that institutions and customs, like organisms, are subject to a selective process, grounded in the struggle for existence. He points out, though somewhat less clearly than his successor Kidd, that the struggle for existence assumes at an early period in the development of the human race a group form; it is a struggle between groups rather than a struggle exclusively of individuals to live and perpetuate their kind. What is needed for survival under these circumstances is group strength, which must be secured by effective government, or, as he puts it, "law—rigid, definite, concise law." This, however, is just what it is most difficult for primitive men to attain. Government and law were forced upon half the western world by the Romans, as conquerors, "but where did the first ages find Romans or a conqueror?" [9] The principal explanation of the survival and spread of law, once it was evolved, is natural selection; for success in the

[8] *Ancient Law*, pp. 112-13.

[9] Bagehot, Walter, *Physics and Politics*, or thoughts on the application of the principles of "natural selection" and "inheritance" to political society (New York, 1879), p. 21.

struggle "any form of polity is more efficient than none." [10] The primary problem, however, is how the necessary obedience was gained in the first groups in which it emerged.

The "Cake of Custom." Bagehot's answer to this question is that obedience is had in early society through an identification of church and state, an application of the supernatural sanction for the purposes of government.[11] When such a *régime* exists, there is formed a "cake of custom," which gradually subjects all members and all classes of a society to a "hereditary drill," which is essential for "making the mould of civilization and hardening the soft fibre of early man." [12] Here Bagehot takes advantage of an insight gained from Maine; namely, that the history of law is that of an evolution from status to contract.

> In modern days, in civilized days, men's choice determines nearly all they do. But in early times that choice determined scarcely anything. The guiding rule was the law of *status*. Everybody was born to a place in the community: in that place he had to stay: in that place he found certain duties which he had to fulfill, and which were all he needed to think about. The net of custom caught men in distinct spots, and kept each where he stood.[13]

The problem still remains, at this point in the argument, as to the first development of the cake of custom. Bagehot had intimated that it was facilitated by the identity of church and state, but that does not tell how it came about. To solve the problem, he resorted to the idea of imitation, in the exploitation of which he was a forerunner of Tarde.

> At first a sort of "chance predominance" made a model, and then invincible attraction, the necessity which rules all but the strongest men to imitate what is before their eyes, and to be what they are expected to be, moulded men by that model. . . . I believe this unconscious imitation to be the principal force in the making of national characters.[14]

The Religious Sanction of Custom. Customs are created, then, by imitation, just as a literary style spreads in

[10] *Ibid.* pp. 24-25.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

the modern world, but our author recognized the need of some further explanation of the power which the customs have in early societies. For this explanation he turns more definitely than in the previously mentioned passage to the religious sanction. Primitive men, he finds from his examination of available information, were continuously dominated by fear—fear of everything, animate and inanimate, but most of all fear of "the world," behind which they imagined unseen powers which must be propitiated in every way.

> At first sight it seems impossible to imagine what conceivable function such awful religions can perform in the economy of the world. And no one can fully explain them. But one use they assuredly had: they fixed the yoke of custom thoroughly on mankind. They were the prime agents of the era. They put upon a fixed law a sanction so fearful that no one could dream of not conforming to it.[15]

To be sure, there comes a time when custom, enforced by such "awful sanctions," became an obstacle to further progress and an impediment in the inter-group struggle for existence. It remains therefore to explain how it was replaced by a more flexible, adaptable form of social control, and that Bagehot also very ingeniously does, as we shall note in a later chapter.

Herbert Spencer is thought of as the interpreter of the economic organization of society, in terms of his famous "organic analogy." In his *Principles of Sociology,* however, he seems to treat religion as one of the two great elements of the "regulating system" of society, and this view is definitely attributed to him in the epitome of his theory which was prepared by Professor Giddings and approved by Spencer himself.[16]

The Evolution of Religion. An examination in greater detail of Spencer's treatment of religion shows that it bears a striking resemblance to that of Maine and others who have particularly concerned themselves with the question of the relation between religion and morals, in that he too adopts the theory that religion has its roots in ancestor worship, or in other words, in what Sumner later termed "ghost fear."

[15] *Physics and Politics,* p. 57.

[16] This summary is quoted by Lichtenberger, *op. cit.,* pp. 347-48. Giddings has incorporated it in his *Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* pp. 113-14.

Spencer dealt with religion as he did with nearly all other social phenomena, from the standpoint afforded by his general theory of evolution—the progressive or unilateral differentiation of structure, accompanied by the differentiation of function.[16a] Differentiation of the public cult proper to the chief's family from the private cults of the other families, the delegation of the priestly functions by the chiefs to special functionaries, and the multiplication of cults—subsequently integrated with each other in a polytheistic system—through the conquest of societies by one another.[16b]

On the side of function, Spencer lays particular stress on the separation of worship from morals.

> Beginning as the entire series of phenomena does with propitiation of the dead parent or dead chief, and dependent as the propitiatory acts are on the desires of the ghost, which are supposed to be like those of the man when alive; worship in its primitive form, aiming to obtain the good will of beings in many cases atrocious, is often characterized by atrocious observances. Originally there is no moral element in it; and hence the fact that extreme attention to religious rites characterizes the lower types, rather than the higher types, of men and societies.[16c]

The ethical or moral element is thus interpreted as of propitiatory origin. "But slowly, experience establishes ethical conceptions, round which there gather private sentiments and public opinions, giving them some independent authority." [16d] As the transition from the militant to the industrial society, on which Spencer lays emphasis, proceeds, rules of conduct gain more and more of a rational sanction, until finally an ethics emerges which may even force theological dogmas to submit to its criticisms.[16e] Spencer, being very much of a rationalist, naturally wished to see this displacement and subordination of religion by ethics go forward, and, the wish no

[16a] Spencer's general theory of evolution is presented in *First Principles,* which was written as the volume introductory to the remaining volumes of the *Synthetic Philosophy,* of which the *Principles of Sociology* forms a part.

[16b] *Principles of Sociology* (2nd edition; New York, 1912), Vol. III, pp. 150-52.

[16c] *Ibid.,* Vol. III, p. 152.

[16d] *Ibid.,* Vol. III, p. 153.

[16e] *Ibid.,* Vol. III, pp. 153-54.

doubt serving to father the thought, he predicted that it would go forward: Sermons, he states, will no doubt become more and more ethical in content until they have no other subject-matter. In the sense in which religion is to be defined as the sum of man's ideas about the ultimate causes and destiny of things, however, some residue must always remain, since the first cause of things is unknowable, but can never cease to be an object of reflection.[16f]

Kidd's "Social Evolution." Considerable attention was paid, by the generation of sociologists just closing, to a book by Benjamin Kidd entitled *Social Evolution,* which first appeared in 1894 in London.[17] Kidd's theory bears no little resemblance to that set forth by Bagehot in *Physics and Politics,* although it seems to have been regarded by many students of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a distinct contribution. Perhaps the most impressive feature of Kidd's discussion is his suggestive phrase, "no rational sanction for progress." He points out, as had Bagehot, that man like the other animals is subjected to a process of struggle and natural selection, which tends to assume the form of an inter-group struggle and selection. This point he supports by a somewhat extended review of evidence to show how persistent and universal a phenomenon warfare has been in the history of our species.[18] Success and survival in this inter-group struggle involves the subordination of individual interests to group interests; it is to the interests of the individuals of any particular generation, as individuals and even collectively, to exert their power of controlling the increase of population, and by this and other means, to avert the evil of continual warfare. To do so, however, would be to inhibit the beneficent effects of selection—to check the progress of mankind.[19] It must be said of Kidd that he tends to have recourse at this point in his reasoning to a teleological argument; that is, he assumes the necessity of progress from its desirability in the interest of future generations. The will of a deity seems to lie concealed

[16] *Principles of Sociology,* Vol. III, pp. 155-75 *passim.*

[17] See Lichtenberger, *op. cit.,* p. 287, for a brief biographical note on Kidd.

[18] *Op. cit.,* pp. 39-40 *et passim.*

[19] *Ibid.,* pp. 59-64.

somewhere in Kidd's argument, taken as a causal factor in the process he is analyzing. Be that as it may, he concludes that there is no rational sanction for progress; or that individuals can have no rational reason for submitting to that social control which is the basis of progress.[20]

If, now, there is no rational sanction for progress, and if progress nevertheless goes on, as he assumes it does, there must be some non-rational sanction by the force of which men are led to subordinate themselves to the interest of future generations. Such a sanction Kidd points out in religious beliefs, which he designates as the "super-rational sanction."[21] He considers that, inasmuch as all attempts on the part of apologists to find a rational explanation and justification for religious beliefs have failed to provide an explanation on which they can agree, there can be no such thing as a rational religion, and the explanation of the survival of such beliefs must lie in the super-rational sanction which they provide for progress.[22] Apparently, what Kidd really showed was that religious beliefs survive because they have survival value, at least in certain stages of social evolution.

Sumner's "Folkways." Probably no writer of the past has contributed more to the formation of a systematic and objective social theory of morals than the late Professor William Graham Sumner. His *Folkways* (1906) was in fact the first book to characterize moral practices and moral ideals in a manner which was both objective and abstract, and at the same time conspicuously free from propaganda on behalf of any particular code of morality. The influence of this book was undoubtedly the greater because of the impressive exhibit of ethnological evidence with which the author supported his few relatively simple generalizations. It is an interesting fact that Sumner cites Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites* many times, but always as an authority for some statement of fact, as a source of some ethnological datum, and never as the source of any explanatory concept or idea. There is, however, some similarity between Sumner's treatment of the *mores*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 101-03.

and Robertson Smith's treatment of ritual and myth, in that Sumner, like Robertson Smith, is disposed to make the practice antecedent to the "philosophy." Sumner, however, does not specially emphasize religious rites or ceremonies, but continually directs his attention to the *mores,* the morals, among which he does not noticeably distinguish one sort from another, except for convenience of surveying them.

It is in connection with his distinction between the terms "folkways" and "mores," which we have touched upon in an earlier chapter, that Sumner develops his account of the relation of morals to religion, on which, it will be seen, falls in the same general tradition as those of Maine and Bagehot. Sumner defines the *mores* as "folkways, including the philosophical and ethical generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they grow." [23] Elsewhere in the volume he has indicated that the *mores* are those folkways which are taken to form a part of the "prosperity policy" of the social group. Some commentator on Sumner has suggested that by *mores* he means "folkways which count." The point to be emphasized for present purposes is, however, that by the *mores,* however he may define them, Sumner plainly means those customs which are felt, or have been felt, in a given society, to be essential and mandatory; they are, in other words, the *morals* of that society, the customs which it is held to be *wrong* to violate. Now in explaining how the *mores* come to be regarded as conducive to group welfare, Sumner has recourse, to some extent, to the imputation of crude notions of natural cause-and-effect relations to the members of the group in question, but mainly, he thinks, the *mores* found their sanctions in "ghost fear."

> It is quite impossible for us to disentangle the elements of philosophy and custom, so as to determine priority and the causative position of either. Our best judgment is that the mystic philosophy is regulative, not creative, in its relation to the folkways. They reacted upon each other. The faith in the world philosophy drew lines outside of which the folkways must not go. Crude and vague notions of societal welfare were formed from the notions of pleasing the ghosts, and from such notions of expediency as the opinion that, if there were not children enough, there would not be warriors enough,

[23] See Lichtenberger, *op. cit.,* p. 30.

or that, if there were too many children, the food supply would not be adequate.[24]

Just what is this "ghost fear" to which Sumner appeals as the explanation, in the main, of the power of the *mores?* It proves upon examination to be very much the same thing as that ancestor worship which, Maine had suggested, might be regarded as the source of the earliest sanction of established custom, or law.

With great unanimity all over the globe primitive men followed the same line of thought. The dead were believed to live on as ghosts in another world just like this one. The ghosts had just the same needs, tastes, passions, etc., as the living men had. These transcendental notions were the beginning of the mental outfit of mankind. They are articles of faith, not rational convictions. The living had duties to the ghosts, and the ghosts had rights; they also had power to enforce their rights. It behooved the living therefore to learn how to deal with ghosts. Here we have a complete world philosophy and a life policy deduced from it. When pain, loss, and ill were experienced and the question was provoked, Who did this to us? the world philosophy furnished the answer. When the painful experience forced the question, Why are the ghosts angry and what must we do to appease them? the "right" answer was the one which fitted into the philosophy of ghost fear.[25]

"Ghost Fear" and Ancestor Worship. It should be added here that this doctrine had previously been more completely worked out by E. B. Tylor in his *Primitive Culture,* and by Herbert Spencer in his *Principles of Sociology,* where the authors had explained the fear of spirits and the worship of ancestors in terms of the deductions which primitive man was supposed to have made from his experiences of dreams. When one sleeps, his associates can testify that his body remains in one spot, so the argument runs; whereas he himself knows that during the same interval he has had the most extensive adventures. Nothing is more logical than the inference from such a contradiction in the apparent facts, that something invisible which dwells in the body and is its more vital part can leave the body at times and carry on an independent existence. When the person dies, then, his associates simply con-

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 30.
[25] *Ibid.,* p. 29; see also p. 7.

clude that his "spirit" has left the body for a longer stay, but it has not ceased to exist, an opinion which is borne out by the fact that one often meets his deceased ancestors and comrades in the dream world. Because of the mysterious and awe-compelling character of this spirit world, and because of the recollection of the authority which the ancestor had when he was present in the flesh, nothing is more natural than that it should be felt necessary to continue to obey the dead leaders, and to seek to ascertain their will. This is the orthodox modern theory by which religion is explained primarily in terms of "ghost fear" and ancestor worship, and it is an interesting fact that a much more systematic interpretation of the relation of religion to moral rules and ideals has been derived from this theory than has as yet been worked out in terms of the Durkheim-Harrison theory whereby religion is explained primarily in relation to collective emotion created in savage dance and ritual.

Ross' Treatment of "Belief." In his *Social Control,* first published in 1901, Professor E. A. Ross reviewed the whole subject of belief as regards its relation to social control, placing before the reader a selected exhibit of the evidence, ethnological and historical, and of the theories which had been evolved to account for the relationship of the two, but without making any striking new contribution to the subject. His discussion of this subject, like much else that he has written, gains popular interest, but is impaired for scientific use, by the intimate way in which he interweaves a social-ethical evaluation of the forms and means of control described with his objective description and analysis.[26]

Recent German Contributions to Religion and Morals. In recent decades, several German writers have made contributions to the existing body of general social theory of religion and morals, among them being Ernst Troeltsch, Paul Natorp, Max Scheler, and Max Weber. Some features of Max Weber's treatment of "Religionsoziologie," as it is coming to be termed among German sociologists, have been ably reviewed by Professor Sorokin in his recent *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928), to which the reader is referred. Weber has

[26] *Op. cit.* (New York and London, 1906), Chap. XII, "Belief."

devoted particular attention to the relations of religion and economic organization; he is one of those—there have been several others—who have sought to trace a functional relationship between the ethics of Protestantism and the general organization of modern capitalism. Protestantism, under the leadership of Luther, Calvin, and others, is asserted to have placed particular ethical stress upon the virtues of diligence, thrift, self-restraint, and the like, the virtues most appropriate to a capitalistic, large-scale organization of industry and business.[26a]

Another German writer who has contributed to the general body of theory with which we are concerned in the present chapter is Ferdinand Tönnies. Tönnies' contrast of *Gemeinschaft,* "community," with *Gesellschaft,* or "society" affords the basis for a distinction between two kinds of social control similar to that made at the beginning of this chapter between control in the primary group and control in the secondary group. In *Die Sitte,* a little brochure published in 1909, Tönnies develops the theory that religion is derived from customary morality, rather than the latter from the former. More specifically, he holds that conformity to the *Sitte* (*mores,* morals) rests upon the *Ehrfurcht* or respect which the younger generation has for the parents and older members of the community. This attitude, directed originally toward the living elder members of the community, evolved into the cult of ancestor worship.[26b] Thus Tönnies arrives at a theory of the religious sanction for morality not unlike that presented by other writers whose work we have been reviewing. As a contributor to a general theory of collective behavior, however, Tönnies has an importance greater than the foregoing brief summary of the argument in *Die Sitte* would indicate. In various passages in his writings he has developed a theory of social will, and of the relation of *Volksgeist,* "folk soul" to social will, which is very suggestive. He has been one among others to develop in its sociological applications the thesis that "will" is, from a scientific point of view, simply a name for the tendency to

[26a] Sorokin, Pitirim, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, 1928), pp. 673-83.

[26b] Tönnies, Ferdinand, *Die Sitte* (Frankfurt am Main, 1909), pp. 18-22.

act in a certain manner, and from this point of view, he points out that customs, religion, legislation, convention, public opinion, and the like may be regarded as various forms or manifestations of social will.[26c]

Malinowski's "Crime and Custom in Savage Society." So far in the present survey, we have not paid any attention, directly, to the contributions of the professional ethnologists and anthropologists to our subject. It may be said, however, that, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a number of these specialists had supported a doctrine like that laid down by Bagehot and Sumner, but, if anything, a stronger one, namely, that in savage society the individual is completely and rigidly controlled by the dictates of group custom.[27] In a recent interesting volume based on field studies in the Trobriand Islands, Malinowski subjects this view to a searching criticism, and submits a much modified general account of the forms and content of social control among the savages as he has known them. The central feature of his argument is the evidence which he brings to bear to show that there are all degrees of adherence to custom on the part of savages in the same group. Some customs are very lightly broken; others are regarded as mandatory and as sanctioned by supernatural penalties, but have acquired a mechanism of magical immunization by means of which the offender may be protected against the penalties.[28]

Among the Trobriand Islanders, Malinowski informs us, certain of the tribal *mores* are so powerful that violation of them may lead to suicide on the part of the guilty person. Yet even in these cases, he feels that there is something to be said against the view that the custom controls the behavior of the individual automatically and despotically. He narrates a most interesting case which came under his personal observation, in which a breach of the tribal rules of exogamy, followed by accusations and insults uttered by the girl's discarded

[26c] See, among other passages, Tönnies' *Soziologische Studien und Kritiken Erste Sammlung* (Jena, 1925), p. 356 ff.

[27] Malinowski, Bronislaw, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (London and New York, 1926), "Introduction." In this introduction Malinowski reviews briefly some of the theories of which the volume constitutes a critique.

[28] *Ibid., passim.*

lover, led to the suicide of the male culprit, executed in a ceremonious manner, and followed in turn by armed conflict between the village of the offender and that of the offended lover. As Malinowski points out, it has been commonly held by ethnologists that nothing arouses greater horror than the breach of the exogamic customs of a folk, and so it appeared at first in this case. He found upon inquiry that the natives had a great terror of the consequences of any such breach, and they believed that, should an individual offend in this manner, he would be visited, by supernatural agencies, with various evils, "sores, disease, and even death." This, he remarks, is the *ideal* of native law.

When it comes to the application of morality and ideals to real life, however, things take on a different complexion. In the case here described it was obvious that the facts would not tally with the ideal of conduct. Public opinion was neither outraged by the knowledge of the crime to any extent, nor did it react directly—it had to be mobilized by a public statement of the crime and by insults being hurled at the culprit by an interested party. Even then he had to carry out the punishment himself.[29]

Most interesting of all the discoveries of Malinowski, however, is the customary magical technique for evading the consequences of a breach of tribal custom.

As regards the supernatural sanction, this case led me to an interesting and important discovery. I learned that there is a perfectly well-established remedy against any pathological consequences of this trespass, a remedy considered practically infallible if properly executed. That is to say the natives possess a system of magic consisting of spells and rites, which when correctly carried out is completely efficient in undoing the bad results of clan incest. . . . Later on I discovered that such parasitic growths upon the main branches of tribal order exist in several other cases besides the counteraction of incest. The importance of this fact is obvious. It shows clearly that a supernatural sanction need not safeguard a rule of conduct with an automatic effect.[30]

The comment might of course be made that the arrangement for magical evasion of supernaturally sanctioned moral rules which is here characterized seems to be in itself an evidence of

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

some previous period in the history of the tribe when the rules in question were not regarded as subject to evasion, the protective technique being apparently a later development. Malinowski's critique is therefore after all not so much one which has the effect of modifying the theory of social origins in the realm of morals and religion, developed by Spencer, Tylor, Sumner, and others, as it is a critique of their treatment of the matter, when regarded as a generalized description of contemporary savage society.

The same comment would perhaps apply to the most general thesis developed by Malinowski in this study, namely, that the reign of custom in savage society is a complex and variegated matter, just as it is in more civilized society. "In this the 'savages' do not differ from the members of any self-contained community with a limited horizon, whether this be an Eastern European ghetto, an Oxford college, or a Fundamentalist Middle West Community. But love of tradition, conformism, and the sway of custom account but to a partial extent for obedience to rules among dons, savages, peasants, or Junkers." [31] It is his ultimate purpose in this volume to show in some detail how social order is actually maintained in the Trobriand society, and this he does in a very illuminating way.

The "Future" Relation of Religion to Social Control. One question which logically arises in connection with the study of the relation of religious beliefs and practices to general morality, concerns the permanency and long-run indispensability of the religious sanction for moral conduct, that is, conduct essential to group survival and efficiency. This is naturally a question with which the more philosophically inclined students of society have concerned themselves. A natural science of sociology cannot, while keeping strictly to the limitations imposed by its own viewpoint and assumptions, develop predictions as to the general course of future developments. Its generalizations must inevitably assume the *if . . . then* form; they will assert that, given certain describable conditions and factors, certain predictable processes will ensue, but science, *qua* science, can scarcely say what conditions and factors will obtain in the distant future.

[31] *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, pp. 51-52.

For present purposes, we may consider briefly two attempts which have been made, by philosophical methods, to arrive at some foresight as to the future relation of religious beliefs to social control. Professor Charles Bouglé, in a recent volume, has suggested that religious sanctions tend to lose their force as the bases of social control in the measure that the boundaries of social units are extended to incorporate culturally dissimilar groups. Social control and order, and even social ideals, must in such a case find some other foundation than the religious one.[32] Since, being influenced by Durkheim's study of the "social division of labor," Bouglé anticipates that this process of social differentiation and the incorporation of alien elements into single societies will proceed still further than it has, his conclusion tends to assume the form of a prediction that the religious foundation of social morality and control will become of less and less relative importance. He looks to science and to the cultivation of esthetic sensibility to supply the need of new bases for social unity.[33]

Of somewhat similar trend is Whitehead's discussion in his previously cited little volume, *Religion in the Making.* His anticipations assume, however, the form of a prediction of a "rational religion," and are thus, on the face of the matter, in direct contradiction to the theory of Kidd.[34] He thinks that a rational religion, which, he intimates, will involve an "almost profane concept of the goodness of God," will be correlated with a world-consciousness, as contrasted with the group-conscious religions of the past, and will rise to a conception of the "essential rightness of things," in place of the idea of preservation which underlies a group or national religion.[35]

It will be noted that these philosophical approaches to the problem of religion and morality tend to bring in the concept of the group or social *ideal.* Ideals, however, are also found in the tradition of a culture group, and this fact can serve us as a point of departure for the review of some of the literature

[32] Bouglé, Charles, *The Evolution of Values,* studies in sociology with special applications to teaching, translated by Helen Stalker Sellars, with an introduction by Roy Wood Sellars (New York, 1926), p. 145.
[33] *Ibid.,* pp. 145-46, and Chaps. XII and XIII.
[34] *Op. cit.,* pp. 31-34.
[35] *Ibid.,* pp. 40-41.

dealing with tradition as a *process* of transmission of cultural traits, objective and subjective, with education as a special and group-conscious form of this process, and with the relation of both to group ideals. This range of material will be the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER XX

CULTURE, ART, AND EDUCATION

Original Nature, Culture, and Collective Behavior. Human beings are born into the world as physical organisms, differing tremendously in degree from other animal organisms, however, as to the plasticity and modifiability of their behavior tendencies. Because of this plasticity, human personality becomes shaped and formed to fit in with the patterns of activity already predominating in the society into which the individual is born. In other words, the individual acquires as his habits the customs of the groups in which he lives, particularly those in which he spends his earlier years. These customs, which in their totality and interrelatedness we speak of as the *culture* of the group in question, appear to be always more or less imperfect when regarded as the mechanism whereby physical and social means are adapted to human ends; the ends being given, in the last analysis, by the projection as ideas and ideals of those deep-seated cravings which are presumably in some sense functions of the sort of organisms we are. The resulting tension, which is reflected in the individual soul as "personality conflict," or mental conflict, finds outlet upon occasion in emotionally colored "expressive" acts, which through a species of psychic contagion are frequently communicated to other individuals and give rise to a form of social behavior which is in a particularly emphatic sense *collective* behavior. This is, from one point of view, at any rate, the explanation of crowd and mob action, of the more conspicuous types of "social movements," and—not least in importance—of the more elemental and spontaneous types of religious activity. From this point of view religion may be seen as that form of collective behavior in which are formed and maintained certain prepotent "collective representations," or symbols of supreme forces and ends with reference to which the activities of the group are

oriented. Viewed in this light, religion may be regarded also as the means by which the group consensus operates to constrain the individual members to conform to those customs of the group which are felt to be important for the common welfare. In this function, religion is supplemented, in modern, "civilized" societies by the forces of politics, legislation, and administrative regulation, which are necessarily evolved to meet the needs for order and control of those societies into which heterogeneous cultural elements have been incorporated. From this point of view also, however, religion may be seen, sociologically, as the form of collective behavior in which *ideals* of social betterment—visions of a more satisfactory future state of affairs—are formed and perpetuated. Such is, in brief *résumé,* the main trend of those aspects of social theory which have been reviewed in the ten chapters immediately preceding this one.

"Education" as the Transmission of Culture. Societies, then, live and have their being largely by virtue of what we call their "culture." Culture is an important source, not only of the current regulation and stabilization of social behavior, but also of the hope of better things. It is no more than natural, then, since this function of the group mores is always at least dimly perceived by the older members and leaders of social groups, that there should have developed special techniques for the transmission of the group culture to successive generations. Such deliberate procedures for the transmission of the cultural heritage constitute a large part, but not in all cases the whole, of what we understand by "education," and education is in fact a topic of no small interest to sociologists. An extremely voluminous literature devoted to the description, analysis, and direction of educational practices has come into existence in the past century or two, much of it of a very technical character and as such outside the scope of the present survey, but some of it, also, too important as a phase of social theory to be neglected here.

The Transmission of Culture as "Diffusion." The most elemental sociological conception of education is, in short, that it is the process of cultural transmission, in so far, at least, as this transmission is more or less deliberately effected as a

matter of policy by the direction and sanction of the older members of a society. We ought to recall parenthetically at this point, however, that the transmission of culture is a matter which has been extensively studied and discussed by the anthropologists, among whom there exists a long-standing controversy concerning the relative importance of "diffusion," that is, the transmission of culture, and "evolution" from independent origins as the explanation of the cultural uniformities found to exist at widely separated points on the surface of the earth.[1] This controversy has been ably reviewed by Edward Westermarck in the Introduction of the new edition of his *History of Human Marriage*. Westermarck himself leans to the "evolutionary" side of the argument. As he points out, however, the contentions of the two parties tend to "converge," whether the cultural traits, in the course of their existence, do or not. The most ardent believers in independent origins are constrained to admit that there is a great deal of diffusion; there is in fact no other acceptable way of accounting for the cultural homogeneity of a particular folk. Likewise the most enthusiastic "diffusionists" must admit that cultural traits somehow, somewhere, originate and evolve, else whence the traits to be diffused?[2] The resolution of the controversy must obviously come from further study of the manner in which culture traits, that is, customs, folkways, mores, actually do in concrete cases originate, change, and diffuse. The process of cultural diffusion, however, when analyzed, seems to be very much the same as the process by which culture is transmitted; in other words, it involves the inculcation of the customs and traditions of some group in individuals who did not previously share them. It may also be remarked that certain studies of segregated religious sects which have sought to preserve and inculcate in their members peculiar mores, distinct from those of the "world," show that diffusion of customs and ideas from one group to another takes place largely through the agency of the younger generation. It is the children and young people, in one of these sects, who acquire in their formative years the customs and valua-

[1] See Chap. XII above.
[2] *Op. cit.*, fifth edition (New York, 1922), Vol. I, p. 1-25.

tions of the unregenerate, and who grow up culturally assimilated to the larger world outside rather than to the faith of their fathers, who constitute for the most part the real accretions of the larger cultural group from the smaller one. It seems not improbable that this is more or less characteristic of all so-called "diffusions" of culture traits. In other words, this time-honored problem of the anthropologists has much in common with the problems of the student of education as a social process. It is, in part, *inculcation,* which both are seeking to understand, to describe, and to measure.[3]

"Social Heritage" and Education. Although we shall want to take into account several volumes of earlier date, we may profitably consider at this point the discussion of the transmission of culture and of education given by Graham Wallas in *Our Social Heritage,* since he has so clearly stated a fundamental version of the whole matter. He starts with the standard biological distinction between "nature" and "nurture," or biologically inherited (inborn) and acquired traits. Nurture, he points out, is of two kinds; there are those habits which each acquires for himself, and there are those habits and that knowledge which was once, no doubt, acquired by some individuals for themselves, but which have since been handed down by the social process of teaching and learning.

It is the latter part of nurture which he calls our "social heritage." "Men," he continues, "differ widely from other animals by the extent of their social heritage, and the degree of their dependence on it."[4] He believes in fact that, in the course of the million years or so which have elapsed since men began to have transmitted culture, the cultural factor must have been an important factor conditioning the process of natural selection, and must have led to significant modifications in the biologically inherited nature of man. Today we are biologically less fitted to live without it, than were our remote ancestors of the eolithic age. We have in fact come to be "bio-

[3] Arguments on both sides have recently been summarized in a little book entitled *The Diffusion Controversy,* edited by G. Elliott Smith (New York, 1927). See also in the same connection Malinowski's review of *Race and History,* by Eugene Pittard, under the title "Useful and Useless Anthropology," in *The New Republic* for March 16, 1927, pp. 109-11.

[4] *Op. cit.* (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1921), p. 14.

logically parasitic upon our social heritage." [5] It should be mentioned here that Herbert Spencer, in his discussion of the respective interests of parents, offspring, and species, and John Fiske, in his theory of the prolongation of infancy, had previously arrived by independent routes at a somewhat similar conclusion.[6] If customs and traditions did not lead parents to care for their offspring until a comparatively advanced age, it does not appear that human infants, as they are born today, could survive; this much both Spencer and Fiske emphasized, although they interpreted the point somewhat differently, each from the other, and both from Wallas.

Wallas' treatment of education is particularly interesting for our present purposes. He points out that, whereas education has been described by numerous modern theorists in terms of "growth" and the like, in so far as it consists of the process whereby the customs of society are acquired by the individual, it is necessarily something which demands effort on the part of the individual student.[7] He criticizes American educational leaders and writers for having failed to see the importance of this point.

> I have before me the 64th Bulletin of the American Federation for Child Study. As regards parents, the Federation state that their object is "to replace Impulse with Purpose." As regards the child, the Federation say, "the child is a developing organism, not a miniature man." It may be that twentieth-century America will realize that, although a child is a "developing organism," he is an organism which cannot attain adult well-being without the acquirement of the socially inherited accumulations of civilization; that this acquirement will not effectively take place without conscious intellectual effort in school and college; and that therefore, it is in the child rather than in the parent that the "replacement of Impulse with Purpose" is most needed.[8]

Dewey's Social Theory of Education. Wallas, then, holds that education must still be defined in the good old Lockian sense, as "a process of learning things," one which requires an effort of the will and which may not be expected

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[6] Spencer, Herbert, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 624 ff. Fiske, John, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 342-44 (London, 1874).
[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 45, 50-51.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

to come as a mere natural growth. In the American literature, at least, the treatment of education as a social process which most strikingly contrasts with that of Wallas in this respect is perhaps that of John Dewey. In one of the first of his contributions to this subject, a volume entitled *Schools of Tomorrow* (1915), he presented a review and interpretation of some experiments in education as "growth" and as a process accomplished in and by "participation" in the normal activities characteristic of the adult world; the child is to learn by doing things as nearly as possible like those which he will have occasion to do in his adult years, by doing them experimentally, and in a normal sort of participation with others in cooperative undertakings, rather than as a puppet minutely directed by a "teacher."

When we turn to Dewey's great educational classic, *Democracy and Education,* which first appeared a year after *Schools of Tomorrow,* and sought to present in more systematic and abstract fashion some of the inferences drawn from the earlier volume of concrete studies, we find, surprisingly, that the author starts from a description of the educational process not strikingly different from that of Wallas.[9] In this book the discussion begins with the drawing of a fundamental distinction between animate and inanimate beings, namely, that the former have the property of renewing their own substance, whereas an inanimate object, though to be sure it offers a certain resistance to any force tending to disrupt it, is none the less subject to all kinds of decay, destruction, and wearing away which are in no way compensated for by any process of growth or metabolism. In the higher species of organisms, however, the continuity of the species is in no way dependent upon the immortality of the individuals, although in a way it is in the lower orders of plants and animals; in the higher orders reproduction is the process whereby the group is kept alive.[10] The birth of new individuals, however, may raise in the mind of the reflective observer a question as to the mechanism by which the typical life-processes of the species are to be

[9] Dewey, John, *Democracy and Education:* An introduction to the philosophy of education (New York, 1916).
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

kept in operation. In all animals except man, the answer is that what we call biological heredity transmits to the successive generations the necessary behavior tendencies and patterns. In man, on the other hand, the patterns of behavior necessary for survival under conditions as we know them today are not biologically inherited; they must be learned; and the array of such activity patterns necessary for survival is so great that the individual cannot learn them for himself by trial and selection, without some guidance.

> The primary ineluctable facts of the birth and death of each one of the constituent members in a social group determine the necessity of education. On the one hand, there is the contrast between the immaturity of the new-born members of the group—its future sole representatives—and the maturity of the adult members who possess the knowledge and customs of the group. On the other, there is the necessity that these immature members be not merely physically preserved in sufficient numbers, but that they be initiated into the interests, purposes, information, skill, and practices of the mature members: otherwise the group will cease its characteristic life.[11]

Transmission, Communication, and Like-mindedness. The life of a human social group, therefore, is preserved and renewed through a process of transmission, which is, in fact, a process of communication. "The communication which insures participation in a common understanding is one which secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions—like ways of responding to expectations and requirements."[12] Dewey here touches on a point which has been to some extent the object of controversy among American sociologists. What men must have in common to form a society, he states, is "like-mindedness, as the sociologists say." Like-mindedness was to be sure the concept emphasized in his earliest writings by Professor F. H. Giddings, of Columbia University; other sociologists, on the other hand, have insisted that men form a society not so much because they are alike as because they are different. This latter view has been set forth with varying degrees of emphasis by Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, and Park and Burgess, who point out that being different and having different rôles in the society, men are interdependent, and thereby

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

come to form a collective unit which must be studied as such. Still it is conceded by all that men must have something in common, some common "definitions of situations" in order to be able to live together and act collectively. Just what it is that they must share is as a matter of fact not relevant to the further course of Dewey's argument in the volume with which we are now concerned.

Communication as a "Creative" Process. Now communication, Dewey's explanation continues, is educative in another sense. The one who communicates something as well as the one to whom it is communicated learns in the process.

> The experience has to be formulated in order to be communicated. To formulate requires getting outside of it, seeing it as another would see it, considering what points of contact it has with the life of another so that it may be got into such form that he can appreciate its meaning. Except in dealing with commonplaces and catch phrases one has to assimilate, imaginatively, something of another's experience in order to tell him intelligently of one's own experience. . . . It may fairly be said, therefore, that any social arrangement that remains vitally social, or vitally shared, is educative to those who participate in it. Only when it becomes cast in a mold and runs in a routine way does it lose its educative power.[13]

The foregoing passage lays down in theoretic form the ground on which Dewey presumably bases his approval of some of the techniques of the so-called "new" or progressive schools; they educate by bringing about participation in constructive social experiences. Perhaps Dewey would meet Wallas' demand for "effort" in the learning process by saying that participation in group enterprises is the best of all ways to induce young people to put forth effort to learn things.

The account continues with a description of the manner in which the growing complexity of civilization has necessitated the development of a special procedure of teaching and a specialized institution, the school, for carrying on the process of education. "Without such formal education," Dewey says, "it is not possible to transmit all the resources and achievements of a complex society." [14] The problem then becomes, for the scientific student, the description and analysis of the function-

[13] *Democracy and Education*, pp. 6-7.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

ing of the school as a social institution. Dewey finds that the school has three functions sufficiently specific as compared with the other activities of life to be noted. First, the school has to break the complex total of civilization into pieces so that the young may assimilate it piecemeal; the school has the function of providing for the child a *simplified* environment. In the second place, the school is expected to eliminate from the environment in which it places the child what we consider to be the undesirable features of the larger environment outside. Thirdly, the school is to bring the child into some sort of balanced relationship with the manifold phases of the larger world by which he will inevitably be affected, to emancipate him from the limitations of the environment into which he may have happened to be born, and to coordinate or integrate for him the divergent influences of the complex social environment in which he will have to live.[15]

Dewey's Theory of Social Aims or Ends. It is worth while to survey not only the existing body of social theory designed to describe and explain education as the process in which group *customs* are transmitted, but also to indicate what has been achieved in the way of a social theory of education as a procedure in which the effort is made to transmit to the young, and encourage in them, *ideals* of a more satisfactory mode of social life. Rightly or wrongly, education is commonly regarded as a means of inculcating or developing ideals in the rising generation, and it is in point for us to inquire whether this actually takes place, and if so, by what mechanism. To this problem, Dewey has made important contributions. The meaning of means and ends in human life, individual and social, is an ever-recurrent theme in his writings, and is illuminatingly discussed in his recent metaphysical treatise, *Experience and Nature*. As we noted in an earlier chapter,[16] Dewey's theory of ends is that they are simply the ends which we have habitually reached in previous activity and experience, presented to consciousness as *desiderata* when habitual activity is in any way interrupted or impeded. The way to form adequate ends, in the sense of ideals, is, then, simply to acquire

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 23-26.
[16] Chapter XII above.

through experiment and observation a knowledge of what results may be expected to follow certain ways of acting. That certain ends and not others are chosen is, from Dewey's point of view, a matter for the physiologist to explain, if anyone can; it is somehow due to the nature of the human organism. This view of the matter is developed, as regards its bearings on education, in *Democracy and Education,* in the chapter on "Aims in Education," part of the summary of which we may quote.

> An aim denotes the result of any natural process brought to consciousness and made a factor in determining present observation and choice of ways of acting. It signifies that activity has become intelligent. Specifically it means foresight of the alternative consequences attendant upon acting in a given situation in different ways, and the use of what is anticipated to direct observation and experiment. A true aim is thus opposed at every point to an aim which is imposed upon a process of action from without.[17]

If education is kept sufficiently free from arbitrary and formal direction, in other words, Dewey believes that the determination of ideals will take care of itself; it is the nature of human beings to form and be guided by visions of better things. This point, however, has, as we shall see, been further and differently developed by other writers.

"Educational Sociology." Dewey's *Democracy and Education* may be regarded as the forerunner of a considerable body of literature which has acquired a special name and has tended to develop into a special discipline, the literature of "educational sociology." So far as is known to the writer, the books which have been written on this subject have almost without exception been elementary textbooks, the general purpose of which seems to be to present to the prospective teacher the sociological concepts and principles which he or she will most need in professional work, together with suggestions concerning the application of sociological insights in teaching and educational administration. W. E. Chancellor, F. R. Clow, W. R. Smith, Ernest Groves, David Snedden, and Alvin S. Good are among those who have prepared such textbooks.

[17] *Democracy and Education,* p. 129.

Among these, Snedden's *Educational Sociology* appears to be possibly the most influential at present. His definition of his field is therefore of interest:

> Educational sociology has as its chief province the scientific determination of educational objectives. It constitutes an *applied* or *linking* science between the fields of sociology (as a pure science) and social economy (as the science of all phases of social well-being) on the one hand, and the practice of education on the other.[18]

He adds in a later paragraph that "Educational sociology must aid in accounting for the large differences among social groups due to heredity, environment, and opportunities," since "from these differences flow differences of educational progress."[19] Snedden does not have much to say which is directly apropos of the point that education may be regarded as the process of transmission of cultural practices and ideas. In a discussion of the objectives of education, however, he makes a distinction between *developmental* objectives—the provision of wholesome conditions for natural growth, physical, intellectual, social, and esthetic—and *projective* objectives, which are "those imposed upon youth against the long years of adult needs." For the conveniences of his own discussion he calls the developmental objectives *beta* objectives, and the projective objectives *alpha* objectives. He continues:

> Beta objectives, ordinarily, seem to admit of very great flexibility of *means*. . . . Alpha objectives, on the other hand, tend toward greater definiteness. Handwriting, the multiplication table, spelling of the most widely used three thousand words, the essential facts of American history or world geography, the essentials of Spanish, trigonometry, or chemistry—all these, as organized for school purposes, perhaps as necessary in adult life, seem to represent areas of training and instruction in which flexibility, freedom to range and browse, and a wide variety of options are not at all practicable.[20]

There appears to be no little agreement between this statement of the matter and Graham Wallas' discussion of the necessity for effort in education, summarized above.

The study of "educational sociology" is at present in so early

[18] Snedden, David, *Educational Sociology* (New York, 1922), p. 33.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 34.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 327-29.

a stage of development that it is difficult for one not actively participating in the movement to discern just what it is to be, or what its problems are. It is noteworthy that the movement has reached the point of having a specialized journal, the *Journal of Educational Sociology,* edited by the faculty of sociology in New York University. A special section on educational sociology has also been organized within the American Sociological Society.

The Transmission of Culture. As was intimated at the beginning of this chapter, the general process of cultural transmission has been on the whole an object of more interest to anthropologists than to those who have called themselves sociologists. Sociologists, and the American writers notably, have by no means failed to pay attention to "culture" as a topic of sociological interest, but they have paid more attention to culture as a factor in social control and personality than to the mechanism whereby it is preserved and transmitted, if one makes exception of Ross' redactions of Tarde's writings on "imitation." There has been among American sociologists, however, considerable interest in "cultural evolution"; that is, taking the perpetuation of culture for granted, they have inquired into the processes by which it is changed in its content. The first, and in some respects the most systematic American treatise devoted to this subject was A. G. Keller's *Societal Evolution* (first edition 1915), mentioned in an earlier chapter. In this book the author has made a systematic attempt to apply the Darwinian concepts of "natural selection," "heredity," "variation," "transmission" (heredity), and "adaptation" in the description and explanation of social changes. He acknowledges his indebtedness to Kidd, Bagehot, and other predecessors, but speaks rather slightingly of their contributions, more so, in the judgment of the writer, than is justified by the contrast between their accomplishments and Keller's own discussion.

One of the most emphasized points made by Keller is his distinction between "automatic" and "rational" selection as processes determinative of the course of cultural change.[21] The term "Utopia" with which we shall be concerned below,

[21] *Op. cit.* (1920), Chaps. III, IV, and V.

he uses only once, and that in an incidental, depreciatory reference. There is in one passage in this book an intelligent discussion of "idealization," but the author has a poor opinion of the effectiveness of the process as he sees it.[22] He places his faith in the rational selection of means and ends, strictly so called, for any effective improvement in human conditions.[23] "It is only the shallow and half-educated who do not hesitate to evolve 'programs' when it comes to the more derived and less knowable and verifiable societal processes." Rational selection, he thinks, can take place most readily among the "mores of self-maintenance," that is, economic customs and institutions, and technical productive devices, and these are determinative of the other mores. "Thus scientific selection, applied at the point where it can be applied most readily—where its results are most easily verifiable—is bound to become indirectly effective, in a sure and natural manner, at points less secure." [24] There is in this a noticeable resemblance to Dewey's account of the development of ends through experience with means in the course of human activity.

Professors F. Stuart Chapin and W. F. Ogburn have also written books on social evolution in which, naturally, attention is paid to the processes of cultural change.[25] As was mentioned in a previous chapter, the latter has defined, in the "cultural lag," a concept which seems to have caught the fancy of contemporary sociologists to no small extent. More recently Professor Charles A. Ellwood has published a volume called *Cultural Evolution,* in which, however, the principal endeavor is to indicate the direction in which social change has proceeded and will proceed, as regards various outstanding phases of culture, agriculture, war, clothing, housing, the family, law and government, and so forth.[26] In his discussion of "The Development of Education and Science," Ellwood has given a definition of "the cultural process" which it is of interest to

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 110.
[23] See however *ibid.,* p. 96 ff., but also pp. 137-39.
[24] *Ibid.,* pp. 161-62.
[25] Chapin, F. Stuart, *Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution* (1920); Ogburn, William F., *Social Change* (New York, 1922).
[26] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1927); see Table of Contents.

place in exhibition for comparison with other material reviewed in the foregoing pages:

> From the beginning all culture has depended for its continuity upon the education of the young. The cultural process is essentially an educative process. The making of the simplest physical tool has usually necessitated the learning of the process of making from some other individual. The whole of culture has, therefore, been preserved from time immemorial by a process of education. . . . When we study the educative process, therefore, we are studying the heart of the cultural process.[27]

Professor R. E. Park has proposed the term "historical process" for use in a sense quite identical with cultural process as here defined. Park uses the term "cultural process" in a different sense, namely, to refer to the process in which culture is made and changed.[28]

Culture Traits and Cultural Ideals. In the preceding pages we have repeatedly come upon the thought that education, as ordinarily conceived nowadays, is concerned not only with the transmission of culture and with the fostering of a healthy growth of the individual in mind and body, but also with the inculcation of ideals as a method of group-conscious direction of cultural change. The definition of ideals is in one sense not the subject of scientific procedure; it is a problem for philosophers, and for everyone in so far as each must in the last analysis decide problems of ethics for himself. It is possible, however, to take a sociological point of view toward the process in which group values are in fact formed and changed, and group ideals arrived at and perpetuated. Cooley once coined the phrase, "valuation as a social process."[29] He used the insight which the phrase expresses mainly as a point of departure for the discussion of some of the more general meanings and aspects of pecuniary valuation; it might with equal validity be used to show the relation of ideals and their development to other aspects of social life. There exists in fact a certain amount of literature, most of it not the work of pro-

[27] Ellwood, *Cultural Evolution*, p. 237.

[28] "Sociology and the Social Sciences," reprinted as Chapter I in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 51-52.

[29] Cooley, Charles H., *Social Process* (New York, 1918), Chap. XXV and following.

fessorial sociologists, in which this very topic has been treated with a measure of success.

Bouglé's "Evolution of Values." One very suggestive volume to be considered in this connection is the work translated as *The Evolution of Values,* which was written by C. Bouglé who now holds the chair in the Sorbonne formerly occupied by Durkheim, and who is recognized as one of the apostles of the Durkheim tradition in sociology. In this book the author is at some pains to set forth, in his earlier chapters, a line of reasoning essentially like that of Dewey, Wallas, and others; namely, that social life as we know it is dependent upon communication and the transmission to successive generations of a social heritage of language, customs, and ideas. He sets himself as his central task, however, the analysis of the mechanism by which social "values" are created and transmitted, and of the relation of values to other aspects of social life and organization. As one might expect, he finds in Durkheim's treatment of primitive religion and his concept of "collective representations" the clue to an interpretation of social ideals and social values in general. There was implicit in Durkheim's account of the religious dance and rituals of savage societies the theory that out of such forms of collective behavior there are generated common visions or images of beings or forces felt to be beyond and above the human members of the group, with reference to which, therefore. the behavior of the group is oriented.

> When a common life is organized, the new forces which are liberated are forces of a spiritual nature which overflow from the individual souls. . . . The "category of the ideal," as Renan calls it, begins to function. People learn to respect certain things or beings in common. And these common respects are so many steps which aid the ascent of the individual: by means of them he raises himself from animality to humanity.
>
> It should be noted that without these rallying-points—these stars—society, the synthesis of consciousness, would lack an ordering principle. The science of superior values, exacting universal reverence, is a condition of its very life.[30]

The values or ideals of a society, in other words, are essential to its organization and action. It is, in fact, by means of

[30] *The Evolution of Values,* pp. 34-35.

common symbols, "collective representations," as Durkheim called them, that human beings are enabled to act collectively. Without some common focus of attention, other writers have pointed out, there may indeed take place a species of collective action based on inherited, "instinctive" behavior tendencies of the individuals in the group, as in the ant hill, but scarcely any collective behavior which we would recognize as characteristically human. It will be noted that this line of thought has much in common with Sorel's treatment of the social function of myth, noted in an earlier chapter.

Bouglé takes pains to point out that the ideas of the purpose or function of some feature of social organization which men give as explanations are not necessarily, probably not as a rule, the *correct* explanations of those forms of social behavior, in the sense of being true historical accounts or psychological descriptions of the process by which they have come into being. These ideas about social customs and institutions are, as other modern writers have also shown, "rationalizations"; they are the attempts men have made to justify to themselves and to others practices which they do not in fact clearly and objectively understand, but which they feel some need of preserving. This critique of current popular explanations of social institutions, on the other hand, does not mean that the ideas themselves are of no importance.

> Epiphenomenalism too readily forgets that to treat a fact as appearance is by no means to prove it non-existent or inefficacious. Call them appearances if you like. Nevertheless the reasons mankind gives as justifications for its conduct are not themselves without reasons. They constitute, certainly, very useful appearances. As such, they have a rôle to play, functions to fulfill, and among these latter, perhaps, precisely social functions. This is what sociology could not fail to perceive through its own progress, when, limiting the materialistic tendency, it accorded a larger and larger place to the study of collective representations.[31]

A logical corollary to this is the point made by the author at a later stage in his discussion, namely, that a given social institution may be supported by various individuals and groups for different reasons, and even by the same persons for differ-

[31] *The Evolution of Values*, pp. 74-75.

ent reasons. "The various reasons for maintaining an institution which we see arising one after another, are far from inevitably expelling one another." The felt need for joint action, he thinks, tends to produce a convergence of personal and group ideas.[32] This principle is of importance and of utility in the explanation of concrete cases of political action. It is notorious that men enter into common political enterprises for quite various and even contradictory reasons.

Ideals as Romance or Fiction. For students of the theory and practice of education, most of the American writers in the field being inspired no doubt, directly or indirectly, by John Dewey, the problem of social ideals is treated, as we have seen, in terms of the impact of the natural energy and constructive force of human nature upon the material provided by the physical and cultural environments. From this point of view, ideals or aims are formed by a sort of projection in imagination of previously existing behavior tendencies—activities which have been in progress—when such tendencies or activities are in any way impeded or balked of direct continuance and realization. It has been the general theory of Dewey and other modernist writers on the subject that the rising generation would produce ends for itself readily enough provided the educational process were not too completely subjected to preestablished authority and routine. Certain contributions to a fundamental and illuminating theory of group self-direction have also been made by at least two other kinds of specialists. Students of "literature" in the polite sense of the term have contributed something to our knowledge of the subject by their discussions of the significance of the romantic type of literature. James Branch Cabell's *Beyond Life* and Floyd Dell's discussion of the fairy tale as a type of literature[33] are worth the attention of any student of general social science. Briefly, the theory set forth in the latter paper is that the function of the fairy tale, and likewise of the novel, is to provide an "emotional interpretation of the world." Cabell's treatment is of somewhat similar tenor. Similar, but more formal, is

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[33] Dell, Floyd, "The Difference Between Life and Fiction," in *The Novel of Tomorrow*, by Twelve American Novelists.

Vaihinger's presentation of the theory of "fictions" in his *Philosophy of "As If."* The underlying argument of all such discussions runs somewhat as follows: In order to solve the problems which his experience presents to him without undue conflict or failure, man has to introduce some sort of *meaning* into the world of his experience as a whole. Instinct and habit provide him with ways of reacting in particular, specialized, and familiar situations, but the sensitiveness and the great mobility of the human organism tends, frequently, to place the individual (or the group) in contact with environmental situations so diverse or so novel as to evoke contradictory tendencies to action. There appear to be several ways in which mind and body deal with such a dilemma; one way is through the formation in imagination from the material provided by memory, of some more or less unified pattern or *"gestalt"* into which the various heterogeneous elements of the problem situation are fitted as parts of one whole. Such an imaginatively constructed pattern is in a sense a figment, a fiction; it corresponds to nothing which can be directly predicated of the physical world, but it is valid when and in so far as it serves to direct some consistent and satisfactory line of action. Most readily asserted of the individual, this line of reasoning is with no great difficulty applied to collective behavior, with the added result that, as Durkheim, Bouglé, and others have shown us, the fiction which is a "collective representation" serves also to unify and focus the divergent action tendencies which exist in the group due to its character as a unit made up of several or many individuals.

The Utopia as a Social Ideal. Still another, somewhat distinctive approach to the study of the rôle of ideals in social behavior has been made by students of political theory. It is as a special form of political thought that utopian writings have conventionally been classified; and students of the range and development of political thought have accordingly felt it necessary to pay some attention to the classical examples of utopian writing. More recently, at least two writers have devoted special volumes to the review of utopian literature. J. O. Hertzler, in his *History of Utopian Thought,* has brought together in scholarly fashion the substance of a considerable

number of the utopias of the past twenty-five centuries. Much more interesting for our present purposes, however, is the general interpretation of utopian thought with which Lewis Mumford has introduced his *Story of Utopias.*[34] In this discussion, the author starts from the proposition that utopia is not simply, as it is commonly regarded, a name for the unreal and the impossible; utopia is also (a) a means whereby we make the world tolerable to us, and (2) a pattern by which we guide ourselves in our efforts to make the world over to meet our wishes. "The more that men react upon their environment and make it over after a human pattern, the more continuously do they live in utopia; but when there is a breach between the world of affairs and the overworld of utopia, we become conscious of the part that the will-to-utopia has played in our lives, and we see our utopia as a separate reality." [35]

According to Mumford's further discussion, the utopia is a special illustration of the relation between thought and action which Walter Lippmann has described in terms of "the world outside and the pictures in our heads." Man lives, as Mumford puts it, in two worlds, the world within and the world without. The inner world, or world of ideas, he proposes to call the *idolum.*

> This world of ideas serves many purposes. Two of them bear heavily upon our investigation of utopia. On one hand the pseudo-environment of idolum is a substitute for the external world; it is a sort of refuge to which we flee when our contacts with "hard facts" become too complicated to carry through or too rough to face. On the other hand, it is by means of the idolum that the facts of the everyday world are brought together and assorted and sifted, and a new sort of reality is projected back again upon the external world. One of these functions is escape or compensation; it seeks an immediate release from the difficulties or frustrations of our lot. The other attempts to provide a condition for our release in the future. The utopias that correspond to these two functions I shall call the utopias of escape and the utopias of reconstruction.[36]

Thus Mumford treats the utopia, in effect, as a special case of the general class of group ideals or "representations" with

[34] London and New York, 1923. Citations below refer to London edition.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 11.
[36] *Ibid.,* pp. 13-14.

which a number of other social scientists have dealt, ideals seen as means of group integration and collective action. There is in the foregoing passage, also, the suggestion that the dream of a better world may have the character of what modern psychiatrists call a "flight from reality," a refuge from the baffle ments and disappointments of ordinary experience. It is in the utopia of reconstruction that Mumford is more particularly interested.

> The utopia of reconstruction is what its name implies; a vision of a reconstructed environment which is better adapted to the aims and nature of the human beings who dwell within it than the actual one. . . . By a reconstructed environment I do not mean merely a physical thing. I mean, in addition, a new set of habits, a fresh scale of values, a different net of relationships and institutions, and possibly—for almost all utopias emphasize the factor of breeding—an alteration of the physical and mental characteristics of the people chosen, through education, biological selection, and so forth. The reconstructed environment which all the genuine utopians seek to contrive is a reconstruction of both the physical world and the idolum.[37]

Of these two phases of the task of social reconstruction, he continues, the reconstruction of the mental world has so far been the least successful, with the result that the world of ideas has become less and less adjusted to the changing physical world. In this connection he thinks it important to note that, except by the utopian writers, these two have been regarded as separate tasks: the reconstruction of the physical environment is for practical men to accomplish; while the reconstruction of human nature and values is somewhat contemptuously relegated to the "idealist." "The first was something whose aims could be realized in the Here and Now; the other was postponed to the sweet bye-and-bye." [38] The well-known classical utopias have, however, been limited by the fact that they were usually not based on a sufficient study of the real environment.[39] Mumford accordingly devotes several chapters in the closing part of his book to a survey of various conceptions of "Eutopia," as he calls it, that is, of the present social situation as imaginatively reconstructed or idealized by

[37] *The Story of Utopias*, p. 21.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 267.

special classes and groups in the population. The trouble with most of these ideals is, in his opinion, that they are "partisan"; they represent the interests and desires of limited elements within the society. In this concluding section of his discussion there occurs a complimentary reference to the work of the Outlook Tower group of British sociologists, headed by Patrick Geddes and Victor Branford. The contribution of these writers to the general stream of social thought is in fact a peculiar and interesting one.

The Social Theory of Geddes and Branford. Patrick Geddes, by training a biologist, and author of distinguished works in that field, became interested in social science through participation in certain city-planning enterprises. The result was that he adopted some of LePlay's sociological concepts and methods, and developed from them a scheme for what he calls "regional surveys." The regional survey as projected by Geddes and his associates is a plan for grounding social reconstruction upon comprehensive studies of the existing facts about natural areas or regions—facts of a geographic, economic, and cultural order. The leaders of the movement also point with approval to the Garden City movement and other comprehensive town and city-planning projects. A noteworthy feature of the published writings of Geddes and Branford is their use of a utopian method for indicating the nature and scope of the reforms which they are seeking to promote, and for the outlining of the range of facts which they believe that a regional survey should gather. It should also be emphasized in passing that their writings make constant use of the formula "Place—Work—Folk," which was adapted from LePlay's "Place, Work, Family." [40]

The mention of still another feature of the sociological theory of Geddes and Branford may serve us as a transition to the concluding topic to be dealt with in the present chapter, namely, the relation of art to culture and to social control. These writers have made much of the idea that the art of a

[40] See for instance *The Coming Polity*, by Patrick Geddes and Victor Branford (London, 1919). *Cities in Evolution* (London, 1914) is another of Geddes' important contributions to the literature of the movement. A representative volume by Victor Branford is *Interpretations and Forecasts* (London, 1914).

folk should be the representation and the guiding inspiration of other features of the common life. It would require little forcing of the argument of Durkheim concerning the relation of symbols, or "collective representations," to group behavior, to derive from it a social theory of art. Art would then be the generic term for the techniques by which effective and appealing symbols of group values are created. There is in fact something of this reasoning behind Geddes and Branford's treatment of art forms in relation to other phases of the life of a society. Architecture, literature, ritual, and the drama are for them, in part at least, means whereby a group achieves unity and self-control.

Ellis' Theory of Art. Havelock Ellis, in an interesting volume called *The Dance of Life,* first published in 1923, has set forth a somewhat different interpretation of the relation of art to social life. Ellis emphasizes the thought that art is a direct and intuitive form of activity, a matter of work or action, and not, primarily, of contemplation; or, rather, it is a form of activity in which action and contemplation are intimately united. The artist, according to this view, evolves an ideal as he works, but the ideal is bound up in an organic unity with the activity from which it emerges. Ellis' vision of social progress is expressed in terms of the relationship between art and other forms of social life, and this relationship should be, in his conception, virtually one of identity. Religion, literature, and morals, should all be arts. When religion was penetrated by reason, something was gained, namely, the unification or integration of morality; but something was also lost, among other things a "vital illusion" of the immediate presence of super-human forces in the world of everyday experience and activity.[41] Ellis mentions with approval, however, the work of a French philosopher, Jules Gaultier, in which there is developed a doctrine similar to that of Mumford; and he refers also with approval to the "as if" philosophy of Hans Vaihinger.[42]

Vogt's Theory of Art and Religion. A somewhat similar theory is developed, and perhaps more systematically presented, in Von Ogden Vogt's *Art and Religion.*[43] The osten-

[41] *Op. cit.* (Boston and New York, 1925), pp. 256-57.
[42] *Ibid.,* pp. 335-36.
[43] New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.

sible point of departure for Vogt's discussion is the proposition that the need or craving for beauty is fundamental in human nature, or, in other words, that art is to be regarded as a fundamental form of human activity. Worship he regards as the fundamental or all-inclusive art.

> The art of worship is the all-comprehending art. No other art can satisfy the demand of human nature for an all-inclusive experience. Nor can the conditions favorable to that experience be ever freshly reproduced without the aid of all the arts.[44]

These propositions are supported by the author through the definition of the arts as "the description of the world as an age or a people apprehends it." An age or a people lacking in arts expressing a unity of thought or feeling, he holds, is nondescript.[45]

Vogt denies the view, which he says is commonly held, that men differ widely from one another in their need for artistry in connection with the religious aspect of their lives. With the acquisition of education, to be sure, there is a tendency to draw away from strong emotional expression of any sort, and to demand the mental type of satisfactions. Yet with still more cultural development they begin to seek lost feeling in the arts.[46] As a matter of fact, he intimates, it is easier to draw men together in common religious worship, if that worship be developed with the aid of the various special arts so as to provide a satisfying emotional experience for wise and simple alike, than it is to achieve theological or intellectual unity of faith. It is to the *art* of worship, accordingly, that those who desire to promote religious unity should have recourse.[47] Following up this line of thought, Vogt has written a most stimulating chapter entitled "A Brief for the Cultus," in which he defines "Cultus" as the system of religious acts and exercises which is maintained by any religion, and argues in favor of a renewed attention to this side of religion, especially on the part of the modern Protestant churches. This

[44] *Op cit.*, p. 4.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 9; see also pp. 11-12.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

chapter is in fact a significant addition to the literature of social theory, although not written primarily as such.[48]

The study of the processes in which culture is transmitted and changed—such is the conclusion which tends to emerge from the foregoing survey—reveals to us the gradual evolution of an aspect of social control from a stage in which it is essentially an unintended result of natural forces, albeit psychological forces, to a stage in which social groups, or societies, become more and more self-conscious and seek to control their members in the interests of some conception of the common welfare. A principal factor in this evolution is the process which Durkheim has described as "collective representation," which has as its most impressive products those comprehensive visions of the future and its possibilities, in the light of which it may be possible to regulate and orient the whole of social activity.

[48] *Art and Religion,* Chap. XII.

CHAPTER XXI

CULTURE AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The Place of Culture in General Social Theory. If it be conceived as the task of social theory, or general sociology, to describe, classify, and explain the various types of behavior exhibited by human beings living under normal conditions, that is, social conditions, then an application of the general method of all natural science would apparently call for the analysis of the phenomena to be explained into the elements or units which interact to produce those phenomena, and certain more or less universal forms or processes of phenomena, and certain more or less universal forms or processes or mechanisms of interaction taking place among the units or elements.[1] More or less sophisticated attempts to develop such an analysis of social phenomena have resulted in the formation of certain theories of personality and individuality, and of tentative classifications of human instincts, desires, wishes, attitudes, and other tendencies to action, which we have reviewed in the preceding chapters. There have also been developed certain theories concerning the fundamental mechanisms or processes of social interaction, with which we shall be further concerned in later chapters. The study of human social behavior in the concrete, however, has led also to the emphasis of a third sort of factors, *cultural* factors, or in other words those forms of behavior which are apparently not innate, but are matters of custom in the group, of habit in the individual. The study of culture lends support to the inclusion in the body of general social theory of a fourth sort of factors, to the inclusion of which, indeed, social theorists were already predisposed on intuitive grounds, the groups in which human beings live and move; for culture appears to be primarily a function of the

[1] See Gumplowicz, Ludwig, *Der Rassenkampf* (Innsbruck, 1883), pp. 158-61; translated and adapted in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), pp. 346-48.

group, rather than of the individual, and furthermore the group, when examined from certain points of view, seems to have an existence which is relatively independent of that of the members. The task of the social theorist thus lends itself to subdivision and arrangement under several main headings, among them (1) the study of the factors conditioning social phenomena,—factors of geography, race, and the like; (2) the study of the original or fundamental behavior tendencies of human beings; (3) the study of individuality and personality; (4) the study of habit and custom as factors in human social behavior; (5) the study of groups as such, that is, of collective behavior—its genesis, forms, and functioning; and (6) the study of social process or social processes. Manifestly other headings may be added or different ones may be substituted, in conformity to the immediate purposes of the discussion in hand.

The Relation of Culture to Social Organization. In any case, however, a general survey of the development and literature of social theory, such as is undertaken in this volume, ought to have a place for the work which has been done, and the insights which have been gained, relative to the relation between the content of a group's culture and the form, pattern, or structure of its organization. Certain writers on cultural anthropology have been disposed to treat social organization as a sub-topic under the general head of culture; that is, they seem to regard social structure as one only of the many manifestations of culture. Some other writers have apparently regarded culture as something which is determined largely by the organization of structure of the society. In the attempts at resolution of this potential controversy, and in the course of other studies, there has been published a considerable body of significant literature dealing with the relation of culture to social organization.

As a result, primarily, of the studies and speculations of the students of cultural anthropology, several theses regarding the relation of culture to social organization have been developed. In the first place, it is pointed out that culture itself has a structure. The simple traits or customs into which culture may, ultimately, be analyzed, bear certain determined relation-

ships to one another; they are combined in "culture complexes," and the complexes in turn are said to form "patterns." Certain features of a given culture so dominate and give form and color to other features that it is possible to speak of *types* of culture. In the second place, the interrelationships of the members of a given society, their subordinations and reciprocal responsibilities and the like, and their special functions in the economy of the group, are in considerable part determined by the time-honored customs or mores which make up the culture of the group. In the third place, anthropologists have become much interested, in the past two decades, in the geographic aspects of the distribution of culture traits and culture complexes. The conclusions which they have reached up to now seem to be of significance primarily as regards the viewpoint and methods of ethnological investigation—*i.e.*, the collection of ethnological data. It appears likely, however, that the student of general social theory may ultimately be able to derive from this knowledge of the spatial distribution of culture, insights concerning the reciprocal relations of culture and social organization.

Wissler's Treatment of Cultural Pattern. Dr. Clark Wissler has expressed, perhaps more clearly and systematically than anyone else, the anthropological conception of the organization or form *of* culture, as distinguished from social organization determined *by* culture. What he has found to say on this subject reflects in part, of course, the influence of numerous earlier writers. Walter Bagehot, H. S. Maine, Benjamin Kidd, and E. B. Tylor were among the pioneers in the formulation of a general theory of culture, in which is implicit the idea that culture displays definite forms. Bagehot's concept of the "cake of custom," mentioned in an earlier chapter,[2] might very well be named as the starting-point of present theories of cultural pattern. Wissler's immediate point of departure, however, is the explanation of several concepts which have been developed by cultural anthropologists to guide their field studies. It is in this connection, first of all, that the concept of the *culture trait* has been formed. This term is used simply to refer to the smallest units of culture or custom

[2] Chapter XIX above.

which the field worker finds it necessary to take into account. "Thus, the fire-making implement, accompanied by field notes, becomes the objective record of a unit of observation." [3] Those who are acquainted with the literature of culture anthropology will not need to be told that writers in this field are much given to the use of material objects or artifacts—implements and ornaments—as the symbols and objective manifestations of cultural facts, although they always assert that it is the *custom* of making and using the implement or of making and wearing the ornament which is the essential object of their study. In general they have no hesitancy in naming a custom, *i.e.*, a describable type of behavior, as a culture trait.

The culture traits found to exist among a certain people may, as Wissler further points out, be regarded as so many independent facts, to be collected as if in a basket, without reference to their correlations. Such has in fact been the practice, to no small degree, of those anthropological field workers who until recently busied themselves collecting artifacts and skeletal remains for museums and private persons. It has been discovered, however, that traits are as a rule joined to each other in larger systems which are now called *culture complexes*. Thus in the culture of the Ojibway Indians a whole system of practices are found to be connected with one another and with the use of wild rice as an article of food. The "wild rice complex" includes not only practices and implements used in collecting, preparing, and storing the wild rice, but also "property rights, labor obligations, etiquette, methods of keeping time, and a number of religious observances, prohibition and taboos." "It is thus plain," Wissler continues, "that if we arrive at an adequate notion of the wild rice trait, we must see it as a complex of many processes, all of which bear a functional relation to the end to be achieved." [4]

When the culture complexes have been traced, the field worker has a basis for comparing the culture found to exist in different areas. The situation which is usually found, among the American Indians at any rate, is that a number of those politico-social groups called tribes have for the most part

[3] Wissler, Clark, *Man and Culture* (New York, 1923), p. 50.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

the same culture complexes, any one differing from the others, perhaps, as regards one or two complexes and as regards some of the traits included within the complexes which they have in common. It is thus possible to describe a *culture type* found over a relatively wide area. "By type of culture we mean a norm, or standard form, of tribal culture readily distinguishable from others." [5] On the ground plan here outlined, American anthropologists have developed methods of studying and interpreting cultural facts in several directions. In the concept of culture type we have the point of departure for the study of culture areas and centers, which we may postpone to a later paragraph. Wissler also uses the concepts of culture trait, culture complex, and culture type, together with ethnological data described with the aid of these concepts, as a basis for his theory of "universal cultural pattern," which has been the object of considerable interest and controversy among the specialists in this field of study.

What Wissler points out here is that, although tribal cultures fall into a few classes or types, a certain similarity holds throughout. All tribal cultures, he thinks, conform to a common plan or pattern:

> Students of culture find that the same general outline will fit all of them; thus we say that the facts of culture may be comprehended under nine heads . . . viz., Speech, Material Traits, Art, Mythology, Religion, Social Systems, Property, Government, and War. This outline can be greatly elaborated if the reader gives his imagination full play. It is, however, full enough for our purposes.[6]

As we shall have occasion to note later, this notion of a universal culture pattern has been criticized on the ground that it is not the universal features, but the differences in culture patterns that are important. What is of interest to the student of general sociology, however, is the semblance of logical relationship between this conception of a universal cultural pattern which has been developed by Wissler, and the theory which in various forms has been so persistent and widespread among sociologists and social psychologists, that all men have certain fundamental motives, desires, or behavior tendencies in com-

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 73-75.

mon—tendencies which are presumably inborn traits of the human species. All such theories are to be sure open to attack on the ground that they have been imposed upon the facts by the student, rather than discovered in the data.

The generalization that cultural traits are arranged in "patterns" really contains, implicitly, the other principle that the possession of a common culture is a circumstance which has a determining influence upon the relationships to one another of the members of a group. Furthermore, the idea of cultural pattern seems to contain within itself the implication that the relationships existing among the members of the group are more or less orderly, being regulated by the customs which they follow. So much of a theory of the relation of culture to social organization is too obvious to need elaboration, and has been commonly taken for granted, both in the literature of cultural anthropology and in sociological writings. Certain problems arise, however, when the attempt is made to describe in greater detail the nature of this relationship.

Rivers' Treatment of Culture and Social Organization. The late Professor W. H. R. Rivers seems to have been one of the first to express very definitely the idea that "social organization," or "the framework of society," is simply one of a number of aspects of social behavior affected by the general body of customs called the culture of a group. We have already noted Wissler's inclusion of "Social Systems" and "Government" as particular parts of the universal culture pattern; and in fact the designation of social relations as one of the topics to be investigated by the field student of culture is a characteristic feature of anthropological method. Rivers elaborated this point in its more general implications in a paper written some years ago, in which he discussed the problem of cultural analysis, *i.e.*, in particular, the problem of distinguishing, among the various elements of any culture, those which may be transmitted and acquired by mere contact of peoples, and those which are only acquired by actual blending of two or more once distinct groups. In the course of this discussion, he developed the thesis that, "The social structure, the framework of society, is still more fundamentally important and still less easily changed except as the result of the intimate blending

of peoples, and for that reason furnishes by far the firmest foundation on which to base the process of analysis of culture." [7] It is not easy to make out from this paper, however, just what Rivers meant by "the framework of society," and the paper has been criticized unfavorably on this account. He later worked out an extended discussion of "Social Organization" which was published with some amplification after his death by his pupil, W. J. Perry.[8] In the earlier paper referred to, Rivers apparently meant by "social structure" primarily the system of reckoning kinship which is so prominent a feature of the culture of many savage peoples. In the later volume, on the other hand, the term "social organization" is explicitly defined and used in a very broad sense, being taken to refer not only to the relations of individuals within the group, but also to the relationships of different groups with one another. Relationships of individuals, furthermore, are taken in this treatise to include political, religious, educational, and other aspects of the common life, as well as the ties of kinship.[9] In this late volume the author still maintains, by implication if not expressly, the view that social organization is a manifestation of culture, the culture being, on the whole, taken for granted. He has very little to say, so far as this particular treatise is concerned, as to the possibility of regarding the culture as the means whereby the group is adapted to its geographic and social environment. Rivers was in fact a pioneer among those who sought to explain culture facts mainly in terms of "diffusion"; and it is perhaps not grossly unfair to the representatives of this school to say that they have evaded for the most part all other questions about particular cultural facts save only those concerning diffusion.

Culture a Derivative of Social Organization. One might place in contrast with this tendency on the part of Rivers and other anthropologists to derive social organization from culture with no reference to any causal influences which may run

[7] Rivers, W. H. R., "The Ethnological Analysis of Culture," *Nature*, Vol. LXXXVII (1911), pp. 358-60; quoted in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 746-50.

[8] Rivers, W. H. R., *Social Organization*, edited by W. J. Perry, with a Preface by G. Elliott Smith, New York and London, 1924.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-9, *passim;* see also Table of Contents.

in the other direction, the position taken by Gilbert Murray and other students of early religions, to the effect that the religious phase of a tribal culture, at any rate, tends to reflect the social organization, which in turn they are disposed to account for, in part, in terms of the succession of wars, conquests, and annexations.[10] One must give Wissler credit, however, for having recognized the dangers of the extreme position taken by Rivers. Elsewhere in the volume previously referred to he points out that sociologists concern themselves primarily with what he has treated as "a mere socio-complex in culture," and imputes to the sociologists the assumption that all else is subordinate to this one phase of culture. This position, he concludes, is wrong only when it is taken to imply that the social pattern is the whole of culture, and even then there is something to be said for the view.[11] It is probably a safe statement, however, that very few contemporary sociologists would contend that social pattern constitutes the whole of culture, or even, to quote Wissler more accurately, that this complex-pattern forms the pattern for the whole of culture.

The "Culture Group" a Social Unit. A third major phase of the problem of the relation of culture to social organization may be briefly indicated by suggesting as an hypothesis that all those who have a common culture, or, in the language of Wissler, all those who have a type of culture, are likely to form for some purposes a group, or a society, that is, a real functioning social unit. The anthropologists' contribution to this phase of the problem has been made in part, as we shall see, through their studies of the geographical distribution of culture traits and culture complexes. The anthropologists have also interested themselves, however, in the relation between the concepts "race" and "nationality," a field of social research some aspects of which were reviewed in an earlier chapter of the present volume. Wissler is one of those who have pointed out that the term "race," as used in popular discussion and in the daily papers, is likely to have reference to a group of persons having like customs, speech, and dress, rather than to a

[10] Murray, Gilbert, *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1925), Chap. II, *passim.* See also Wallis, Louis, *Sociological Study of the Bible, passim.*

[11] Wissler, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.

group of persons distinguishable from others by their inborn traits.[12] Anthropological research seems to show that in savage society the various tribes having a single type of culture do not as a rule function in any significant respect as a single group in relation to other groups having a different type of culture. Among civilized peoples, however, the possession of important cultural traits in common has frequently been the basis of a measure of group consciousness. The proposition may be illustrated by the merest reference to the significance of the term "Christendom" throughout the medieval period of the history of the western world, and even in modern times. The persistence of a "sentiment of nationality" among the Poles, the Czechs, and other "racial minorities" in modern Europe likewise illustrates the point.

Social Morphology. The geographic approach to the study of culture, which will next command our attention, has evoked an interesting reaction on the part of one group of European sociologists, namely, the disciples of Emile Durkheim, who have developed the concept of "social morphology" as a proposed substitute, apparently, for the conceptions advanced by the anthropo-geographers. No British or American writer seems to have been confident that he has understood exactly what these writers have meant by social morphology. The term would apparently be clear enough from its use in certain passages in the works of Durkheim, Mauss, and Beuchat, were it not for the contrast which they seem to wish to draw between social morphology and anthropo-geography, to the discredit of the latter specialty. In some passages in their writings, the authors mentioned seem to attach to the term its apparent meaning, namely, the study of social structure, as distinguished from the study of social process and collective behavior. Elsewhere, however, they have defined social morphology as the study of the material foundation of societies.

> It is known that we designate by this word (*morphologie sociale*) the science which studies, not only in order to describe it, but also to explain it, the material substratum of societies—that is, the form which they take in establishing themselves upon the earth (*le sol*)

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 336-40.

the volume and the density of their population, the manner in which it is distributed, as well as the sum of those things which afford a basis for the collective life.[13]

Febvre's Critique of "Social Morphology." This conception of "social morphology" developed by the Durkheim group has been rather severely criticized by Professor Lucien Febvre, author of a work entitled (in English translation) *A Geographic Introduction to History,* in which he quotes the passage we have just considered. Febvre is an exponent of a modified version of the anthropogeography of Ratzel and others, and he interprets the conception of social morphology held by Mauss and Beuchat as an attack upon Ratzel's work, but one which, he thinks, is without foundation.[14] Referring to the passage quoted, he characterizes it as a rebirth of anthropogeography, under a different name, from the ashes to which Mauss and Beuchat conceive that they have reduced it. It seems, however, that in this ironical comment he has overlooked the fundamental implication of the words which he quotes. Mauss and Beuchat propose to describe and explain "the form which societies take in space," that is, to use the facts of geographical distribution and arrangement as an index and guide to the study of the subtler forms of social organization. It is of interest that Jean Brunhes, the contemporary French teacher of human geography, refers to Febvre's book as one which was already out of date when it appeared, since it attacks a conception which is no longer held by any geographer.[15]

As we have noted in a previous chapter, Ratzel himself, who may perhaps be named as the founder of the modern science of anthropogeography or human geography, defined certain concepts and indicated points of view from which the study

[13] Mauss, Marcel and Beuchat, H., "Essai sur les variations saisonièr des sociétés eskimos: etude de morphologie sociale," *L'Année Sociologique,* 1904-05, p. 39. Quoted by Lucien Febvre in *La Terre et l'Evolution Humaine* (Paris, 1922), p. 41. The latter volume has been translated as *A Geographical Introduction to History,* published in the History of Civilization series. References here are to the French edition.

[14] *Op. cit., loc. cit.;* see also *op. cit.,* p. 29.

[15] Brunhes, Jean, "Human Geography" (Chap. II in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* New York, 1925. Edited by Harry Elmer Barnes), p. 71.

of geographic data might serve as an approach to the study of social organization.[16] Ratzel defined "position" in terms of interaction,[17] and proceeds to point out that the geographer must consider not only "natural position," which determines the interaction of a people with their physical surroundings, but also "vicinity" (*Nachbarschaft*), which is a matter of relation between any one group and its neighbors.

> The stronger is the natural position, the more self-sufficient is the people. The island peoples and the mountain peoples bear the strength of their native soil in their character. The stronger is the vicinal position, the more dependent is the people upon the neighboring peoples, and the more powerfully can it react upon them under circumstances.[18]

The Geographic Distribution of Culture. These suggestions developed by the anthropogeographers and the French sociologists may serve us as an introduction to the work done by American anthropologists in the field of cultural distribution. A number of students have contributed to the resulting body of fact and theory; for convenience we may take some of Wissler's summaries as representative of a trend which appears in their findings. As we have seen, Wissler calls attention to certain interesting facts about the geographical distribution of culture traits and culture complexes—facts which are susceptible of investigation by thoroughly objective methods. As we saw in an earlier paragraph, he defines the concept, "type of culture," which has evolved to meet the needs of anthropological field work, as one having a spatial connotation; a culture type is a more or less homogeneous aggregate of culture complexes found distributed over a certain area. Among the North American Indians, at any rate, many politically independent tribes or confederations of tribes are found within such an area; and Wissler states that existing evidence seems to show that the same state of affairs was to be found among the native tribes of Africa, Northern Asia, and Australia a few hundred years ago. Each such tribe or political unit usually has its own language, intelligible only in part

[16] Chap. I above.
[17] Ratzel, Friedrich, *Anthropogeographie* (1899), Vol. I, pp. 211-12.
[18] *Ibid.*, 212-13.

if at all to its immediate neighbors, but in regard to other phases of culture, there is marked similarity among the tribes living within an area much wider than the habitat of any one of them.[19]

When the anthropologist attempts, however, to define the *boundaries* of such a culture area, he discovers that this is a very difficult task; it is often, perhaps usually, hard to decide which of two types of culture the culture of a given tribe living on the margin between two culture areas represents. If one proceeds by a statistical method, and enumerates the trait complexes of the various tribes, he can then draw a boundary which is satisfactory for his purposes, but it then appears to make little difference to which of two areas a marginal tribe is assigned. One suspects, therefore, that the culture area is after all only a name for "the coincidence in trait-complex distribution." [20] When the distribution of individual trait-complexes is made the primary object of study, as was done, for example, with the distribution of pottery styles in the southeastern part of the United States, it is found that "the true culture area is a succession of distribution zones encircling a nucleus and that this center is the point of dispersal from which trait complexes are diffused." [21] The anthropologists' attention, then, comes to a focus in the end on the nuclei or centers of distribution of culture traits and complexes, and the conception which they have formed of the process underlying the facts of culture distribution is that of a dispersion or diffusion, either by "borrowing" or by actual blending of peoples, or both, of culture traits from certain centers which have somehow functioned as places of origin and therefore of extraordinary inventiveness. How to account for the existence and activity of these centers is of course, a somewhat different problem.[22] Wissler is inclined to believe that the fundamental process relates to the discovery from time to time in particular places of new basic methods of exploiting the resources of the earth, followed by a progressive exhaustion of the resources made available through this tech-

[19] *Op. cit.*, pp. 16-20, 55 ff.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 55-58.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 63.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 155-56.

nique resulting finally in the emergence of a new center of dominance—that is, of invention and diffusion—where a new fundamental technique of exploiting some natural resource has been discovered.[23] What tends to result from Wissler's analysis of the findings of the anthropologists' studies of culture distribution and culture areas, therefore, is, among other things, a tentative theory of the process of cultural evolution, in which the adaptation of human societies to their physical surroundings is seen as the basic element. As was previously suggested, these studies have not stressed the relationship which might be traced between the facts of culture distribution and the organization of social organizations larger than the tribe; it may be pointed out, however, that in the southern part of North America and the northern part of South America, at least three great political systems had developed before the coming of the Europeans into the New World, namely, the Aztec, the Maya, and the Inca states. That these political organizations rested, in part, upon the foundations afforded by culture distribution seems fairly obvious.

Herskovits and Willey's Treatment of "Social Pattern." It seems appropriate to incorporate in the present chapter a brief account of a recent development of the general theory of "cultural pattern," namely, that worked out by Professors Melville J. Herskovits and Malcolm M. Willey in two or more recent papers. As we have seen, the organization of pattern of culture is, after all, in a certain sense a phase of the organization of the society or group possessing the culture, and this is in effect the assumption which Herskovits and Willey make when they substitute for the term "cultural pattern" the analogous term "social pattern." In the earlier of two papers in which they have set forth their ideas, they take exception to Wissler's use of the term "universal pattern," on the ground that "the pattern of a civilization includes just those elements in which that society differs from others." It will be noticed incidentally that in expressing the matter in this way the authors imply that a "civilization" tends to be also a "society." Their argument continues, "Further, each trait gained from a foreign group is absorbed so as to conform to the general pat-

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 198-203.

tern of the society taking it, and if the trait goes contrary to the pattern it will be rejected." [24] The general inference which they draw from these propositions is that, to be thoroughly objective, the facts and tendencies of given societies must be studied with reference to the actual social patterns of those particular societies, and not simply from the basis afforded by any conceptions of universal forces and laws. "A group of American anthropologists . . . by their detailed investigations of exotic peoples, have come to see and realize more and more clearly that no theory of society yet advanced has a universal validity." [25] It is not logically necessary that the methods of social research indicated by this viewpoint should displace all use of more general or universal concepts and theories; the ideal of methodology would be for the insights afforded by the study of particular culture patterns and those afforded by broader generalizations and deeper abstractions to supplement each other in the long-run process of social research. The practical issue raised by Herskovits in a later paper, however, concerns the question as to what sort of research should be *first* in point of time. "The methodological step which must be first taken, in the study of society, if we are to arrive at any understanding at all adequate, is one which must be based on the historical background of the society studied." That is, he thinks we must first ascertain what the main outlines of the particular concrete social situation are, and how they have come to be what they are, before we are in a position to have or to apply any universal, abstract concepts or principles in the explanation of the case. He proceeds to the not very obvious conclusion that "the chief tool of a sociology which is to study the problems we have at hand will have to be the adding machine, until we have at least an adequate knowledge of where we stand in any given social situation." [26] Herskovits justifies his position by the argument, characteristic of an important trend in recent American anthropological

[24] Herskovits, Melville J. and Willey, Malcolm M., "The Cultural Approach to Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX (September, 1923), p. 196.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

[26] Herskovits, Melville J., "Social Pattern: A Methodological Study," *Social Forces*, Vol. IV, p. 1 (September, 1925), 57-69. See especially p. 59.

thought, that cultural facts are to a certain extent their own explanation.

> As the cultures of primitive societies are studied, it becomes more and more apparent that there is little rhyme or reason for the actions we see in them, other than the time-honored one, "it has always been done thus." In other words, a thing is done because it once happened to have been done so, and this method became set in the habits of the people and ingrained in their pattern of behavior. It is true that we compliment ourselves that this is not the case with us, but the stability of cultural traits even among ourselves is a fact that needs more than rationalization to disprove, and one need not adduce examples here of how we continue to do things which have little reason, or which might not be done more sensibly in different fashion, merely because we are accustomed to seeing them done the way we do them.[27]

A distinction should be made, however, between the point that the members of a group often have no adequate *reasons* for the customs which make up the body of their culture, and the point made by Sumner, that the mores display a "strain toward consistency with each other," and a strain of better adaptation of means to ends. In other words, it may be true that people are usually unable to give logically adequate reasons for their adherence to group customs, while at the same time it is also true that these customs have been subjected to a selective process whereby they have come to represent an accommodation between the fundamental behavior tendencies of mankind and the circumstances of physical and social environment. If there is any value in the latter hypothesis, then it is also of value for research purposes to attempt to discover and name the fundamental behavior tendencies which are involved on the one side of the equation which connects social groups with their environments.

The Organization of Savage Societies into "Moities." It is also in order to note, in this general review of theories concerning the relations of culture and social organizations, the thesis developed by Marcel Mauss, Bronislaw Malinowski, and other contemporary anthropologists, to the effect that the cultures of many primitive societies are such as to bring about a division of the larger society into two moities, between which

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

there exist well-defined relationships of division of labor and exchange. These arrangements, they point out, are intimately bound up with other features of the tribal culture, being sanctioned and enforced by various ceremonies and religious and political attitudes.[28] Malinowski goes so far as to say, "A dual organization may appear clearly in the division of a tribe into two 'moities' or be almost completely obliterated—but I venture to foretell that wherever careful inquiry be made, symmetry of structure will be found in every savage society, as the indispensable basis of reciprocal obligations." [29] He rests this prediction, apparently, on the general principle that individualization is a comparatively late development in social evolution, and in savage societies a workable arrangement for economic exchange can only be developed in the form of a relationship between two groups segregated within the larger social body. This explanation is not explicitly stated, however; after the manner of anthropologists Malinowski seeks to make the description of the general arrangement a self-sufficient explanation of it. In fact, however, there is no self-evident explanation, in the mere description of the dual organization, for the fact that exchange is not a purely individual relationship.

Spatial Organization of Society in the Modern City. The anthropological approach to the study of culture areas may, as we have seen, be regarded as an introduction to the investigation of the manner or process in which cultural factors tend to determine the spatial organization of human societies. Studies of the "natural areas," or "moral regions" in the city of Chicago, made by members and students of the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago, such as Zorbaugh's study of the Lower North Side, Wirth's study of the Ghetto, and Reckless' study of the distribution of vice in Chicago, may be regarded as additional contribution to the same general line of research.[30] What these studies tend to show is that com-

[28] Mauss, Marcel, "Essai sur le don," *L'Année Sociologique,* Tome I (N. S.), Fascicule 1, 1925. See also Malinowski, Bronislaw, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (New York and London, 1925), *passim.*

[29] *Op. cit.,* p. 25.

[30] Zorbaugh, Harvey W., "The Dweller in Furnished Rooms: An Urban Type," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society,* Vol. XX (1925), pp. 83-89. Reckless, Walter C., "The Distribution of Commercialized Vice in the City: A Sociological Analysis," *ibid.,* pp. 164-87. Wirth, Louis, "The Ghetto," *ibid.,* Vol. XXI (1926), p. 139.

petition and other social processes bring about a segregation in definite areas of the city of persons and families of identical or similar nationality, habits, and tastes, and that these areas thus become "moral regions." [31] What is equally characteristic of the modern urban type of society, however, is that, with the improvement of the mechanical means of transportation and communication, and the increasing mobilization of individuals, less and less pressure is exerted toward conformity to common cultural standards and traditions on the part of those who may happen to live side by side. This aspect of the interaction between culture—in the sense of customs, traditions, ideas, and beliefs—and the spatial organization of society has been well expressed by Professor Giddings, in a discussion of the group-making rôle of ideas and beliefs. Any idea or belief or set of ideas or beliefs, held in common by a number of persons, he points out, may draw and hold them together in some form of association. Similarly, contradictory ideas tend to repel the persons to whom they are repugnant, at the same time that these persons are drawn toward those of like mind. Since about three hundred years ago and until recently, the appearance of new and fundamental beliefs had a tendency to lead to the formation of sectarian colonies, as in the case of several of the early white settlements on the eastern coast of North America, and later, in the settlement of Utah by the Mormons. As communities become more composite and highly differentiated in their make-up, however, this tendency to the formation of segregated sectarian communities disappears. The remarkable rise of the Christian Science faith, as Giddings points out, has not led to the establishment of any colony like that of the Mormons.[32]

A conclusion which forces itself upon us very strongly as we review the work which has been done in the investigation of the relation of cultural facts to the facts of social organization is that the path of research and reflective analysis inevitably leads back from the more static or substantive aspects of the phenomena in question, to the processes of social inter-

[31] Park, R. E. and others, *The City* (Chicago, 1925), p. 43.
[32] Giddings, F. H., *Studies in the Theory of Human Society* (New York, 1922), pp. 175-79.

action by which the former are determined and changed. Granted that we do find human beings living in groups which are frequently differentiated from one another as to culture, *i.e.,* customs and ideas, and that the internal social structure of the groups, likewise, both determines and is determined by time-honored custom, or culture, the study of these matters brings before our attention the contact and interaction of such groups with one another. Through such interaction, for one thing, culture traits are diffused, and the "diffusion controversy" as we have seen constitutes a perennial issue between two factions of anthropologists, as well as an important research problem. The interaction of "culture groups" also takes the form of inter-group migration, a process in the course of which certain further processes are set in motion, leading to conflict, adjustment, and eventual assimilation. In other respects the contact of peoples of divergent culture gives rise to conflicts, which have still other results. It is with some of these processes arising out of the contact of cultures that we shall be concerned in the next few chapters.

CHAPTER XXII

CONTACT AND ASSIMILATION

Culture Contacts. The research which has been carried on in the past has enabled us to understand, in a measure, the intricate way in which culture—social custom and tradition—is related to the structure or organization of societies. Although a single *type* of culture may be represented by a number of independently organized societies, still each such society usually has to some extent its own customs and traditions, and in particular its own language. On the other hand, forces and processes which are in large part fundamentally economic tend to bring about contacts, in the course of time and most rapidly in recent times, between the members of these societies. As has been brought out in previous chapters, increasing commercial intercourse and migration are tending more and more to create an interdependence of nations and a mingling of their citizens. These contacts may for some purposes be regarded as contacts of divergent cultures, and they lead in some cases to conflicts between nations or other culture groups, in some cases, eventually, to the blending of previously distinct groups and of their culture traits. The conflict of cultures ensues in processes which may be regarded as political, but also in social disorganization. The blending of cultures was explained to some extent by Bagehot, Tarde, and other nineteenth-century writers in terms of "imitation"; more recently anthropologists have studied it empirically and have described it in terms of "diffusion." Recent sociological writers, on the other hand, taking their departure from some of the practical problems of modern civilized nations, have discussed the same fundamental process in terms of "accommodation," "assimilation," and "amalgamation." The social processes arising out of culture conflicts will occupy us in later chapters of this volume; here we are concerned primarily with the process of assimilation and with closely related forms of social interaction, as they

have been described, analyzed, and explained by a number of recent writers.

The Diffusion of Culture. In the same representative volume which we had occasion to consider in the preceding chapter, Clark Wissler has summed up very well the view of the process of cultural transmission which tends to emerge from the studies of the anthropologists. His first conclusion is that the mixing of cultures proceeds constantly and inevitably whenever they come into contact.

> It looks as if there is but one way to prevent cultures from mixing, viz., to keep them from touching. Conquest cannot do it unless it amounts to instant extermination. That this should be so is not strange, for the very accumulative nature of culture and its apparent tenacity of life require a readiness to inoculation, diffusion, or perhaps a better term is readiness to suggestion. . . . So the answer to our question, "Are cultures ever obliterated?" may be formulated by stating that a type of culture as a balanced whole may be overthrown by the ill fortunes of the people practicing it, but unless they are quickly destroyed, many elements of that culture will find their way into the culture of their conquerors.[1]

In a later passage in the same volume, in which he examines more carefully the process of diffusion, Wissler shows that not only is culture spread by an inevitable, unintended process, but social groups sometimes become acutely conscious of some phases or traits of their cultures, and desire to extend these over the earth. Usually this tendency is the outcome of the desire of political and military leaders for new fields of activity.[2] The missionary also, however, may be regarded as a type of agent delegated by social groups to the task of propagating culture traits.

> The mere mention of the word *missionary* automatically calls to our minds the modern individual and organized efforts to "convert the heathen." But there are other missionaries at work besides those who can be designated as Christian, and, as we shall see, all these are merely so many different kinds of culture missionaries. For example, what are we trying to do when we set out to convert the heathen? The answer will be that we are bent on changing his religion by teaching him the Bible. But a little reflection will show that there is more involved than acquiring a knowledge of the Bible, for the "heathen"

[1] Wissler, Clark, *Man and Culture*, pp. 42-43.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

are to be made to live according to the ethical and industrial notions of the missionaries.[3]

Wissler thus establishes the existence of two levels of culture diffusion, so to speak, a sub-conscious, automatic level, and a conscious, purposive level. The processes taking place on the last-mentioned level are evidently connected with, and in a sense determined by, those conscious group aims and values, some insight into the origin and significance of which is gained by the study of religion and myth as factors in collective behavior.

We noted in the preceding chapter the theory developed by Wissler from his study of culture areas, to the effect that diffusion of culture traits and complexes takes place from centers, and that these centers are determined and shifted through the operation of a species of "economic cycle," which is in turn explained by reference to the exploitation and eventual exhaustion of natural resources as made available through successively invented productive techniques.[4]

Acculturation and Racial Traits. A different anthropological interpretation of culture contact and assimilation has been developed; it has been vigorously expressed by Pitt-Rivers, who holds that the possibilities of assimilation, so far as it is a question of the inculcation of the culture traits of civilized peoples in savage peoples, is limited by racial characteristics, strictly so-called.[5] In a volume written with special reference to the problems of government of native races in the Pacific by European powers, he starts with the proposition that such practical problems cannot be successfully solved except on the basis of a "functional analysis" of the customs and beliefs of the natives.[6] Such studies when carefully executed tend to show, he believes, that the supposed ability of civilized governments to "raise a people in cultural level" is in fact dependent upon the interbreeding of the invading with the

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 160-61.

[4] *Loc. cit.*; see also *Man and Culture*, pp. 198-203.

[5] Pitt-Rivers, George Henry Lane-Fox, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*: an anthropological and psychological study of the laws of racial adaptability, with special reference to the depopulation of the Pacific and the government of subject races, London, 1927.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

native population.[7] Apart from such a mixture of blood, and even when it takes place, he holds that experience in the Pacific islands tends to show that the effect of efforts at acculturation in these cases is, first to disorganize the culture of the natives, and ultimately to exterminate the stock.[8] This author has a habit of citing as "facts" which go to support his thesis, statements which are really sweeping generalizations. The latter part of his book does contain quantities of more or less relevant facts, but the author has not, in the opinion of the present writer, shown convincingly that the facts which he gives have the effect of proving his theory. His theory is, however, very plausibly developed, and is deserving of respect as an hypothesis to guide and be tested by further research.

It is one of the gains of modern social theory to have developed a careful discrimination between *assimilation,* as the blending and unification of divergent cultures, and *amalgamation,* the term now commonly used to denote the mixture of originally distinct racial strains. Sarah E. Simons worked out this distinction very carefully in a paper published at the opening of our century. She pointed out that assimilation and amalgamation are processes which can take place more or less independently of each other; the breeding in of a small element of a foreign race may bring about a modification of culture quite disproportionate to the proportion of alien blood introduced, as in the case of modern France, which has a culture essentially Latin, but is overwhelmingly Teutonic in blood. Likewise, considerable assimilation can take place without intermarriage.[9] As a matter of fact, the history of the Negro race in America seems to show that, in a certain sense, amalgamation may take place without corresponding assimilation. A great deal of white blood has unquestionably been bred into the Negro race in the United States, without having the effect of blurring the "color line" to any great extent; the individual still is distinctly a member of the one group or the other. This is a matter which has never been made the central objective of research effort.

[7] Pitt-Rivers, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
[9] Simons, Sarah E., "Social Assimilation," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. VI (1901), pp. 790-801. Quoted by Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924 edition), p. 741.

The Concept of Social Contact. One of the foundation stones for the investigation of contact and assimilation must evidently be a careful definition of the concept "social contact." For an essay toward such a definition we are indebted to Small. His suggestion was that the term "contact" be used as a most general term applying without further specifications to all phenomena which involve relations between individuals and groups.[10] Much more recently Park and Burgess recurred to the topic, and showed that, if the term contact be taken in this most general sense, then it must be said that modern commercial developments have in effect brought everyone into real though indirect contact with everyone else.[11] A more precise sociological use of the term, however, gives it reference to relations which involve *communication.* From this point of view, social contact may be defined as the starting-point of communication, or of some psychological form of interaction.[12] Individuals or groups may have indirect commercial relationships with one another, or may be shown to compete with one another in a biological sense, with only a minimum of social contact in the latter sense. The extension of commerce and division of labor, and the increase of international migration are having the effect in modern times, however, of bringing about contacts between previously isolated peoples—contacts from which cultural interactions inevitably ensue. The sociological interest in assimilation has arisen largely from attempts to deal with the practical problems arising out of the immigration of aliens in large numbers into the United States. When these foreigners settle in American cities, contacts between them and natives follow.

Foreign Immigration into the United States. The past few decades have witnessed the publication of a great volume of literature intended to describe, measure, and to analyze the facts, causes, and consequences of foreign immigration into the United States. The magnitude of that immigration in the years before the World War, as is well known, was very great, and it was seen to have important bearings upon labor conditions and wages, perhaps also upon the problem of preventing

[10] Small, Albion W., *General Sociology* (Chicago, 1905), p. 486.
[11] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-81.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 281.

crime, delinquency, and poverty in American communities. The main trend of the earlier literature devoted to this subject was economic; immigration was studied as a factor affecting population and labor supply. Some of the refined conclusions resulting from this form of analysis have been effectively summarized by Professor F. A. Bushee in a chapter in his *Principles of Sociology.*[13] Bushee has attempted to reduce to simple formula the effects of immigration upon population and standards of living, in both the countries of emigration and those of immigration. He takes account also of the effects of rate of immigration, believing it possible to distinguish quite different effects from a rapid outflow of migration from a country, and a gradual flow, respectively, due to the impossibility of compensation through the birth rate in the former case. Bushee's treatment of immigration seems designed mainly to afford some grounds for the formation of national policies of immigration restriction or regulation. What his analysis tends to indicate, however, incidentally to his main argument, is the strength and fundamental character of the forces making for international immigration. Various writers have summarized the available statistical facts concerning modern international migrations.[14] The reports of the United States Census Bureau and of the Commissioner of Immigration provided masses of material for such studies. In his general treatise, *Immigration* (1913), Professor Henry Pratt Fairchild had anticipated to some extent the treatment of Bushee. Jeremiah Jenks and William A. Lauck,[15] and E. A. Ross [16] have contributed volumes on immigration which are of somewhat broader scope, the latter's treatment being in a popular style. John R. Commons [17] and Edith Abbott [18] have collected materials relating particularly to concrete and practical aspects of the problem.

[13] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1923), Chap. XXI, "Migrations."

[14] See for example "World Migrations and American Immigration," by Judson C. Welliver, *American Review of Reviews,* August, 1923, pp. 193-99.

[15] Jenks, Jeremiah and Lauck, William A., *The Immigration Problem,* New York, 1912.

[16] Ross, Edward A., *The Old World in the New,* New York, 1914.

[17] Commons, John R., *Races and Immigrants in America.* New Edition, New York, 1920.

[18] Abbott, Edith, *Immigration: Select Documents and Case Records,* Chicago, 1924.

Thomas and Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*[19] remains the most thoroughgoing account and analysis as yet available of a single current of immigration and its resulting contacts, conflicts, adjustments, and assimilations. The summary and interpretation of concrete materials worked out by a distinguished American sociologist in Park and Miller's *Old World Traits Transplanted* will serve, however, as a conveniently compact representative work to be reviewed here.[20]

"Old World Traits Transplanted." As the title would indicate, *Old World Traits Transplanted* does not deal primarily with immigration as a movement of population, but with the contact of customs and traditions resulting from immigration. It is in fact, in the main, an interpretation of the changes produced in the personalities of individual immigrants, and in the social organization of immigrant groups, as a result of their endeavor to live and act in the new social surroundings in which they find themselves. The first changes in the immigrant are naturally those necessitated in getting a living and avoiding humiliation; he is likely to modify his dress and "other signs which will betray him as a 'greenhorn' " very soon after his arrival.[21] More deep-seated changes, however, may take place very rapidly; but in many cases these changes are limited and slow, because the immigrant lives in a colony of his own people and has little to do with Americans.[22] The immigrant's personality, nevertheless, is frequently modified very profoundly by his experiences in the New World. The personality he brings with him is based largely on his sense of his status in his group, and of the status of his group among other groups, and of his nation among nations. In this country, on the other hand, the very marks which identified him as a member of his group and defined for others his status in the group—his dress, language, and so on—are regarded with contempt and subject him to ridicule. "In Europe, the question of personality was not the subject of much reflection,

[19] New Edition, two volumes, New York, 1927.

[20] *Op. cit.* (Carnegie Foundation Americanization Studies), New York, 1921. A large part of the content of this volume is the work of a sociologist whose name does not appear on the title page.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

because everything was habitual, but here the realization of incongruities between himself and American life makes the question of personality acute." [23] The ultimate outcome for the individual immigrant may be the complete disorganization of his behavior.

> The person who has been completely controlled by a group, whose behavior in a limited number of possible situations has been predetermined by his community, tends to behave in wild and incalculable ways, to act on any vagrant impulse that invades his mind, when withdrawn from the situations he knows and removed from the background of a permanent community. The result is behavior that is incomprehensible because it follows no known pattern.[24]

In fact, however, various individuals react in different ways to transplantation to a new social environment, depending upon their temperaments, previous experiences, and the particular character of the experiences they have in the new environment. A chapter in *Old World Traits Transplanted* is devoted to the description of a number of characteristic "immigrant types" which have been recognized and named by the immigrants themselves.[25]

The general analysis of the problem of assimilation which has been worked out in the volume we are considering runs in terms of "participation." Participation is seen both as the end and as the means of assimilation. The desire of a nation to assimilate its immigrants is based upon the necessity of securing reasonable order and efficiency, and for this purpose it is desirable to make the immigrants "a practical part of our organization." [26] A certain number of unassimilated aliens may dwell within the boundaries of a nation without destroying its corporate efficiency, but, in a country with a democratic government particularly, the amount of such population which the country can include without losing its culture is limited.[27] Assimilation involves bringing the ideas of life held by the immigrants into harmony with those of the natives—or per-

[23] *Old World Traits Transplanted,* pp. 47-48.
[24] *Ibid.,* p. 72.
[25] *Ibid.,* Chap. V, "Immigrant Types."
[26] *Ibid.,* pp. 259-60.
[27] *Ibid.,* pp. 261-64.

haps in some cases, in so modifying both sets of ideas so that they harmonize. The most important factors affecting this process are (1) the previously existing degree of similarity between the two cultures, and (2) the attitude displayed by the natives toward the immigrants' culture.[28] In other words, assimilation is accomplished when the same thing or situation has the same meaning for the immigrants that it has for the natives. Things get their meanings, for any given person, from his past experiences and from the past experiences of his group which are incorporated in its customs and traditions.[29] It is necessary therefore that persons who are to participate in common enterprises and community activities develop common memories and traditions sufficient to enable them to understand one another. It is desirable not only that immigrants learn to speak the language of their adopted country, but that they learn something of its history also. Similarly, it is desirable that native Americans should know something of the history, social life, and traditions of the countries from which their immigrants come.[30] Immigrants can become interested in, and can understand, the activities and ideals of a country only if these latter can be related to something in his previous experience and existing attitudes.[31] From points of contact between the nationalities, where the interests merge, because the situation is intelligible to both, mutual understanding may be extended to other areas of life.[32]

Not the least valuable and illuminating feature of the volume from which the foregoing paragraphs have been abstracted, is the numerous bits of concrete case material with which the various concepts and propositions are illustrated. It is, in fact, in concrete experiences that the adjustment of an individual or of a group to a strange cultural *milieu* takes place, and it is through the study of such experiences, revealed in the letters and testimony of immigrants, that sociologists have been enabled to gain greater insight into the nature of the processes of adjustment.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 265.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 265-68.
[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 270-71.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 272.
[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 279-80.

Processes of Cultural Adjustment. Park and Burgess have perhaps done more than any other American writers to describe and explain in abstract, generalized terms these processes whereby adjustment is effected between diverse cultures. Assimilation, they point out, is a term which arose in popular usage to describe the process whereby the culture of a country is transmitted to an adopted citizen. It is also often understood negatively, as a process of denationalization; and in Europe efforts to bring about assimilation of conquered peoples have generally taken the latter form. In either case, however, the term evidently refers to the problem arising from attempts to "establish and maintain a political order in a community that has no common culture." [33] In all these popular ideas of assimilation there has been implicit the thought that it is a process of becoming alike. These authors call attention also, however, to the idea developed by certain social workers and idealists, to the effect that the immigrant peoples have something valuable to contribute to the culture of the United States, and that their cultural heritages should be preserved from disintegration. This is not inconsistent, of course, with the notion of an ultimate cultural homogeneity to be attained, but it brings into notice that the *process* of adjustment is concerned with differences as well as with likenesses to be achieved.[34] To aid in defining and describing more accurately the total interaction involved, the authors have accordingly developed another term, *accommodation.*

> Accommodation has been described as a process of adjustment, that is, an organization of social relations and attitudes to prevent or to reduce conflict, to control competition, and to maintain a basis of security in the social order for persons and groups of divergent interests and types to carry on together their varied life-activities. Accommodation in the sense of the composition of conflict is invariably the goal of the political process.[35]
>
> Every society represents an organization of elements more or less antagonistic to each other but united for the moment, at least, by an arrangement which defines the reciprocal relations and respective spheres of action of each. This accommodation, this *modus vivendi,*

[33] Park, Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W., *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924 edition), p. 734.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 735.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 735.

may be relatively permanent as in a society constituted by castes, or quite transitory as in societies made up of open classes. In either case, the accommodation, while it is maintained, secures for the individual or the group a recognized status. Accommodation is the natural issue of conflicts. In an accommodation the antagonism of the hostile elements is, for the time being, regulated, and conflict disappears as overt action, although it remains latent as a potential force.[36]

The significance of the term "accommodation" as the name of a scientific, sociological abstraction, when considered in its logical relation to the contact of different cultures, is that it helps us to distinguish a form of adjustment which, normally, takes place earlier and more rapidly than assimilation, strictly so-called, and which, while to be sure it involves inner, psychic changes in the persons affected, is an adjustment of a relatively formal and external character as regards the type of relationship set up between the culture groups and their members.

This definition of accommodation as a process distinguishable from assimilation, in theory and by intellectual analysis on the part of the student at least, provides a basis for defining more precisely what is meant by assimilation. It is in the passage immediately following the definition of accommodation first quoted above that Park and Burgess describe assimilation as "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life." [37] Defined in this way, the concept assimilation has reference to the possibility of participation by the alien in the life of the community, as we have found that idea outlined in *Old World Traits Transplanted;* and Park and Burgess have quoted with approval the study of methods of Americanization prepared by W. I. Thomas for the Carnegie Corporation's study of Americanization, in which he defines Americanization in similar terms.[38]

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 665.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 735.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 739; see also pp. 762-69.

The Physical Marks of Race a Barrier to Assimilation. Having defined assimilation as a sharing of sentiments, memories, and attitudes, Park and Burgess reach the conclusion, which is supported also by studies of concrete instances, that such a fusion is most completely brought about by means of intimate associations between individual members of the once distinct culture groups.

> The rapidity and completeness of assimilation depends directly upon the intimacy of social contact. By a curious paradox, slavery, and particularly household slavery, has probably been, aside from intermarriage, the most efficient device for promoting assimilation.[39]

Using the approach here indicated, Park has developed more elaborate explanations of the processes set in motion by the contact of cultures, in papers based on the study of race relations on the Pacific, which he directed. When the members of one group are set off from the members of another with whom they are spatially in contact by common differences of appearance, the reaction of the members of the racial majority to the aliens is "categoric," as N. S. Shaler has expressed it, rather than individual and sympathetic.[40]

> Why is it that to the average American all Chinese, like all Negroes, look alike? It is because the individual man is concealed behind the racial type. The individual is there, to be sure, but we do not meet him. . . . These racial traits and racial differences that constitute the racial type and conceal the individual man are not always altogether physical. Physical differences are emphasized and reenforced by differences of dress, of manner, of deportment, and by characteristic expressions of the face. . . . Race prejudice is a function of visibility. The races of high visibility, to speak in naval parlance, are the natural and inevitable objects of prejudice.[41]

With this hypothesis as a guiding principle, then, Park points out that many of the earlier Japanese immigrants came to California with high and romantic expectations of life in the New World, and with the definite intention of settling permanently but, because they are so infallibly identified with their race by Americans, they have not been able to participate in American

[39] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 739.
[40] Shaler, N. S., *The Neighbor* (Boston, 1904), pp. 207-27.
[41] Park, Robert E., "Behind Our Masks," *Survey Graphic*, Vol. IX, p. 2 (May, 1926), 135-36.

life and to identify themselves with its interests as they would perhaps have wished to do.[42] They have accordingly had thoughts of returning to Japan. Meanwhile, however, their children, born in this country, educated in American schools, and reading American papers and magazines, have not only wished to identify themselves with the American people but to a very great extent have actually done so, and thereby have met peculiar personal problems. For, as Americans in thought, they have unconsciously and unintentionally adopted the American attitude of contempt and hostility toward foreigners and particularly Orientals; and thus race conflict is translated into mental conflicts.

> Children acquire the prevailing attitudes in the community by a sort of moral infection, but even the adults are not immune, and there are moments when they are not wholly able to overcome that "sickening sense of inferiority" which overtakes us all at times; moments when they could say what members of other racial minorities have sometimes said: "I hate my race! I hate myself!"
>
> In this way the conflict between the Orient and the Occident which presents itself in one of its aspects as external and international, assumes, in another aspect, the character of an internal and moral conflict. It becomes a conflict of loyalty; a struggle to knit together the strands of a divided self, to find a place to live, and to preserve one's moral integrity in a world in which one can hardly hope for understanding or recognition.[43]

Park thinks it may be true in general that in the process of assimilation of any foreign people only superficial traits are modified, but he adds "Most of the race traits that determine race relations are superficial." Children of foreign parents may inherit, biologically, from their racial ancestors, deep-seated characteristics, yet in two or three generations the descendants of our earlier European immigrants have become almost wholly blended into the common life, and they differ from other citizens of diverse ancestry only as individuals in a modern nationality always differ from one another, without as a rule being rendered incapable thereby of participation in common social enterprises. As a matter of fact, as we saw in an earlier chapter, it may be said that a nation has to assimilate

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.

all of the children who are born into it, those of its oldest racial stocks no less than those of immigrant parents. Education and assimilation are virtually two names for the same process.[44] Visible physical traits, as Park points out, do not change, and the Oriental, like the Negro, continues through the generations to be marked in this way; "The physical marks of race, in so far as they increase the racial visibility, inevitably segregate the races, set them apart, and so prolong and intensify the racial conflict." [45] One group can assimilate the members of another only when the latter are seen to have similar human sentiments and desires, which in fact they do possess. In the alien, however, and particularly in the Oriental and the Negro, we fail to notice and to interpret the expressions of human feelings like our own because they are hidden by the "racial uniform." Failure to understand them opens the way to sinister interpretations of their behavior. Yet the contacts brought about by commercial and other external relations inevitably generate personal relationships, and even friendships, sooner or later, between individuals of different races, and in these personal relations the individual is discovered. "Personal relations and personal friendships are the great solvents." [46] Through this line of analysis, then, Park arrives at his formula for the "race relations cycle . . . contacts, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation," which, he thinks, is "apparently progressive and irreversible." [47]

Assimilation as a Research Problem. This whole theory of contact and assimilation must, of course, be regarded as a scientific hypothesis, to be entertained subject to test in further research. It appears, however, to meet in a measure the pragmatic test; it renders some of the things we know about the contact of races and nationalities more intelligible than they would be without such a fundamental explanation. Meanwhile attempts are being made, from time to time, to gather more information about the actual conditions existing and the developments going on where two or more culture groups have

[44] *Supra,* Chap. XX.
[45] *Op. cit.,* p. 138.
[46] *Ibid.,* pp. 138-39.
[47] "Our Racial Frontiers on the Pacific," *Survey Graphic,* Vol. IX, pp. 2 (May, 1926), 196. Quoted at length in Chap. IV above.

come into contact.' The study of Americanization financed by the Carnegie Corporation was one substantial effort; the survey of race relations on the Pacific Coast another. Julius Drachsler presented in popular form in *Democracy and Assimilation* (1920) some of the findings of a study carried out with the aim of subjecting assimilation to quantitative measurement. Professor H. P. Fairchild has been responsible lately for the editing of a volume intended to promote familiarity with immigration cultures on the part of American readers.[48] At present the Social Science Research Council, representing several of the national social science associations, is supporting a large-scale study of Human Migrations since about 1800, in which a number of scholars are participating.

In Europe, as has already been indicated, the interest of social scientists and others in assimilation has a somewhat different ground, on the whole, than it has in the United States; since their principal practical problems of this kind arise from the contacts of peoples on international boundaries, and the incorporation of conquered or annexed culture groups into larger national states. One of the most interesting contributions to the literature dealing with this phase of the problem of assimilation is Ludwig Bernhard's study of the attempt by the German government to assimilate, that is, to Prussianize, the Poles in East Prussia.[49] This study has particular value for scientific purposes because of the viewpoint of the author, who, being himself a German, is striving to explain how and why the efforts at denationalization of the Poles failed. In carrying out this investigation he has recounted at length the measures adopted by the Polish leaders to preserve the economic strength and the sentiment of nationality of their followers, as well as the measures employed by the German government to incorporate them. W. I. Thomas has published in English a briefer study of the same episode.[50] The per-

[48] *Immigrant Backgrounds,* edited by Henry Pratt Fairchild, New York, 1927.

[49] Bernhard, Ludwig, *Die Polenfrage: Das Polnische Gemeinwesen im Preussischen Staat,* Leipzig, 1910.

[50] Thomas, William I., "The Prussian-Polish Situation: An Experiment in Assimilation," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XIX (1913-14), pp. 624-39.

sistence of the Jews as a distinct cultural group in the face of the divisive effects of their dispersion and lack of a politically sovereign basis of operations has also attracted much attention. One of the best studies of this case accessible to American readers is Maurice Fishberg's [51] volume, *The Jews.* What such studies as these tend to show is that attempts by a sovereign state to effect the assimilation of an alien group frequently have an effect quite opposite to that intended; the alien group gains strength and national sentiments under the pressure of the force making for denationalization.

In a recent paper, Adolf Günther has reviewed the literature dealing with "boundary peoples," and has attempted to describe with greater exactness the tendencies to be discerned in such a people, living as a more or less distinct cultural unit on the border between two larger and more powerful states.[52] His most general conclusion is that a boundary people, instead of becoming assimilated by one of its neighbors, tends to become a "dynamic" element in the international situation, and that the problems presented by such peoples are worthy of further study.

Thus we see that the study of cultural contacts with primary reference to the assimilation which has been assumed and expected to follow such contacts, while it does not lead us to discard the assumption, does draw our attention over and over to the differences between cultures, and to the adjustments which may be made but which fall short of complete assimilation of the two or more cultures into a common heritage. On the one hand, this view of the matter affords a basis for the study of the political process, which may be regarded as the method by which groups of unlike and even opposing cultural tendencies and aims manage to get along together. On the other hand, accommodation is not always successful, and when it fails, the intimate contact of members of different culture groups results in social disorganization. Because of their need for some form of mutual adjustment, persons who do not share

[51] Fishberg, Maurice, *The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment,* New York, 1911.

[52] Günther, Adolf, "Soziologie des Grenzvolks, erläutert an den Alpenländern," *Jahrbuch für Soziologie,* Vol. III (1927), pp. 200-34.

one another's fundamental traditions and attitudes are likely to get along on the basis of agreement in superficial matters; superficial attitudes, ideas, and practices are all that such people can have in common. This is perhaps why fashion and transient conventionalities are so prominent in our modern world, in which contacts of peoples have been so many and so rapid in their tempo. It is with these latter results of culture contacts that we shall be concerned in the chapters immediately following.

CHAPTER XXIII

CONFLICT AND DISORGANIZATION

Social Theory and "Social Problems." In the opening chapter of this volume we have considered the relation of modern social theory to the practical social problems which have commanded attention in the countries of the western world since the industrial revolution. We saw there that the special interest in sociology which has caused it to be known to some extent in Europe as "the American Science" is due in considerable part to the attention which was directed late in the nineteenth century to the condition of individuals, classes, and institutions in our society which seemed to certain persons of refined sensibilities to call for improvement. It is particularly in connection with the study of social disorganization, naturally, that these sources of contemporary social theory need to be examined. It may perhaps be considered one of the greatest gains which has been made in the direction of a scientific sociology, to have succeeded in a measure in formulating an objective description of social disorganization—which was by no means an easy thing to do. The literature dealing in a practical and ethical spirit with social disorganization is, however, enormous, and the space limitations of this volume will prevent our canvassing it in any systematic way. The trend which is represented by the history of that literature may be briefly summarized by saying that the earlier works were almost without exception devoted to the arousal of sentiment and to the discussion of problems of administration of corrective and relief agencies; while with the passage of time there have appeared a number of works in which the attempt is made to define practical social problems with reference to natural social forces and processes. Resulting points of view toward what are felt to be the outstanding practical problems of our society may be gathered from literature of compara-

tively recent date. The most fundamental note which is sounded in recent theoretic discussions of social disorganization is probably that relating disorganization to certain forms of social conflict,—conflict of social classes, rivalries of religious sects, and conflicts between the old and the young, but most of all the conflicts of races and nationalities as brought about by migration and conquest, and the resulting effort to incorporate culturally dissimilar groups and individuals into unified political organisms. In brief, social disorganization tends to appear as an outcome, in large part, of *culture conflicts;* hence the justification for dealing with it at this point in our study of the range of social theory.

The Study of Crime as Social Disorganization. The class of social phenomena which were earliest studied from a scientific sociological angle of approach were those which we call crimes. Gabriel Tarde, a pioneer in the field of sociological theory, first had his interest directed toward these theoretic inquiries as a result of his studies of crime and criminals, due, in turn, to his experience as a magistrate. His first work on criminology, *La Criminalite* (1886), was based on articles he had previously published, in which he attacked the anthropological (physical) criminology of Lombroso, and proposed as a substitute theory an interpretation of crime as a social phenomenon.[1] It is worth noting in passing that Tarde developed what was in effect a general theory of social disorganization, though without applying that term to it. Having described social development as a process in which a multitude of internal adaptations take place among the elemental desires and beliefs which are in his conception the ultimate atoms of the social order, he points to the fact that certain "inadaptations" also exist at any given time.[2] Half a century earlier, as a matter of fact, Herbert Spencer had set forth a similar definition of social evils in his *Social Statics* (1850): "All evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to conditions." [3]

After the start had been made by Tarde, the published works

[1] See Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory,* pp. 402-03.
[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 421-26; quoting Tarde's *Social Laws, passim,* especially pp. 194-95.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 312; quoting Spencer, *op. cit.,* p. 28.

on criminology came to reflect more and more frequently the view of crime as a social phenomenon, and as one, therefore, which can be understood only in relation to the society in which it occurs. Thus for instance a Dutch scholar with a sympathetic attitude toward the socialism of Karl Marx, William Adrian Bonger, published in 1905 the first edition of his *Criminality and Economic Conditions,* in which he expressly defines crime as a term applying to acts harmful to the interests of some group of persons who have at their command the power necessary to enforce their will.[4] He points out, what is too little appreciated even now, that in many savage societies there is comparatively little that could be called "crime"; in their relations with one another the members of such societies are remarkably peaceful and mutually considerate.[5] It is of importance, however, in this connection, to notice that primitive peoples have entirely different standards governing their conduct toward outsiders; their ethics displays a pronounced dualism.[6] The problem, then, in Bonger's view, is to discover what changes have led to the development of so much anti-social conduct in modern civilized societies, when there is so little *within* savage societies. His solution of the problem is expressed in terms of changes in the economic conditions of society, so that (1) where in primitive society production was carried on primarily for consumption, in modern society it is for exchange; (2) in primitive society there is neither great wealth nor poverty, while in modern society there are both, and there is a marked differentiation of classes from one another; and (3) modern societies are less directly dependent upon nature than are primitive societies, and have less necessity for maintaining effective solidarity in the group in order to present a united front in the struggle with nature.[7] Bonger's general theory of crime is thus, in substance, that it is a phenomenon which arises in societies which are subdivided into groups of widely differing status and interests. That he saw

[4] Bonger, William Adrian, *Criminality and Economic Conditions,* translated by H. P. Norton. Modern Criminal Science Series, Boston, 1916, p. 379.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 381 ff.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 391.
[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 396-97, 667.

this internal subdivision almost exclusively as a matter of economic stratification may for our present purposes be dismissed as something appertaining to the special interests and intellectual affiliations of the author.

Crime in Its Relation to Social Progress, by Arthur Cleveland Hall, a book published a few years before the first European edition of Bonger's massive treatise, is interesting both for the similarities and the contrasts which it presents when compared with the former work. The fundamental question which Hall sets himself to answer is, Why do societies define certain classes of acts as crimes and prescribe penalties for committing them?[8] Crime is regarded by him, as it is fundamentally by Bonger, as an act believed to weaken some group which is in a position to penalize it. More explicitly, he defines punishment as a form of social selection which is substituted by societies for the slow and often inhibited action of natural selection in eliminating divergent types. In Hall's theory, however, crime is seen as an act of a divergent individual, rather than as an incident of the struggle of groups within the larger society.[9]

Among the most important of the general works on criminology recently published in the United States are *Criminology and Penology,* by Professor John L. Gillin,[10] and *Criminology,* by Professor E. H. Sutherland.[11] Gillin takes pains to show that a crime is not necessarily a socially harmful act, but one which is believed to be harmful by a group of people which has power to enforce its beliefs.[12] His book, although comprehensive in scope, is primarily administrative in emphasis. Sutherland, however, has made an attempt to deal with the causes of crime in terms of natural social processes. His definition of crime emphasizes the point that it involves disorganization in the group.

> Crime, as a social situation, may be said to involve the following elements or relationships: A value which is appreciated by a group or

[8] *Op. cit.* (New York, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, 1902), p. 3.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 5.
[10] New York, 1926.
[11] Philadelphia, 1924.
[12] *Op. cit.,* p. 13.

a part of a group that is politically important; an isolation of another part of this group so that these members do not appreciate this value or appreciate it less highly and consequently tend to endanger it; a pugnacious resort to coercion decently applied by those who appreciate the value to those who disregard the value. When a crime is committed it involves these relationships. Crime *is* that set of relationships when viewed from the point of view of the group rather than that of the individual.[13]

The interpretation of crime here implied is elaborated further along, in Sutherland's discussion of the causes of crime. After an enumeration and discussion of many of the concrete "factors" found by statistical and other investigations to be associated with the occurrence of crime, and therefore presumed to have a causal bearing on it, he turns to an inquiry into the bearing of the attitudes and opinions of "the public" upon crime.

During all previous history society was organized on the basis of primary, face-to-face groups. Each group was largely self-sufficient and isolated from all other groups. All members of a group had the same traditions and were confronted by the same problems. In that situation control was spontaneous and easy. . . . The control of . . . secondary relations has not been developed. We do not have sufficient uniformity of interests or sufficient uniformity of attitudes regarding our interests to have a spontaneous control. Each individual or small group attempts to get the desired objects, with little regard for society as a whole. . . . At the same time the present is an age of diversity of opinions, standards, and codes. . . . We do not like the variant activities of other groups and we attempt to stop them by laws. We attempt to compel uniformity in the beliefs and activities that we regard as proper.[14]

The author further points out that the mobility characteristic of modern life tends to bring the individual into contact with a great variety of these ideals and standards. This leads the individual to feel that he has a right to the things enjoyed by members of other groups. Government is seen by Sutherland as the device to which we have resort to meet this need for control in secondary groups. But because the government is regarded by members of many groups within the larger society as something remote, it lacks prestige in their eyes, and its

[13] Sutherland, *Criminology*, p. 21.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

laws are easily broken.[15] In short, crime is, from this point of view, little else than a manifestation of lack of integration in a large complex society. It is strongly implied in this account that the effective integration would be secured, if at all, through the development of common conceptions, ideals, myths, or "collective representations," after the manner suggested by the work of some of the writers mentioned in our chapter on religion.

Poverty as Social Disorganization. It is probably safe to say that there is in contemporary sociological literature less tendency to treat poverty as a form of social disorganization than is the case with crime. The commoner practice is to interpret poverty as the outcome of *individual* handicaps, as the outcome of a process closely analogous to natural selection, with the difference that the less fit in human society are not always eliminated by death, but sink to the lower economic strata of a society. There are in the literature some exceptions to this tendency, however. (Professor Georg Simmel, in the first edition of his *Soziologie,* published in 1908, referred to the poor and the criminal as "the inner enemies," implying by this phrase that the poor as well as the criminals represent forces inimical to the welfare of the society in which they live.[16] In this respect at least, he would apparently have been willing to say that the existence of poverty in a society is a manifestation of disorganization in that society.)

At about the same time, Edward T. Devine, basing his treatment of the topic on his experience in the administration of charitable and relief agencies in this country, suggested that poverty is a phenomenon which has *social* causes, in a strict sense of the term.

> The question which I raise is whether the wretched poor, the poor who suffer in their poverty, are poor because they are shiftless, because they are undisciplined, because they drink, because they steal, because they have superfluous children, because of personal depravity, personal inclination, and natural preference; or whether they are shiftless, and undisciplined and drink and steal and are unable to care for their too numerous children because our social institutions and

[15] Sutherland, *Criminology,* pp. 163-65.

[16] *Op. cit.,* p. 686. Quoted by Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), p. 560.

economic arrangements are at fault. I hold that personal depravity is as foreign to any sound theory of the hardships of the modern poor as witchcraft or demoniacal possession; that these hardships are economic, social, transitional, measurable, manageable. Misery, as we say of tuberculosis, is communicable, curable, and preventable.[17]

The real emphasis in the foregoing passage, to be sure, is laid on administrative possibilities, but it nevertheless sets forth clearly the view that poverty is an aspect of a social process. Maurice Parmelee has asserted a similar view.[18] Professor John L. Gillin in his recent volume on poverty and dependency, has asserted a viewpoint which incorporates both the idea that poverty is inimical to the interests of the society in which it occurs, and the idea that it is of social causation, as a point of departure for his review of particular causal factors and administrative possibilities.[19]

Practically all of the earlier interpretations of poverty, crime, and other "social evils" fell short of the ideal of a scientific sociology in that they took for granted the socially undesirable character of these phenomena. Their concept of social disorganization was intuitive, rather than objective. It was through a consideration and objective description of the conditions affecting social control and the possibilities of collective or corporate action that a really scientific definition of social disorganization was made possible. Professor Giddings, in one of his more recent works, has contributed materially to this inquiry.

Whatever else society is, it is a group of units and relations which acts collectively and under self-direction. It not only manifests a continuing process, as brain and nervous system manifest the processes of mind, as organic matter manifests the processes of life, but also, like living matter and like mind, it controls its own processes. Society constrains. Unconsciously at first, but consciously in its later and higher development, it brings pressure to bear upon its component units.[20]

[17] Devine, Edward T., *Misery and Its Causes* (New York, 1909), Chap. I.
[18] Parmelee, Maurice, *Poverty and Social Progress* (New York, 1916), p. 225.
[19] Gillin, John L., *Poverty and Dependency: Their Relief and Prevention* (New York, 1925), Chap. I.
[20] Giddings, F. H., *Studies in the Theory of Human Society* (New York, 1922), p. 201.

This "pressure" he interprets as an outgrowth of the process of natural selection. It involves, however, "a set of highly complicated adjustments made to the similar adaptations of other units," and it tends toward the manifestation of antipathy to those variations from type which attract attention. Praise and blame are the means of constraint used in human society, and by them men's characters are molded to approved types. "For all these processes of constraint and regulation in their entirety, society has its own descriptive names. Collectively they constitute the thing familiarly known as *discipline,* and their objective product, conformity of behavior, is *morale.*" [21]

Morale is used here, as it has been, vaguely, in connection with military organization and with labor management, as a term for the solidarity and corporate efficiency of a social group, of whatever size and efficiency it may be. In all but the simplest groups, however, morale is not a perfectly simple thing, but is a state which involves organization of unlike elements into a unified whole. The organization of a human society, furthermore, is not a purely static, substantive thing; the individuals and smaller groups that make up the larger whole are constantly changing.

> Society, as an aggregate that is simultaneously losing and absorbing motion, experiences an incessant rearrangement of its parts. This means two very important things: First, there can be no social gain that does not entail somewhere, on the whole community or on a class, the break-up of established relations, interests, and occupations, and the necessity of a more or less difficult readjustment. Second, the increase of social activity, which is the only phase of progress that most people see at all, may so exceed the rate of constructive readjustment that the end is disorganization and ruin.[22]

For Giddings, then, social disorganization is, so to speak, one phase of a continuing process, the other phase of which is adjustment, or readjustment. This is a view of the matter which, as we shall see, has been found illuminating by other writers also.

Conflict as an Element of Organization. As was intimated in an earlier paragraph, the more detailed explanation

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 202-06.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 231.

of social disorganization toward which sociologists have been finding their way is one which relates disorganization to conflict. This is a natural view of the matter; one inevitably thinks of a community, or a nation, that is torn by internal struggles as a disorganized society.[23] Conflict within a group, however, is by no means always to be regarded simply as a manifestation of disorganization. Simmel has described conflict as a form of organization, "in many ways the only means through which coexistence with individuals intolerable in themselves could be possible." [24] Giddings has made the point somewhat more concrete in his discussion of the "group-making rôle of ideas and beliefs" in which he shows that conflicts give rise to the formation of sects, which are frequently able to get along together quite peaceably in the same society.[25] Conflict may in fact be regarded as a process in which accumulated tensions are liquidated; seen in this light conflict and accommodation are to be regarded almost as aspects of the same process.[26] Returning to the idea that disorganization can be objectively defined or described only with reference to the possibility of effective and unified collective action, the formal principle evidently is that conflict is synonymous with disorganization when, and in so far as, it involves the exhaustion in internal struggle of the forces which might be used in concerted endeavor; in so far as the conflict takes the form of a mere enduring tension of oppositions, or of the discharge of antipathies too strong to be held in check in relatively harmless forms—relatively harmless to the collective enterprise, that is, it is in effect simply a form of positive organization, and, indeed, a means by which cooperation is rendered possible.

Culture Conflicts and Social Disorganization. It is more particularly through the study of modern urban life that it has been found possible to show how one particular form of conflict, *culture* conflict, leads to a form of social disorganiza-

[23] See Steiner, Jesse F., *Community Organization* (New York, 1925), p. 36 ff.

[24] Adapted from a translation from Simmel's *Soziologie*, by A. W. Small, under the title "The Sociology of Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IX (1903-04), pp. 490-501.

[25] *Op. cit.*, Chap. X.

[26] House, F. N., "Social Relations and Social Interaction," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXI (March, 1926), pp. 617-33.

tion which can be objectively described and analyzed as such.[27] Thomas and Znaniecki have described and analyzed this form of social disorganization more thoroughly than anyone else has done up to the present time.[28] It will be worth while in the present survey, accordingly, to review at some length their findings and explanation.

These authors have found that there has been, since the latter part of the nineteenth century, no little disorganization of Polish peasant society in the Old World, due to the increasing industrialization of the economic life of the nation, and increase of contacts of Polish peasant communities with the people and customs of other countries.[29] Thomas and Znaniecki's discussion of social disorganization in the abstract, in fact, is used by them equally to explain the disorganization of the old-world social order, and to account for certain features of personal behavior of Polish immigrants in the United States. Among Polish immigrants in America, however, manifestations of the failure of the community to maintain order and control over the individuals are particularly marked. This is seen, for instance, in cases which come up before the juvenile courts in American cities.

> The children brought with the family or added to it in America do not acquire the traditional attitude of familial solidarity, but rather the American individualistic ideals, while the parents remain unchanged, and there frequently results a complete and painful antagonism between parents and children. This has various expressions, but perhaps the most definite one is economic—the demands of the parents for the earnings of the child, and eventually as complete avoidance as possible of the parents by the child. The mutual hate, the hardness, unreasonableness, the brutality of the parents, the contempt and ridicule of the child . . . become almost incredible. The parents, for example, resort to the juvenile court, not as a means of reform, but as an instrument of vengeance; they will swear away the character of their girl, call her a "whore" and a "thief," when there is not the slightest ground for it.[30]

[27] Park, Robert E., "The City," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XX (1914-15), pp. 593-609; see also Park, Robert E., and others, *The City* (Chicago, 1925), pp. 23-24.

[28] Thomas, William Isaac, and Znaniecki, Florian, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (second edition, two volumes, New York, 1927); see in general on this topic Vol. II, p. 1119 ff.

[29] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 1119.

[30] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 103-04. Used by permission of author.

Disorganization is manifested also in some of the crimes committed by immigrants, when these are subjected to an examination as to their details. As was noted in the preceding chapter, when an immigrant leaves an old-world community in which all of the circumstances and usages of life were familiar to him, and comes into contact with a multitude of institutions and practices, in a foreign city, which are entirely unfamiliar to him, he is likely to fail so completely to "define the situation" that his behavior assumes a form that is quite incoherent and meaningless; it "follows no known pattern." These authors have reproduced at length the story of a man accused of murdering another Polish immigrant, his experiences for a period of two or three days as told by himself. The most striking thing about this story is just this lack of meaning; the man's actions are inconsistent with one another, and lack pattern.[31]

By way of providing a systematic body of hypothesis to account for facts of this sort, then, Thomas and Znaniecki have developed a general theory of social disorganization. The term "social disorganization" as used by them is stated, first of all, to have reference primarily to institutions, and only secondarily to men. Social organization, moreover, is in their view never exactly parallel to individual life-organization, although the two are obviously interrelated. The individual never embodies in his own conduct all of the rules of the society; and there are in any society individuals who to some extent follow rules and schemes of their own devising. The society as a whole has, however, an organization.

> The progress of social differentiation is accompanied by a growth of special institutions, consisting essentially in a systematic organization of a certain number of socially selected schemes for the permanent achievement of certain results. This institutional organization and the life organization of any of the individuals through whose activity the institution is socially realized partly overlap, but one individual cannot fully realize in his own life the whole systematic organization of the institution since the latter always implies the collaboration of many, and on the other hand each individual has

[31] *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* Vol. II, pp. 1759-61; see also Park and Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted,* 61 ff., 72-75.

many interests which have to be organized outside of this particular institution.[32]

Social organization, then, as the term is here used, is a matter of institutions, or, in other words, of socially approved "schemes" of joint or cooperative action, by which collective ends are pursued. To say as much, however, is not equivalent to defining clearly what is to be understood by social *dis*-organization. The latter term might, at first mention, seem to have reference to a state of affairs in which there were no socially approved schemes regulating the behavior of individuals, or it might have reference to a condition in which the schemes existed and were, apparently, approved, but few individuals were guided by them in their individual conduct. Thomas and Znaniecki have incorporated both alternatives into a single conception.

> We can define [social disorganization] briefly as *a decrease of the influence of existing social rules of behavior upon individual members of the group.* This decrease may present innumerable degrees, ranging from a single break of some particular rule by one individual up to a general decay of all the institutions of the group. Now, social disorganization in this sense has no unequivocal connection whatever with individual disorganization, which consists in a decrease of the individual's ability to organize his whole life for the efficient, progressive, and continuous realization of his fundamental interests. An individual who breaks some or even most of the social rules prevailing in his group may indeed do this because he is losing the minimum capacity of life-organization required by social conformism; but he may also reject the schemes of behavior imposed by his milieu because they hinder him in reaching a more efficient and more comprehensive life-organization.[33]

Now such "decrease of the influence of existing social rules" upon individuals started, among Polish peasants, as our authors tell us, when the original village communities in Europe came into contact with the outside world, and its members became acquainted with standards of conduct and customs previously unfamiliar to them. Such a contact with unfamiliar customs and institutions, however, is likely to take place in much greater measure in the case of the members of a colony of Polish im-

[32] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 1127-28.
[33] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 1128-29. Used by permission of author.

migrants in an American city. To be sure, the immigrants quite spontaneously develop segregated residential arrangements and associations for various purposes in which they are able to maintain contact with one another and thus preserve a degree of group solidarity based on the cultural homogeneity of community and association. They are not able to segregate themselves entirely, however; furthermore, immigration inevitably breaks up old familial and communal ties upon which the original pattern of peasant life in Poland largely depended. New idea and new standards of behavior are taken over by individuals, but these ideas are often incompatible with the general organization provided by their original culture, and, besides, the customs and institutions observed in the new land are frequently misinterpreted.

One way in which an immigrant culture group maintains a degree of organization and solidarity in the face of the acceptance of new standards by its members, is to treat these matters, as they successively develop, as questions of individual choice, not matters over which the group has jurisdiction, formally or by custom, even though this may be a supposition quite contrary to historical fact. Progressive *individualization* of behavior is therefore one of the protective devices whereby the groups are enabled to preserve some solidarity in spite of culture conflicts.[34] Another device for resisting complete disorganization of the culture group is the invention or discovery of new aims and purposes for the immigrant associations, through the promotion and rational pursuit of which the group may continue to afford to its members some reason for adherence to it. Leaders have in fact sought to inculcate the idea that it is only in Polish organizations that the Polish immigrant may properly and genuinely find satisfaction for his desires, aside from the purely economic need for a wage.[35]

Social Disorganization of Primitive Peoples. Thomas and Znaniecki's theory is, then, briefly stated, that exposure of the members of a group to attitudes and institutions to the understanding of which their own culture gives no clue, tends to lead to acts on their part which seem to the observer to be

[34] *The Polish Peasant,* Vol. II, p. 1173.
[35] *Ibid.,* Vol. II, pp. 1583-85; see also Vol. I, p. 78.

perverse or meaningless. Unable to define the situation, they react to it in incoherent ways. Pitt-Rivers, in the volume cited in the preceding chapter, has presented a somewhat similar explanation of the social disorganization which he believes to result invariably when savage peoples are exposed to the culture of more civilized nations. Pitt-Rivers, however, expresses his interpretation of the outcome of the impact of conflicting culture traits upon savages in terms of the loss of interest in life which the savage experiences when confronted with institutions which he cannot comprehend.

> Change in merely physical conditions, if not too great, provokes and stimulates the purposive mind to master the task of readjustment, whereas a change which limits in any way the normal functioning of habitual mental tendencies (such as is inaugurated by the subjection of a race to alien dominance and control, which irresistibly curbs, modifies, or checks the hopes and ambitions attached to every phase of their activity) deadens rather than stimulates the mind, in which interest and self-confidence is stamped out. All adaptation is primarily psychological in as much as adaptation, the condition of survival, is a purposive process, even when it is unconscious.[36]

It may be added that most contemporary ethnologists appear to agree with Pitt-Rivers as to the actual, historical effects of contact with civilization upon savage peoples, though not all would agree with his explanation, and probably not all would agree that these unfortunate effects could not be avoided by more intelligent administrative measures.

Formalism and Disorganization. Somewhat different from the interpretations we have just reviewed is Professor C. H. Cooley's treatment of social disorganization. Although his definition of disorganization is not incompatible with that given by Thomas and Znaniecki, Cooley regards it as closely related to formalism.

> The apparent opposite of formalism, but in reality closely akin to it, is disorganization, or disintegration, often though inaccurately, called "individualism." One is mechanism supreme, the other mechanism going to pieces; and both are in contrast to that harmony between human nature and its instruments which is desirable.

[36] Pitt-Rivers, G. H. L-F., *The Clash of Cultures and the Contact of Races*, p. 142.

In this state of things general order and discipline are lacking. Though there may be praiseworthy persons and activities, society as a whole wants unity and rationality, like a picture which is good in details but does not make a pleasing composition. Individuals and special groups appear to be working too much at cross purposes; there is a "reciprocal struggle of discordant powers" but the "harmony of the universe" does not emerge.[37]

By "formalism" Professor Cooley evidently means that condition of rigidity and over-organization in which the rules and customs defining the standards of personal behavior in a society are so stereotyped that successful and harmonious social adjustment to changed conditions is rendered impossible except, perhaps, after a period of disorganization.[38] His view of the relation of personal disorganization to social disorganization differs somewhat from that of Thomas and Znaniecki: Cooley holds that the effective development of personality in a period of social disorganization is possible only through the carrying over of guiding lines from some earlier era of social integration.[39] This position is of course in harmony with Cooley's general and fundamental thesis that "Mind is an organic whole, made up of cooperating individualities as the music of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds."[40] Personal unity without a corresponding social unity is for Cooley virtually a contradiction in terms.

At bottom, however, Cooley's conception of the nature of social disorganization is the same as that to which Thomas and Znaniecki find their way, and may furthermore be regarded as a conception quite consistent with Dewey's emphasis on communication as the fundamental social process.[41]

From one point of view, disorganization is a lack of communication and social consciousness, a defect in the organ of language, as formalism is an excess. There is always, I suppose, a larger whole; the question is whether the individual thinks and feels it through some sort of sympathetic contact; if he does he will act as a member of it.[42]

[37] Cooley, Charles Horton, *Social Organization* (New York, 1909), p. 347.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 349.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 348.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 3 (adapted).
[41] See Chap. XII above; also Cooley, *Social Process* (New York, 1922), p. 198.
[42] *Social Organization*, p. 350.

"Lack of communication" is of course one way of referring to exactly the state of affairs which we otherwise characterize as "culture conflict." Social organization, in the positive sense, as Durkheim, among others, has shown, is not equivalent to thoroughgoing homogeneity, of culture or of individual behavior; society is made of unlike but cooperating individualities, and it is precisely the fact of communication that makes possible cooperation of the most distinctively human sort.

Cooley's injection of the idea of formalism into his discussion of social organization and disorganization may be taken to afford us a convenient point of departure for the examination of a phase of social theory which we have as yet not expressly considered. Formalism is surely closely related to conventionality and fashion; and it is probably something more than a mere coincidence that periods of social history which might be characterized as periods of disorganization have so frequently been characterized by the extravagant sway of fashion and fad. Several substantial contributions to a theory of fashion and conventionality have in fact been made by social scientists, and to some of these we will turn our attention in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XXIV

CONVENTIONALITY AND FASHION

Fashion and the Study of Fashion. The systematic, scientific study of fashion and conventionality has been almost entirely of fairly recent date, as is the case with various other types of phenomena of sociological interest. The phenomenon of fashion is, however, itself relatively ancient. There is some evidence to show that the members of the privileged classes in the countries of the Mediterranean region began to be swept by tides of fashion in dress, amusement, and other phases of behavior as early as the fourth century B.C. And, of course, as soon as the phenomena of changing fashions made their appearance, they were made the object of comment and more or less severe condemnation by certain individuals who professed to have at heart the interests of the public. Xenophon, in *The Banquet,* gives a vivid picture of convivial life in the time of Socrates, one which suggests that the pursuit of the latest thing in the way of diversion was not unknown to the Athenians of that day. Aristotle evidently had in mind the tendency to imitate foreign manners when he recommended, in the *Politics,* that the ideal city be built at a distance from its seaport, because "the introduction of strangers brought up under other laws" would be a menace to good government.[1] Petronius Arbiter, in *The Satyricon,* describes scenes which constitute some evidence that the pursuit of new fashions had become much more intense since the period described by Xenophon. It was probably no more than we should expect that the great commercial activity which the conquest of the Mediterranean by the Romans made possible, should have facilitated in turn the spread of interesting novelties of dress and amusement from one city to another. The name of Cato the Censor has become for educated people a symbol of the

[1] *Op. cit.,* Bk. VII, Chap. IV.

criticism uttered against such innovations by those who have in mind an ideal of national vigor based on simple habits of life. In the treatment of the matter by the ancient and medieval critics, however, fashion was rarely distinguished from luxury; new fashions were attacked on the ground that they were luxurious, wasteful, and tended to emasculate the race.

Among modern writers, Spencer and Tarde were the outstanding pioneers in the discussion of fashion. There is no significant conflict between these two writers' views of fashion, but there is a marked difference of emphasis. Herbert Spencer is interested primarily in the effect of fashion upon the constitution of a society; Tarde deals primarily with "fashion imitation" as a type of social process. This difference is in harmony with the general contrast which can be noticed in the work of the two men, Spencer being always concerned with social structure, or social organization, and its evolution; while Tarde was a pioneer in the description of the social process as mental or psychic interaction.

Fashion as a Force Making for Social Equality. Spencer's chapter on fashion occurs in the section of his *Principles of Sociology* which is devoted to the discussion of ceremonial. As we have seen, he treats ceremonial as a form of social control. Here he points out that ceremony tends to enforce, not likeness, but unlikeness, between higher and lower, ruler and subject. Fashion, on the other hand, is a force tending to bring about likeness between the higher and lower classes in a society; it is the imitation of the superior by the inferior. The sociological problem is to account for this difference.[2] Now there are, as he believes, two motives for the imitation of the superior by the inferior, the one flattering to the superior, and therefore likely to be encouraged by them; the other a rivalrous motive, but one which is likely to find exercise under cover of the precedent set by the tolerance of the rulers for "reverential imitations." [3]

> Habitually there have been a few of subordinate rank who, for one reason or another, have been allowed to encroach by imitating

[2] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1916), Vol. II, p. 210 (Part IV, Chap. XI).
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 211-13.

the ranks above; and habitually the tendency has been to multiply the precedents for imitation, and so to establish for wider classes the freedom to live and dress in ways like those of the narrower classes. Especially has this happened as fast as rank and wealth have ceased to be coincident—as fast, that is, as industrialism has produced men rich enough to compete in style of living with those above them in rank. Partly from the greater means, and partly from the consequent greater power, acquired by the upper grades of producers and distributors; and partly from the increasing importance of the financial aid they can give to the governing classes in public and private affairs; there has been an ever-decreasing resistance to the adoption by them of usages originally forbidden to all but the high born.[4]

Thus by a progressive obliteration of the marks of class distinction, Spencer concludes fashion has tended toward equalization. It has also favored the growth of individualism—a remark which other writers would question, and one which perhaps illustrates the disposition to force the facts to fit a preconceived theory, which has been imputed to Spencer by his critics. He thinks, however, that fashion "has aided in weakening ceremonial, which implies subordination of the individual."[5] As the passage quoted above implies, Spencer correlates the growth of fashion imitation with his famous account of the transition from the militant to the industrial society. Ceremonial is in his view characteristic of a military society; fashion, on the other hand, is a trait of industrial society.

Fashion Contrasted with Custom. Gabriel Tarde agrees with Spencer to the extent that he also holds that there is a trend toward the greater and greater sway of fashion in human affairs. In a chapter of his *Laws of Imitation,* he has developed a much-quoted comparison between "custom imitation," which he regards as the imitation of ancestors, and "fashion imitation," which is defined as the imitation of contemporaries.[6] The tendency to the increase of fashion Tarde believes to be permanent and irreversible, since it is based upon the growth of population and the consequent increase of urban life. In rural communities people are typically exposed to only one

[4] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* Vol. II, pp. 213-14.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 215.
[6] *Op. cit.* (Parsons' translation, New York, 1903), p. 245.

model or pattern of behavior, which is that of their fathers. In cities, however, "the nervous plasticity and openness of adults . . . is in general well enough preserved to permit them to continue to model themselves upon new types brought in from outside." [7]

Tarde points out that, whereas fashion is apparently the admiration of everything new; in fact "the customary and traditional element is always preponderant in social life." Innovations can be propagated by their supporters only through appeal to the time-honored values, that is, by some form of identification of the new with the old.[8] It seems, however, that Tarde failed here to distinguish between *innovations* which certain persons are endeavoring to persuade others to adopt, and *fashions* which appear to spread more spontaneously. It can scarcely be said that all new usages are adopted because people are convinced that they are not really new. Such a theory can scarcely account for the passion for "the latest" which is so characteristic of some phases of social behavior in our day.

This author makes a distinction between epochs or periods of custom and epochs of fashion or conventionality. The former, he holds, are characterized by men's love of their country; the latter by love of the times.[9] He has sought, looking at the matter in perspective, to trace a typical cycle in the succession of fashion and custom. There is a natural tendency, so he believes, for new inventions or discoveries to spread faster than the people among whom they originate could enlarge their sway by the increase of numbers. Ultimately, after new inventions have spread widely over a region, no race can hope to survive unless it is apt in making use of the new devices; and the civilization, through this process, will tend to select a race of beings capable of perpetuating it.[10] It appears very much as if, in this line of reasoning, Tarde had made use of what Comte called the metaphysical theory of causation, hypostatizing a tendency as cause of the developments of which it consists. It may be, however, that he intended his language

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 247-48.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 246-47.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 247.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 250-52.

in the passage cited simply as a convenient metaphorical representation of a trend noticeable in history. By a similar line of reasoning, in any case, he arrives at the generalization that a form of civilization, after it has spread through a number of tribes and has adapted them to its requirements, welding them into a new human type, called a nation, tends to cease spreading, and settles down, so to speak, in the habitat it has created for itself.

> Ceasing to look beyond its own frontiers, it thinks only of its own posterity, and forgets the foreigner—as long, at least, as he does not force it to pay attention to him by some rude external shake-up. At this time everything in it takes on a national garb. It is to be observed that sooner or later every civilization tends toward this period of drawing in upon and consolidating itself. . . . Imitation, which was at first custom-imitation and then fashion-imitation, turns back again to custom, but under a form that is singularly enlarged and precisely opposite to its first form. In fact, primitive custom obeys whereas custom in its final stage commands, generation. The one is the exploitation of a social by a living form; the other, the exploitation of a living by a social form.[11]

Fashion and the Mores. One of the most thorough discussions of fashion that has yet been published is that which Sumner embodied in his *Folkways*.[12] His approach to the topic is through a comparison of fashion, fad, and the like with the mores, a comparison not entirely unlike Tarde's comparison of custom-imitation and fashion or convention-imitation. Fashion, fads, poses, and affectations, according to Sumner, differ from the mores in that they lack "the elements of truth and right with respect to welfare." That is, it is not felt by the members of a society to be morally obligatory to follow the changes of fashion; indeed a sort of virtue is imputed to the non-observance of the extravagances of these changes. Like the mores, however, these other social phenomena illustrate, and even more obviously than the mores, through their absurdity, the sway of mass movements over the individual.

> Fashion in dress has covered both absurdities and indecencies with the aegis of custom. . . . Conventionalization also comes into play to

[11] Tarde's *Laws of Imitation*, p. 253.
[12] *Op. cit.* (Boston, 1907), pp. 184-201.

cover the dress of the ballet or burlesque opera and the bathing dress. Conventionalization always includes a strict specification and limits of time, place, and occasion, beyond which the same dress would be vicious. . . . There never is any rational judgment in the fashion of dress. No criticism can reach it. In a few cases we know what actress or princess started a certain fashion, but in the great majority of cases we do not know whence it came or who was responsible for it. We all have to obey it. We hardly ever have any chance to answer back. Its all-sufficient sanction is that "everybody wears it," or wears it *so*. Evidently this is only a special application to dress of a general usage—conventionalization.[13]

Fashions are unlike the mores, which are subject to a "strain of better adaptation of means to ends," in that there is no guarantee that fashions will serve expediency. "All fashions tend to extravagance because the senses become accustomed to them, and it is necessary, in order to renew the impression of distinction, to exaggerate." [14]

The scope of fashion is very wide. There are fashions not only in the superficial activities of life, but in logic and reasoning, in philosophy, in science and in mathematics. In the latter fashion affects both content and concepts; hence "methodology" is eternal.[15] Fashion engenders affectations and poses on the part of those who cannot attain the real type set. The range of types of behavior which can be made matters of pose or cult is enormous, like the range of behavior affected by fashion strictly so-called. Schools of literature develop to support each such cult.[16]

It is Sumner's view that ultimately some fashions affect the mores, though in origin they are distinct from the mores.

The vanities, desires, prejudices, faiths, likes, and dislikes, which pervade a society, coerce dissenters and become stronger and stronger mass phenomena. They then affect interests. Then they wind strands of influence and control around individuals and demand sacrifices. In their combination they weave webs of action which constitute life and history. The selection which they exert, drawing in some and repelling others, produces results on the societal fabric of a later time. The consequences react on character, moral tone, life philosophy, ethical principles, and ruling sentiments. Thus they affect the mores,

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 184-85.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 192.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 193-94.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 197-98.

or even enter into them. The whole is handed on to the rising generation to be their outfit of knowledge, faith, and policy, and their rules of duty and well living.[17]

The distinction between fashion and the mores is thus after all not an absolute one, in Sumner's opinion; or at any rate there are intermediate gradations of conformity, and transitions from the one to the other. Sumner does not, in the passage cited, suggest that mores may degenerate into mere conventionalities not regarded as morally obligatory, but the proposition could easily be sustained by concrete instances; church-attendance, for example, seems to be a matter of fashion rather than of morality in certain classes and groups in our cities, although the reverse was true of the ancestors of the same persons.

E. A. Ross, through his use of Tarde's discussions of imitation in his *Social Control* and *Social Psychology,* has also emphasized the point made by Sumner, that fashion is a powerful form of social control. Like Sumner also, who suggests in the passage quoted above that fashion is a special case of a broader process which may be called "conventionalization," Ross prefers the terms "custom" and "convention," or "conventionality" as equivalents for Tarde's concepts of custom-imitation (*imitation-coutume*) and fashion-imitation (*imitation-mode*). A similar terminology has been used also by Cooley.

The Relation of Fashion and Custom to Communication. Professor Cooley has also reviewed with very illuminating comments Tarde's treatment of the contrast between custom and fashion. He refers to Tarde's discussion, but thinks too much has been made of the difference between the two forms of "imitation."

There is truly a momentous difference in this regard between modern and medieval life, but to call it a change from tradition to convention does not, I think, indicate its real character. Indeed, tradition and convention are by no means the separate and opposite things they may appear to be when we look at them in their most contrasted phases. It would be strange if there were any real separation between ideas coming from the past and those coming from contemporaries, since they exist in the same public mind. A tradi-

[17] *Folkways,* pp. 200-01.

tional usage is also a convention in the group where it prevails. One learns it from other people and conforms to it by imitation and the desire not to be singular, just as he does to any other convention. . . . In old times the conforming group, owing to the difficulty of intercourse, was small. People were eager to be in the fashion, as they are now, but they knew nothing of fashions beyond their own locality. Modern traditions are conventional on a larger scale.[18]

In a similar manner, he argues that conventions are also traditions. In a larger view of the matter, therefore, he concludes that tradition and convention "are merely aspects of the transmission of thought and of the unity of social groups that results from it." "All influences are contemporary in their immediate origin, all are rooted in the past." [19] This is of course not absolutely opposite to the position taken by Tarde, and is not so offered by Cooley. Cooley, however, gives the comparison of tradition with convention a somewhat different emphasis. In his view, the difference between a traditional society and a conventional society depends strictly upon intercourse with the larger world outside, a view similar to Tarde's contrast of the rural community with the city, but one which is used by Cooley as a point of departure for a discussion of the rôle of communication in both tradition and convention. In fact, he concludes, the extension of communication does not so much destroy the influence of tradition, as it exposes men to the influence of a broader range of traditions and leads to a selection of those traditional ideas which suit the tastes of the individual or group.[20]

Cooley has contributed several interesting detailed suggestions to the discussion of fashion. The dominance of a society by settled types of behavior, whether traditional or conventional, is, he thinks, furthered by several circumstances, including (1) racial or national temperament, (2) the lapse of sufficient time for a type to establish itself, "even fashion cannot be made in a minute," and (3) the right degree of interest in the matter, "We are most imitative when we notice but do not greatly care." [21] It must be remarked, however, in reference to the second of these points, that Cooley fails, like everyone

[18] Cooley, Charles Horton, *Social Organization* (New York, 1909), p. 337.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 338.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 338-39.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 340.

else who has discussed the topic, to give any revealing explanation of the tremendous rapidity with which fashions and crazes may spread, change, and die. Obviously there is in this subject still a field for research. In his more recent volume, *Social Process,* Cooley has mentioned fashion as an example of an "impersonal form" which seems to have a life-cycle of growth like that of a living person.[22]

Social Interaction in Time and Space. Georg Simmel has expressed in more abstract and general terms a doctrine of social interaction which is logically consistent with Cooley's and Tarde's expositions of custom and convention. With Simmel the inquiry assumes the form of an analysis of social interaction in time and in space. The existence of a social group is, he shows, in the last analysis, a matter of social interaction. This is the fundamental reason why individuals separated in space may be taken as members of a single entity, a society or group. But the persistence of a social group through the lapse of time is likewise possible only if its members continue to interact. It remains, then, to distinguish between the process by which the group exists and the process by which it endures. Spykman has summarized and adapted Simmel's further discussion of the question, in part, as follows:

> The group exists at a certain time because the mental bond between the individuals overcomes their separation in space. It is the process of interaction between them that creates and maintains the group. But in the case of individuals separated from one another in time, the group unity cannot be maintained in the same manner. In that case a complete reciprocity is impossible. The earlier members may indirectly influence the later members but the later members cannot influence the earlier ones. . . .
>
> Among the different factors which contribute toward this persistence of the group may be mentioned the following: The fact that change in membership occurs only gradually; the permanence of the locality; the objectivation of the group unity in symbols; its protection by means of law, honor, and morality; and the formation of special organs.[23]

Simmel's analysis of the processes by which the group is enabled to persist through the lapse of time, to maintain its

[22] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1922), p. 12; see also pp. 4 and 8.

[23] Spykman, Nicholas J., *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925), p. 164.

continuity, in other words, affords, by implication, a basis for a further explanation of the sway of convention—the imitation of contemporaries—in certain social situations. That is, whenever for any reason the forces making for continuity fail to operate; when the interaction of the older with the younger members of a society is interrupted, not only is social disorganization likely to ensue, as we noted in the preceding chapter, but the younger members of the society are more open to the influence of their contemporaries in other societies. It has been pointed out that in modern cities a great deal of attention is paid to appearances, to the maintenance of "front," mainly because most of those with whom the individual comes in contact know nothing else about him except what they see at the time, but perhaps also because the individual is not sufficiently in communication with the elders of his ancestral society to have their standards and customs impressed upon him. Maintaining appearances in such a society takes of course the form of conformity to fashions.

Fashion as "Conspicuous Waste." Thorstein Veblen's treatment of fashions of dress, in his *Theory of the Leisure Class,* is somewhat in the spirit of the foregoing suggestions. In this well-known volume the author traces the evolution of the grounds on which prestige is based, through the main stages of human history. It is his general thesis that, whereas prestige in primitive society rested chiefly upon efficiency in productive activities, it early came to be grounded on success in performances having the character of "exploits," and upon the possession of trophies and other tangible evidences of successful exploit. Through steps which need not concern us here, he traces the gradual substitution of "conspicuous leisure," "conspicuous consumption," "conspicuous waste," "vicarious consumption," and "vicarious leisure" as grounds of prestige, for the naïve display of trophies of the chase and successful warfare, his general theory being that these things gradually came to be accepted, through a process of transference of interest and the substitution of the result for the supposed cause, as the evidences of the sort of career to which "reputable notoriety" was attached in the society. Having established the principle that conspicuous leisure and conspicu-

ous waste are criteria of personal reputability in modern society, he then readily shows that the fashions of dress always conform to these criteria. It remains, however, to explain why fashions change so frequently.

> Dress must not only be conspicuously expensive and inconvenient; it must at the same time be up to date. No explanation at all satisfactory has hitherto been offered of the phenomenon of changing fashions. The imperative requirement of dressing in the latest accredited manner, as well as the fact that this accredited fashion constantly changes from season to season, is sufficiently familiar to everyone, but the theory of this flux and change has not been worked out. We may of course say, with perfect consistency and truthfulness, that this principle of novelty is another corollary under the law of conspicuous waste. . . . This is good as far as it goes, but it is negative only . . . it leaves unanswered the question as to the motive for making and accepting a change in the prevailing styles, and it also fails to explain why conformity to a given style at a given time is so imperatively necessary as we know it to be.[24]

One might question the author's unwillingness to accept the social demand for conspicuous waste as a sufficient explanation for the rapid succession of changing styles. This explanation, elaborated, would run as follows: In societies with highly organized commerce and markets, like those of the western world today, since the greater number of the desirable things of life appear to be purchasable, wealth comes to be the fundamental, and well-nigh universal criterion of prestige. The natural tendency of the individual, then, is to attempt to satisfy his desire for recognition or status by a display of the evidences of wealth, since his actual wealth cannot be known accurately to large numbers of people except through his evidences of expenditure. Hence individuals seek to dress in such a manner as will convey to all observers the impression that they are wealthy, *i.e.*, "successful." But this impression on the part of the observers will be heightened if one wears garments of a style which originated only a few weeks or at most a few months earlier, thus showing that he could afford to discard his old clothes and buy new. Hence, the susceptibility of most persons to the appeal of the new fashions offered by the mer-

[24] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1922), pp. 172-73.

chants, and the consequent incentive offered to the dealers and manufacturers to offer new styles at frequent intervals.

Veblen's own conclusion is, as we have seen, that "conspicuous waste" is not a sufficient explanation of the changes of fashion, and he offers as a more dynamic explanation the "motive of adornment," which he evidently assumes to be an innate human craving. "The changing styles are the expression of a restless search after something which shall commend itself to our æsthetic sense." [25]

Park and Burgess have briefly reviewed some of the literature dealing with fashion and related topics, and have contributed at least two pertinent suggestions for the further study of the phenomenon.[26] Regarding fashion as a general type of change in social usage, they have called attention to A. V. Dicey's discussion of the trend of change in public opinion, and have suggested that this is a sort of fashion. The question is raised in this connection whether the changes in public opinion have displayed a long-run trend in one direction. The answer to the question evidently depends in part upon the exact definition given to public opinion. Park and Burgess, following a suggestion drawn from Sumner, assert that public opinion changes one way and the other, like the weather, but the mores, which underlie public opinion, change steadily in one direction.[27] Manifestly, however, this is a problem for further study on the basis of research work on concrete material. These authors have also made a pertinent distinction between fashion and reform.

> Fashion is related to reform and to revolution, because it is one of the fundamental ways in which social changes take place and because, like reform and revolution, it also is related to the mores.
>
> Fashion is distinguished from reform by the fact that the changes it introduces are wholly irrational if not at the same time wholly unpredictable. Reform, on the other hand, is nothing if not rational. It achieves its ends by agitation and discussion. Attempts have been made to introduce fashions by agitation, but they have not succeeded. On the other hand, reform itself is a fashion and has largely absorbed

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 174.
[26] *Op. cit.*, see in general Chap. XII, "Social Control," and Chap. XIII.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 831-32.

in recent years the interest that was formerly bestowed upon party politics.[28]

This is perhaps in effect a reiteration in different terms of Sumner's dictum that there are fashions in most phases of social activity,—not only manners and dress, but politics, philosophy, and science. This is not the same thing, however, as to say that politics, philosophy, and science are simply fashions.

Since scarcely any type of behavior is more obviously *social* than is fashion, it is somewhat surprising that the subject has not been more thoroughly and systematically studied. The foregoing review of some of the interesting bits of existing literature dealing with fashion in a more or less objective, scientific way, seems to reveal mainly the very fragmentary, conjectural character of our present knowledge.

[28] Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1922), pp. 933-34.

CHAPTER XXV

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RECREATION

Play and the Study of Play. The phenomenon of play, if the term be defined as it most commonly is, is evidently older than the human race. The young, and even upon occasion older individuals, of the higher animal species engage in activities which we may quite properly call play; and there seems to be little reason to doubt that human children have always and everywhere played except when they have been prevented by severe environmental constraint. Like many other types of social behavior with which we have been concerned in the foregoing chapters, however, play has been studied in an objective and systematic way only in fairly recent times. If, provisionally, we designate work, courtship and love, religion, government and politics, war, and play as the major forms of socialized human activity, then we need have little hesitancy in saying that play is the latest of these to become the object of scientific research or philosophical speculation. The case would not be different if we should add the fine arts to the list.

The Ancient Theory of Recreation. This historical neglect of the study of play and recreation has probably been due, in part, to two influences: (1) In the western world, since Christianity became the preponderant pattern for religious and moral beliefs, recreation, as a mere purposeless indulgence of the desires and impulses of the flesh, was usually condemned in so far as it was noticed at all, and was therefore hardly considered worthy of serious study. It should be added, however, that in this as in so many other matters, the Roman Catholic church has always been disposed to temper doctrinal absolutism with considerable leniency in ecclesiastical administration of control over the conduct of believers. The "Continental Sunday," given over in large part to recreation, has long been the object of criticism by the Puritan religious leaders of

the Anglo-Saxon countries. (2) In earlier times, recreation—in its more institutionalized forms at any rate—was not sharply differentiated from religion; the drama and the dance, for instance, were generally regarded by savage, barbarian, and even ancient civilized peoples as religious ceremonies; hence it was not felt by the ancients to be necessary to discuss recreation seriously as a separate type of social activity. The play of children was, in ancient times, either taken for granted or treated as a means of training for future responsibilities, the latter being the attitude taken by Plato and Aristotle. We owe to Aristotle, to be sure, his famous "cathartic theory of tragedy," which, as we shall see, has enjoyed a revival in modified forms at the hands of modern writers on recreation and sport, and which may perhaps be regarded as the germinal idea at the bottom of most contemporary theories intended to account for the fact of recreation.

Medieval Theories. Whether for the reason we have indicated or for others, medieval writers seem to have left very little literature upon which modern students of play and recreation could build. Bede Jarrett has rescued from obscurity and summarized the treatise on education entitled *De Liberorum Eruditione,* composed by Mafeo Vegio, a fifteenth-century Italian scholar, in which he advises the provision of stated times for games, and discusses the relative and special merits of various sports.[1] In the works of earlier writers summarized or cited by Father Jarrett, there is evidence of some recognition of the fact that children may be expected to play, and that older persons naturally have their recreations.

The Union of Religion with Recreation. It is in fact possible for the sociologist to make any one of several different approaches to the study of play and recreation. Play is a social phenomenon in that it is a widely distributed feature of the life of peoples with different cultures and differing social organizations, even if it is perhaps not demonstrably a universal feature of human behavior. Play is also a social phenomenon in the sense that both children and adults appear to prefer to carry on their play or recreation, as a rule, in company, col-

[1] Jarrett, Bede, *Social Theories of the Middle Ages* (Boston, 1926), pp. 50-51, 64.

lectively. The objective study of play may, accordingly, be approached in the light of either of these conceptions. In fact ethnologists have paid considerable attention to the forms of play and recreation employed by different culture groups, and their findings were drawn upon by Karl Groos for the material used in his classical treatise on the play of man, to which we shall refer later. Ethnological studies have disclosed, as was suggested above, that in the earlier stages of social evolution recreation is scarcely to be distinguished from religious ceremonial. It is, therefore, as a type of collective behavior which is at the same time religious and recreational that a number of modern social scientists have dealt with some of the types of adult recreation practiced by ancient and modern primitive peoples. Much of the literature to which we referred in our study of the sociology of religion might, from this point of view, be regarded as introductory to the study of the sociology of recreation. Emile Durkheim, Jane Harrison, and Gilbert Murray, all of them describe societies in which recreation and religious ritual are mainly one and the same. It is quite evident that the Greek drama was appreciated as a form of entertainment by the time of the great classical dramatists, and this is particularly apparent of the comedies of Aristophanes; yet Murray and Harrison have shown most convincingly that the Greek drama was in origin a religious ceremonial, and that it retained something of this character down to historic times.

Durkheim has not only shown that the savage dance is a primitive form—perhaps the primitive form—of religious ritual, but he has called attention to the existence among the native Australians of a totemic group having its own characteristic sacred rites and sacred objects like other such groups, but having in the general religious system of the society no discernible function except that of providing entertainment for the other members of the tribe.

> We have . . . a whole group of ceremonies whose sole object is to awaken certain ideas and sentiments, to attach the present to the past or the individual to the group. Not only are they unable to serve useful ends, but the worshippers demand none. . . .
>
> The Warramunga have a totem "of the laughing boy." Spencer and Gillen say that the clan bearing this name has the same organi-

zation as the other totemic groups. . . . The rites connected with this totem are indistinguishable from those relating to the animal or vegetable totems. Yet it is evident that they could not have any physical efficaciousness. They consist in a series of four ceremonies which repeat one another more or less, but which are intended only to amuse and to provòke laughter by laughter, in fine, to maintain the gaiety and good humour which the group has as its specialty.[2]

Durkheim's general theory concerning the social significance and social "survival value" of such rites, expressed by him as a theory of religion, is suggested in the opening sentence of the foregoing quotation; it is that religious ceremonials thrive and endure because they promote effective solidarity and continuity in the groups having them. The instance given, however, suggests that any performance whereby the members of a society are led to participate in a common emotion with which group traditions and memories are connected, a humorous emotional state as well as a serious, reverent or enthusiastic one may have social value as a conserver of group solidarity.

The Fusion of Work with Play. Of related interest, because similarly based on comparative and objective studies of cultures, is Karl Bücher's discussion of the fusion of play with work in certain social groups. In *Arbeit und Rhythmus* he reaches the conclusion from the examination of considerable concrete material that, "in the early period of human evolution, work and play were not separated." He finds many instances of a form of work in which not only the useful purpose of the work, but also the attitude of reluctance ordinarily thought of as inseparable from work, are almost lacking, and in place of these attitudes, two positive impulses are exhibited in connection with the performance: an impulse derived from rhythmic bodily movements, and an impulse expressed in, and fostered by, vocal song or other music. Some of these types of work are carried out in dance-like movements. In such cases, then, he asserts, the boundary line between work and play is almost obliterated.[3] Indeed, this entire treatise of Bücher's might be regarded as an exploration of the forms of human activity in which many native impulses seem to con-

[2] Durkheim, Emile, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, pp. 378-79.
[3] *Op. cit.* (Leipzig, sixth, improved and enlarged edition, 1924), p. 332.

verge and find satisfaction; the activities of this sort assume a pleasing, stimulating rhythmic form, frequently guided and timed by folksongs; and, while these activities have effects economically useful to the group, they are scarcely to be characterized as work any more than as play or recreation. As we shall note on a later page, certain writers have discussed the possibility of deriving from such instances a social ideal for the guidance of industrial betterment generally.

The Psychological Causes of Play. Modern studies of play and recreation have proceeded, as a rule, along two lines of inquiry: the investigation of the psychological causes of the existence and of the forms taken by play and recreation; and the analysis of the social consequences of various forms of these activities, under which latter heading we may classify the studies that have been made of "play groups," as well as the study of sports, festivals, the theater, and the dance. The study of laughter and of wit and humor appears, however, to be logically related to the study of recreation, and we may take space to note briefly in the following pages some of the contributions which have been made to this phase of socio-psychological theory. Finally, some attention should be paid to the literature dealing with the "play movement" and with practical problems of the administration and supervision of play and recreation, which are now recognized as a special field of social work and social betterment.

"The Play of Man." Without doubt the most influential general treatment of play that has yet been published is that appearing in Karl Groos' two standard treatises, *The Play of Animals* and *The Play of Man.*[4] Space limits prevent reviewing here the considerable body of concrete material which has been brought together and interpreted in these volumes; what is of most importance for the primary purposes of this volume is the central theory of human play which Groos presented in *The Play of Man.* Like most other writers who have sought to develop general theoretic explanations of the fact of human play, Groos found it expedient to base his treatment on a rather indefinite hypothesis concerning the "instincts" or less definite innate behavior tendencies of man. Referring briefly to his use

[4] Translations by Elizabeth Baldwin, New York, 1898, 1901.

of a theory of instinct in the volume on the play of animals, and pointing to the intrinsic plausibility of a more or less analogous explanation of the play of man, he notes certain difficulties in the way of using the term instinct, in a strict sense, in an explanation of human play. He decides that "we can only hold fast to the fact of the primal need for activity, which, while it cannot, any more than the other, be included in the narrower sense of the terms, has nevertheless an unmistakable relation to the life of impulse and instinct." Under the term "primal need for activity," Groos would include the tendency to seek for special sensation as well as definite and indefinite tendencies to physical movement.[5]

In his development of this general assumption, Groos indicates the impulse to imitate as a force which is especially conspicuous among the factors determinative of play. He mentions with qualified approval Tarde's identification of the imitative with the social, but adds that two other fundamental human tendencies, connected, he thinks, with the needs of the family, are still more characteristic of human forms of play. These are the tendency to association, or the gregarious, herd, tendency, and the tendency to communication.[6] Using these assumptions concerning the dynamic forces involved, then, Groos presents as his general theory of play what others have called the "practice theory."[7] Briefly stated, this theory is that, while arising from innate behavior tendencies, play is in fact and in function a preparation for the more directly useful activities of adult life. Social games, according to this view, prepare boys and girls for later life by exercising the gregarious or associative tendency. These games have the value also, however, of developing and inculcating in the individual the habit of voluntary subordination which is so essential a feature of an evolved social life. Likewise he holds that play is instrumental in teaching children submission to law, as well as to a leader. In this latter respect, he believes that the play of boys

[5] *The Play of Man*, pp. 1-4.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 334-35.
[7] G. T. W. Patrick speaks of Groos' theory in these terms in his *Psychology of Relaxation* (Boston and New York, 1916), pp. 34-35, 79. Groos himself, as rendered by his translator, has also called his theory the "practice theory" in one passage.

typically gives them more training than does the play of girls; their games have in them more of the element of subordination to the rules of the game. "Woman is the guardian of good form, but as a rule she will not subordinate herself to rigorous law." Groos accounts for this difference between the sexes in part also, however, by a difference in the innate nature of the two sexes. By a similar line of analysis, he concludes that play exercises and inculcates the idea of formal punishment for infraction of law. Play fosters the development of sympathy or "tender emotion." Language is a form of activity which serves a practical as well as a playful end from its earliest appearance in the individual; there are, however, many examples of its playful exercise and practice of this tendency. Referring to dancing as a form of play Groos mentions with approval the theory of Grosse, presented in the latter's treatise, *The Beginnings of Art,* according to which dancing is an elemental process in which social solidarity is generated; it "fuses the distinct individualities into a unified essence moved and governed by a single emotion." [8]

This "practice theory" does not, in Groos' judgment, lack application in the explanation of the play of adults. The practice in social solidarity afforded by social games is indeed, he holds, more important to adults than to children, "since the latter has always a certain social sphere in his relations with his elders, while the wider demands of an adult are not always so well provided for." [9] The general theory is summarized by the author in the following words:

> In general I hold to the view that play makes it possible to dispense to a certain degree with specialized heredity mechanism by fixing and increasing acquired adaptations. On the social side we find much the same conditions, though we may perhaps assume that comradeship in play has an orthoplastic influence on the intensity of the social impulse. When a society undertakes new tasks which lead to stronger and more extended social organization, play alone can supply the necessary conditions. Under its "screening" influence natural selection has time to eliminate the variations which are not coincident, to further those which are, and so to strengthen gradually the social impulses." [10]

[8] *Op. cit.,* Pt. II, Sec. IV, "Social Plays," *passim.*
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 395.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 396.

As we shall note in a later paragraph, the general theory of Groos has been criticized by Patrick for its too great reliance on the accuracy with which natural selection may foster complex adaptations, as implied in the passage quoted. Most later writers have, however, drawn upon Groos' suggestions in forming their own theories of play.

Play and Instinct. Several other writers have stated even more definitely than Groos the thesis that play is based on instinct in one way or another. McDougall, usually credited with the introduction of the instinct concept into social theory, names play as one of the "non-specific innate tendencies" of human beings. He mentions Groos' theory of play, with approval but with certain criticisms. The actual causation of play, he thinks, is variable and is not susceptible of being reduced to so simple and universal an explanation as Groos proposes. He points to the fact that play is frequently characterized by conscious self-restraint on the part of the actors; one is careful to keep his playful fighting, for instance, within relatively harmless bounds. This tendency, he implies, is scarcely compatible with the definition of play as spontaneous, purely instinctive, or impulsive activity. Again, he points out that play often takes a strongly rivalrous form, and in such cases the instinctive basis of the activity must, he concludes, be rather complex, derivative from the fighting instinct in part, but differentiated from the simple manifestations of that instinct through the concomitant operation of other instincts or tendencies.[11]

Professor Ross relates recreation to instinct in his explanation of the former, but it is a somewhat different causation which he asserts from that supposed by Groos to account for play. The two positions are not necessarily altogether contradictory; for Groos is concerned primarily with the *play* of children, while Ross has in mind primarily the *recreations* of adults. Ross explains modern forms of recreation as modes of satisfaction for thwarted instincts.[12]

[11] McDougall, William, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (thirteenth edition, New York, 1918), p. 110 ff.

[12] Ross, Edward Alsworth, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1920), p. 607.

The increasing poverty of modern employments in elements which stimulate the instincts accounts for the amazing growth in our time of the passion for recreation. What the "stale" worker covets is not *rest;* else why not lounge away his holiday on his back porch? Nor is *change of activity* all he craves; else why does not the hotel clerk spend his vacation as stevedore, the physician as teamster or piano-mover? If it is *relaxation* he is after, why does not the tired brain worker spend his summer holidays in gymnasium, bowling alley, and shooting gallery? No, what ails the slave of desk and clock, of client and customer, is what ails the horse pawing in his stall, the wolf restlessly pacing his cage. *He needs experience that will feed his famishing instincts.*

Starting from the proposition that modern recreational tendencies express a need for experience that will satisfy thwarted instincts, then, Ross continues his discussion with a line of reasoning based on familiar facts, to show that these tendencies lead to vice. He does not specifically indicate what he means by vice, but the term is implicitly taken to mean socially and individually harmful, "vitiating" types of activity. He traces excesses in sports and amusements, in part, to the differentiation of spectators from participants. The dangers, he believes, may be counteracted by suppression, substitution, and sublimation, the latter two methods, naturally, being indicated in his discussion as the more effective in the long run. Ross presents briefly a theory of the constructive value of play similar to those of Groos and Cooley, namely, that social play makes for "character discipline," and that the playground serves as a "miniature society." [13]

The Child's "Play World." Various writers have attempted to describe and interpret the play world as seen through the child's own eyes. It has been appreciated for a long time that the child's play world has a character of its own, quite different from the world in which the adult lives and moves. Its character has been described by such terms as "fanciful," "imaginary," "unreal," and the like. Professor Kurt Koffka, a leading representative of the new "Gestalt" school of psychological thought, has formulated a suggestive description of the child's play world from the viewpoint afforded by the doctrine of that school.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 609-16.

It seems to me that we can best understand play, psychologically, by considering the activities of the child from the point of view of the larger configuration of events in which play occurs. We have, at the beginning, a situation in which the child can form no temporal patterns at all which go beyond the activities just performed. Here all separate activities must be independent of one another, everyone being of the same sort and of the same worth. From the child's point of view there is not as yet anything at this stage that can be called play or not-play. From the adult's point of view, however, childish behavior can be characterized as *playful,* provided one accepts Groos' definition of play as an activity which is enjoyed purely for its own sake.[14]

Koffka goes on to indicate that later, especially after the child goes to school, the play-world is differentiated by him from the world of work, but both remain for a time relatively shut off from the rest of the world as known to other, adult, persons. "Play itself can, however, be so directed that it becomes closely related to the rest of life. The play-character then disappears almost entirely." [15]

What Koffka evidently means by the last-quoted sentences is that if the child's play activities are so manipulated and interpreted for him by older persons that all such activities have reference to some ulterior end or value, the activity ceases to be play, while not becoming effective work; it acquires a sort of neutral, emotionally insipid quality. Graham Wallas has expressed the same idea vividly with the aid of the remark quoted from a six-year-old English boy who had been sent to a Froebelian school in London which aimed at obliterating the distinction between "play" and "lessons." At the end of the first week the little boy said to his father, "At that school, when they work they don't really work, and when they play they don't really play." [16] Wallas himself, needless to add, believes strongly that the line of advancement and progress lies in the direction of recognition and cultivation of the sense of the difference between play and work; he is strongly critical of the virtual professionalization of sports which he holds to be

[14] Koffka, Kurt, *The Growth of the Mind:* An Introduction to Child Psychology, translated by Robert Morris Ogden (New York and London, 1925), p. 344.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 352-53.
[16] Wallas, Graham, *Our Social Heritage,* p. 45.

characteristic of academic institutions in the United States.[17]

A number of modern writers have presented variants of the general theory that recreation consists, essentially, in temporary release from socially created tensions. The passage quoted from Ross above is in effect a simple statement of this theory, which, in the form primarily of a theory of wit, has been most elaborately developed by Freud, who explains the popularity of *risqué* jokes and stories in terms of the temporary, not too obvious release which they afford to the ubiquitous interest in matters of sex, which interest is ordinarily held in leash by social conventions.

Sumner appears to have evolved a similar but somewhat less technical explanation of some features of recreation quite independently of any knowledge of Freud's theory. Sumner's discussion takes the form mainly of an interpretation of the excesses and liberties allowed by a special sort of social convention at certain festival occasions. Experience of the society with the destructive effects of excesses, particularly sexual excesses, have, according to this theory, led in the course of time to the formation in all societies of "folk-ways of restraint, which are customary and conventional regulations of primary natural impulses." Since festivals, however, are usually conceived as occasions for recalling and doing honor to revered ancestors, these tend to become occasions of reversion to the "natural ways" of the ancestors, who are conceived to have been uncultivated as compared with the later generation. Hence on festival occasions, societies tolerate behavior of types which are forbidden under other circumstances. Sumner extends this explanation with no particular justification for doing so, to apply to the licence allowed in the theater. The point might be made that, while this explanation perhaps actually does constitute the rationalization which reflective persons give to account for the relaxation of the mores on special occasions, the *psychological* causation of these roughly periodic episodes of release may be quite different. Sumner, however, does not distinguish between the two viewpoints.[18] He does state in a

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 49-51.

[18] *Folkways*, pp. 561-64; see also the remainder of Chap. XVII, pp. 560-604.

later passage of the same general discussion that "It is evident that amusement and relaxation are needs of men. The fondness for exhibitions can be traced through history." [19]

The idea that amusement is a need of mankind suggests W. I. Thomas' inclusion of a "desire for new experience," or for adventure, stimulations, and romance, as one of his four fundamental classifications of human wishes.[20] Professor R. E. Park has briefly discussed this romantic impulse in its relations to the make-up of the modern urban community; he correlates the search for excitement and adventure with the stultification of natural tendencies which is brought about by the minute subdivision of labor found in a modern industrial city.[21] Professor F. M. Thrasher has made use of much the same thesis in his interpretation of the activities and motives of boys' gangs in a modern city.[22] It is Thrasher's opinion that one reason why boys' play groups become delinquent gangs in certain parts of the city and not in others is that the former areas afford no opportunity for the boys to act out their romantic impulses with sympathetic tolerance and guidance from their elders. The slum boy's attempts to play are extremely likely to embroil him with the police, because there is no place in the slum or near it where play is allowed; whereas the vicinity of the slum abounds in haunts which are forbidden but which to the boys' eyes afford great opportunities for romantic adventure.

Theories of Laughter and the Comic. In the English language, at any rate, play and recreation are also spoken of as "fun," and the psycho-physical phenomenon of laughter is likewise associated with the concept of fun. While the laughable and the social effects of laughter evidently constitute only a part of the realm of what we think of as recreation, it seems logical to incorporate in the present chapter a brief account of some of the contributions which have been made to a general theory of laughter. Probably best-known of all books devoted to this topic is the little volume *Laughter: An Essay on the*

[19] *Folkways*, p. 603.
[20] See Chap. XV above.
[21] *The City*, by R. E. Park and others, Chap. VI, *Community Organization and the Romantic Temper;* see especially pp. 117-18.
[22] Thrasher, Frederic M., *The Gang*, pp. 116-17.

Meaning of the Comic, by the famous French philosopher Henri Bergson.[23] It is primarily the causation of laughter with which Bergson concerns himself; he seeks to formulate a generalized answer to the question, What is it that we tend to laugh at? Briefly stated, his answer to the question is that we laugh when we see or hear or read of human beings acting as if they were inanimate objects, *i.e.,* when they act or are manipulated mechanically, as if they lacked choice and self-determination. He does, however, draw from this thesis the obvious inference that laughter exercises a function of social correction; it tends to hold people up to a certain standard of performance and self-control. Some time after Bergson's essay appeared James Sully published a more elaborate study of the same phenomenon, in which he criticized Bergson's theory of laughter on the ground that it was over-simplified, and attempted to canvass in some detail the various sorts of events which are the occasion of laughter, and to point out the causation of each type.[24] Of greater interest to the social scientist, however, are Sully's remarks as to the social function of laughter. While not departing fundamentally from the suggestion made by Bergson, that laughter is a corrective of social customs and innovations, he elaborates the proposition. He points out, among other things, that laughter is contagious, and thus it operates to fuse the members of a group into a greater solidarity, a principle which was also, we may recall, suggested by Durkheim. Laughter is, on the other hand, divisive in its effects as regards the laughers and the person or group laughed at. It is therefore facilitated by the existence of well-marked distinctions between classes and other groups within a society; through ridicule the different groups control and curb each other's encroachments. On the other hand, laughter has the effect of softening and dissolving hostilities between social groups; it tends to invite the turning of combat into play, and cultivates good temper, toleration, and comradeship.[25] Sully also distinguishes the individual from the social

[23] Authorized translation by Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell, New York, 1911. (First French edition dated much earlier.)

[24] Sully, James, *An Essay on Laughter:* its causes, its development, and its value. New York and London, 1902.

[25] *Ibid.,* Chap. X, *passim.*

manifestations of laughter. Individual laughter is the province of the humorist, and this author regards the humorist as a species of philosopher. He is able by taking the humorous attitude to detach himself from many of the social judgments held in the community of which he is a member; and this affords him a basis for the exercise of reconstructive suggestions.[26]

An interpretation of laughter somewhat similar to that of Sully was expressed by Dugas, another French writer, in a volume published at about the same time. Perhaps the principal emphasis made by Dugas which is not so prominent in Sully's treatise is that of the essential cruelty of laughter, when it is not restrained and discriminating.[27]

Patrick's General Theory of Relaxation. The whole subject of play and recreation has been concisely reconsidered, along with certain related topics, by Professor G. T. W. Patrick, in his brief but thoughtful volume, *The Psychology of Relaxation*.[28] As his title suggests, the viewpoint of the author in this volume is primarily that of the psychologist, but, as will appear from the following *résumé*, his psychology is what some would call *social* psychology, and the general hypothesis which he advances to account for some of the current aspects of the human tendency to seek "relaxation" is certainly of interest to the social scientist. Professor Patrick develops the theory that a single type of psychological causation may be held to account for a variety of forms of relaxation, including play, laughter, profanity, alcoholism, and war. His point of departure is the assertion that ours is an age of very great activity, industrial, commercial, professional, and intellectual. "It is an age of great effort and endeavor, of stress and tension, of labor and strain, of scientific and inventive ability; an age of great efficiency and striving for efficiency; an age of variegation; a centrifugal age." [29] He mentions with apparent approval Giddings' summary of the *social* results of an age of such ac-

[26] Sully, *op. cit.*, Chap. XII, *passim*.

[27] Dugas, L., *Psychologie du Rire* (Paris, 1902); quoted (adapted) by Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1924), pp. 370-75.

[28] Boston and New York, 1916, ix + 280 pp.

[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

tivity: namely, "(1) an increase of wealth, culture, and refinement, followed by a marked increase of population; (2) a movement of the people toward the large cities; and (3) a displacement of the higher types of people by the lower, followed by an increase of crime, vagabondage, suicide, and feeble-mindedness." [30] Patrick's inquiry is primarily, however, toward the effects of this activity upon the individual, that is, the psychological effects. His general name for the sum and type of such effects is *tension;* and tension, he thinks, leads by natural psychological—perhaps at bottom physiological and neurological—processes to various forms of relaxation, of release of tension.

> The repression of primitive impulses to the end of growing social needs is the fundamental law of human progress. Such continual repression necessitates constant effort, constant strain, and constant exercise of voluntary attention. It involves those higher brain centers whose development has conditioned human progress, and brings upon them a severe and constant strain, making rest and relaxation imperative. When this everlasting urge of progress is excessive, as it has been in recent times, we may say that there is in a way a constant subconscious rebellion against it and a constant disposition to escape from it, and the method of escape is always the temporary reversion to simpler and more primitive forms of behavior,—a return to nature, so to speak. Sudden momentary and unexpected release from this tension, with instinctive reinstatement of primitive forms of expression, is laughter. Daily or periodic systematic return to primitive forms of activity is sport or play. War is a violent social reversion to elemental and natural inter-tribal relations. Profanity is a resort to primitive forms of vocal expression to relieve a situation which threatens one's well-being. Alcohol is an artificial means of relieving mental tension by the narcotizing of the higher brain centers.[31]

In the chapter of his book devoted particularly to play, Patrick subjects to a critical examination the theories of play which he considers to represent the principal approaches which earlier writers have made to the subject, namely, Herbert Spencer's theory that play is the expenditure of the energies of organs and systems which are not sufficiently employed in the ordinary activities of human life; [32] Groos' practice theory

[30] Patrick, *Psychology of Relaxation,* p. 17.

[31] *Ibid.,* pp. 19-20. Used by permission of author and publisher.

[32] *Ibid.,* p. 31; see Spencer's *Principles of Psychology,* Vol. II, Chap. IX; also his "The Gospel of Relaxation," in *Modern Eloquence,* Vol. III, pp. 1067-76.

of play; and G. Stanley Hall's recapitulation theory. Space prevents our reviewing his criticisms here; we may simply note that he finds some valid insight in each, but considers that each is over-simplified and otherwise defective. He also cites Groos' recent "catharsis" theory of play—that play is a safety valve for pent-up emotion. This theory, Patrick believes, is nonsensical if taken in its most literal form, but he thinks that Groos probably did not intend it to be so understood, and he points out that recent physiological researches carried out by Cannon and others have given support to a modified version of the catharsis theory, as a way of describing the consumption of unused secretions in play, and the consequent restoration of "psychophysical balance." [33]

Patrick's own theory of relaxation is sufficiently indicated for our purposes in the foregoing quoted passage from his introductory chapter. The reader is referred to his book for further particulars. One or two significant points in his constructive treatment are, however, worth special mention. He finds a striking similarity between the plays of children, those of adults, and those of primitive man, and believes that all three are to be accounted for by the same general theory, namely, the recurrence of old racial activities.[34] Of interest also is his treatment of religion as a form of relaxation.

> Religion is a letting go the stress and tension of the individual and resigning one's self to an outside power, whether that power be God or the Church. The function of religion in this aspect is that of a sustainer, and religion loses much of its usefulness if the individual, as is often the case, feels it his duty to sustain his religion. His religion must sustain him. Clubs, societies, fraternities of all kinds, exercise a similar function. The great charm of all fraternal societies is that they relieve the stress, the burden, the tension of the individual and shift the responsibility upon the society as a whole. The society is back of him, to some extent will do his thinking for him, decide moral questions for him, relieve him from fear.[35]

As was suggested in an earlier paragraph of the present chapter, the theories of play which we have been considering

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 41-45.
[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

to this point have on the whole the quality in common of being theories of the *cause* of play. They attempt to reveal the psychic mechanism by which the sort of activities which we call play and recreation is generated. To be sure, some of them, like that of Patrick, present also some description of the *social function* of recreation, and relate it to the causal explanation offered, on the general assumption that if some form of recreation has a certain effect upon men's social condition—particularly an effect in the direction of releasing accumulated tensions, they will naturally stumble upon that means of release sooner or later, and it will then to some extent become institutionalized, sanctioned by the society under certain safeguards or restrictions as to time and occasion. A theory of recreation of this type is perhaps entitled to a more prominent place in a general system of scientific social theory than a more or less generalized analysis of some of the practical problems and local, concrete manifestations of the play tendency. Several interesting contributions to the body of literature dealing with play and recreation have, however, been of the latter type.

Play Groups and Boys' Gangs. The nature and functioning of the *play group* have been made the object of inquiry by several recent writers. As we have seen, Groos held that social games have a socializing effect, in that they teach the child to submit to necessary discipline and leadership. McDougall reasserted the same point.[36] Particularizing the idea somewhat, Cooley named the play group as one of the commoner types of primary group, in which "human nature" as we know it is formed.[37] Boys' gangs, which may be considered a special type of play groups, have been studied by J. Adams Puffer,[38] and, more thoroughly, with a larger, more systematic use of concrete data, by Frederic M. Thrasher.[39] Thrasher found among the activities of boys' gangs in Chicago processes of mutual stimulation, leading to the increase of the feeling of group solidarity, somewhat in the manner suggested

[36] *Op. cit.*, pp. 352-54.
[37] Cooley, C. H., *Social Organization*, pp. 24-25; see also Chap. IV, *passim*.
[38] Puffer, J. Adams, *The Boy and His Gang*, Boston, 1912, xii + 188 pp.
[39] *Op. cit.*

by Durkheim and others.[40] Studies of children living on the West Side of New York City, made by the Russell Sage Foundation some years ago, throw light upon the relation which exists between juvenile delinquency and the difficulties of play in the city environment.[41] Jane Addams has given a popular, readable interpretation of the same sort of conditions in *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets.*

The "Play Movement." Clarence E. Rainwater has brought together in a small volume some of the facts concerning the development of public and quasi-public efforts and the supervision of play and the provision of better facilities for play and recreation.[42] In a short theoretic introduction to his factual chapters he indicates as one of the working principles which it is found necessary to apply in the administration of playgrounds and supervised recreation generally, that play may take an infinite variety of forms, because the form of play is "determined by the response of the inherited and acquired capacities of persons to the social situation, and is intrinsically related to what ethnologists describe as the culture of the group." [43]

The Evolution of Play. One finds here and there in the literature dealing with play and recreation the attempt to indicate the trend of evolution which is visible, if any, in the history of the recreations of men, also the attempt to state what direction the evolution of play ought to take. We have noted in an earlier paragraph the observation of Karl Bücher, that in relatively primitive societies it is often the case that work is not sharply separated from play; some forms of work seem to be also play. It has likewise been pointed out by numerous writers that particular individuals who "love their work" find their greatest satisfactions in their work, and feel little or no need of other forms of activity to serve as recrea-

[40] Puffer, J. Adams, *The Boy and His Gang,* Boston, 1912, pp. 50-52.

[41] West Side Studies, edited by Pauline Goldmark. (1) *Boyhood and Lawlessness;* (2) *The Neglected Girl,* by Ruth S. True, New York; Russell Sage Foundation and Survey Associates, 1914.

[42] Rainwater, Clarence E., *The Play Movement in the United States,* Chicago, 1922.

[43] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

tion. From these observations, the conclusion is frequently drawn that societies should strive to reach an organization of the activities and aims of their members in which separate recreation would not be necessary, the work being purely or mainly a pleasurable form of activity. Graham Wallas is one of those who has elaborated this thesis, in the concluding chapter, entitled "The Organization of Happiness," in his book *The Great Society.* Sumner concluded, however, from his rather comprehensive studies of concrete materials, that there is no ground in the history of recreation and the fine arts for the popular notion of "progress." He felt that "waves upward and downward" could be discerned, but nothing like a steady change in one direction.[44]

It is apparent from a review of the literature of the subject, however, that neither this nor many other generalizations or abstractions concerning the actual functioning of play and recreation can as yet be supported by adequate studies of the concrete data. The study of the development of forms of recreation, furthermore, waits upon the improvement of forms of recreation, furthermore, waits upon the improvement of our understanding of the process of social change in general, which will form the subject of inquiry in the following chapter.

[44] *Folkways,* p. 604.

CHAPTER XXVI

THEORIES OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION

The Problem of Social Evolution. It has been the general method of the preceding chapters of this volume to focus attention particularly upon the attempts which have been made by social scientists and philosophers to account for some of the obvious conditions and features of the social life of mankind as they are, or as they occur, without reference to the period of historic time in which they occur, or to the developmental process by which they have come to be as they are. We have paid some attention to the history of social theories, but we have avoided, for the most part, the consideration of social theories of history. As one proceeds in the task of canvassing and examining some of the important published contributions which have been made to general social theory, however, one finds that in fact a great many important and influential writers have thought of the study of social phenomena primarily as the study of social evolution. The scope of a work so general as the present volume must be limited in some way, and a limitation which has been chosen in this case is that which involves devoting only a minimum of attention to theories of social evolution. The evaluation of such theories involves the consideration of difficult questions and problems of methodology, which really demand extended inquiry if they are touched upon at all. Certain conspicuous contributions to the literature dealing with general questions of social evolution are, however, too important to the social scientist to be entirely overlooked in a study of the range of social theory. Some of them have obtruded themselves in connection with topics dealt with in previous chapters, while others have been, up to now, avoided. The present chapter, accordingly, will be devoted to the further consideration of some of the suggestions which have been made for the interpretation of social evolution

as an evolution of culture. In a later chapter, following our discussion of theories of political forces and processes, we shall recur to the subject of social evolution for a final consideration of some of the problems which it involves.

Utopian Thought and Social Evolution. One form of social theory which one naturally thinks of in connection with the study of social change is the utopia. Most writers and groups who have devoted themselves to radical or fundamental efforts at social reconstruction have in fact been inspired and guided by some dream of an ideal, or vastly improved, social order, and many of these dreams of utopia have found a permanent place in world literature. Indeed, these "social myths" may be regarded as a typical feature of the more comprehensive and purposive forms of collective behavior, as we have seen. Any comprehensive group program, or ideal, is in fact of the same general order as those visions of social perfection which have found more or less unified and artistic expression as utopias, and it may be said that most lasting social groups have cherished ideas of a better order of things to come, though often in the form of a belief in life after death. Hertzler [1] and Mumford [2] have summarized some of the most interesting utopias which appeared in the western world since the time of Plato, and, as we noted in an earlier chapter, Mumford has developed a revealing interpretation of the significance of these writings.[3] Utopia has ordinarily been regarded, however, either as a state of affairs to be effected rather simply and radically, by taking thought, as in the case of Plato's *Republic,* or as a millennium, to be ushered in with no particular effort on the part of human beings, through the agency of Divine Providence. In any case, the dream of an ideal society has usually had, for the people living at the time of its publication, the character of a "flight from reality," a psychic compensation for the disappointments of this mundane world, rather than that of a program of social action.

The Idea of Progress. The idea of progress represents

[1] Hertzler, Joyce O., *The History of Utopian Thought,* New York, 1923.
[2] Mumford, Lewis, *The Story of Utopias,* London and New York, 1923. See especially Chaps. I, XI, and XII for author's general theory of utopian thought.
[3] *Supra,* Chap. XX.

another approach which has been made to the problem of social evolution. This idea or concept, as we know it today, has been shown by writers who have investigated its history to be a product, in the main, of the social philosophy and rationalism of the eighteenth century. It seems to have been in part the outgrowth of the habit of looking to reason and enlightenment to solve all problems, and in part a reaction to the perception that human affairs and institutions were in fact changing, industrially, commercially, and politically; this fact of rapid social change naturally fostered an expectation of change. The feeling that many of the changes which took place in the life of the western world after, say, 1500 A.D. seems to have been, therefore, the source of the belief that, under the guidance of enlightened and emancipated reason, the general lot of humanity were to enjoy better and better conditions. Whatever the reasons for the changed attitude and expectancy, J. B. Bury, among others, has shown that in the course of the eighteenth century the idea of progress became a widespread article of faith among the intellectual leaders of western Europe, an attitude which may be said to have diffused downward through two or more strata of the populations affected during the intervening years, so that in our own day progress is recognized as a part of the social creed of the American middle class, although meanwhile the leaders have many of them become more pessimistic or agnostic in their opinion of the possibilities of social betterment.[4]

During the past few decades the concept of progress has been taken by a number of writers to define a topic or problem of major social interest, and the concept has been subjected to inquiry and elaboration in various ways. F. S. Marvin, in a short paper dealing particularly with the origin and history of the idea of progress, has contended that at the time of its emergency into the area of discussion, which he thinks was during the period of the Renascence, two factors making for bias and for the further development of the idea of progress in a certain direction were introduced. One of these was the sentiment of nationality, with its implication that the national

[4] Bury, J. B., *The Idea of Progress:* An inquiry into its origin and growth (London, 1921), p. 346.

interest, though of supreme importance to citizens, is likely to be in conflict with the interests of other nations, and must be supported accordingly. It is of some significance that the paper in which this idea is set forth forms part of a small volume edited by Marvin as a sequel to an earlier volume dealing with "the unity of Western civilization." Marvin's own idea of progress, in other words, is on the whole an idea of a unified, international movement. In the later volume, he also names as a factor making for bias in the further development of the idea of progress the undue emphasis on the material, mechanical, and external aspects of social change.[5]

In the United States, it has been Professor Carver of Harvard University who, more than any other sociologist, has interested himself and his students in the concept of progress. It has been his thesis that progress, although a matter of increasing well-being, may be defined and studied in terms of evolving adaptation, of mankind to the physical environment, of the environment to men, and of men and societies to one another. In his introduction to a volume of readings on the subject he distinguishes between active and passive, and between physical and geographic, economic, and spiritual factors involved in progressive adaptation.[6] One of Carver's former students, Professor L. M. Bristol, has reviewed a number of the important contributions to sociological theory from the viewpoint afforded by Carver's outline.[7] Professor F. A. Bushee, also a former student of Carver's, has taken a modified and elaborated form of Carver's outline of the forms and factors of adaptation as the ground plan for a general textbook, *The Principles of Sociology,* which, because of its point of view, is really a treatment of the principles of social evolution. Professor A. J. Todd, in his *Theories of Social Progress,* has subjected the literature of the subject to a critical review in somewhat the same fashion as Bristol, but with a different

[5] Marvin, F. S. (editor), *Progress and History* (London, etc., Oxford University Press, 1917), pp. 15-16. See also *The Unity of Western Civilization* (London, 1915), also edited by F. S. Marvin.

[6] Carver, Thomas Nixon, *Sociology and Social Progress* (Boston, 1905), 8 ff.

[7] Bristol, Lucius Moody, *Social Adaptation:* A study in the doctrine of adaptation as a theory of social progress. (Cambridge, 1915.)

outline as a guide, and with greater attention to the psychological forms of adaptation or adjustment.

The Philosophy of History Movement. Of considerable logical similarity to the idea of progress is the idea of a philosophical interpretation of history in general, from which it has been hoped, typically, to derive some sort of chart, graph, or formula revealing as a relatively simple movement or pattern the long-run trend and direction of human social development. The philosophy of history movement, however, which is a fairly distinct and recognized phase in the history of social thought, was typically bound up with the belief in a guiding Providence, or with some metaphysical refinement of that belief, such as the philosophy of the Absolute. In this respect the philosophy of history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries presents a contrast with the philosophy of progress, with its tendency to rely on blind force on the one hand, and human reason on the other. To be sure, no sharp line divides the two groups of social philosophers; more than one writer has been discussed both as a contributor to the philosophy of history and as an exponent of the idea of progress.[8] For example, Professor U. G. Weatherly is the author of a recent volume, entitled *Social Progress—The Dynamics of Social Change,*[9] which is ostensibly a continuation of the interest in progress, but which might also be considered as a philosophy of history. The same might be said of Ellwood's recent volume, *Cultural Evolution,* with which we shall be more particularly concerned in the latter part of this chapter. The philosophy of history movement has sometimes been treated as a closed chapter in the history of social thought; Spengler's *Decline of the West* is quite clearly of the same genus as the earlier studies, however, and has been widely so characterized.[10] It now seems probable that there are independent values to be served by the philosophical consideration of history, quite separate from those

[8] The best single treatment of the philosophy of history movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is *The Philosophy of History; France and Germany,* by Robert Flint. Edinburgh and London, 1874. There is a later edition of Flint's *Philosophy of History,* which, however, does not contain the material on German writers found in the 1874 edition.

[9] Philadelphia, 1926.

[10] See F. C. S. Schiller's Introduction in *Civilization or Civilizations,* by E. H. Goddard and P. A. Gibbons, p. viii.

forwarded by the construction of a scientific sociology. We shall recur to the theme in a concluding chapter of the present volume.

The Discovery of Organic Evolution. It is now well known that the theory of organic evolution was not put together out of whole cloth, so to speak, by Charles Darwin, as was supposed by all but the best informed specialists until recently. The notion had been "in the air," as we sometimes say of conceptions which appear to crystallize gradually out of a flux of discussion and investigation, for some decades when Darwin published a brief outline of his own studies along with Wallace's first paper on natural selection. That, however, is not a story which need concern us here. What it is important for the student of social theory to appreciate is that through the efforts of Darwin, Wallace, T. H. Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and others, the idea of organic evolution became in the course of some twenty years very widely known to scientists and scholars, and, presently, to the general public, though in a less clear form. As some one has said, the idea of evolution inherited all the goods of Divine Providence, and had the advantage of being in fashion. The philosophy of history and the philosophy of progress had prepared the way for the application of the evolution concept in the study of human social change, and such an application very soon took place, notably at the hands of Herbert Spencer and Lester F. Ward. The general sociological theories of both these men were essentially theories of social evolution.[11] Comte's positive philosophy, it may be remarked, had much the same general character, although it was published before Darwin's *Origin of Species.* The sociological theories of Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer were also permeated and shaped by the theory of natural selection, in this case in the special form of a theory of struggle of racial and interest groups for supremacy, resulting in a political equilibrium. Much the same may be said for a number of other

[11] Spencer, Herbert, *Principles of Sociology,* New York, 1876, and many later editions. Three volumes. Lester F. Ward's most influential volume has probably been his *Dynamic Sociology* (1885) in two volumes. His *Pure Sociology* gives a more compact and systematic presentation of his general theory of social evolution.

nineteenth-century sociologists, among them Vacher de Lapouge, Paul Lilienfeld, and Otto Ammon.[12]

Social Evolution as a Cultural Process. All of the earlier theories of social evolution which have just been mentioned, with the partial exception of Comte's and Ward's, might fairly be characterized as theories of the evolution of social structure. It was primarily changes in the framework or form of social organization which they sought to explain; and the main trend of their thought was in the direction of the explanation of the evolution of social structures by changes in the racial or biological composition of society, due, in turn, to some form of natural or social selection of certain biological types of individuals. This tendency stands out most strongly in Gumplowicz' *Der Rassenkampf.* Auguste Comte had, however, done much to consolidate and strengthen the position taken by the eighteenth-century rationalists, or at least a position much like theirs. According to his view of the matter, progress, or evolution, is largely a matter of ideas; his famous three states or phases of society are obviously distinguished by as many different mental attitudes toward the fundamental problems of life and the universe. Lester F. Ward approved the Comtean position in the main, and set about it to show that the possibilities of better mental adaptation between men and their surroundings—better solution of the practical problems of life through education—were indefinite.[13] Meanwhile the science of ethnology, or "cultural anthropology," was becoming well established as a separate field of study, and, influenced perhaps by Comte, certainly by Lazarus, Steinthal, and Wundt, founders of the study of "folk psychology," was defining its province in part as a psychological one. Gradually, some of the methodological difficulties presented by the mind-matter dualism have been overcome, and the study of culture has come to be regarded more and more, in recent decades, as the study of *modes of thought,* and of *tradition,* as well as of *modes of action* or *customs.*[14]

[12] Some attention is paid to most of these writers in other chapters of the present volume. See Sorokin, Pitirim A., *Contemporary Sociological Theories* for excellent summaries.

[13] This feature of Ward's sociological theory appears in all of his works, but most elaborately in *Applied Sociology.*

[14] Wissler, Clark, *Man and Culture,* Ch. XII.

Through these approaches, then, and through the influence of lines of investigation and speculation summarized in earlier chapters of this volume,[15] the task of explaining social evolution has come to be seen by many writers and students as a task of describing, analyzing, and explaining cultural change or cultural evolution. It may be plausibly argued that the principal gains which have been made in the execution of that task, down to now, have been methodological gains, consisting mainly of better definition of problems, more revealing and stimulating general hypotheses. Both the cultural anthropologists and the students of migration and assimilation have, however, been accumulating masses of factual data by reference to which theories may be tested, and some advance in the empirical validity and value of the general theories of cultural evolution formulated in the future may probably be expected. The comparison of the earlier contributions made by Maine, Bagehot, Kidd, and others with Ogburn's volume on *Social Change,* and with Wissler's development of his theory of culture change based on cycles of economic exploitation, reviewed previously, gives some evidence of progress already taking place.[16]

For the sake of further light on the trend of theories of cultural evolution, it will be profitable for us to consider briefly the point of view and main line of thought of each of two recent works, each of which seeks to deal with social change in a very inclusive way, and each of which sees human social change essentially as *cultural* change. Oswald Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* is a massive two-volume treatise in which the author has sought to interpret world history as the story of the rise and decline, and general characteristics, of a number of great cultures. The book proved enormously successful from a commercial point of view in Germany, and went through many editions following its first publication shortly after the World War. At about the same time as the first appearance of the English translation of this work, two British authors, E. H. Goddard and P. A. Gibbons, published a shorter work intended to represent in simpler form the gen-

[15] *Supra,* Chaps. XII, XIII and XV.
[16] *Supra,* Chaps. XX and XXI.

eral theory of Spengler, under the title *Civilization or Civilizations.*[17] This latter volume is provided with an interesting introduction by the philosopher F. C. S. Schiller, in which he expresses very politely a rather unfavorable opinion of the Spenglerian philosophy. Professor Charles A. Ellwood's *Cultural Evolution,* which was mentioned in a previous chapter, is a much more modest undertaking than that of Spengler. He has, however, sought to develop a quite general interpretion of social change as cultural evolution, and it is of interest to compare his treatment, as a sample of the approach made in the name of a natural science of sociology, with that of Spengler, which is distinctly that of a philosopher, and may be regarded as a modern philosophy of history. If the two theories are to be compared in this spirit, it should be also said, however, that Ellwood's discussion of cultural evolution is strongly permeated by the philosophy-of-history attitude.

Spengler's "Morphology of World History." Spengler represents it as his aim to depict the outlines of a "morphology of world history." [18] He contrasts this with the morphology of "the world as nature" which has been developed from the viewpoint and by the methods of natural science, and which, as he explains at length, is based upon a conception of the world as extended in space, rather than as enduring and undergoing transformations in time.[19] Each of these views of the world has its own logic; there is a logic of space and a logic of time.

> Mathematics and the principle of Causality lead to a naturalistic Chronology and the idea of Destiny to a historical ordering of the phenomenal world. Both orderings, each on its own account, cover the world. The difference is only in the eyes by which and through which the world is realized.[20]
>
> There emerge, then, as the two basic elements of all world-picturing, the principle of Form (Gestalt) and the principle of Law (Gesetz). The more decidedly a particular world-picture shows the traits of "Nature," the more unconditionally law and number prevail in it; and

[17] New York, 1926.

[18] *Op. cit.,* 5 ff. (All citations of Spengler refer to the American edition.)

[19] This distinction is quite familiar to German philosophers, having been discussed at length by Windelband, Rickert, and more briefly, by Ferdinand Tönnies.

[20] *Ibid.,* pp. 7-8. Quotations from Spengler used by permission of and special arrangement with Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., authorized publishers.

the more purely intuitive the picture of the world as eternally becoming, the more alien to numbers its manifold and tangible elements. "Form is something mobile, something becoming, something passing" (Goethe).[21]

All modes of comprehending the world may, in the last analysis, be described as Morphology. *The Morphology of the mechanical and the extended, a science which discovers and orders nature-laws and causal relations, is called Systematic. The Morphology of the organic, of history and life and all that bears the sign of direction and destiny, is called Physiognomic.*[22]

It is the latter of these two varieties of morphologies by which Spengler proposes to deal with world history; he attempts to sketch the main outlines of a "physiognomic" of history.

The picture which he arrives at by this method is not that of a single progression, of "one linear history," but "the drama of *a number* of mighty Cultures, each springing with primitive strength from the soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound throughout its whole life-cycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, *in its* own image; each having *its own* idea, *its own* passions, *its own* life, will, and feeling, *its own* death." [23] Spengler believes it possible, in other words, to discern in the manifold facts of world history the *life histories* of a few great Cultures. A Culture, in the sense in which he uses the term, is assumed to be an organism, and in fact, in elaborating the contrast between the method and viewpoint of natural science with the method and viewpoint of history, or "physiognomic," Spengler characterizes the latter as "organic." The organic eludes the grasp of the numerical methods of natural science; history must be handled *poetically.*[24]

Making use, then, of the poetic or intuitive method of the true historian, it is possible to discover, not only the major Cultures which have in fact arisen since the dawn of human history, but further, the outline of the *type,* the universal form characteristic of all cultures.

Cultures are organisms, and world-history is their collective biography. Morphologically, the immense history of the Chinese or of the Classical Culture is the exact equivalent of the petty history of

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 97.
[22] *Ibid.,* p. 100.
[23] *Ibid.,* p. 21.
[24] *Ibid.,* p. 96.

the individual man, or of the animal, or the tree, or the flower. . . . In the destinies of the several Cultures that follow upon one another, is compressed the whole content of human history. And if we set free their shapes, till now hidden all too deep under the surface of a trite "history of human progress," and let them march past us in the spirit, it cannot but be that we shall succeed in distinguishing amidst all that is special or unessential, the primitive culture-form, *the* Culture that underlies as ideal all the individual Cultures.[25]

What is this type physiognomy of culture, the form which as ideal underlies all the great Cultures? We can gain some idea of it as Spengler conceives it by summarizing the main headings from two of the three tables in which he places in parallel columns the "contemporary" or homologous steps, artistic and political, which in his view have been traversed by several of the great Cultures.[26] The great Cultures which he recognizes are the Egyptian, the Chinese, the Classical, the Indian, the Arabian, and the Western. Goddard and Gibbons, in their essay on the Spenglerian philosophy of history, have added an emergent Russian Culture to the list. Or, rather, they appear to think that the Russian culture constitutes a retarded, semi-separate element in the Western Culture, and one which, by its late flowering, may bring a new birth or revival to the latter, after it is otherwise far advanced in its decline.[27]

In each of these great Cultures, then, Spengler believes that certain inevitable great stages or epochs may be distinguished. These epochs are the spiritual or physiognomic contemporaries of each other, regardless of their actual dates. Briefly stated, his outline of these stages is as follows:[28]

A. *Precultural Period.*—Primitive folk or tribes; no "politics" and no "state." In art a chaos of primitive expression forms; mystical symbolism and naïve imitation.

B. *Culture.*—National groups of definite style and particular world-feeling; "nations"; working of an immanent state-idea. In art the life-history of a style formative of the entire inner-feeling; form-language of deepest symbolic necessity.

[25] Spengler, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

[26] The philosophical and scientific developments have been similarly summarized for four great cultures through the great middle period of their development in a first table.

[27] *Op. cit.*, pp. 200-04.

[28] *Decline of the West.* Abridged and condensed from tables inserted at the close of the volume.

I. *Early period.*—1. Feudalism; spirit of countryside and countryman; the "city" only a market or stronghold. 2. Crisis and dissolution of patriarchal forms; from feudalism to aristocratic state.

In art, ornament and architecture as elementary expressions of the young world-feeling; the "primitives."

In the realm of the "spiritual," (1) rural-intuitive, and (2) earliest urban and critical stirrings.

II. *Late period.*—Actualizing the matured State-idea; town versus countryside; rise of third estate or Bourgeoisie; victory of money over landed property.

In art, formation of a group of arts, urban and conscious, in the hands of individual "great masters."

In the realm of the "spiritual," (1) intelligence of the city, zenith of strict intellectual creativeness, and (2) dawn of megalopolitan civilization, extinction of spiritual creative force.

C. *Civilization.*—The body of the people, now essentially urban, dissolves into formless mass; megalopolis and provinces; the fourth estate ("masses"); inorganic, cosmopolitan. In art, existence without inner form; megalopolitan art as a commonplace; luxury, sport, nerve-excitement; rapidly changing fashion in art.

The foregoing table is in itself too brief to reveal much concerning Spengler's conception of the universal culture-form in its physiognomic or time dimension; for that the reader is referred to the original treatise, which may in fact be considered in large part as the elaboration of the tables from which the foregoing was condensed. The table we have used does, however, suffice to convey two interesting features of the Spenglerian "morphology of world history," or theory of cultural cycles. One is the distinction which he makes between "culture" in the strict sense in which he prefers to use the term, and "civilization." The other is his theory that Cultures, as they grow old, tend to become more and more centered in great cities, and to take on urban, or "megalopolitan," characteristics. "Civilization" is for Spengler the hardened manifestation of a culture which has lost its vitality, the inward and outward fulfilment of every Culture, but also the sign of the "decline" of that culture.[29] His interpretation of the great city in its relation to a Culture is found more particularly in the second volume of *Untergang des Abendlandes.*

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 106-07.

In his critique of the Spenglerian philosophy of history, published as an Introduction to Goddard and Gibbons' essay, F. C. S. Schiller has attacked the contention that Spengler's "morphology," however valid it may be as an empirical summary and interpretation of some of the great phases of world history, really expresses a "law" of cultural evolution or cycles, in the sense of a general formula which they must inevitably follow in the future as they have in the past. Philosophies of history, Schiller thinks, are useful to us in the way of making some of the great facts of history more easily comprehensible. That nations and cultures rise and fall, however, may, he believes, be due to a series of coincidences, and to different causes in each case, rather than to the operation of a "law"; indeed, the fall of a civilization may be due to mere human stupidity, which we may one day be able to remedy in a measure. He also points to the possibility, insufficiently precluded in Spengler's interpretation, of the actual historical data, in his judgment, that the cycles of cultural rise and fall may in fact be *spirals,* and may therefore embody an upward growth of civilization in general. "Hence," he concludes, "it is probably better to take Spengler's ideas as interesting suggestions than as established dogmas." [30]

It will be more or less apparent from the foregoing summary and quotations, however, that for Spengler himself and his more ardent disciples, like Goddard and Gibbons, his theory has very much the character of an established dogma; it is worked out in the mystical, absolutistic language typical of a certain type of German metaphysical literature. Very different and much less pretentious in scope and content is Professor Ellwood's treatment of cultural evolution in his recent volume of that title.

Ellwood's Theory of Cultural Evolution. Ellwood's treatment of cultural change may be said, in general, to differ from that of Spengler in two respects: (1) Ellwood has devoted the larger part of his space to just that depiction of the history of civilization in terms of a unilinear progress to which Spengler, as we have noted, objects; and (2) Ellwood makes an attempt to subject cultural change and evolution to the very

[30] *Op. cit.*, pp. xi-xiv.

sort of natural-scientific explanation which Spengler holds to be impossible of application to this purpose. As regards the first of these differences, Ellwood states that "There is no single typical line of cultural evolution except in the broadest sense." In a footnote to his brief discussion of Spengler, however, he has summarized his objection to the theory of the latter, as follows:

> The rhythms in cultural development, of course, cannot be denied. They have been emphasized in our discussion, but a very different explanation of them has been offered than that given by Spengler. Spengler insists that cultures have a relatively definite life cycle. We, on the other hand, have pointed out that cultural evolution proceeds by a process of trial and error, that the declines in culture are due to errors which are, at least in theory, preventable.[31]

Cultural evolution is in Ellwood's view a *cumulative* process, and this is a very fundamental aspect of his treatment of the subject, one which must be grasped if one is to appreciate the difference between his theory and that of Spengler. It is also, he holds, essentially a *mental* or *psychic* process; and as such, it is the significant fact about human social evolution. It is not, however, the whole of human social evolution, or at least it is not in itself, in Ellwood's view, the whole explanation of social evolution. In this view, there are certain basic features of human behavior and of social interaction which provide the conditions within which cultural development is able to take place. Among these conditioning factors he emphasizes especially the fact of "intercommunication" in human groups; the fact of division of labor, which is present also in animal groups and therefore cannot be considered a product of culture exclusively, but which is indefinitely modified by culture; and the creative or imaginative, problem-solving powers of the human mind.[32]

Having laid the foundation for the explanation of cultural evolution through the designation of these factors or conditions, Ellwood derives from W. I. Thomas' discussion of *invention,* in the latter's *Source-Book for Social Origins* the principal conceptions used in his own theory, for which, indeed, he

[31] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1927), p. 257.
[32] *Ibid.,* pp. 8-10.

claims no great originality. Thomas accounts for new inventions in terms of (1) crisis—a situation in which a decision must be made, or a new course of action selected; (2) the focus of attention brought about by the crisis; and (3) the subsequent tentative solution of the problem in imagination, or conceptually, before its solution in physical activity is attempted.[33] The process of cultural evolution results, in fact, from the establishment of control over the physical environment, but "man makes over his world in concept, in imagination, before he makes it over in reality. . . . This he can do because through his imagination he is able to see how elements in the situation may be manipulated to bring about a result which he desires." [34] The general process is greatly affected, according to Thomas, by three factors, the presence of extraordinary individuals in the group, the general level of the group culture, and the character of the ideas in circulation in the group.[35] The ideas in circulation in a group may in fact be opposed to change, and in that case that group will be unlikely to accept the inventions offered by the superior minds.[36]

Ellwood finds in the whole process four steps, as follows: (1) the creation of new patterns of action, (2) the diffusion of these patterns through imitation and communication, so that they become *social* or *cultural* patterns or traits, (3) the incorporation of the social patterns in the tradition of the group, and (4) the inculcation of the social tradition in the young through some system of education.[37] The feature of this summary to be emphasized here is that it constitutes a natural-scientific explanation of cultural evolution. Though it deals only with the bare elements of the process, and doubtless may be differentiated and elaborated through the study of further collections of concrete data, it has at any rate the character of a formula or rule by means of which a great range of factual data may be brought within the range of insight afforded by a single, in a sense universal, set of generalizations. An essential characteristic of this formula is its complete detachment from

[33] *Op. cit.* (Chicago, 1909), pp. 13-26. See also Ellwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-46.
[34] Ellwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-46.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 47.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

all qualifications set by historic time or chronology, and this is perhaps its most distinctive contrast with the theory which Spengler professes to use. It should be noted, however, that Spengler's theory of cultural cycles, from the very fact of its cyclical form, becomes ultimately detached from the idea of historic time, in spite of the author's emphasis upon chronology and time. Ellwood regards cultural changes as comparable in considerable detail, on a small scale; while Spengler seems to hold, in a manner somewhat suggestive of the "historical school" of cultural anthropology, that the details of any culture are intelligible only in relation to the whole pattern of that culture, each "Culture" having its own distinctive physiognomy.

One interesting corollary of the view which regards cultural evolution as the outcome of a mental or psychic process is the renewed interest which it helps to create in the intellectual history of mankind. Several valuable specialized treatises dealing with this phase of general history or western history had been written before the theory of cultural change which we have been considering was clearly developed. Among them may be mentioned F. A. Lange's *History of Materialism,* and Merz's *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century.* More recently, and with an obvious relation to the newer theory of cultural change, James Harvey Robinson has attracted a great deal of attention with two short volumes, *The Mind in the Making,* and *The Humanizing of Knowledge.* J. H. Randall has lately published a somewhat more ambitious study than Robinson's, entitled *The Making of the Modern Mind.* Recent studies of the history of science might also be mentioned in the same connection.

Probably the most interesting, as well as the most controversial, aspect of the whole subject of cultural evolution, however, is that which bears upon the possibility and degree, if any, of emancipation of humanity from the limitations of their own hereditary, biological nature. W. F. Ogburn, among many others, has emphasized the tremendous changes in human life which have been made possible in recent centuries while man's biologically inherited nature has apparently remained almost

constant.[38] Another whole series of questions, however, concern the relation of *culture,* as we have conceived it, to the *political* organization and evolution of human society. With these questions we shall be concerned in the following chapters.

[38] *Social Change,* pp. 133-35.

PART III. CONFLICT AND SOCIAL CONTROL

CHAPTER XXVII

THE SOCIAL STRUGGLE

Conflict as the Elemental Political Process. It has been apparent from the earliest times in which men began to think objectively and systematically about social phenomena that conflict is one form of social interaction, although it was not until quite recent times that the matter was stated so simply and clearly as that. The idea of conflict has, however, had some part in most writings dealing in any general way with problems of social theory. Hence, in earlier chapters, we have had occasion to take notice of some of the contributions which have been made by various writers to a general social theory of conflict, particularly in connection with our study of theories of race and nationality, and of economic competition. At this point we may profitably approach the further survey of the literature of the subject with a brief recapitulation, with certain new additions, of the general theory of conflict which tends to emerge in the works of modern social scientists.

As we have seen, the central task of scientific sociology has been regarded by some as the discovery and description of social *forces,* or elements; by other thinkers, however, it has been held that the fundamental problem of sociology is the description and analysis of social *process.* But by writers of the latter sort, two quite different conceptions of the basic character of the social process have been entertained: (1) the conception that the social process is essentially one of imitation, assimilation, or communication, leading to the unification of individuals and groups into large wholes, having common ideas of things and common purposes—a conception developed particularly by Gabriel Tarde and by John Dewey; and (2) the conception that the social process is essentially one of competition, conflict, or struggle of some sort, leading to selection, subordination, and the incorporation of social groups into larger,

usually more complex, unities—in short, a process of social differentiation and integration.[1] It is, of course, primarily the theories of the latter kind with which we shall be concerned in this division of our inquiry. Naturally, however, there have been social theorists who have made more or less successful attempts to harmonize and unite the two conceptions of the social process. It can probably be safely asserted that the most successful of these attempts at the unification of the theory of conflict with the theory of assimilation—successful in the abstract at any rate—is that of Georg Simmel.

Social conflict, as distinguished from biological competition, may be defined as a typically conscious process,[2] and as one which tends to results in the development of modified types of social control, which are imposed upon individuals and groups as if from without; in contrast with this the more elemental, moral or cultural types of social control tend to become incorporated into the personalities of the members of a social group and hence may be thought of as operating internally. Conflict may therefore be regarded as the essential form, or at least as the primitive form, of *political* activity, in which the forms of social control characteristically administered by governments are wrought out. Parliamentary discussion and balloting can, from this point of view, be regarded as sublimated, regulated forms of conflict, whereas war is seen as the form assumed by the political process when it involves societies which have not yet been subjected to any common authority. In the following chapters, therefore, some of the representative theories of conflict and rivalry have been brought into juxtaposition with theories of politics in order to reveal, so far as may be, the tendency to unification and integration which appears to be now operative in the development of these phases of social theory.

Ancient and Medieval Theories of Social Conflict. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century theories of social conflict have been, as we shall see, strongly influenced by the Darwinian theory of biological competition and selection. To many modern social theorists, in fact, war and other social conflicts have

[1] See Lichtenberger, J. P., *Development of Social Theory*, pp. 438-39.
[2] Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), pp. 506-10, 574.

been interpreted quite naïvely as human manifestations of the "struggle for existence," resulting in the same sort of biological selection and consequent alteration of racial characteristics as is believed to be produced by the struggle for existence among other, animal and vegetable, organisms. It is, therefore, not surprising that on the whole social theories developed before the publication of the Darwinian hypothesis and before the rise of the modern, individualistic, impersonal type of economic competition, should embody the view of the nature and results of social conflicts briefly indicated in the foregoing paragraph more frequently than do the theories of more recent formulation. To ancient and medieval writers of the western world with few exceptions, in fact, war seems to have appeared as the natural and inevitable expression of human nature and of political forces, painful to contemplate as regards some of its immediate consequences, no doubt, but nevertheless as a natural and on the whole useful method of political transformation and adjustment.

It is in this general spirit that Plato deals with war in the *Republic,* although to be sure there is a vein of irony in his discussion. Following a passage in which he outlines the requisite human and geographic elements of a simple society which, he rather more than intimates, he would personally regard as ideal, but which is objected to by one of his interlocutors as scarcely human, he proceeds to the discussion of conditions necessary to "the growth not of a city merely, but of a luxurious city."

> The country too, I presume, which was formerly adequate to the support of its then inhabitants will be now too small, and adequate no longer. Shall we say so?
>
> Certainly.
>
> Then must we not cut ourselves a slice of our neighbor's territory, if we are to have enough both for pasture and for tillage, while they do the same to ours, if they, like us, permit themselves to overstep the limit of necessaries, and plunge into the unbounded acquisition of wealth?
>
> It must inevitably be so, Socrates.
>
> Will our next step be to go to war, Glaucon, or how will it be?
>
> As you say.
>
> At this stage of our inquiry let us avoid asserting either that war

does good or that it does harm, confining ourselves to this statement, that we have further traced the origin of war to causes which are the most fruitful sources of whatever evils befall a state, either in its corporate capacity, or in its individual members.

Exactly so.[3]

Aristotle interprets war from the viewpoint afforded by his general conception of the relation of means to ends; war is, in his opinion, to be employed as a means to the end of imposing government upon men who are by nature intended for government, but who will not otherwise submit to it.[4] War is, however, in all cases to be regarded as means only, never as an end in itself.[5] In another passage, Aristotle develops the thesis that war is for the sake of peace, a view which is strangely similar to that set forth by Georg Simmel over two thousand years later.

Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals and plants for the sake of man. And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for it includes hunting, an art which we ought to practise against wild beasts, and against man who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just.[4]

The whole of life is . . . divided into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace. . . . And the preference given to one or the other class of actions must necessarily be like the preference given to one or the other part of the soul and its actions over the other; there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure. . . . For men must engage in business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better. . . .

Facts, as well as arguments, prove that the legislator should direct all his military and other measures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. For most of these military states are safe only while they are at war, but fall when they have acquired their empire; like unused iron they lose their edge in time of peace. And for this the legislator is to blame, he never having taught them how to lead the life of peace.[6]

Aristotle's discussion of war may be thought of as the pattern followed by medieval schoolmen. It is his method to in-

[3] Golden Treasury Edition, translation by Davies and Vaughan, London, 1916, pp. 59-60 (Bk. II).
[4] *Politics*, Bk. I, Chap. VIII, Sec. 12.
[5] *Ibid.*, Bk. VII, Chap. II, Sec. 16.
[6] *Ibid.*, Bk. VII, Chap. XIV, *passim*.

terpret war with reference to an assumed public good—the "general welfare," as modern writers have termed it. In a somewhat similar manner, the writers of the Middle Ages were interested in war primarily with reference to its rightfulness or wrongfulness, and this was to be judged by reference to some general end or value which all Christians were presumed to recognize. Discussion of war must therefore take the form, largely, of a weighing of the claims to consideration presented by the scriptural ideal of non-resistance, on the one hand, and the emergent idea of the national state as a moral entity with a rightful claim upon the loyalty of its citizens, on the other hand. Bede Jarrett, who has brought together in a scholarly chapter a great deal of representative literature of the period, points out that the earlier writers, down to the end of the fourteenth century, took their ideas concerning war mainly from St. Augustine, who was inclined to accept the apparent scriptural position favoring non-resistance.[7] From the end of the fourteenth century onward, however, as the use of paid soldiery developed more and more, new questions and problems concerning war were constantly arising to plague the moralists, and the general tendency was to place more emphasis on the idea of statehood, with its implication that the state had the right of self-preservation.[8] The "sentiment of nationality" had become sufficiently developed in fact to enter into the determination of political policies and thus to operate as a cause of war. Hence it was necessary to find some line of reasoning to fit the facts, to justify on moral grounds the fighting on behalf of country which men found themselves able to carry on with good conscience.[9] The medieval approach to the study of the problems of war continued to be made chiefly and fundamentally on moral grounds, however, and it is this approach which is typified in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas on the subject. War is judged by him always with reference to an ideal of peace, as Aristotle had suggested that it should be, but St. Thomas Aquinas defines peace in rigorously moralistic

[7] Jarrett, Bede, O. P., *Social Theories of the Middle Ages—1200-1500* (Boston, 1926), Chap. VII, "War." See especially on the point mentioned, p. 181.

[8] *Ibid., loc. cit.*

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 184-85.

terms, *i.e.,* in terms of the mental or spiritual attitudes and desires of the parties to the arrangement.[10] He concludes, finally, that war is justifiable when it fulfills three conditions:

> The conclusion . . . reached by St. Thomas is that war is justifiable on three conditions: that it is declared by the public authority of the state; that it has a just cause; that the intention of those who go to fight is right. . . . To the three conditions, however, later writers sometimes add, that the war should be properly conducted.[11]

The scholastics were not entirely uninterested in the *causes* of war, but causes interested them mainly when they could be translated into motives; for the goodness or badness of human acts were held to be determined, largely, by the intention or motive with which they were performed. The supreme consideration respected by the medieval moralists in dealing with war as with other questions of social policy, came to be ultimately, according to Father Jarrett, the establishment and maintenance of a reign of law—law which, of course, was supposed to approximate the will of God.[12]

The Modern Version of the Theory of War. It is convenient to take Machiavelli (1469-1527) as the most important representative of the beginnings of "modern" political thought. Pierre Dubois, who wrote early in the fourteenth century, may, however, be regarded as an earlier representative of the same realistic tendency in political thought which we symbolize by the name of Machiavelli. What we find in the writings of these men is after all not so very different from the theory of Aristotle, that war is for the sake of peace. With Dubois and Machiavelli, however, the argument takes the form of an inference from the assumption that *political order* is an inherently desirable social end. Dubois was a lawyer having a state position under Philip the Fair of France corresponding roughly with the function of the State's Attorney in a modern state. As such he was entrusted with the responsibility of upholding the king's interests in suits involving property claimed by the Church. It was evidently out of this experience that his few brief writings grew. Into the late medieval struggle of Pope

[10] Jarrett, *op. cit.,* pp. 182-83.
[11] *Ibid.,* p. 193.
[12] *Ibid.,* p. 205.

and Emperor for supremacy in Christendom, he injected a new element, namely, the suggestion that the King of France was better qualified than either to discharge the functions of a temporal sovereign.

> Dubois sets forth, with a calm cynicism that suggests Machiavelli, the emptiness of right without might. The Pope is no warrior, and ought not to be; his business is to save souls, while by meddling in politics he has sent many men to hell. Moreover, the men who are elected popes are generally decrepit old men, without that family influence and connection which are essential to wide power in temporal affairs. They should confine themselves therefore to their spiritual ministrations. Meanwhile their temporal functions and their temporal revenues should be committed to the administration of someone competent to perform the task well. No one is better qualified for this task than the French monarch; and thus the essence of the writer's project is revealed to be, that the King of France shall appropriate to his own use the territories of the Pope and employ them in asserting a leadership over Christendom.[13]

Machiavelli's discussion of war is, then, very much in the vein suggested by this earlier precedent. He takes it for granted that there will be wars; apparently he thought of them as the inevitable outgrowth of the situation which he had in view—a multitude of petty Italian principalities, each with its own Prince or ruling oligarchy, and each the prey of all the others. In the fourteenth chapter of *The Prince* he discusses war with his customary frankness, as a possible means whereby the Prince may preserve or imperil his sovereignty. His motto might well be, In time of peace prepare for war.

Struggle as the Natural State of Mankind. Machiavelli's *The Prince* may be regarded, in turn, as an earlier precedent for the general political theory of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The implicit postulate underlying Machiavelli's entire discussion is that the authority of a single monarch is as a rule to be regarded as the most effective means whereby that political order may be maintained which is in the interests of all. Hobbes states this theory explicitly, and bases it upon an assumption concerning the primitive or original state of man-

[13] Dunning, W. A., *Political Theories: Ancient and Mediæval*, pp. 227-28. See also Power, Eileen, essay on Pierre Dubois in Hearnshaw, F. J. C., *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediæval Thinkers.*

kind. He finds in human nature three main causes of struggle, the desire for gain at the expense of others, the fear of attack and spoliation by others, and the desire for glory.

> Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a Warre, as is of every man against every man. For Warre, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together; so the nature of war consisteth not in actuall fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is Peace.[14]

From this foundation postulate Hobbes proceeds to his familiar thesis, that to escape from the evils of the state of universal struggle of each against all, men entered into a compact by the terms of which they subjected themselves to the sovereignty of a monarch, a compact which, he held, was irreversible so long as it was not abrogated by the failure of the monarch to maintain peace and order with a reasonable degree of efficiency. Space does not permit of comment here on the rather amusing personal difficulties in which Hobbes' theory involved him, since it had the effect of justifying any revolution or revolt against established power, when it was an accomplished fact.[15]

International Law and the "Theory of the State." We have noted in an earlier chapter the mediæval habit of referring all sorts of political and social questions to the concept of a reign of law. It is perhaps as an outgrowth of this ideal that we can best interpret one interesting feature of the history of modern political science, namely the development of the most abstract and metaphysical phase of the science, the phase commonly called "theory of the state," out of the ancient interest in international law, including the law of war, an interest which had a marked revival at the time of the rise of modern national states. Space limits again forbid our giving detailed

[14] Hobbes' *Leviathan* (Everyman's Library edition, London and New York, n. d.), p. 64.

[15] See however Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-82

attention to this feature of the evolution of social thought; the best-known early modern representation of the type of theory is that of Hugo Grotius, in *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1624) and one of the most important and characteristic of later volumes developing similar themes is J. K. Bluntschli's *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (1852). Probably the most important bearing of this phase of political theory upon the development of an objective science of politics is the contribution which it makes to the definition of a viewpoint from which war is seen as a struggle out of which, from its very nature, mechanisms of regulation and control of struggle develop.

Recent Theories of Social Conflict. As we remarked at the beginning of this chapter, the theories of social conflict most typical of the "recent" period in social thought have without exception been strongly influenced by the Darwinian treatment of biological competition as "struggle for existence" resulting in selection and adaptation. The natural tendency of social scientists has been to attempt to apply this fruitful and stimulating theory to the interpretation of social, *i.e.*, inter-group, struggles. Reflection and research along these lines have resulted in the development of two types of social theory to which we have paid some attention in earlier chapters on the present volume: the "race" and "eugenics" emphasis in the treatment of social questions, and the theory of cultural evolution which treats it as analogous to, though not exactly identical with, natural selection, that is, as a species of natural selection of folkways and social institutions. It will be profitable for us, however, to consider further in the present connection some aspects of the development of theories of social conflict since about the time of Darwin (*The Origin of Species* was first published in 1859, and *The Descent of Man* in 1871, revised edition 1874).

Malthus' Theory of Population. It is of no slight interest to students of social science that Darwin's theory of natural selection was suggested to him by Malthus' famous essay on population (first edition, 1788), and the earlier work may be regarded as the first clear anticipation of the modern idea of social struggle. Malthus' basic contribution was of course his emphasis of the principle that the human species, like other

species of living organisms, has the capacity for indefinite increase, whereas the capacity of the physical environment for supporting population is limited. The immediate inference which he drew was that if the growth of population were not held in check through the prudential postponement of the age of marriage with consequent limitation of the birth rate, it must inevitably be checked sooner or later through the death rate, at the cost of great misery to the masses of the people. One passage in the second edition of the famous Essay shows, however, that Malthus was by no means unaware of the bearing of his discovery upon the subject of human warfare.

> It might fairly be expected that war, that great pest of the human race, would, under such circumstances (i.e., under the operation of "moral restraint." F. N. H.), soon cease to extend its ravages so widely and so frequently as it does at present.
>
> One of its first causes and most powerful impulses was undoubtedly an insufficiency of room and food; and greatly as the circumstances of mankind have changed since it first began, the same cause still continues to operate and to produce, though in smaller degree, the same effects. The ambition of princes would want instruments of destruction if the distresses of the lower classes of people did not drive them under their standards. A recruiting sergeant always prays for a bad harvest and a want of employment, or, in other words, a redundant population.[16]

Malthus himself did not develop in further detail the explanation of the cause of war which is suggested in the foregoing passage; the implied explanation has, however, as we shall see, been elaborately worked out by later writers.

Darwin's Theory of "Struggle for Existence." It was, by Darwin's own testimony, from the reading of Malthus' famous essay that he derived the clue which led him to formulate his theory of the struggle for existence, and in fact he makes use of the presumably familiar argument of Malthus as a device for explaining what he means by the struggle for existence.

> The term "struggle for existence" is used in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and

[16] Malthus, Thomas R., *An Essay on Population* (Everyman's Library edition, reprinted from seventh edition, which is substantially the same as the second edition), Vol. II, pp. 164-65.

including (which is more important) not only the life of the individual but success in leaving progeny. . . . A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which organic beings tend to increase. . . . It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms; for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential restraint from marriage.[17]

Social scientists might have been expected to be particularly interested in the assertion which follows the passage just cited, namely, that the struggle for existence is usually most acute between individuals and varieties of the same species, since they usually have similar habits and constitution, and are dependent upon the same sources of food. It seems to have been, however, the proposition that the term "struggle for existence" is to be understood "in a large and metaphorical sense" which has had the greatest significance as a point of departure for the application of the Darwinian theory to problems of social science; for this suggestion, coupled with the indicated possibility of application of the idea to "dependence of one being on another," which encouraged social scientists to emphasize the fact that human beings may combine to aid one another in the struggle for existence, and that, consequently, it is in its human form as much a matter of cooperation as of competition. The name of Kropotkin is perhaps the one most prominently associated with this particular modification of "social Darwinism," due to his suggestive study of "mutual aid." [18]

Herbert Spencer. Before proceeding further with the survey of recent social theories of conflict and adjustment which have obviously been influenced, directly or indirectly, by Darwin's theory of struggle and selection, we should not fail to notice the contribution to the subject made by Herbert Spencer, who was a contemporary of Darwin, and received the *Origin of Species* with great cordiality as a welcome confirmation of his own theories, but who in fact developed his general theory of evolution and his specific theory of war and social equilibration almost without reference to the work of Darwin. Spencer's *Social Statics* was first published in 1850, nine years

[17] *The Origin of Species,* pp. 50-61 (adapted by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.,* pp. 514-16).

[18] Kropotkin, P., *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution,* London, 1902.

before the *Origin of Species,* and eight years before Darwin published the first brief outline of his theory jointly with Wallace's essay *On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Original Type* (1858).[19] In *Social Statics* Spencer gave a very clear statement of the general theory of equilibration of organisms and environment which formed the foundation of all his later work. Being by early training and experience an engineer, and by habit and inclination a natural philosopher, Spencer always showed a preference for the formulation of his theory of evolution in terms of the equilibration of forces, rather than in any terms so anthropomorphic as "struggle" and "conflict." In this early work he did, however, present a definite description of the process in which war might be expected to lead to the establishment of progressively better and better adapted, more and more socialized, types of human life, remarkably similar to the more general theory of selection and adaptation later embodied by Darwin in his *Origin of Species.*[20]

Later, in his *magnum opus,* the *Synthetic Philosophy,* Spencer definitely adopted the Darwinian terminology for describing the process of evolution. In a passage in his *Principles of Sociology,* which forms a unit of the latter work, he discusses the bearing of the "struggle for existence" upon human and social evolution, but argues that it is not necessarily to be expected that struggle as we ordinarily think of it, that is *conflict* as defined at the beginning of this chapter, will always continue to play so prominent a part in the evolution either of the human species or of human social forms.[21] One of the most influential contributions made by Spencer to the general discussion of social conflict is his famous comparison of the militant with the industrial type of society, contained in two chapters which, significantly, form a part of the section of *Principles of Sociology* devoted to "Political Institutions."[22] In these chapters

[19] Cf. Lichtenberger, *op. cit.,* Chap. XI, "Darwin and Evolution," which gives very full summaries of some of the theories more briefly mentioned here. See especially pp. 276-77.

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 316. Quoting Spencer, *Social Statics* (New York, 1903), pp. 238-39.

[21] *Op. cit.* (1916), Vol. II, pp. 240-41.

[22] *Ibid.,* Bk. II, Part V, Chaps. XVII and XVIII.

the author advances the theory that the militant type of social organization, characterized by powerful centralized governmental control, is a natural social development at a certain stage in the evolution of mankind, *i.e.,* so long as other features of human civilization are at a certain stage of advancement, the militant organization of society has "survival value"; but at a later stage, the militant social organization tends to give way to the industrial type, which is decentralized and individualistic.

Walter Bagehot. We have taken some notice in an earlier chapter of the general argument of Walter Bagehot's *Physics and Politics,* which was the first important application of the ideas of Darwin to the problems of human society to be published in English after Spencer's earlier writings, appearing in 1867. In this striking little volume, as we saw, the author definitely formulates the proposition that human customs and institutions undergo a process analogous to natural selection, due to the struggle of society with society. In one chapter in that volume Bagehot develops explicitly the thesis that war is to be regarded as the human form of natural selection, a hypothesis which he elaborates by pointing out how forces and factors which make for the subordination of the individual to the group make for group survival and conquest.[23] This is a theory which, in varying forms, has had a prominent place in sociological theory ever since.

Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer. To recall still other works which we have had occasion to consider in previous chapters of the present volume, we may notice here that Gumplowicz' theory of racial struggle and Ratzenhofer's theory of the development, struggle, and adjustment of conflicting group "interests" within a state constitute two of the most important contributions by Continental writers to the general theme with which we are here concerned. Particularly noteworthy in this connection is Gumplowicz' general formula for social interaction, "Every stronger ethnic or social group strives to subjugate and make serviceable to its purposes every weaker element which exists or may come within the field of its influence." [24]

[23] *Physics and Politics* (New York, 1879), Chap. II, "The Uses of Conflict."

[24] From an adapted translation of pp. 158-61 of *Der Rassenkampf* (1883), in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), p. 347.

The late Professor Albion W. Small did much to familiarize American students with the theory of Ratzenhofer through his incorporation of lengthy summaries of Ratzenhofer's discussions in his *General Sociology*. It is also worth mention that Lester F. Ward, who was likewise so very influential in the shaping of early American sociological thought, was so favorably impressed by the work of Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer that he simply states their conclusions briefly in his *Pure Sociology*, and expresses the opinion that it is unnecessary for him to repeat in detail the reasoning or the evidence which they have so well presented.[25]

Recent Contributions to the Theory of Social Conflict. During our own century, the theoretic discussion of the more general and obvious forms and aspects of social conflict has continued rather actively, having naturally been stimulated by the events of the World War. This recent discussion has involved two main lines of inquiry: (1) the further investigation, with considerable attention to concrete data, of the biological and economic foundations of social conflict, and of war in particular, and (2) the investigation and discussion of the problem of the psychological grounds of social conflict. It may be ventured as a general summary of the trend of recent theory that writers whose ultimate interest is the furtherance of some scheme for the prevention of war are disposed to favor the explanation of war primarily and chiefly in psychological terms, presumably since it seems as though the sentiments and attitudes of men might be more amenable to manipulation than the basic facts and tendencies of population and natural resources. The point is repeatedly made in contemporary periodical literature of a radical or progressive sort, however, that the problem of the prevention of war is intimately bound up with the "population problem," and therefore with the problem of birth control.

We shall defer to the following chapter the consideration of some of the literature in which war is studied with particular reference to economic factors and causes. The biological approach has been set forth in a thorough-going and stimulating

[25] *Op. cit.* (1903), pp. 203-04.

fashion in a volume written during the war by Dr. G. F. Nicolai, a German physician of pacifist inclinations.[26] In this book he not only restates very clearly the biological theory of the cause of war which is readily derived from the theory of Malthus,[27] but also reviews at length the evidence bearing on the supposed selective value of war. The larger part of the volume, however, is devoted to a philosophical discussion of the changing character of modern warfare and its factors.

The application of a psychological viewpoint in the study of social conflict, so far as English and American writers are concerned at any rate, has been largely influenced by McDougall's presentation of the instinct theory, in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*. McDougall included "pugnacity" without qualification in his enumeration of the original instincts of man. The assumption that fighting is instinctive apparently disposes of the problem of explaining social conflict psychologically, without the necessity of further inquiry. If it is instinctive for men to fight, apparently this accounts for the fact that war has always been so popular, and affords ground for the prediction that war can never be abolished. Various sociological writers have, however, been disposed to inquire into the matter more critically. It is pointed out that a number of uncivilized tribes, contrary to the popular impression, are of very peaceable habits and customs, and that many individuals in civilized countries never have the opportunity of exercising their supposed instinctive tendencies through participation in war, even though they join the army. Modern warfare is not of such character as affords much outlet for a fighting impulse on the part of the very members of the military force, to say nothing of the larger number of male citizens of a warring country who must remain at work in the industries at home in order to provide for the maintenance of an army in the field. Graham Wallas, who has defended the applicability of the instinct theory to sociological problems more ardently, perhaps, than any other prominent contemporary sociologist,[28] argues along

[26] *The Biology of War*. Translated by Constance A. and Julian Grande. New York, 1918.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 30-34, *passim*.

[28] *The Great Society* (New York, 1920), Chaps. III and IV; see especially, pp. 64-65.

some such lines as are indicated in the foregoing sentences, in support of the possibility of inventing a less destructive substitute for war.[29] In a somewhat similar manner, Henry R. Marshall reasons that even if fighting is instinctive, the tendency is not inevitable or unalterable.[30]

The recent tendency of social theorists has been, accordingly, to seek to formulate psychological explanations of social conflict which are somewhat more complicated than those which rest simply and directly upon the assumption of a fighting instinct.[31] W. I. Thomas published some years ago a paper in which he argued for the existence of an innate interest in conflicts and contests, a responsiveness to the stimuli afforded by a conflict situation which has presumably been bred into the race because of its survival value; the emotional reenforcement of the activities of fighting is calculated to aid one to succeed in such a struggle. He thinks of the innate interest, however, as one which may be satisfied by the rôle of the spectator at a contest of one sort or another, and which does not, accordingly, inevitably press for expression in direct participation in physical struggle. In fact Thomas speaks of the instinctive tendency as the "gaming instinct." [32] Similar at least in its deviation from the naïve explanation of war as the expression of a fighting instinct is G. T. W. Patrick's theory of war as a form of relaxation from the demands and the monotony of ordinary civilized life, to which, as he points out, the human species can by no means have become adapted in the course of the past few centuries of rapid social evolution by any process of natural selection.[33]

Giddings' Interpretation of the Human Social Struggle. Professor Giddings has developed a general outline of a theory of social struggle which is probably to be considered represen-

[29] *The Great Society* (New York, 1920), pp. 172-73.

[30] Marshall, Henry Rutgers, *War and the Ideal of Peace* (New York, 1915), pp. 96-110.

[31] See Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, Chap. IX, for an excellent group of selections from various writers bearing on this point.

[32] "The Gaming Instinct," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI (1900-01), pp. 750-63. Quoted (adapted) by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 579 ff.

[33] "The Psychology of War," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. LXXXVII (1915), pp. 166-68. Quoted by Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 598 ff.

tative of the emergent viewpoint of modern social theory, in so far at least as it affords a basis for dealing with the complex and protean character which struggle displays in human society. Giddings names four distinct varieties of human struggle: (1) the struggle to react, (2) the struggle for subsistence, (3) the struggle for adaptation to the objective conditions of life, and (4) the struggle for adjustment, by group-living individuals to one another.[34] The significant thing about this classification is that it affords to Giddings a starting-point for the characterization of phases of the human social process which are evidently rooted in the struggle for existence, in part at any rate, but which are not necessarily, as we find them in contemporary society, activities which would ordinarily be called struggle at all. Thus he continues his discussion by pointing out that the struggle for *existence,* strictly so-called, "initiates and broadens into the economic life," while "the struggle for adaptation becomes the ethical life. For adaptation, in its beginnings a mere taking on or perfecting of useful characters, develops, in time, into self-control, self-direction, and self-shaping." [35] This interpretation provides the ground for a brief explanation of the manner in which social conflict operates as a self-limiting process.

> Competition tends to engender conflicts inimical to group cohesion; but in aggregations of animals or of human beings in which individuals generally are substantially similar in behavior and approximately equal in strength, conflicts are self-limiting in a degree. An equilibrium of "live and let live" is arrived at, which makes gregarious life possible for animals and conscious association possible for human beings. In human communities the let live habit of noninterference becomes a conscious toleration, in which adaptation passes into adjustment, a reciprocal adaptation. It is a precarious adjustment at first, because rivalries continue and conflicts recur. When, however, these provoke collective (i.e., group) reactions in defense of the let live status, the struggle then begun is a struggle to maintain adjustment and to improve it. On its success group cohesion depends, and on group cohesion social evolution depends.[36]

To paraphrase in different words the central thesis of the quoted passage, the advantages to all concerned of the limita-

[34] Giddings, Franklin H., *Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* p. 14.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 15.
[36] *Ibid.,* p. 16.

tion and regulation of the sheer brute struggle of man against man and of group against group, at first more or less accidentally hit upon as the obvious termination of a struggle between evenly matched combatants, are perceived and then made the objects of conscious social effort. The ensuing process may be thought of as a "struggle for law," and has been so interpreted at length by Rudolph Jhering in his two significant works, *Kampf ums Recht* and *Zweck im Recht*.[37] Jhering is credited by Roscoe Pound with having been the principal agent in stimulating the shift in attention in theoretical studies in jurisprudence from the concept of sovereignty and of law as an unconditional command of a sovereign to the equilibration of conflicting claims or interests.[38]

Conflict as Socialization. The most profound of all the general interpretations of social conflict which has so far been published is probably that of Georg Simmel. (Simmel's fundamental hypothesis is that conflict is to be regarded and studied as a form of civilization. His development of this thesis has been summarized by Spykman, as follows:

> Struggles and conflicts have a positive sociological significance in contrast with dissolutions and repudiations of socialization, which are both negative. An antagonism between elements may arise from different subjective impulses, wants, desires, envies, or hatreds. But once the antagonism has arisen, the function of the actual struggle or conflict is to overcome the existing dualism and to arrive at some form of unity, even if it involves the destruction of one of the parties. The conflict itself is but the resolution of the tension between the two elements. That a conflict eventually terminates in a peace, either in the form of coordination or in the form of subordination, is only the obvious expression of the fact that it is a special form of synthesis between elements. It is a higher concept which contains and implies both union and opposition.[39]

[37] Jhering's (Ihering) *Kampf ums Recht* is published in English translation as *The Struggle for Law*, Chicago, 1879. The first volume of *Zweck im Recht* has been translated by Husik as *Law as a Means to an End*, 1913.

[38] "Jurisprudence," by Roscoe Pound, in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, pp. 452-53. See also "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," by Roscoe Pound, *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. XXV, pp. 140-47.

[39] Spykman, Nicholas J., *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925), p. 113 (summarized from Simmel's *Soziologie*, Chap. IV. See also "The Sociology of Conflict," translation in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IX, pp. 490-505, 672-89, 798-811.

Social conflict, in other words, is a process in which accumulated social tensions are liquidated, and through which, in consequence, new, and in general more complex, forms of social organization are established.

In much of the literature reviewed in this chapter, the approach made to the problems of social conflict has been speculative and metaphysical, through the analysis of the implications of fundamental concepts. As a research problem, the study of social conflict appears, as a result of this theoretic analysis, as a twofold one, even in its most general aspects. On the one hand, it is a task of investigation of the processes in which the attitudes, sentiments, and policies of the conflicting parties are modified, and in which adjustment is reached or approached through conflict, and the struggle itself is subjected to regulation and limitation with reference to value recognized by all parties. This is, in essence, the task of *political* research, provided that we define the term "political" broadly. On the other hand, social conflict as a research problem also tends to involve the investigation of the forces and processes determinative of the fundamental biological and economic competition which forms the basis of social conflict. In its sophisticated form, the latter line of research involves what has come to be known as the "economic interpretation of war." It is with some of the typical contributions which have been made in this field that we shall be concerned in the chapter immediately following; while in later chapters we shall turn our attention to the development and literature of political research, in the narrower and the broader sense.

CHAPTER XXVIII

ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS OF WAR

The Economic Interpretation of War. If social conflicts are an outgrowth of the biological struggle for existence, reenforced by emotional tendencies which have become established in the original nature of mankind by natural selection, which was the general thesis that much of the literature reviewed in the preceding chapter tended to support; then one would expect to find war, which is the most obvious form of social conflict in modern times, explained in part in terms of economic competition, which is the most obvious form assumed in civilized societies by the biological struggle for existence. As a matter of fact, many modern writers have sought to explain war from this general point of view. It is virtually an article of faith with most socialist groups that wars are brought about by the machinations of capitalists, in furtherance of their business interests; and it is significant that socialists have for half a century shown a tendency to organize themselves into international organizations, typically committed to the ideal of pacifism, except as regards the exception which they make in favor of the "class war" or the social revolution. Economic interpretations of war are, however, by no means exclusively the product of doctrinaire socialists. Whether it proves anything as to the validity of the thesis or not, it is probably safe to assert that a majority of the attempts which have been made by writers of some repute to explain wars scientifically, have involved some sort of economic interpretation of the causes of war. That is, they have explained war, in part, as a manifestation of the economic struggle with one another in which all societies are assumed to be involved, whether consciously or subconsciously.

Sumner's General Theory of War. One of the most suggestive and provocative general discussions of war which

has yet been published is that developed by W. G. Sumner and embodied, in brief, in *Folkways,* but somewhat more elaborately presented in an earlier essay entitled, simply, "War." [1] Sumner's general theory of war is not a purely economic interpretation, although it is significant in this connection that he was a teacher of political economy before he applied himself to the broader field of general social science. What makes his theory of war interesting and important, indeed, is the way in which it relates the economic interpretation to certain other considerations. As is well known, Sumner was a pioneer, among American scholars, in the utilization of ethnological data as an important class of primary source materials in sociological research. The starting-point for his discussion of war is, accordingly, a generalized account of the warlike activities of "primitive" peoples. He points to instances calculated to support the assertion that many primitive peoples are not warlike and "do not practice war if they can help it." When they do quarrel, their conflicts are not usually very destructive of life.[2] On the other hand, he finds many examples of groups of a low degree of civilization who are extremely warlike. Furthermore, it is his judgment that only very few of his instances of peaceable societies seem to illustrate a really primitive "Arcadian" peace and simplicity, and he thinks that fuller knowledge of these peoples might cause some modification of the description of their ways. Other examples of supposedly primitive peaceableness really represent the breaking of spirit through previous misfortunes and abuse, or they are due to "cowardice." Just why some uncivilized peoples should be especially cowardly he does not further seek to explain. What he does infer from his cases, however, is that "we cannot postulate a warlike character or a habit of fighting as a universal or even characteristic trait of primitive man." [3]

It is, then, as Sumner views the evidence, a matter of constructing an hypothetical picture of the typical organization of primitive society which will account for as many of the ascer-

[1] First written as a lecture in 1903. Published as title essay in the posthumous volume *War and Other Essays,* edited by Albert Galloway Keller (New Haven, 1911).

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 3 ff.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

tainable facts as may be. As the basis of such an hypothesis he adopts the proposition that the natural relationship of primitive social groups to one another is one of hostility.

> When we undertake to talk about primitive society we should conceive of it as consisting of petty groups scattered separately over a great territory. I speak of groups because I want a term of the widest significance. . . . It is to be observed that this ultimate unit is a group and not an individual. Every individual excludes every other in the competition of life unless they can by combining together win more out of nature by joint effort than the sum of what they could win separately. . . . If by greater culture a higher organization becomes possible, the groups coalesce by intermarriage or conquest, competition gives way to combination again, and the bigger unit enters into competition with other composite units. Thus at all stages throughout the history of civilization combination and competition alternate with each other.
>
> These groups are independent of each other, their size being determined by their mode of life, because the number who can live together economically is limited by the possibilities of the food-quest. When a group outgrows this limit, it breaks up and scatters. The fact of former association is long remembered, [but] . . . their remoter relationship does not keep them from quarreling and fighting.[4]

In-groups and Out-groups. Having established the foregoing general picture of the structure of primitive populations, Sumner finds it to be possible to characterize more explicitly the conditions existing among them as to conflict and cooperation. Inside one of the groups mentioned in his account, the relationship is, typically, one of peace and cooperation; he speaks of such a group as an "in-group" or "we-group." The sentiment toward members of all outside groups on the part of members of an in-group, on the other hand, is one of hostility. These two attitudes are in fact not inconsistent, but complimentary, in view of the situation as Sumner interprets it. War, in his view, arises from the "competition of life," and not merely from the biological struggle for existence. By the competition of life he means the process which is set in motion when two or more men are carrying on the struggle for existence side by side; their interests then tend to overlap and collide, and if the number of men struggling for the supply

[4] Sumner, *War and Other Essays*, pp. 7-9, *passim*, condensed and adapted as indicated.

is large in proportion to the size of the supply, the collision may be violent. The competition of life, however, takes place typically, between groups, those basic groups which were described in the previously quoted passage, and the size of which is determined by the general mode of life of the people, that is, by the general character of their "economic culture," as contemporary anthropologists would call it. Such groups are formed of those who can work together to the greatest advantage, and the members, therefore, have a common interest. Any one group, on the other hand, must, typically, have control of a certain amount of land, from the resources of which it will derive its subsistence; and it is in the struggle for the possession of land that groups come into collision with each other. The competition of life, therefore, determines *both* the sentiments of peace and cooperation within the group, and the sentiment of hostility toward outsiders. "It is the competition of life, therefore, which makes war, and that is why war has always existed, and always will. It is in the conditions of human existence." [5] Among the nature peoples who have no war, Sumner states, there are *quarrels* over hunting grounds and other matters. Furthermore, where there is no war, either there is no crowding, because the conditions of existence are so unfavorable as to prevent population from growing, or out of past fighting peace-pacts are formed, which have had the effect of welding the groups into larger combinations.[6]

We can see now why the sentiments of peace and cooperation inside are complementary to sentiments of hostility outside. It is because any group, in order to be strong against an outside enemy, must be well disciplined, harmonious, and peaceful inside; in other words, because discord inside would cause defeat in battle with another group. Therefore the same conditions which made men warlike against outsiders made them yield to the control of chiefs, submit to discipline, obey law, cultivate peace, and create institutions inside. The notion of rights grows up in the in-group from the usages established there securing peace. . . . There are two codes of morals and two sets of mores, one for comrades inside and the other for strangers outside, and they arise from the same interests.[7]

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

In the suggestion in the foregoing passage that the notion of rights "grows up" in the in-group, there is contained the implication that it may be subsequently extended to some of the relations with out-groups, and this implication is accepted by the author, in the context. Neighboring groups, he admits, cannot remain completely isolated from each other, so far as economic intercourse is concerned. Each will be likely to have in its territory some things which the other desires, and there are certain advantages to be had from inter-group exchange. Likewise, there is a constant tendency to intermarriage between neighboring groups. Consequently, sooner or later, they are likely to form treaties with one another—treaties which bring about "a middle state of things between war and peace." These treaties, he believes, may be regarded as the origins of modern international law. As we shall have occasion to note in a later chapter, they may indeed be regarded as the earliest form of any positive, impersonal law, whether municipal or international. He contends, however, that a comparison of modern international with municipal law will show that the distinction between the in-group and the out-group still exists.[8]

Sumner concludes, finally, that if we return to the primary question, whether men are naturally in a state of war or in a state of peace, the answer is that they began with both together. Which phase preponderated, war or peace, was, he thinks, largely a question of the intensity of the competition of life in that place at that time.[9] If, on the other hand, we inquire more specifically concerning the *motives* which impel men to make war, he believes that we must look to all the motives or desires which are fundamental and characteristic of the human species. These he names as hunger, love, vanity, and fear of superior powers, and the causes of war, in this sense of the term, are to be found under all of these interests.[10] In this respect, Sumner's general theory of war bears no little resemblance to that of Hobbes, on the one hand, and to such doctrines as Ward's treatment of "social forces," Small's and Ratzenhofer's "in-

[8] Sumner, *War and Other Essays*, p. 13.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

terests," and Thomas and Znaniecki's four classes of "wishes," on the other hand.

What we can get from Sumner, then, is an inclusive explanation of war, based primarily upon the study of uncivilized societies, but extended by implication to apply to more highly developed societies. The theory may be summarized in a few simple propositions: (1) The "competition of life" is primary and arises inevitably out of the struggle for existence. (2) Men naturally unite to carry on the competition of life cooperatively, in groups. (3) The size and complexity of these groups are determined largely by the stage of economic culture at which the group in question is living. (4) Appropriate *sentiments,* of peace and friendliness within, and of hostility toward outsiders, are developed in the in-groups, and become incorporated in the mores of those groups. (5) The sentiments of cooperation and the notions of personal "rights" developed in the in-groups become extended, under circumstances arising out of economic interdependence of groups with one another, to apply to relations between groups, but with modifications which give rise to a state of affairs which is neither war nor thoroughgoing peace. This is the origin of international law.

Robinson's Economic Interpretation of War. In a paper written at about the same time as Sumner's essay on war, Edward Van Dyke Robinson outlined a theory of war which is much more strictly economic than was Sumner's theory, and which may be taken as a representative example of economic interpretations of war by modern writers. The primarily economic character of the author's theory is in fact clearly indicated by his title, "War and Economics in History and in Theory." [11]

Robinson's analysis begins with a description of primitive society very similar to that worked out by Sumner, in other words, one which represents the population of an extended region as composed of numerous tribes, each involved in a

[11] *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. XV, pp. 581-622; reprinted by Thomas Nixon Carver in *Sociology and Social Progress* (Boston and New York, 1905). Citations here have reference to the latter reprint.

struggle for existence with all the others, or at least with its neighbors. Robinson seems to place somewhat more emphasis, however, upon the pressure of increasing population upon food supply, resulting in the overlapping of tribal territories.

> So arises a war of extermination, whose issue is the destruction of the least efficient social organization and the restoration of the equilibrium between population and food supply. At this stage of economic development, war is a business enterprise,—the only means by which a vigorous tribe may procure for itself an increased food supply. Nevertheless, a victorious tribe cannot expand without breaking up into smaller tribes, for the economic condition forbids men to dwell in large groups. This state of things thus tends to perpetuate itself. Individual tribes may rise or fall, but the old way of life goes on unchanged.[12]

The problem for the social theorist, as Robinson sees it, then, is to discover the process by which the primitive state of society which he has described gives way to successively more complicated and more extended economic and political organizations.

Direct evidence bearing on this problem is obviously difficult to collect, since most of the earlier developments in question took place in any given people before the beginnings of written history. Both common sense and the culture myths of peoples now on a higher plane of organization suggest, however, that the escape from the vicious circle of war and restriction of the possible size of social groups was had through the discovery or invention of "artificial" food supplies. This would, at first sight, appear to have taken place when all other means of providing increased food supply, and in particular war, had failed; this would imply that we ought to look for evidences of invention of artificial ways of increasing the food supply by defeated tribes. But defeated tribes, Robinson thinks, seldom have after their defeat any surplus population to feed, and even when their numbers again increase, the creation of an artificial food supply is hindered by their inability to defend themselves or their possessions. Such tribes, therefore, typically fall back upon the limitation of their numbers, by infanticide or "senicide"—the killing of aged members of the tribe

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 134.

when they cease to be able to contribute their share of the tribal subsistence. "It is rather among tribes whose equality of strength or inaccessible location prevents a decisive victory that the creation of an artificial food supply becomes a necessity and hence a fact; and the same rule holds good for most of the subsequent stages in economic progress. In other words, industrial development is the result of strenuous competition, of which war is the most acute form." The step in economic development then taken may be, Robinson thinks, either pastoral or agricultural, depending upon the nature of the environment. In either case, however, there will be ultimately a tendency to division of labor, and to the differentiation of the social status of different elements in the population, based upon their economic status. In all such cases, furthermore, the "law of decreasing returns" is certain to be felt sooner or later, with the consequence that war again becomes a necessity.[13]

The foregoing sentences indicate in summary Robinson's interpretation of the wars of those peoples whom we might classify as "ancient"; it was, he thinks, a matter of (1) increase of numbers made possible by the development of artificial food supplies under favorable conditions of isolation or equilibrium of strength with reference to neighboring tribes; (2) development of a hierarchical, centralized and therefore powerful government through differentiation of strata of the population; (3) eventual check of the increase of food supply through the incidence of the law of decreasing returns; and (4) ultimately, fresh stimulus to aggression upon neighboring tribes, such aggression being, in effect, like the wars of primitive peoples, a matter of "business enterprise." The theory that wars are usually business enterprises for the increase of national subsistence is in fact the central feature of Robinson's paper. Turning to the investigation of wars waged in the Middle Ages in Europe, he finds that they may be classified under four headings: (1) defensive wars, waged against the barbarian invaders from the north; (2) feudal or territorial wars, fought over the possession of land, then the only important source of subsistence and of wealth; (3) the Crusades—ostensibly religious in motive, but really, as he believes, motivated in large

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35.

part by the hope of plunder to be had in the east, and, unconsciously, by the pressure of population at home; (4) commercial wars, which were at the close of the Middle Ages struggles of rival commercial and maritime states, such as Venice and Genoa, over the markets in which they wished to maintain exclusive trading privileges. As is briefly suggested in the foregoing enumeration, Robinson finds an economic motive, more or less disguised in some cases, underlying all of these conflicts.[14]

At the close of the Middle Ages, Robinson sees the wars of mankind, particularly of the nations of the western world, transferred, so to speak, to a new theatre. The discovery of the New World provided an outlet, for the time, for the surplus population of some of the nations of Europe, and a fresh source of food for the populations who remained at home, but it precipitated a struggle over the possession of the new territories, a struggle which, according to his interpretation, took the form of a series of war periods, ending about 1763, and followed by a century of comparative peace, a century which, however, was punctuated by a series of military and diplomatic struggles rooted in commercial issues—the control of trade routes to the Far East and the like.[15]

Turning his attention to the question of future prospects of war, as seen from the time when he wrote, at the opening of our century, Robinson restates briefly the Malthusian theory of population—though not under that name—and derives from it a point of view for the analysis of the contemporary situation. Briefly summarized, his conclusions are: (1) Wars might conceivably be forestalled by the voluntary limitation of the population of existing nations, but, without discussing the point, the author leaves the impression that he does not regard this as a probable solution. (2) Nations may find a temporary solution of the needs created by the growth of their populations by the development of manufacturing within their own boundaries, and the exchange of manufactured products and of their commercial services with less developed countries for raw materials and food stuffs, and in this way making it possible for

[14] *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XV, pp. 151-55.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 155-56.

the areas which they occupy to support populations larger than would be possible if they had to be fed from the produce of their own soil. (3) This solution of the problem is not, however, susceptible of indefinite expansion; sooner or later the population must catch up with the enlargement of resources in this way, and meanwhile one nation after another turns to the same remedy, becoming in increasing degree a manufacturing and mercantile nation instead of an agricultural one. (4) The possibilities of increasing the product of the soil in any given area are indeed indefinite, but they can be had, beyond a certain undetermined point, only subject to the "law of decreasing returns"; *i.e.*, added applications of labor will not produce proportionate increments to the net product. Hence he concludes that the prospect of wars in the future is very great.

> The cause of war is as permanent as hunger itself; since both spring from the same source, the law of decreasing returns. So long as that persists, war must remain, in the last analysis, a national business undertaking, designed to procure or preserve foreign markets, that is, the means of continued growth and prosperity. *Chacun doit grandir ou mourir.*[16]

War and the Population Problem. Professor Thomas Nixon Carver, who incorporated Robinson's paper in his own volume of readings for students of general sociology, has set forth in various passages in his writings similar hypotheses concerning the basic causes of war.[17] There is this difference between the two men's apparent theories, however, that Carver indicates, though in no great detail, his hopefulness as to the possibilities of voluntary restrictions of the population, and likewise of the restriction through social control of the tendency of human desires to increase indefinitely, as preventives of future war.[18] The opinion that the growth of population may be brought under control, and future wars thus avoided, has of course become a familiar one in recent years, through the propagandist efforts of those who are often grouped together as "Neo-Malthusians." Professor East's *Mankind at the Cross-*

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 170-73.
[17] See for example his *Essays in Social Justice* (Cambridge, 1915), Chaps. II, IV and X.
[18] See particularly Chap. X, *op. cit.*

Roads, to which we referred in the chapter on Population, is a representative and able popular presentation of this point of view.

Perhaps the most provocative treatment of the causes and prospects of international war is that found in John Carter's recent volume, *Man Is War.*[19] Carter marshals his data, consisting largely of factual and imaginative representations of the affairs of world diplomacy, with great dexterity. The general premises of his argument are much the same as those of the writers we have been considering, but he dismisses the possibility that birth-control may one day become a widespread reality with the contemptuous remark that such a condition "will spell the easy death of degeneracy." [20] He pictures, briefly, the pressure of population upon subsistence, and the ultimate limitation of the resources of the earth; and, as a consequence of these conditions, he sees the past and prospective alliance of men and communities into larger combinations, for cooperation in the competition of life against each other. In his later, more speculative chapters, Carter visualizes the possibility, which he even appears to regard as an eventual probability, of the emergence of a world state, but he does not regard that end as the end of the process of struggle, but only as the initiation of a new cycle. Interest is lent to Carter's treatment, for the well-informed reader, by the concreteness with which he pictures the recent and future probable development of international politics and diplomacy. The essential difference between Carter's treatment of the causes of war and that of East is that, whereas the latter looks to birth control and the consequent limitation of the growth of population to provide an eventual preventive of war, the former writer has no hope for any such outcome, and hence paints a picture of the prospects which is pessimistic as regards its ultimate bearings, and which has "preparedness" as its immediate practical application.

Numerous other versions of the economic interpretation of war have been published in recent years; the economic interpretation is, for instance, quite compatible with Nicolai's bio-

[19] Indianapolis, 1926.
[20] *Op. cit.,* p. 351.

logical interpretation, and is incorporated in his discussion as a minor feature. We may briefly note interesting features of the argument of two other recent writers.

Oscar T. Crosby, in a volume entitled *International War—Its Causes and Its Cure,*[21] has reiterated the economic explanation of the causes of war, but, being interested primarily in the formulation of a plan for the prevention of war, he emphasizes the conception that economic causes, strictly so-called, operate to produce war only through the medium of human nature, and that, consequently, the effects of the economic causes of war are determined eventually by human attitudes, customs, and institutions.

> The condition which has always provoked force-contests for food is, in substance, one of *limited* visible supply, insufficient for vital needs of rival claimants, and an *inability* on their part to conceive of increasing the supply by cooperation. In so far as intelligence points the way toward cooperation, violent struggles cease because they are found to be stupid methods for attaining desired ends.
>
> Moralities in plenty, property rights, sexual rights, political rights, all grow out of surplus stocks of foods. But always, when Fate wished to mock us, she swept away from groups of men their garnered stores. Then there befell again the ancient strife. Again men struggled for life, and freed themselves from sophistries of right and wrong.[22]

This passage, taken by itself, might be construed to indicate a belief on the part of the author that by "cooperation" the supply of the necessities of life might be increased indefinitely, and that in consequence, to prevent future wars it is necessary only to devise a plan for the control of the psychological attitudes which constitute the immediate causes of war and to concentrate human intelligent effort on the problems of production of the necessities of life. As a matter of fact, however, the author discusses very candidly in a substantial chapter the factor of growth of population, and reaches, by reasoning from considerations satisfactory to himself, the conclusion that, while the pressure of population may be expected to provoke international disturbances in certain quarters of the globe in the relatively near future, ultimately the experience of certain countries of

[21] London, 1919.
[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

the western world gives ground for the expectation that the voluntary restriction of increase of population will be accomplished everywhere. Like others who have dealt with the matter, he concedes that the means of subsistence are not capable of indefinite increase.[23]

Evidence and arguments relating to the economic causes of war have been surveyed and summarized by John Bakeless in a recent volume, *The Economic Causes of Modern War—A Study of the Period 1878-1918*.[24] The author's general findings are (1) that economic causes are in fact working to produce wars as an outcome of the struggle for markets and food supplies, much as has been indicated by the authors whose works have been reviewed in the preceding pages; (2) that the same fundamental causes are, however, working toward peace; the international financier is usually though not always interested in peace for the sake of the safety of his investments; (3) the complexity of modern economic inter-relationships between states has led to the formation of various arrangements and understandings which promote a spirit of cooperation; but finally (4) as matters have developed hitherto, "the economic causes are working a great deal faster towards war than peace." [25]

Evidently there is in contemporary social theory a trend, at least, toward the formation of a consensus as to the interpretation of war, on one side, in terms of a process of economic competition in which it is held to have its origins or sources. That such a theory of the causation of war would be agreed to, with various reservations and qualifications, by a majority of reputable social theorists today is the judgment of the present writer. This theory is, however, but one phase of any acceptable general theory of social conflict. War is not the only form of conflict to be observed in contemporary society; it remains to consider the theories which have been developed to account for and interpret the effects of other forms of social conflict. Likewise, the human and the scientific interest attaching to

[23] Crosby, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXIX.

[24] New York: Printed for the Department of Political Science of Williams College, 1921, David A. Wells Prize Essay.

[25] *Op. cit.* (author's *Introduction*), pp. vii-viii.

social conflicts is not limited to their causes and their ultimate prospects; social science has sought also to gain intelligible explanations of the mechanisms whereby they are, as they undoubtedly are, in some sense and to some degree adjusted. Specifically, the broader reaches of the present inquiry must include the industrial organization of modern societies, internally and "non-politically," as well as their external economic relationships and rivalries. In the following chapter we shall be concerned with the social theories which have been developed to help us understand the process of industrialization through which economic life has been passing in the past two or three centuries.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

Industrialization as a Problem in "Economic" Theory. In Part I of this volume we have had occasion to review some of the more interesting and important contributions which have been made to the "economic" phase of modern social theory. We ought to recall here particularly the material covered and the points made in the chapters dealing with competition, the division of labor, commerce, and the market. It seems desirable in connection with our discussion of theories of politics and social control, however, to give separate consideration to certain ideas which have had a prominent place in the literature of social science in recent decades, and which relate to the general subject of "industrialization" as a process of realignment in the social and economic relationships of human beings. Such a process, it is pointed out, has had much to do with the determination of the setting in which the evolution of social control takes place.

It would not be altogether illogical or inappropriate to give some other name instead of "industrialization" to the process of change which has provided the background for some of the changes in the control organization of society with which modern social and political theories have dealt. The skilful interpretation of world history worked out by Professor Gras in his *Introduction to Economic History* tends to suggest that we might think of the other changes which interest the social theorist as having for their background a "process of urbanization," and there is much in the writings of others to lend support to such a view. Similarly, it may be pointed out that passages in the writings of Ratzel, Semple, and Karl Bücher seem to contribute to the formulation of a theory that the fundamental change which has been taking place in modern society has been a "mobilization" of the individual man, an

emancipation of the individual from the bonds and the economic handicaps of fixed location in space. Most of the important contributions to our present knowledge and theory of the forces and process underlying changes in the organization of social control have, however, been made by students of economic history or "historical economics," and, naturally, the historical development which has loomed larger than any other in their eyes is that by which large-scale, standardized, power-machine types of production have replaced the handicrafts of a previous era. From the point of view which the economic historians have helped to define, the political and psychological aspects of contemporary social life may be studied as results of the impact of the factory system upon medieval culture and politics. The value of this approach to the matter seems to have been considerable, even if it is based upon an inaccurate assumption. In recent years a number of writers, among them Graham Wallas and C. A. Ellwood, have criticized severely the theory of "economic determinism," of which the view here outlined is perhaps a special variant, and have contended for a more psychological interpretation of human social change, holding in substance that industrial changes are no more cause than they are effect of changes in other aspects of the common life of a people. Similarly, a number of writers have sought to interpret the general pattern of human relationships characteristic of modern economic society as an outcome, in some respects, of the Protestant Reformation. The point of view here described, however, originating in part no doubt from the "economic determinism" of Karl Marx, but developed also through the efforts of the nineteenth-century German "Historical School" of economists, has been on the whole the predominant one down to the present time. Representative and influential proponents of the view include Werner Sombart and Karl Bücher among modern German writers, and the Webbs and the Hammonds among British writers.

An "Objective" Approach to the Study of Social Control. Social Scientists have been engaged since about the time of Adam Smith in a struggle to bring within the range of objective and rational explanation the forces and processes by which men are enabled to carry on a more or less orderly and efficient

common life in community and nation. This is what we mean by the problem of *social* control, taken as a theoretic problem. For several generations after the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century beginnings of modern social science, however, the efforts of the social scientists to develop interpretations of the more abstract and general features of the organization of social control, without losing objectivity of reference, were relatively ineffective because of certain preconceptions from which they proceeded. On the one hand, they sought to apply to the problems of modern times the ideals and axioms of the medieval schoolmen, supplemented by the speculations of the eighteenth-century rationalists. On the other hand, they failed to perceive clearly the nature and bearing of the fundamental changes which were taking place in the economic life of the societies in which they were living. The interpretation of these latter changes was due in the first instance, quite naturally, to the work of the keenest and most critical students of modern history.

We have had occasion to note in Part I some of the most significant contributions to the subject here under discussion which were made by Sombart, Bücher, and others, including the revealing outline treatment of modern economic history for which we are indebted to N. S. B. Gras. For the sake of convenience and unity of presentation we may depend here, for a representative treatment of the process of industrialization in modern society, upon the excellent summary volume, *The Rise of Modern Industry,*[1] prepared by J. L. and Barbara Hammond on the basis of the more detailed studies set forth in their well-known works, *The Village Laborer, The Town Laborer,* and *The Skilled Laborer.*

The Hammonds have reviewed very ably in a number of chapters the changes in international relations, in modes of transportation, and in specific industrial technologies, which affected, if they did not exclusively cause, the great expansion of commerce which took place in the eighteenth century and which provided so much inducement for enterprisers to undertake quality production of various kinds of commodities for sale in a widening market. We are chiefly interested here, how-

[1] New York, 1926.

ever, in the changes in some of the fundamental aspects of human life and in the organization of men, women, and children for productive purposes, as described by our authors.

The Dissolution of Control by Producers' Associations. The first step in this interpretation is that which involves making clear the nature of the process of disintegration which went on, in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries but chiefly in the last-mentioned time, as regards the medieval organization of agriculture and industry which had existed in England. For the sake of conciseness we may here follow the example of the Hammonds in paying little attention to the differences between the process of industrialization in England and the somewhat different and slower development of analogous changes in the Continental countries. Our authors show that, not only are the developments in agriculture more or less parallel and similar to those taking place during the same time in industry, but the two are interrelated. Both had as their ultimate result the replacement of a system of customary regulation based on the relative economic independence of a small local area, by a system of politico-economic and legal *individualism,* as it is usually termed, in which the control and direction of affairs rested primarily with a few rich and aggressive enterprisers.

> Down to the time when the great inventions come into use the history of industry bears a certain resemblance to the history of agriculture. Both agriculture and industry had been regulated originally, in greater or less degree, by associations of producers. These associations differed in power, character, history and length of life, in different industries and different places; nor did they exist everywhere and in all industries; for guilds did not cover all industrial life, just as the common field communities did not cover the whole field of agriculture. Roughly speaking, this type of rural and industrial life loses first the substance, and then the look of power, as the range of commerce develops, the relations of the persons engaged change, and agriculture and industry become richer and more ambitious.[2]

The Economic Revolution in Agriculture. Turning for the moment now to the Hammonds' interpretation of the change in agriculture, which they speak of as "the destruction

[2] *Op. cit.,* p. 103.

of the peasant village," they find the unit of social control in this phase of life to be the Manor, "a unit of government and cultivation having a lord as its responsible head." [3] The manor was essentially a cooperative agricultural community, with not only the general social regulation of things, but the specific regulation of agriculture itself determined by a common authority, nominally, and indeed in fact to no small extent, the authority of the lord; but the caprice of the lord of the Manor was restrained by time-honored custom and by the procedure of the manorial courts. As a stabilizing tendency after the chaos of the Dark Ages, our authors believe the manorial system to have had no little constructive human value, but it was a restrictive system as regards its bearings on the potential efficiency of agriculture and herd-culture. So long as the operation of the farms was regulated by the customs and traditions of the manorial system, with its wasteful strip-cultivation of otherwise common fields, and its habit of placing main reliance upon tilling soil which could afford a more profitable yield when enclosed for the pasturing of sheep and cattle, it was impossible for large landholders of initiative and ambition to realize their plans for a more profitable use of the soil. The expansion of commerce had, however, provided a market for certain products of the land, a market in which a larger yield could be disposed of to advantage. Furthermore, the changing commercial and political situation brought it about that the prestige of the lord was no longer determined primarily by the number of his retainers, *i.e.*, his tenants, but by his monetary expenditures; a large money income rather than a pretentious feudal establishment became the ambition of the privileged classes. There were created, accordingly, strong motives for the feudal aristocracy to have the old manorial system swept away and replaced by one in which the landlord could carry on his business in the modern manner, with paid laborers and with the privilege of using his fields in any way which might promise the largest returns, regardless of traditional restrictions and customs. This change began in fact in the sixteenth century, but proceeded most rapidly and decisively in the eighteenth.[4]

[3] Hammond, J. L. and Barbara, *The Rise of Modern Industry,* p. 81.
[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 81-84.

In the sixteenth century, and here appears the close interrelation of the commercial, agricultural, and industrial revolutions, the particular motive of the landlords in seeking the privilege of "enclosure" and the dispossession of their feudal tenants was to take advantage of the market for woolen cloth which the commercial expansion had created, and which made sheep-raising more profitable than tilling the soil according to medieval ideas. In the eighteenth century, on the other hand, the great inducement on the part of the landlords in seeking further enclosure privileges was the development of a more intensive and efficient system of tillage, in order to produce foodstuffs which could be sold to the growing town population brought into existence by the technological changes and the growth of factories using power machinery, which we know primarily as the "industrial" revolution.

The agriculture of the manorial system was to be sure of a sort calculated to produce foodstuffs, but its techniques were very inefficient, and, according to the Hammonds, the landlords came to believe that the system of individual holdings was the main obstacle in the way of the introduction of improved methods. They set about it, therefore, to have set aside the rights of these peasant holders, and eventually they accomplished this end by means of a long series of special parliamentary acts. The dispossession of peasant holders, however, resulted in the main in the destruction of the peasant class as such, and the degradation of the former peasants to the status of farm laborers.

When the medieval village disappeared in England, the peasant, as a rule, sooner or later, disappeared with it. This was the result at which the enclosing landlord aimed. He held that production was hampered not merely by the system of common fields and cooperative control, but also by the wide distribution of rights of property and rights of common. He believed that the best work was done by laborers who depended on their wages and had nothing to distract them from their duty to their employer. This relationship he considered the best for production, and production was everything. Public spirit and private interest seemed to draw the landlord to the same conclusion. The population was growing faster than its resources; the Industrial Revolution was throwing up towns where food

was consumed and not produced. . . . Corn growing was immensely profitable to the landlord and urgently necessary for the State.[5]

To be sure, this process of dispossession of the peasant holders of farming land had very distressing consequences. The lot of the new class of farm laborers became a most wretched one. The story of this distress and of the fumblings of the government with abortive remedies for the evils created by enclosures are not within the scope of the present inquiry. In part these topics fall within the subject of "social politics," which we shall have occasion to consider in a later chapter.

The Destruction of the Guild System. Now the disintegration of the peasant villages was, as was indicated in the passage quoted above, paralleled by a similar and related development in the field of industry. This change also has been succinctly described by the Hammonds. In the early English "boroughs"—say, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, industry or the crafts was controlled by producers' associations called guilds, in somewhat the same manner, fundamentally, that agriculture was controlled by the association of tillers of the soil in the peasant village, with the difference that the feudal lords had little to do with the economy of the guild system from its beginnings. The guild system was, however, throughout the total period of its history an evolving thing. It began with an arrangement for the joint control of industry by a large number of small masters, and gradually assumed the form of a hierarchical structure with the principal powers concentrated in the hands of a few.[6] This concentration of power over industrial operations facilitated the displacement of the guild system by a different system of industrial control in the seventeenth century. As our authors show, the whole transition in the organization of industrial control was correlated with the enlargement of the market which as we have seen also motivated the destruction of the peasant village by the landholding class. The guild system in its earlier form was adapted to the needs of a local commerce. "When commerce expanded and the range and scale of trade increased, merchanting became much more elaborate and this organization

[5] Hammond, J. L. and Barbara, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 98-100.

was no longer adequate."[7] By the end of the seventeenth century, the industrial society, grounded on the crafts and regulated by the guilds, had given place to one in which the Hammonds find six classes, ranging from the journeyman to the large merchant.

The first substitute for the regulating power of the guilds, devised by statesmen and national leaders after efforts to rehabilitate the guilds had been abandoned, was the well-known plan of governmental paternalism and monopolies of the time of Elizabeth. This method was presently followed, however, by a strong reaction against governmental regulation, and by the development of the predominant practice of governmental non-interference in industry and commerce. In this realm of national economic life as in agriculture, the public policy and the scheme of social control—which in fact included a very real and effective scheme for the protection of "property"—was based on the widespread belief that the good of all is best promoted by allowing the maximum scope for private initiative.[8]

The Hammonds have shown, then, that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England the older, relatively compact and intimate organization of agriculture and industry, in which active control was largely exercised by the feudal lords, to be sure, but in which the primary organ of control was an association of producers, was progressively replaced by an economic and political system in which the maximum of independence and initiative was allowed to the single enterpriser, who was freed more and more of all customary restraints which might hamper him in making the most advantageous contracts with his employees. The more distinctly human or psychological aspects of this trend of change, however, our authors are able to bring out by describing them in other terms and by adding other specifications.

The "Shadow of the Slave Trade." They have pointed out, for instance, that these great changes making up what we know as the "Industrial Revolution," in a broad sense of the term, took place during and immediately following the period in which the laws of England still countenanced the slave

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 100.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 101-09.

trade.[9] In the opinion of the Hammonds, the trade in African slaves grew up largely in response to a demand for labor to develop and work the mines and plantations of the New World; in other words, it was, like the guild system and the enclosures, a device hit upon to meet the needs and opportunities seen in changing economic circumstances. Although the modern slave trade is said to have been initiated by the Portuguese, the importation of African slaves into British colonies and settlements in America and the West Indies, by British traders sailing British ships came to be of great importance by the latter part of the seventeenth century. Hence, although the system of Negro slavery never became firmly established at home in England, our authors hold that the moral atmosphere created by the slave trade influenced profoundly the human relations in British industry during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; it was an atmosphere "in which it was the fashion to think of men as things." [10]

> An age that thought of the African Negro, not as a person with a human life, but as so much labor power to be used in the service of a master or a system, came naturally to think of the poor at home in the same way. . . . In the days of the guilds the workman was regarded as a person with some kind of property or status; the stages by which this character is restricted to a smaller and smaller part of the working class, and more and more of the journeymen and apprentices fall into a permanently inferior class, have been described by historians. In the early nineteenth century the workers, as a class, were looked upon as so much labor power to be used at the discretion and under the conditions imposed by their masters; not as men and women who are entitled to some voice in the arrangements of their life and work.[11]

A particularly striking manifestation of this tendency to regard human beings as things is to be noted in the history of child labor: "Infant man soon became in the new industrial system what he never was under the old, the basis of a complicated economy." [12]

[9] Hammond, J. L. and Barbara, *op. cit.*, Chap. XII, *passim.*
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 195.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 196. Compare J. R. Commons' statements concerning the "commodity theory of labor," in *Industrial Goodwill.*
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 198.

The Process of Industrialization in England. So far in this chapter we have been reviewing an account of the rise of the new industrial system which makes it, in its human and "social" aspects, appear as the outgrowth of purely economic forces, that is, of changes in commerce and in industrial technology. The particular system of industrial relationships which grew up in England, and which was in substance transplanted presently to the United States, was, however, conditioned to no small extent by certain *ideas* commonly held by Englishmen during the period in question,—ideas of "economic law" rationalized in the terms provided by Adam Smith and Ricardo. That modern economic history ran a somewhat different course in England and the United States from that which it took on the Continent, was due in part to the fact that these ideas never became so well established in Continental European countries.

The form which this idea, or system of ideas, ultimately assumed may perhaps be made clear most easily by starting our analysis from the proposition that the production of economic goods or commodities to satisfy human wants was held to be the principal, if not the only, means of promoting human welfare. Since the developing factory system was producing goods not only for the wealthy, but for the middle and lower classes, nothing seemed more obvious than that the expansion and maintenance of production was in the interests of all.[13] The maximum of production, however, was conceived as an end to be reached only through the free play of the profits motive; Adam Smith was supposed to have shown that conclusively, with certain qualifications which did not affect the ordinary bearings of the principle, in the discussion which reaches its climax in his much-quoted reference to the "Invisible Hand." The guiding principle determining public policy and the enactment of relevant legislation with reference to industry and economic life generally in the nineteenth century was, accordingly, the principle that the maximum scope should be allowed to the enterprise and initiative of business men animated by the profits motive. Eighteenth-century Liberalism

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 210-11.

came in to support this attitude, since it was in essence a revolt against the medieval idea of status—a status into which one was born and in which one was expected to remain. Liberalism "regarded society as existing to enforce respect for rights that man brought with him into society: not as a community whose members and classes served different purposes, and stood in some organic relation to one another." [14] The Industrial Revolution had in fact made it easier for a poor man with courage and initiative (and good fortune?) to rise above the status into which he was born. From the viewpoint of the Liberal this advantage of the new order overshadowed all disadvantages. Economic individualism or "freedom" and "production for profits" were in fact the twin ideas which guided and determined the process of industrialization on the political and legal side.

> The life of man had been regulated before by the needs of a particular order or the pattern of a particular society: the government of king or church or lord had defined narrow limits within which a man was to run his course. The new master was a world force, for this economy could make its profits, so it was believed, where it chose, and when Englishmen rebelled against its rule it would seek its gains and bestow its blessings elsewhere. This way of looking at the new industrial system put man at the mercy of his machines, for if the new power was not made man's servant, it was bound to become his master. If at every point the governing claim was not man's good but the needs of the machine, it was inevitable that man's life and the quality of his civilization should be subordinated to this great system of production.[15]

The prevailing notion, in other words, was that "economic law" was something like the physicists' "laws of nature"; it determined that men should gain their subsistence in a certain way and under certain conditions. To attempt to oppose the workings of economic law was worse than futile; such opposition, however much it might be inspired by humanitarian sympathies for the miseries of the wage workers, was likely to militate against the general welfare of the people in which such rebellion against natural law might be reflected in legislation seeking to raise the level of wages, restrict the employment of

[14] Hammond, *op. cit.*, p. 214.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 204-05.

women and children, or otherwise soften the rigors of life under the machine economy.

The Quest for Guidance in the New Industrial Order. The wretchedness of the new classes of factory and agricultural laborers continued, however, to inspire sympathy and efforts to effect remedies on the part of leaders who arose among the members of the privileged classes; and during the same period unrest, spontaneous strikes or "turn-outs," and rioting continued to disturb the smooth working of the individualist system of economic organization. The very fact that the principle of "economic law" and "liberty" was so much discussed and so frequently reiterated is evidence that the social theory of the times was, as Professor Odum has phrased it, a "quest for social guidance." The trouble was, in part, as the Hammonds point out, that it was difficult to find entirely satisfactory guiding principles for the life of the industrial age.[16] The Greeks had their idea of the "polis," the city-state, which was more than a descriptive term, being also an ideal of right living; the Romans were similarly guided by their idea of the "res publica," the "public thing"; the Middle Ages had likewise had a more or less integral body of customary regulations and traditions, oriented, perhaps we may say, with reference to the idea of "Christendom." The Industrial Revolution, however, destroyed this body of guiding custom, as we have seen. There remained as dynamic forces making for the reorganization of social control two tendencies or motives, the sense of honor and compassion which existed in the minds of a few sensitive and imaginative industrial leaders like Robert Owen,[17] and the random insurgence of the wage workers, evoked from time to time by some particularly shocking episode or some critical reduction in wages.

It is to these two forces that we may trace the origins of the three new features of social control which the Hammonds regard as the most important contributions of England to the reorganization of industrial control: the Factory Laws, Civil Service, and Trade Unionism. The Factory Acts were of course the most direct expression of the growing conviction on

[16] *Ibid.*, Chap. XIV, "A World in Disorder."
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 243.

the part of members of the governing class that some of the human consequences of the factory system were intolerable and must be curbed. The factory laws, however, would, in the opinion of these writers whose account we have been following, have been of little effect if there had not been developed an adequate plan of administering and enforcing them, in the shape of the Civil Service, with its combination of the ideals of efficiency and expertness and of security of tenure. Trade Unionism was of course primarily the contribution of the wage workers to the organization of control to meet the needs of the changed economic conditions.

From the general viewpoint which we must assume in this study, the ultimate interest in the matters we have been considering in this chapter is not an interest in what happened in the way of social reconstruction toward the end of the nineteenth century and since then, nor an interest in the moral issues involved. It is our business here to scrutinize the range and development of social theory, particularly in the sense of social *science*. The actual changes which took place in the organization of control in response to the changed economic conditions have, however, at the same time provided the stimulus to social scientists to examine the forces and processes involved, and suggested to them the problems to be solved. The experience of nineteenth-century English reformers gained in the course of their efforts to rectify the human evils which they saw around them has doubtless been the source, directly or indirectly, of the contributions to social and political science made by a number of writers of our own century. Feeling the inadequacy of some of the older conceptions and theories of government and legislation—including even the traditional but vague idea of "democracy"—they have subjected to fresh examination and analysis the processes in which laws are made and altered, and the nature and working of the force called "public opinion," which has been assumed to be the immediate cause of legislation. It is with some of the fruits of these inquiries that we shall be concerned in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XXX

PUBLIC OPINION AND LEGISLATION

Social Control as a Problem of Social Theory. How can a number of people who find themselves in an interdependent relationship to one another but who have more or less distinct and frequently conflicting desires and purposes, manage to carry on a common life and joint activities without consuming all of their energies in fighting with one another? How have people managed to do this in the past as well as they often have? This is the oldest, most persistent problem of social theory, and must still in our day be regarded as one of the central problems in the general field of theoretic social inquiry. In other parts of the present volume we have reviewed some of the suggestions which have led to the formation of some of the subtler insights into the matter which form parts of the body of contemporary social science. The theoretic problem of social control and that of collective behavior are at bottom different phases of the same question; and all of the knowledge which it is possible to gain concerning the working of religious belief and practice, morality, crowd spirit, and other factors or tendencies affecting social behavior seen as the manifestation of unified *collective* action, forms in fact a part of the theory of social control.

When we think of social control as a problem, whether theoretic or practical, however, it is usually the functioning of government and law which we think of first. Formal civil government is ordinarily thought of as the agency by means of which peace, order, and collective efficiency in the pursuit of common ends are promoted and conserved in a human society. Religion and morals are generally thought of, in contrast, as the forces which determine or define the ends toward which collective activities are directed.

Spencer's Study of Social Control. Herbert Spencer, as we have seen, recognized that there were two kinds of "government," political and religious, and pointed to "ceremonial observance" as "the primitive and undifferentiated kind of government from which the political and religious governments are differentiated, and in which they ever continue immersed." [1] Spencer's analysis of the theoretic problem of social control—although he used in preference the term "government"—might indeed serve as a model for all subsequent writers, with minor modifications to meet the needs created by newly discovered insights; for not only does he start with the assumption that religion and political organization are alike forms of "government," but, in commencing his discussion of political organization, he makes a very penetrating distinction between political and economic forms of cooperation. "A society, in the sociological sense," he says, "is formed only when, besides juxtaposition there is cooperation. . . . But cooperation implies organization. . . . This organization, necessary as a means to concerted action, is of two kinds. . . . There is a spontaneous cooperation which grows up without thought during the pursuit of private ends; and there is a cooperation which, consciously devised, implies distinct recognition of public ends." [2] "Political organization is to be understood as that part of social organization which constantly carried on directive and restraining functions for public ends." [3] Spencer's chapter on "laws" occurs in the section of the *Principles of Sociology* which deals with political institutions, but his treatment of laws is such as to display very clearly his grasp of the theoretic possibility of regarding political government and law as phases of social control having partially distinct origins and therefore susceptible of separate study.[4]

The survey of the development and literature of the theory of social control with particular respect to its political aspects which is undertaken in this section of the present volume may be thought of as one which follows Spencer's outline to a large

[1] *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. II, pp. 3-6.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 244-45.
[3] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 247.
[4] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Pt. V, Chap. XIV. See especially pp. 523-24.

extent. Civil and criminal law are probably regarded by most laymen today as expressions of the public will, enacted by the duly constituted governmental bodies. When one examines the more theoretic and general literature dealing with these topics, however, one finds that it is feasible to isolate from each other for purposes of abstract and summary discussion the two bodies of theory, the theory of law, thought of primarily as "common law," *i.e.,* as a stable body of rules and principles consistently administered by the courts, and theories of political process, of discussion, public opinion, and legislation. In the present chapter it is with the latter segment of the general social theory of government that we shall be especially concerned, reserving theories of law so far as possible for discussion in the following chapter. Following these, several chapters will be devoted to the treatment of certain special aspects of government and political process which have attracted the attention of social theorists to a considerable extent since Spencer's day.

Problems of Political "Philosophy." Even when we have delimited the scope of our inquiry in this way, we are still confronted by an enormous literature, the larger part of which cannot even be named by title and author here, without reducing the discussion to a mere catalogue. For the purposes of the present volume, we must perforce follow the plan of treating a few particularly interesting, thought-provoking works as indicative of some of the main trends in the fundamental theory of government and legislation. Thus for instance we may accept that the whole body of literature dealing primarily with the problem of sovereignty, and most of the earlier discussions of contract theories of government, have only a remote and indirect value for the contemporary social scientist, and we may accordingly leave these works with merely this mention, that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries these topics occupied a large place in the literature of political theory. They may perhaps be regarded as topics in political *philosophy,* rather than in political science.

We may note, however, that eighteenth-century political theorists contributed to the revival and restatement of one idea which may be traced back to classical Greek times—the idea, namely, that *legislation,* that is, the *enactment* of laws for the

guidance of public affairs by some body assumed to represent the common interest or the "general will," is the principal procedure by which social control is effected. Rousseau was among the early modern writers who helped to formulate the thesis that governments should execute the *general will,* which he was careful to distinguish from the *will of all.* The experience of the French Revolution and the long period of experimentation in governmental organization through which France subsequently passed showed, however, that the enactment of the general will was not a simple thing to bring about. We may perhaps without too serious historical inaccuracy think of Rousseau's *Social Contract* and Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* as the first contributions to a long discussion and investigation of the principles and the processes by which legislation is actually determined.

As soon as exclusive reliance upon *a priori* speculations concerning natural rights and liberty and the general will was abandoned for more objective procedures designed to check up on the actual relevant facts, the method of research most obviously indicated was the description and comparison of the actual governmental organization and legislative process employed in the various national states. Political scientists accordingly embarked upon a long and painstaking task of inquiry and composition, relative to the structure and functioning of actual governments, their structure, the division of powers between their branches and officials, the franchise and methods of electing or otherwise choosing legislators and other officials, and the various fundamental rules determining how proposals actually became enacted into law. In particular, this inquiry took on the form of repeated and critical comparisons of the cabinet-parliament system of Great Britain with the Congressional system of the United States, and of both with the various forms of "direct legislation" by initiative and referendum. Space limitations forbid any attempt to summarize or even to sample the content and findings of this body of literature. We may observe that the line of study described has led to the publication of a few massive treatises, like those of A. Lawrence Lowell and Ostrogorski dealing with the comparison of the leading governments of the western world,

of a number of penetrating studies of the English constitution, which has attracted special interest, among them Bagehot's great pioneer treatise and the works of Dicey, Anson, Ilbert, and Lowe. It has also resulted in the publication of a number of valuable compilations of constitutions and charters, and similar documentary materials, and to the preparation of many excellent textbooks for use in college classes, among which those of Charles A. Beard and W. B. Munro are well-known American examples. A large mass of facts of the more formal sort pertaining to the study of government and legislation have been made accessible to all students as the result of these efforts.

Within our own century, mainly, political scientists have begun to see and to exploit the possibilities of another method of attack upon the fundamental problems of government, in the fact of common knowledge that, as it is commonly said, "laws which are not supported by public opinion are difficult if not impossible to enforce." No little criticism has been directed in recent years at the so-called American habit of legislation—the habit of relying upon legislation to cure all kinds of social evils and promote all common purposes. The perception of some of the limitations of this plan of action has led to considerable discussion and a limited amount of research with concrete data, bearing upon the subject of public opinion. The relation of public opinion to legislation, the nature of public opinion, and the processes by which public opinion is formed and changed have been subjected to examination and have given rise to the preparation of a number of very suggestive treatises and essays since the opening of the twentieth century.

The Study of Public Opinion. Although Montesquieu had observed that it is unwise to attempt to change at the same time the laws and the fundamental customs of a people, thus anticipating to some extent the idea that laws must be grounded in public opinion, we may name James Bryce and A. Lawrence Lowell as the pioneers in the systematic study of public opinion. Bryce embodied a series of excellent chapters dealing in a fundamental and theoretic way with public opinion in his

American Commonwealth; while in 1913 President Lowell published as *Public Opinion and Popular Government* the substance of lectures he had previously delivered at Johns Hopkins University. In 1905, however, A. V. Dicey had discussed some of the theoretic and general questions underlying the study of public opinion in *Law and Public Opinion in England,* a volume the primary purpose of which was the narration and interpretation of some features of the political history of England. Dicey's main theoretic propositions are three: (1) that a main trend of gradual change may be discerned underneath the temporary shifts and uncertainties of public opinion; (2) that new opinions originate, typically, with a few leaders, but their general acceptance is conditioned, largely, by the existence of changed circumstances in the society in question; new ideas will not gain adherents in large numbers unless they serve to illuminate new problems which have arisen; (3) since legislation is enacted by assemblies of typically conservative make-up, there is usually a lag between the main current of changing opinion, in any country, and the new legislation which is enacted; the laws enacted by a parliament tend to represent the opinion that was current when the members were younger.[5] Dicey mentioned also a point sometimes lost sight of by more recent writers, that laws foster or create opinion; the fact that some rule is known to be the law of the land may affect profoundly peoples' attitudes toward that rule.

The principal contribution to a general theory of public opinion made by President A. Lawrence Lowell, in his *Public Opinion and Popular Government,* is his careful definition of the concept itself. Thus he points out in a series of short sections that (1) it takes something else beside the opinion of a majority to make public opinion, but (2) absolute unanimity is not implied in the term. It is in fact (3) the opinion to which all agree or "consent" because they are agreed upon the ends and aims of government and upon the principles by which those ends are to be attained. It implies, however, (4) a consent not obtained by force or threat. (5) It must be "opinion," that is a conviction or belief arrived at by some sort

[5] *Op. cit.,* pp. 19-41; adapted in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), pp. 445-51.

of rational process, but (6) it need not, in order to be true opinion, be based wholly or mainly on the holder's own direct experience or observation; opinion adopted from others may be true "opinion" if it forms an integral part of the holder's general philosophy of things. The author believes, however, that "in order that . . . there may be a real public opinion on any subject, not involving a simple question of harmony or contradiction with settled convictions, the bulk of the people must be in a position to determine of their own knowledge, or by weighing evidence, a substantial part of the facts required for reaching a rational decision." [6]

Lowell believes that, since as indicated above public opinion can exist only where men are agreed upon the fundamental ends and aims of government, too great racial or other heterogeneity of a people makes it impossible for them to have a public opinion; for distinct races or widely separated classes will not in the nature of things be able to agree upon fundamentals. It is really no more than a variant form of the same proposition to say, as he does, that questions concerning the fundamental objectives of a government are not subjects for public opinion; the adoption of socialism is mentioned as an example.[7] One section of the treatise to which we are here referring is devoted to a discussion of the function of parties in a modern state. The author regards political parties as the agencies by means of which public opinion is mobilized and unified to the point where it can be effectively exerted. We shall recur briefly to this topic in a later section of the present chapter.

Without doubt the most elaborate analytical study of public opinion that has yet been published is a recent German treatise, *Kritik der Öffentlichen Meinung,* by Ferdinand Tönnies. Tönnies has attacked the subject in a manner somewhat like that of Lowell, but much more thoroughly, with a great deal of attention to the underlying psychological and philosophical background of the immediate phenomena in question. He grounds his discussion of public opinion on the distinction between *Wesenwille,* the impulsive, organic will of the natural

[6] *Op. cit.*, Chaps. I and II.
[7] *Ibid.*, Chaps. III and IV.

group, and *Kurwille,* the deliberate, calculating will of a contractual society, a distinction which he first made in *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1885), and which we have touched upon in another chapter. Following a careful analysis of such topics as the difference between opinion and belief, Tönnies develops the thesis that we can discern in modern societies "public opinions," *i.e.,* opinions held by substantial groups, and *the* public opinion, which he regards as a sort of resultant consensus, emerging from the interaction of the various groups.[8] A considerable part of Tönnies' *Kritik* is devoted to an examination of various concrete materials, particularly those derived from the history of the World War. In this respect the volume resembles a much smaller, less pretentious one, *The Public Mind,* by Norman Angell (Ralph Norman Angell Lane). The latter author emphasizes, in his most theoretic section, the necessity of preserving the habit and possibility of "discussion" if public opinion is to continue to exist.

Public Opinion and Propaganda. Without much doubt, the most stimulating, provocative writings dealing with public opinion and related topics which have as yet been published are those of Walter Lippmann. In his *Public Opinion* (1922) he developed the thesis that people react, not directly to the objects and situations in the world outside, in which presumably they have to live and live together, but to the pictures of that world which they have in their heads. Those "pictures" or ideas by which social action is determined are, however, largely stereotyped, habitual, and the activities to which they give rise are emotional and sentimental rather than rational. Furthermore, as Lippmann had shown in an earlier essay, *Liberty and the News,* interested persons are able by the manipulation of the news to control the formation of these stereotyped ideas of things and persons which men have in their heads. The manipulation of public opinion in the interests of ends not frankly avowed to the general public has become, in fact, a recognized art, the art of *propaganda.* Several volumes intended to teach the elements of this art have been written in the United States in recent years, and it is true in a certain sense that all textbooks of advertising have the character of

[8] *Op. cit.* (Berlin, 1922), *passim.* See particularly Chap. IV.

treatises on propaganda. An interesting volume dealing with propaganda in a more objective, disinterested manner, however, is *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927), by Harold D. Lasswell. Lasswell has studied in considerable detail the propaganda devices employed by combatants in the World War to mold opinion and sentiment among their own people, their allies, the people of neutral countries, and in enemy countries, and has been able to draw from this survey a number of tentative generalizations concerning the effects of different types of propaganda and different schemes for the administration of propaganda. From the viewpoint of the student of pure science, of course, the particular value of such a study lies in the power it may have to give us an objective view of the social forces and processes involved in successful propaganda; ordinarily propaganda is particularly difficult to study with entire objectivity, because most of the would-be students either favor or oppose the group purposes which the propaganda is designed to promote. Mention should be made in this connection of the excellent bibliography on propaganda and closely related topics which Lasswell has included as a supplement to his text.

Implications of the Term "The Public." Even more challenging and thought-provoking than Lippmann's *Public Opinion* is his later, smaller volume, *The Phantom Public* (1925). It had been pointed out by earlier writers, implicitly by Tarde and Lowell, explicitly by R. E. Park, that the use of such terms as "public opinion" and "public sentiment" implies the concept of a certain type of social group to which the opinion or sentiment is imputed, namely, a "public." It is in fact rather surprising that inquiry was not directed sooner than it has been upon the nature of the social groups which we refer to by implication as publics. As we have noted in previous chapters of this volume, Gabriel Tarde showed, in *L'Opinion et la Foule* that the consequence of the development of cheap and universal postal service within the national states of the western world, and of the rise of the newspaper press, was to bring into existence a new type of human association, strikingly different from the "crowd" which Le Bon had described, a form of association which, on account of the distribution of

the participants in space, tended to facilitate *discussion* of current issues and collective action guided by such discussion. Park formulated a more penetrating statement of the differences between the "crowd" and the "public" in his essay, *Masse und Publicum.* It was to the same general problem, but to somewhat different aspects of the problem, that Lippmann directed his attention in *The Phantom Public.* As his title suggests, Lippmann has concluded that "the public" is a myth or a phantom, if we assume the term to mean what many of the customary allusions to "public opinion" indicate that it means. No such thing as "government by public opinion" can exist in a large national state, in any but the most limited sense. Only the most general kinds of opinions can be held in common by majorities of the citizens of such states; whereas very specific and complex opinions must guide the actual course of public affairs.[9] Political leaders are confronted with the necessity of making a general will out of the multitude of wishes of individuals and special interest groups; and this is in fact an art well known to practical politicians. It is carried out, as a rule, by substituting feelings and desires for ideas as the bases of action, since "feelings are much less specific than ideas, and yet more poignant." The result of combining wills in this way is that men of quite different desires are led to support the same program of action, but for widely different reasons; the unity which is thus attained is therefore an ambiguous one.[10]

It is Lippmann's central thesis in *The Phantom Public* that the actions of men living in a society, however broadly "social" or "public" in their *consequences,* are immediately determined by the opinions, ideas, and purposes of those who participate directly in them. The "public" is able to control or affect such acts, when at all, only indirectly. "Our public opinions are always and forever, by their very nature, an attempt to control the actions of others from the outside." [11] The perception of this truth has suggested to Lippmann, as it has also to several other students on fundamental problems in social theory, that

[9] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1925), pp. 44-47. Lippmann summarizes the argument of a large part of this book on pp. 144-45.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 47-49.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

it is profitable to inquire into the nature of the situations in which people are most likely thus to seek to influence other men's actions from the outside. Those who have considered the question generally agree with Lippmann that public opinion becomes active and effective only in *crises*.

> Though we may prefer to believe that the aim of popular action should be to do justice or promote the true, the beautiful and the good, the belief will not maintain itself in the face of plain experience. The public does not know in most crises what specifically is the truth or the justice of the case, and men are not agreed on what is beautiful and good. Nor does the public rouse itself normally at the existence of evil. It is aroused at evil made manifest by the interruption of a habitual process of life. And finally, a problem ceases to occupy attention not when justice, as we happen to define it, has been done but when a workable adjustment that overcomes the crisis has been made.[12]

Our author concludes, then, that the solution of critical social problems is largely a matter of finding a *modus vivendi* in a situation in which there are conflicting interests.[13] It should be remarked incidentally that Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard University has been developing and presenting for some time a similar doctrine as an interpretation of the essential nature of legal and governmental processes. What Lippmann has emphasized, however, is that from the viewpoint of the "general public," since that public cannot possibly deal directly, as a sort of collective entity, with the critical situation, the problem is to discover and select, if possible, those individuals who are personally best able to deal with the crisis. "The power to discern those individuals is the end of the effort to educate public opinion. The aim of research designed to facilitate public action is the discovery of clear signs by which these individuals may be discerned." [14] It is not improbable, since Lippmann is a Harvard graduate, that, just as he drew the notion of crisis from Pound's theory of "sociological jurisprudence," the notion of selecting the individuals able to compose the crisis was suggested to him by William James' essay, "The Social Value of the College Bred," in which the latter

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

writer said that the principal value of a college education is to enable us to know a good man when we see one.

Public Opinion and Private Interests. It will be evident from the foregoing summary and quotations that in Lippmann's view social problems are never settled by "public opinion" in the sense that some sort of mystical "public interest" is discovered and made plain to all or to a majority of voters, so that a collective decision is made in the light of this common conception of the public interest. On the contrary, he thinks that the settlement of active or incipient social conflicts by the *equilibration* of the conflicting interests is inevitable and proper; no better solution can be found than the one that will be so arrived at. A part of the practical problem is to prevent special interest groups from identifying themselves and their proposals, in the minds of persons not directly concerned, with the "public interest," because if this happens the settlements and social arrangements made in view of that idea of the matter will be unstable.

> The true public, in my definition of the term, has to purge itself of the self-interested groups who become confused with it. It must purge itself not because private interests are bad but because private interests cannot successfully be adjusted to each other if any one of them acquires a counterfeit strength. If the true public, concerned only in the fact of adjustment, becomes mobilized behind a private interest seeking to prevail, the adjustment is false; it does not represent the real balance of forces in the affair and the solution will break down. It will break down because the public will not stay mobilized very long for anything, and when it demobilizes the private interest which was falsely exalted will find its privileges unmanageable.[15]

The needed identification of the private interests as such will be furthered, in Lippmann's judgment, by debate. The outsider may not be able, in the course of such an argument, to judge the question on its merits, but if he insists upon full discussion the respective advocates are likely to expose one another, so that the true public can recognize them for the partisans that they are.[16]

From the general point of view which Lippmann develops, as summarized in the foregoing paragraphs, it may be seen as

[15] Lippmann, *The Phantom Public*, pp. 112-13.
[16] *Ibid.*, Chap. XI.

the objective of the public to have any social conflict settled with reference to some working rule which is, not necessarily "just" in any absolute sense, but generally understood and accepted. The forces of the public are then to be mobilized against any violator of such a rule. The practical problem, in many cases, is to determine whether it is a rule generally assented to that someone has broken; the breaking of the rule may constitute evidence that there is no general assent. If only a few persons are involved, the working principle is that the public should not intervene at all. "The public cannot be expected to take part in the minutiæ of human adjustments however tragic or important they may be to the individuals concerned." If many persons are involved, the public must judge of the merits of any protest against a rule by looking to see whether the spokesman voicing the protest is duly authorized by some considerable group. The author discusses at some length the procedure to be employed in deciding this point.[16a]

Dewey's Theory of the Public. It will be evident that one of the features of Lippmann's treatment of his subject is his use of the assumption that an act or a problem is "public" only when its consequences are important to many persons. In Lippmann's discussion, however, this principle is used as a point of departure or a premise which is taken for granted. John Dewey, on the other hand, has made the same point the central topic in his recent essay, *The Public and Its Problems* (1927). The fundamental proposition from which his argument proceeds is that the consequences of human acts are of two kinds, "those which affect the persons directly engaged in a transaction, and those which affect others beyond those immediately concerned." When the consequences are mainly of the former sort, the transaction is considered by Dewey to be a private one; when the welfare of many others than those immediately concerned in a transaction is affected, on the other hand, the transaction is a public one. Dewey emphasizes the principle that the distinction between the public and the private is not the same as the distinction between the individual and the social, if indeed the latter distinction has any application at all to human acts; the social is a much broader category than

[16a] *Ibid.*, Chap. XI.

the public. "In the broad sense, any transaction carried on between two or more persons is social in quality." Similarly, he shows that the public cannot be identified with the socially useful; waging war is an illustration of an activity which must be classified as social, but which is of doubtful social utility. He regards it as significant for the correct handling of the question in hand that the "private" is defined etymologically as the antithesis of "official." Officials are those who are assigned to look out for the interests of the broader public which is held to be affected by the consequences of certain acts.[17]

Dewey's definition of the public is carefully qualified by the emphasis which he places on the proposition that the broader consequences of a human act or a class of such acts must be *recognized* before the act becomes "public" in any practical sense of the term. The social consequences of human acts are presumably infinite, but it is practicable to take account of such consequences only within certain limits.[18] In the concrete, a public tends to be delimited geographically.

> The notion of an inherent universality in the associative force at once breaks against the obvious fact of a plurality of states, each localized, with its boundaries, limitations, its indifference and even hostility to other states. . . . We can hardly select a better trait to serve as a mark and sign of the nature of a state than a point just mentioned, temporal and geographical localization. There are associations which are too narrow and restricted in scope to give rise to a public, just as there are associations too isolated from one another to fall within the same public. Part of the problem of discovery of a public capable of organization into a state is that of drawing lines between the too close and intimate and the too remote and disconnected.[19]

Modern national states are, however, in two fundamental respects the product of past human activities, rather than simple associations of human beings who happen to live in spatial contiguity to one another and whose needs may be provided for by studying their animal nature. On the one hand the things which the citizens of modern societies want and strive to get for themselves, both as means and as ends, are defined largely by social customs which have grown up in the course

[17] *Op. cit.*, pp. 12-16.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 27 *et passim.*
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

of their associated activity and that of their forbears. On the other hand, the results of past human activities have been such as to connect people together in numerous interlacing bonds of interdependence which did not exist in simpler, earlier times. Meanwhile the organization of the public for dealing with its problems and meeting its needs is largely shaped by customs and traditions handed down from the past, formed when conditions were different. " 'The new age of human relationships' has no agencies worthy of it. The democratic public is still largely inchoate and unorganized." [20] The problems of the modern public, in other words, are in Dewey's view largely those which arise out of the incomplete success with which it has discovered itself and its common ultimate needs. The broader consequences of human acts, the recognition of which creates a public, have been very imperfectly traced out, while such consequences have been extending rather rapidly in recent centuries. What is needed, partly, is the application of accurate knowledge to the problems at hand, a need which has been met to some extent by the delegation of official functions to experts. Serious difficulties still exist, however, due in part to the fact that there are too many different, imperfectly integrated publics crossing one another in the same area. The communities of our forefathers were more stable as well as smaller in extent; the transition from a rural to a predominantly urban society is one manifestation of the change that has taken place. Some type of public with a definite geographic basis, such as we are accustomed to call a "community," must be formed to correspond to the society created by extending interaction and interdependence.[21]

Space limitations forbid our following Dewey's argument in this meaty little volume much farther here. Recurring to a thought with which his readers are familiar, and one which we have touched upon in previous chapters, he stresses the point that the need is a need for better *communication* among those who share the consequences of human activities; while communication is carried on by means of *symbols*. It is desirable, therefore, to find symbols for the new types of common in-

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 102-09.
[21] *Ibid.*, Chap. IV *passim*.

terests which have arisen, or to bring about realignments of the people such that their common interests can be effectively symbolized. Dewey appears to have some hope that the latter alternative is a practical one, and his essay closes with a discussion of the possibilities of reconstituting relatively small, spatially localized communities as the primary agencies for the organization and execution of public purposes.[22]

A survey of the recent literature of political theory reveals three conceptions as to the direction which the further evolution of political organization may be expected to take, each conception being treated by certain writers and groups as an ideal for the guidance of efforts at political and other social reforms. One such conception is the one presented by Dewey, namely, that there should be and will be a revival of local community activity and spirit. A second conception looks for a continued increase in the public importance and power of what have been termed "special interest groups" or "functional groups." This view will be examined in two later chapters of the present volume. A third conception of the future of politics is the one based upon the study of political parties and their functioning, also, apparently, on the study of the working of the parliament-cabinet form of government as best typified by the government of England. In concluding this chapter we may well devote a few paragraphs to the consideration of representative and outstanding examples of the literature in which the third conception has been specially developed.

The Study of Political Parties. The notion that the student of politics ought to deal objectively and dispassionately with the subject of parties is relatively new to the science. As recently as a century ago writers on politics and political theory were almost unanimously disposed to regard parties as "factions" which unfortunately beset the path of governments and which ought to be rooted out. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, it became evident that the traditional parties sustained a very dignified and apparently useful relationship to the government of England, which was furthermore held up to the admiration of readers by a number of gifted writers as the

[22] Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems,* Chaps. IV and V, *passim.*

best existing case of efficient democratic government. In the course of the past twenty years, accordingly, there have appeared a number of treatises on parties in which the subject is treated as an important branch of political science.[23] For present purposes, however, we must confine our inquiry to three works, from each of which we can note only one or two contributions to the formation of a general and fundamental theory of political parties.

Without much doubt, the work which contains the most elaborate theoretic discussion of the nature and functioning of political parties is the treatise by Professor Robert Michels of the Universities of Basle and Turin, Italy.[24] Michels studied in Germany and may be classified, loosely, with the group of contemporary writers who have been influenced by Georg Simmel. Like Simmel he evidently thinks of his task as the description of the *pure forms* of social interaction, in this case the forms of interaction, or relationship, statically considered, which exist between different parties in a state and between the elements to be distinguished within a party. Like other writers on the subject, Michels regards the party as a form of organization whereby large numbers of persons are enabled to support a common program, but with Michels this conception is rather the presupposition of his inquiry than its object.[25] He takes for granted with little discussion the conflict of interests which occurs in a modern society, and defines the political party as a fighting organization, the form and tactics of which are determined by its militant character and purpose. The larger part of his book is then devoted to an examination of the general forces and tendencies determining the relations of leaders and rank and file in a political party; and it is his central thesis that parties manifest an inevitable tendency to oligarchy, which is imposed upon them by the nature of their purposes.

[23] For more adequate discussions of the literature and history of the study of political parties, see, in addition to various books and articles by C. E. Merriam, Dwight W. Morrow's Introduction in *Parties and Party Leaders,* by Anson D. Morse (Boston, 1923).

[24] *Political Parties:* A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. By Robert Michels. Translated from the Italian by Eden and Cedar Paul. London, n. d. (Preface dated 1915).

[25] *Op. cit.,* Introduction and Part I.

Other writers have not differed from Michels in their fundamental ideas as much as might be expected; nearly all of them agree that a party is a conflict group, and their discussions tend to support the general thesis discussed in previous chapters of this volume, that conflict is the essential political process. Thus A. D. Morse defines a party in the following terms:

> A party is a durable organization which, in its simplest form, consists of a single group of citizens united by common principles, but, in its more complex forms, of two or more such groups held together by the weaker bond of a common policy; and which, contrary to the view usually held, has for its immediate end the advancement of the interests and the realization of the ideals, not of the people as a whole, but of the particular group or groups which it represents.[26]

A. Lawrence Lowell, in the volume to which we have referred in previous paragraphs, develops an interpretation of political parties as organizations which grow up in response to the need in societies too large for face-to-face contact, of some means of concerted action. The party, to use terms suggested by Lippmann, is one of the means whereby the public is *mobilized* in support of programs of common action. Some such view of the matter evidently forms the basis of Charles E. Merriam's general characterization of the political party.

> The party may be looked upon as a type of social group, primarily concerned with social control, as exercised through the government. It rests upon fundamental psychological tendencies, upon social or economic interests, develops its own organization, and attracts its own personnel, acquires its professional standards and professional technique, and in time its traditions, tendencies, predispositions. Like other groups its momentum may carry it on, after its immediate purpose has been achieved. Group solidarity, personalities, traditions, ambitions, will have been attained in the struggle, and those who have been acting together in the narrower circle as governors and in the broader circle of those interested for social and economic reasons, may go on acting together for other purposes.[27]

Manifestly this definition is an eclectic one, representing an attempt to reduce to a brief and generalized description many

[26] Morse, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

[27] *The American Party System:* An Introduction to the Study of Political Parties in the United States. By Charles Edward Merriam (New York, 1923), p. 382.

facts of empirical observation. In the concluding sentences of the passage quoted, however, Professor Merriam touches upon a feature of the political party which should be of considerable interest to the sociologist, as it is perforce to the practical reformer; namely, the tendency which parties display to become adequate reasons in themselves for their own existence and activities, so far as their leaders and more devoted members are concerned at any rate. This tendency to self-perpetuation which political parties display is of course explainable, in part, in terms of the "vested interests" in the organization which its leaders and functionaries develop. Many persons become dependent on the party organization for their subsistence or their prestige in the eyes of their fellows; it is naturally to their interest to have the organization live and flourish. They look about for "issues" with reference to which people may be rallied to the party standard.

One of the most significant features of the contemporary theory of political parties is that which has been contributed by students of the government of England. They point out that in the English cabinet-parliamentary system of government the two-party system is virtually a feature of the governmental organization. The "opposition" is really a part of the British government. It is perhaps more evident in England than anywhere else that the political parties are instrumentalities whereby public opinion is mobilized in such a manner that reasonably stable "government by consent" is possible. England is, however, of all modern states the one in which the concept of the "reign of law" has most force. It is because the fundamental ideal of a reign of law is generally accepted by Englishmen that government by public opinion is able to exist to the extent and in the form that it does. Thus the elaboration of a theory of public opinion makes contact with the concept of law as a force distinct from public opinion, notwithstanding the popular idea of law as *legislation* arising from the formulation of public opinion. As we noted in the beginning, the belief that law can be studied more or less apart from politics, strictly so-called, has influenced the development of theories of law for a long time. It is to the latter province that we shall turn our attention in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XXXI

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW

Theories of Law. The conception of law as *legislation,* that is, as the duly enacted rules laid down by States to regulate the conduct of their citizens, is so firmly entrenched in popular thought that it will probably come as a shock to some readers, as it did to the writer when he began the study of the subject, to discover that it is possible and indeed is customary in our day to treat the history and theory of law more or less apart from the subject of government and politics. A brief examination of some of the most accessible literature will quickly show, however, that theories of law occupy a large place in the history of the social studies, and a place, moreover, which is more or less distinct from that occupied by theories of politics and government. So bulky is the literature dealing with this general field, in fact, that we shall be compelled in this study, as in the case of a number of the other special topics dealt with in the present volume, to content ourselves with very brief statements regarding some of the main evolutionary trends in the field, supplemented by only slightly more concrete and detailed consideration of some of the more conspicuous and significant recent contributions to the general theory of law.

The task of the student of the development and present trend of theories of law, or jurisprudence, as the subject is conventionally designated by modern writers, is considerably lightened by the fact that excellent historical and analytical summaries of the literature have been made by specialists, notably by Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard University, and by Professors Kocourek and Wigmore of Northwestern University.[1] The

[1] Pound, Roscoe, *Interpretations of Legal History,* New York, 1923; *Spirit of the Common Law,* Boston, 1921; *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* (New Haven, 1922). Kocourek, Albert, and Wigmore, John H. (compilers), *The Evolution of Law:* Select Readings on the Origin and Development of Legal Institutions, three volumes (Boston, 1915 and 1918).

work of these writers reflects and has to some extent accelerated a trend of change which has been going forward in the study and teaching of law in American universities in the past few years, the significance of which will appear from the following pages, a change, in general, away from the study of law as a closed system of mandatory rules, which need only to be known so far as practicable by the practitioner, and to have their logical implications and their applications to concrete cases clearly understood, and in the direction of the study of legal theory as a field of scientific investigation, a special branch of the social sciences which like other specialties in this field may profitably be studied historically, inductively, and to some extent experimentally.[2] It may be remarked in this connection that for clear thinking in this field of inquiry it is necessary to make a sharp logical distinction between three different subjects of investigation and discussion, namely, (1) the history of law, (2) the theory of law and of the history of law, and (3) the history of the theory of law. The same distinction ought to be made, indeed, for every special subject dealt with in this volume, but space limitations and considerations of readability prevent working out the differences very thoroughly. It is with the third, the history of the theory of law, that we are primarily concerned here; naturally, however, the evolution of legal theory runs parallel to the evolution of law itself, and whatever the exact causal relation may have been between the law as applied and the jurists' theory of law, in different times and places, there can be little doubt that the relationship of the two has been one of *interaction.* It is easy to show that the theories of law predominating at different epochs of British and American history, for example, have had in part the character of rationalizations—*i.e.,* specious justifications by the leading jurists of the rules which they and their colleagues followed for reasons which they were unable or unwilling to represent clearly and openly to themselves or to the public. On

See also Pound's chapter on "Jurisprudence" in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, New York, 1925. Two recent popular treatises on the history of law are Allen, C. K., *Law in the Making* (Oxford, 1927), and Zane, J. M., *The Story of Law* (New York, 1927).

[2] Kocourek and Wigmore, *op. cit.,* Vol. III, p. vii (author's Preface).

the other hand, nothing is easier than to show also that these rationalistic theories of law, once formulated and published, reacted upon the practice, strengthening certain tendencies and crushing or attenuating others. It makes for intelligibility of the account, therefore, to discuss the evolution of law and the development of theories of law in the close connection which they have had in historic fact.

Pound's Outline of the History of Jurisprudence. For the purposes of the present study, we may profitably use as an authoritative summary and as a setting for certain special comments a brief abstract of the account of the history of jurisprudence which Dean Pound has given in a recent paper:[3]

The history of jurisprudence in the western world may be considered as having four periods: (1) Greek philosophy, (2) Roman law, (3) the beginnings of the science of law in the modern world, and (4) the modern science of law. The latest period, being of greatest interest to the contemporary student, is further outlined.

To the Greek philosophers, "the end of law was an orderly maintenance of an idealized *status quo*"; the purpose of law was to keep each man in his place in the politically organized social order of an ideal Greek city. Roman jurists deduced from the Greek idea of a state of nature the concept of natural law, which concept became the guide in the attempt to formulate a set of legal principles to serve as the basis of lawmaking and of legal criticism.

"Modern legal science begins with the teaching of Roman law in the Italian universities in the twelfth century." In the beginning a study of the Corpus Juris section by section, the method became one of synthesis and logical systematization of comments and interpretations of the Roman law. "The Humanists were pioneers in the scientific study of law as a whole, as distinguished from study of texts and titles of the Corpus Juris." The legal theory of the Middle Ages centered in the idea of a stationary society determined by customary authority; in the thirteenth century the effort was to state the theological bases of right and of the binding force of law. The Reformation had the effect, however, of emancipating jurisprudence from theology; jurists were led to seek for other logical foundations for a general science of law. It is from this movement that the modern science of law more specifically dates.

The modern science of law may be thought of as having six phases: (A) the law-of-nature school, (B) the historical, metaphysical, and analytical schools of the nineteenth century, (C) a phase of transi-

[3] Chapter on Jurisprudence in Barnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 444-63, abstracted by the writer, with the permission of the author.

tion to the twentieth-century schools; (D) certain social-philosophical schools of the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries, viz.: utilitarian, Neo-Kantian, Neo-Hegelian, and a French revival of the natural law concept, (E) the economic interpretation, and (F) a sociological school, the development of which shows mechanical, biological, and psychological stages, and a stage of unification.

Jurists of the eighteenth-century law-of-nature school held that a complete system of law might be constructed on the basis of principles to be discovered by reason in the nature of man; "the practical effect was to identify law with what the particular writer thought ought to be law." This gave the impetus, however, to an era of creative law-making which has had significant consequences for the subsequent periods. The nineteenth-century historical and metaphysical schools, though proceeding from different assumptions, agreed in their view of law as something to be found, not made, by judge and lawyer. The theories of these schools had considerable influence, directly and indirectly, on the actual development of law. Writers of the analytical school emphasized the theory that law is the expression of the will of the state, and thus they are apparently committed to the proposition that law is made and not found. In practice, however, by its emphasis on the logical interdependence of particular legal rules and applications, it led to a "jurisprudence of conceptions," *i.e.,* a theory that new situations should always be met by deduction from traditional conceptions. It was because the cramping effect of these nineteenth-century theories was so strongly felt that the twentieth century saw the rise of new approaches to the fundamental problems of jurisprudence. The twentieth-century schools have in common, on the whole, the principle that law must be continually readapted to human needs and changed conditions.

Maine's Theories of Legal Origins. To the student of general social science, the influence of certain writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries upon the development of theories of law is of particular interest. We have had occasion in previous chapters to take note of the theory of Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-88) that laws have their origin in customs, which in turn originate in the repetition of similar judgments made by tribal chieftains or kings in similar cases. Maine concludes his exposition of this point in *Ancient Law* (1861) with the sentences: "Here we have the germ or rudiment of a Custom, a conception posterior to that of Themistes or judgments. However strongly we, with our modern associations, may be inclined to lay down *a priori* that the notion of a Custom must precede that of a judicial sentence, and that

a judgment must affirm a Custom or punish its breach, it seems quite certain that the historical order of the ideas is that in which I have placed them." [4] It will be noticed, however, that the eminent author asserts that the historical order of the *ideas* is such that the idea of a judgment precedes the idea of a custom, not that the order of the facts is so. Indeed, it is scarcely possible to imagine that the judgments of chieftains were not based on existing, but perhaps unformulated, customs. In any case, it appears that Maine is entitled to a large share of the credit for introducing into jurisprudence or legal *theory* the idea that laws have their origin, in part at least, in customs which are believed by the peoples observing them to be supernaturally sanctioned. The particular value of a clear appreciation of this point, to modern students of legal problems, is that it favors an appreciation of the other point—not intrinsically difficult for persons initiated into modern naturalistic philosophy and science to accept—that laws have always displayed a strongly conservative tendency; it has been difficult to modify the form of a rule believed to be divinely inspired; yet it has been necessary to make new laws and to modify old ones to meet new situations.

It has been another of Maine's achievements to have shown how old, divinely sanctioned laws are adapted to the demands of new situations, by the use of *legal fictions*.[5] He also names "equity" and legislation as means whereby law is modified to meet new conditions, but his further discussions and those of others have shown that the principle of legal fiction, defined in a broad way, may be taken to cover them all. It is a significant fact that early parliamentary bodies did not assume the right to *make* law, but only to *declare* it. Maine's general thesis is that jurists have been able in all sorts of cases to square the requirements of a new type of situation with the content of a traditional code by the use of the fiction that the circumstances of the new case were such as to come within the meaning of the old rule. Maine also emphasized the fact that ancient law is much more fully provided with penal rules than with civil rules. This difference, he thinks, is not due

[4] *Ancient Law* (Everyman's Library edition, n. d.), p. 3.
[5] *Ibid.*, Chap. II.

altogether to the fact that violence was more common in barbarian societies and more laws were necessary to restrain and punish it; the poverty of civil law in ancient codes reflects the general fact that it was a law of *status,* and most of the provisions regarding persons, property, and contracts which bulk so large in any modern body of law are covered in an early code by a simple rule defining the status of the individual and thus indicating the authority to which he is subjected.[6] It is also noted that early penal law is not, strictly speaking, *criminal* law in the modern sense of the term; ancient law provides for damages in cases of wrongs or torts done to individuals, and for the punishment of offenses against the gods, *i.e., sins.* An offense against the state, however, which is a crime in the modern sense, when recognized as such by an ancient state, was typically dealt with by a special act of the legislative assembly directed against the particular offender.[7] It will be evident from the foregoing that one of the great services performed for modern jurisprudence by Maine was the clear exposition of the principle that traditional legal rules are likely to have been shaped in the light of ancient theological beliefs, from which the inference can be drawn that these traditional rules, as found in the Roman law, for example, are likely to be unsuitable for a modern State and may be properly replaced by others. This basic theme, the relation of ancient law and ancient religion, was elaborated and further demonstrated by Maine in other writings, notably in his *Early Law and Custom* (1883), in which he discusses the religious origins of Hindu law as represented in the code of Manu.[8]

Jhering's Treatment of "Interest" and "Purpose" in the Law. In Dean Pound's outline of the history of jurisprudence, Rudolph von Jhering (1818-92) is classified with the "Social Utilitarians," *i.e.,* those writers who endeavor to test the general principles on which the actual law seems to be grounded with reference to the *ends* which societies are assumed to have. In Jhering's first great work, *The Spirit of the Roman Law,* he reached the conclusion that law as it

[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 216-17.
[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 217-19.
[8] *Op. cit.,* pp. 26-27, 36-37, 43-44.

evolves reflects human *interests* and is determined by men's subjective conceptions of their rights. The reflective consideration of this proposition led him to develop, in *Law as a Means to an End,* the proposition "that Purpose is the Creator of the entire law; and that there is no legal rule which does not owe its origin to a purpose, *i.e.,* to a practical motive." [9] The Historical School of jurists, by whom Jhering was influenced in his earlier years, sought to develop a theory of law on the basis of a concept of the will, derived from Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* and other ethical writings. Jhering says, referring to the last volume of his *Spirit of the Roman Law,* "I gave a definition differing from the prevailing one, by putting Interest instead of Will at the basis of law." [10] Jhering's development of his thesis of "purpose in the law" reads much more like philosophy than science; nevertheless it appears that his work had a great deal of influence, directly and indirectly, in the direction of causing jurists to give over the attempt to formulate absolute rights, and, instead, to weigh claims of individuals and groups with reference to the ends which the law is held to be designed to promote.[11] We shall recur to this modern tendency in jurisprudence in later paragraphs.

Kohler's Theory of the Relation of Law to Culture. Another writer whose work has done much to shape the present trend of juristic theory is Josef Kohler (1849-1919), a judge in the lower and higher courts of Germany in his earlier years, later professor in Würzburg and Berlin. In one of his earlier publications Kohler emphasizes the desirability of a comparative study of the laws of different peoples, with a view to making out the distinctive characteristics of each system, but also with a view to the better understanding of the fundamental forces and tendencies that underlie all law.[12] In this phase of his writing Kohler may be classified with the ethnological school of jurisprudence, of which Albert Hermann

[9] *Op. cit.,* author's Preface, pp. liii-liv. New York, 1924.
[10] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[11] See Pound's chapter on Jurisprudence, *op. cit.,* p. 469.
[12] "Evolution of Law" (1887). Translation by Albert Kocourek in Kocourek and Wigmore, *op. cit.,* Vol. II, pp. 3-9.

Post is also a representative.[13] Later in his career, Kohler devoted himself to studies and writing of a more philosophical type, based, however, on his ethnological interest. Pound classifies him with the neo-Hegelians because of his discussion of the relation of law to civilization. Each civilization is regarded as having its own distinctive spirit, of which its laws are an expression. Practically, law is to be considered in three ways, "as to the past as a product of civilization, as to the present as a means of maintaining civilization, as to the future as a means of furthering civilization."[14] (In strict Hegelian terms, law is, from this point of view, an incident and a means to the unfolding of the "idea" immanent in a particular civilization.) The logical resemblance between this theory and the treatment of "culture" by Spengler and others, discussed in a previous chapter, is apparent. Like the purpose theory of Jhering, the legal philosophy of Kohler is regarded by Pound as a contribution to the shaping of the modern idea of jurists that existing law is something to be shaped to conform better to the ends which it ought to serve, a forward-looking idea as compared with the principal tendency of the historical and metaphysical jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. In Kohler's philosophy, however, it is the idea or tendency or end inherent in the civilization which is to be discovered and to which the law is to be made to conform.

Duguit's Theory of "Objective Law." Still another variety of philosophical theory of law of considerable current influence is that represented by Leon Duguit (1859-). Duguit calls his theory, or an important phase of it, "theory of objective law anterior to the state."[15] Like the purpose theory of Jhering, Duguit's theory of law is too metaphysical in formulation to attract a great deal of attention in the United States, or to have much direct influence upon the development of theories of law in England and the United States. It is, however, another influence making for the predominance of the idea that law is to be shaped to conform to the needs of a

[13] "Ethnological Jurisprudence," translated by Thomas J. McCormack, in Kocourek and Wigmore, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 20-22.

[14] Pound, *Interpretations of Legal History*, p. 143.

[15] See the translation from Duguit in *Modern French Legal Philosophy* (Modern Legal Philosophy Series).

society. His fundamental thesis is that there is an "objective law" given by the inherent nature of a society. The reasoning by which he derives this is taken in part from Durkheim's account of the "social division of labor."

> In every grouping two elements constitute the social bond; two elements that may appear in infinitely variable forms, but the basis of which, reduced to its lowest terms, is always the same. They are (1) the similarity of needs, which is the basis of solidarity either through mechanical interdependence or through similitude; (2) the difference in needs and aptitudes which produces and makes necessary an exchange of services, and which forms solidarity either by organic interdependence or by divisions of labor.
>
> Thence is derived the following formula for the jural principle imposing itself on all the individuals of a social group: Do nothing which can possibly infringe upon social interdependence, either through similitude or through division of labor; do all that is within your power, within your given situation and within your aptitudes, to insure and increase social interdependence both by similitude and by division of labor.[16]

Spencer's Treatment of Law. From the viewpoint of Pound, which we have been following in general in the present chapter, all such philosophical theories of law as those described in the foregoing paragraphs are of interest simply as influences favoring the emergence of a scientific "sociological jurisprudence." Just what Pound conceives that the sociological jurisprudence now is, we shall inquire presently; first it will be of interest to examine briefly the treatment of law incorporated by Herbert Spencer, in a chapter in his *Principles of Sociology*.[17] When one reads this chapter, it is readily seen that Spencer drew heavily on Maine for his material and interpretation. He starts from the proposition that law originates as custom, and custom still plays a part in the formation of law when it is ostensibly legislation; for the application of an act of parliament is established only after judges' decisions of cases based on the act have established a precedent for the decision of future cases of the same sort.[18] Law is also that which

[16] Adapted from *The Law and The State:* French and German Doctrines. *Harvard Law Review,* Vol. XXXI (whole number for November, 1917), p. 178.

[17] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1916), Vol. II, Pt. V, Chap. XIV, "Laws." (Pt. V first published in 1882.)

[18] *Ibid.,* Vol. II, p. 513.

formulates the rule of the dead over the living.[19] In the beginning there is no distinction between sacred and secular law, and hence, having a supernatural sanction, law has great stability and tends to produce settled social arrangements; early rulers, not daring to transgress these customs, are limited practically to interpreting and enforcing them.[20] There is visible in the evolution of law, however, a gradual trend from a stage in which the predominant source is inherited usage having a religious sanction, through a stage in which the will of influential leaders is predominant, to a condition of reliance upon the consensus of those forming the mass.[21] Spencer's use of Maine's ideas is particularly apparent where he emphasizes the trend from status to contract, which was a fundamental concept with Maine, and in his discussion of the way in which changes are effected in the law by means of legal fictions.

Holmes' Critique of the Historical Jurisprudence. The "sociological jurisprudence," as represented by Dean Pound, has been in practice largely a reaction from the historical jurisprudence of the later nineteenth century. The transition from the one viewpoint to the other is particularly well illustrated in the writings of Mr. Justice Holmes, who was formerly considered an adherent of the historical school, but who has pointed out in some of his writings just where the historical method is open to criticism from the newer point of view. Starting from the observation that the method of explaining anything by tracing its growth has replaced the method of judging the fitness of anything for certain ends which were theologically defined, he continues, in one paper:

> This process of historical explanation has been applied to the matter of our profession, especially of recent years, with such great success, and with so much eagerness, and with such a feeling that when you had the true historic dogma you had the last word not only in the present but for the immediate future, that I have felt warranted heretofore in throwing out the caution that continuity with the past is only a necessity and not a duty. As soon as a legislature is able to imagine abolishing the requirement of a consideration for a simple contract, it is at perfect liberty to abolish it, if it thinks it wise to do so, without

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 514.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 518-19.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 523-24, 536-37.

the slightest regard to continuity with the past. That continuity simply limits the possibilities of our imagination, and settles the terms in which we shall be compelled to think.[22]

Further along in the same discussion he says: "The true science of the law does not consist mainly in a theological working out of dogma or a logical development as in mathematics, or only in a study of it as an anthropological document from the outside; an even more important part consists in the establishment of its postulates from within upon accurately measured social desires instead of tradition." [23]

Evidently the tendencies in legal theory which have been gaining strength since the latter part of the nineteenth century, and which Holmes recognizes in his essays, may be briefly summarized as follows: Law is to be studied and dealt with as a means to the realization of human ends. The ends which the law tends to promote and ought to promote are, furthermore, not necessarily those which can be found in the tradition of a society, nor are they susceptible of being stated with certainty from an analysis of certain concepts assumed to be given *a priori;* they must be discovered by the study of human nature and human society. What is demanded is, then, as Dean Pound expresses it, a *sociological* jurisprudence; his writings on this subject are recognized as an authoritative expression of the tendency, and it will be profitable for us to examine more particularly the propositions he has laid down in some of these writings.

Pound's "Sociological Jurisprudence." One point which he makes will be recognized as the same which is emerging at so many points in the field of social theory; it is the idea that the object of study should be seen as a *process.*

We are coming to study the legal order instead of debating as to the nature of law. We are thinking of interests, claims, demands, not of rights; of what we have to secure or satisfy, not exclusively of the institutions by which we have sought to secure or satisfy them, as if those institutions were ultimate things existing for themselves. We are thinking of how far we do what is before us to be done, not merely of how we do it; of how the system works, not merely of its syste-

[22] Holmes, Oliver Wendell, *Collected Legal Papers* (New York, 1921), pp. 210-11.
[23] *Ibid.,* pp. 225-26.

matic perfection. Thus more and more we have been coming to think in terms of the legal order—of the process—not in terms of the law—the body of formulated experience or system of ordering—to think of the activity of adjusting relations or harmonizing and reconciling claims and demands, not of the adjustment itself and of the harmonizing or reconciling itself as a system in which the facts of life mechanically arrange themselves of logical necessity.[24]

A first principle of the sociological jurisprudence, then, according to Pound, is that it deals with a process of harmonizing and reconciling claims and demands. This principle rests upon an important assumption, through which we can see that the sociological jurisprudence is related to other aspects of social theory which we have considered in previous chapters of this volume.

From an earthly standpoint the central tragedy of existence is that there are not enough of the material goods of existence, as it were, to go around; that while individual claims and wants and desires are infinite, the material means of satisfying them are finite; that while, in common phrase, we all want the earth, there are many of us but there is only one earth. Thus we may think of the task of the legal order as one of precluding friction and eliminating waste in the human use and enjoyment of them, so that where each may not have all he claims, he may at least have all that is possible. But in this way, we are seeking to secure as much of human claims and desires—that is as much of the whole scheme of interests—as possible, with the least sacrifice of such interests.[25]

In his discussion of this point Pound mentions William James' treatment of what is essentially the same topic in "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," in which the philosopher reaches the conclusion that the ethical rule should be to "satisfy as many demands as possible." This allusion might be construed as an admission that the problem of the jurist is after all in the last analysis an ethical one; it is probably not logically inevitable so to construe it, however. One may begin the scientific sociological study of the legal process with the simple assumption that human beings living in society do assert conflicting claims to the material means of existence, claims the conflict of which may, for sociological purposes, be simply

[24] *Interpretations of Legal History*, pp. 152-53.
[25] *Spirit of the Common Law*, p. 196.

referred to the biologist for explanation, since it arises out of the "competition of life." There remains for investigation the mechanism of adjustment and equilibration, which, be it noted however, is just what Pound holds that the sociological jurisprudence is turning away from.

It may be that a more revealing clue to the problem of objective and viewpoint in a scientific sociological jurisprudence is gained when we turn to another phase, one which Pound seems disposed to relegate to a place of minor importance. This is the phase which deals with *social* or *group* interests as ends to be realized by the law. The competition which the law seeks to regulate is, as Pound says, a competition of groups or societies with each other and of individuals with such groups or societies, as well as a competition of individuals with each other, and the law recognizes and gives effect to some of the competing interests in preference to others.[26] The nineteenth-century theories of law which were on the whole predominant, at least in England and the United States, were, as Pound has brought out at various points in his writings, such as to afford recognition and support only for *individual* interests. The individualistic conception of the route to economic prosperity, which arose in connection with the industrial and commercial revolutions and which we have dealt with in former chapters, gave the keynote for legal theories and court decisions throughout the century. The trend is typified by the fact of which jurists have recently become conscious owing to the writings of Ernst Freund and others, namely, that the use of the "police power" to secure *public* interests was restricted to the minimum necessary to maintain order and safety against obvious dangers. That there were public or group interests which the law might recognize and support was an idea to which nineteenth-century jurists were not receptive. The past three decades have, however, been notable for the increasing recognition by British and Americans courts of just such social and group interests. It might be plausibly argued that the most important development in recent legal history is the movement away from a policy of reliance upon individual initiative and enterprise to secure social welfare, and toward a policy of

[26] *Spirit of the Common Law,* pp. 91-92.

reliance upon social and group effort to secure some of the interests of individuals. So far as this is the case, however, students of jurisprudence will evidently have occasion to investigate the social or group claims which are created in social interaction, and this may prove in the long run to be exactly what the "sociological jurisprudence" proclaimed by Dean Pound boils down to.

Under the heading, "The Program of Sociological Jurisprudence," Pound states that sociological jurists are now urging some or all of the following types of study:

1. Study of the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines.
2. Sociological study in preparation for law-making.
3. Study of the means of making legal precepts effective in action.
4. Study of juridical method.
5. A sociological legal history: study of the social background and social effects of legal precepts, legal doctrines, and legal institutions in the past, and of how these effects have been brought about.
6. Recognition of the importance of individualized application of legal precepts.
7. In English-speaking countries, a ministry of justice.[27]

Manifestly much that is outlined here is "sociological" only in a very broad and loose sense of the term; in so far, however, as the animus of the program is such as to favor objective consideration of the empirical facts of law-making and the application of law, it is in harmony with the "drive toward objectivity" which A. S. Small named as the distinguishing feature of the origins of sociology in the nineteenth century.

The Trend of Criminal Jurisprudence. The sixth point in the above program, "individualized application of legal precepts," may be taken as the point of transition to the final topic to be dealt with in this chapter, namely, the trend of development in theories of criminal law. Up to this point in our inquiry, we have paid little attention to the difference between criminal and civil law, save to note Maine's observations on the preponderance of penal legislation in ancient codes. No feature of modern legal theory, however, is more conspicuous than the sharp distinction which is made in most instances between

[27] Chapter on Jurisprudence in Barnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 462-63.

civil and criminal law, a distinction which, as we know, is paralleled by a marked specialization of professional activities on the part of the majority of American lawyers. The theory that law is a means for the equilibration, harmonization, and adjustment of competing claims or interests is manifestly a conception which has in view primarily the civil law. The recent voluminous discussion of the prohibition law, however, as well as earlier discussions of laws designed to punish as criminal acts which many think of as of another type—"vices," has had the consequence of bringing vividly before the attention of thoughtful people the possibility of regarding criminal law as well as civil law as a means whereby conflicting interests and claims are adjusted. Some of the underlying theoretic problems of criminal jurisprudence may be clarified if we make a distinction between two kinds of criminal statutes, (1) those which do little more than formulate and standardize rules which are in fact firmly established in the mores of the society, and (2) those which formulate as legal rules with appropriate sanctions the convictions of some part of the citizens of a State, which moral convictions, however, are not shared by many other citizens or alien residents. A great deal of confusion seems to have resulted, in past discussions of problems of legal theory, from the failure to make a working distinction between the mores and the enacted laws of a society.[28] As we have noted in the chapter on Social Disorganization, current social theory is beginning to recognize that in a stable, homogeneous society the mores tend to be largely self-enforcing; it is due to contact with or penetration by other cultures that social disorganization—that is, decrease in the influence of existing rules of behavior—takes place. Criminal law, then, in so far as it is not mere formulation of universally acknowledged moral rules, is in general the expression of an attempt by one element in a population to impose its moral rules upon another.

Faris' Theory of the Origin of Punishment. It is also significant, however, that the typical attribute of criminal law is its prescription of *punishments* as the means whereby the

[28] See Park, R. E., "Public Opinion and the Mores," in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), pp. 829-33.

law is to be given effect. It is noteworthy that to a lawyer "sanction" generally means punishment or penalty. Looking at the matter from this point of view, one of the most significant contributions which has been made to a modern theory of criminal law is the discussion of the origin of punishment which was written some years ago by Ellsworth Faris.[29] For present purposes this provocative paper may be quite briefly summarized. The author lays down two propositions regarding the existence of punishment in primitive societies: (1) that there is serious doubt whether anyone inside such a group was ever punished by anyone of his own society,[30] and (2) that punishment is not the correct term to apply to any attitude or action directed toward members of other societies. In primitive societies children fit into the homogeneous community and have no stimulus to commit acts contrary to the group customs. Furthermore, if an individual does commit such an act, the evidence collected by Faris tends to show that nothing will be done, the individual will not be "punished," except perhaps where the offence is very serious, in which case the offender may be expelled from the community. The members of such a group are restrained from punishing one of their own number, according to Faris' theory, in much the same way that one is likely to be restrained from thrusting a knife into his own flesh. Members of other societies, on the other hand, cannot be said to be "punished," for punishment is our name for a type of action directed toward human beings, toward those, in short, with whom we feel some sort and degree of solidarity; it is an attempt to repair a breach in an existing social order. But members of a savage society of the simple, homogeneous type here assumed do not regard members of other societies as really human; they are enemies, and the attitude maintained toward them is not a genuine *social* attitude.

The conclusion is, therefore, that there is no punishment of anyone in a thoroughly primitive society. The whole universe is divided into two classes for the theoretically primitive savage, and these are the

[29] "The Origin of Punishment," *International Journal of Ethics,* Vol. XXV, No. 1 (October, 1914). Reprinted in Kocourek and Wigmore, *op. cit.,* Vol. II, pp. 151-61. The following citations are to the latter publication.
[30] *Ibid.,* pp. 152-53.

members of his own group whom he does not ever think of striking or punishing in any way, and the rest of the world who are to be watched carefully at all times but who are to be destroyed if they are found in an attitude of attack.[31]

The hypothetical primitive social situation must be modified in some way, then, before the attitude of punishment can develop. Such modification takes place through the increase of population and the resulting migrations, which bring it about that some tribes located at a distance from any one tribe will also be distant kin. In the case of injuries suffered at their hands, the attitude will be one of indignation tempered by other feelings.[32] On the basis of this generalized account, which is supported by concrete materials placed in exhibition, Faris is able to develop a general theory of the origin of punishment.

Here, then, is the solution to the problem of punishment. So long as there are just two groups in the social world of the savage, no punishment could take place, but when there are three or more groups in his world, the attitude of formal punishment becomes a natural one. There is the group to which the offender belongs, the group which he has attacked, and a third which is relatively neutral and has interests in both. . . .

According to this discussion, punishment is a practice that has arisen out of group activity and owes none of its origin to private vengeance or the rule of force within the group. Punishment is the expression of the clashing of groups; with a "buffer-group" to lessen the shock. It is a phenomenon of social psychology and can only be approached intelligently from the social point of view.[33]

The author does not fail to draw the parallel between the case of punishment in primitive society which he has described, and the general pattern in which the procedure of a criminal court is arranged in our society, where the defendant, his attorney, his witnesses, and his friends constitute one group, the prosecuting attorney and his assistants and witnesses are the enemy group—the wronged group, while the judge and jury form a neutral group, the rôle of which gives the characteristic meaning to the total situation.

[31] Faris, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 160.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

Recent Sociological Theories of Crime. Now the typical criminal law and procedure of the recent past, with their reliance upon formal punishment, are seen upon analysis to have two significant features. One is the assumption of moral responsibility on the part of the criminal; the attitude of exacting a compensation for a wrong wilfully done by a free moral being is thinly concealed in modern criminal procedure, in spite of the emphasis on "deterrence" in theoretic discussions. The other feature is the equation of penalty with crime as abstractly defined, such and such a penalty for such and such an offence. We have noted in a previous chapter, however, the tendency in modern criminological theory to have recourse to other theoretic postulates than that of moral responsibility, to regard the criminal as a pathological case, and to stress prevention by other means than deterrence, and, not least in theoretic importance, to question the deterrent or preventive value of the customary types of punishment. We have also noted Pound's mention of the stress placed on "individualization" in the application of legal precepts by the modern sociological jurists. Individualization of treatment of the offender, and the use of other means of prevention than deterrent punishment are in fact the two ideas which seem most prominent in contemporary theoretic discussion of the problems of criminal jurisprudence. As yet it cannot be said that these ideas have greatly affected the methods actually used in dealing with adult offenders, though in juvenile courts they are finding larger and larger scope, and the courts of at least one of our cities are now following the practice of referring a certain number of their adult offenders to psychiatrists representing the state for examination. The interesting thing from the general viewpoint of this study, however, is the tendency that is visible for jurisprudence, as a lawyers' specialty, to take account of the assumptions and hypothesis provided by social psychologists.

CHAPTER XXXII

REVOLUTION AND REFORM

Politics as a Process of Social Change. In previous chapters we have examined passages in the literature of social theory, and have considered recent developments in social science, which tend to establish two important working distinctions that have a bearing upon the special problems of political theory. One is the distinction between social statics and social dynamics, that is, between the study of human social organization in its substantive aspects, as an equilibration of forces, and the study of the process—sometimes referred to as "progress," or as "social evolution"—by which social change is effected, and social institutions are continually readapted to changing circumstances. The other distinction is that which is tending to appear in the literature of social science, between the formal, political and legal aspects of social control and collective behavior, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, all those subtler, more intimate and unreflective mechanisms—customs, ceremonies, social ritual, and "the direct response of person to person"—which constitute in a very fundamental sense the web of social life and to which politics and law, especially legislation or *enacted* law, are related somewhat as is an embroidered pattern to the fabric on which it is placed.[1] In this part of our study it is of course with the formal political and legal phase of social control that we are primarily concerned.

Now to be sure it is neither feasible nor desirable to elimi-

[1] Most metaphorical analogies employed in social science are lame and halting; yet until social science has reached a much more advanced stage of sophistication and standardization than it now occupies, one can scarcely dispense with them. I am aware that political and legal forces are in reality *a part of* the social fabric; nevertheless it appears to me to be the emerging consensus of social scientists that they are related to the more intimate and direct relations of human beings, and to the morals of a people, somewhat as the metaphor I have used tends to suggest. Perhaps the passages from Montesquieu cited below will help to show that the idea is not so very novel after all.

nate the idea of an evolving adaptation from the discussion of any phase of political life; this the preceding chapters have tended to show. Modern political theory, like the other special phases of social science, is permeated by the idea of evolution. At the same time, it is noteworthy that in the vast body of literature dealing with political phenomena and political problems, two concepts which embody a particular emphasis of political *changes* have a prominent place; they are the concepts of *revolution* and *reform*. Indeed it is implicit in the use of these terms in our language that changes in the political organization and in the laws of a society, in so far as they are not effected by a very gradual, sub-conscious process, are brought about by these two means, revolution and reform. In the present chapter, accordingly, we shall be particularly concerned with literature in which these two topics are treated.

Revolutions and Reforms as "Social Movements." It will be recalled that we have anticipated in an earlier chapter—the one dealing with "social movements"—certain points which might find a place here. It is to be recognized today as a first principle in the scientific study of social happenings that one should strive to envision them as natural events. The term which seems to be coming into use to characterize as natural processes the sort of social happenings of which revolutions and reforms are special cases, is social movements. In the earlier chapter which dealt with this topic we noted at least two features of modern social theory which should be borne in mind here. One was the tendency to study social movements as typical sequences or cycles of social happenings. Thus we saw that L. P. Edwards believes it to be possible and helpful to describe the typical sequence of events in a revolution, that is, in *any* revolution. It is significant in this connection that Edwards gave his book the title, "The *Natural History* of Revolution"; for natural history deals with typical phenomena rather than with striking, "historic" events. The other point made in the earlier chapter which has an obvious bearing here is that early modern writers, and in particular Gustave Le Bon, use the terms "revolution" and "reform" very loosely and broadly; we found Le Bon using the term "revolution" in a sense which makes it practically synonymous with "social

movement." For the purposes of the present chapter, let us proceed on the assumption, which seems to be in keeping with the preponderance of recent usage, that a revolution, strictly so-called, is a more or less catastrophic social event, or social movement, which involves considerable modification in the political structure and fundamental laws of a society, or, in abortive cases, an attempt at such modification or a pretence at an attempt at such modification. We shall have occasion to note in the following pages a number of alternative definitions of the term. The expression "political reform" scarcely needs preliminary definition.

Ancient Greek Theories of Revolution. In the writings of the ancient Greek political philosophers, revolutions appear mainly as manifestations of an inevitable cyclical movement of things. It was in this spirit that Plato introduced the subject into the *Republic;* careful observation and calculation might serve to ward off the decay of a governmental system for a time, but sooner or later a slip in the calculations is sure to be made, and a sequence of changes is set in motion, involving the progressive replacement of one form of government by another, until eventually the original, desirable type may reappear.[2] Specifically, it was through some slip in the calculations necessarily accompanying his eugenic scheme for breeding and selecting Guardians that Plato thought the downfall of his ideal State would come about. It is of course a fundamental trait of Plato's political thought that he sees the practical task and aim of political leaders as the approximation of an ideal, knowable by men through reflection and dialectic based on innate ideas. This latter might be called Plato's theory of social reform, in so far as he had any, and as such it gave direction to the political thought of nearly two thousand years.

In the *Politics* of Aristotle we find a much more definite and realistic discussion of political revolutions. He formulates a simple but appealing theory of the causes of revolutions, which topic he treats under these headings: the feeling which underlies them, the motives of those who make them, and the causes from which they arise. The feelings from which revolutions

[2] *The Republic* (Vaughan and Davies' translation; Golden Treasury edition, London, 1916), Bk. VIII, pp. 273-75 *et passim.*

arise he names as the desire for equality and the desire for superiority. The motives are "the desire of gain and honour, or the fear of dishonour and loss; the authors of them want to divert punishment from themselves and their friends." His enumeration of causes is somewhat confusing; on the other hand certain types of political circumstances, such as elections, intrigues, "dissimilarity of elements." [3] The logic which Aristotle evidently intended to introduce into this explanation has somehow been blurred in the text as we have it; the realistic, but psychological, character of his analysis is, like what he wrote on so many other topics, strangely modern. Having laid down this interpretation of the causes of revolutions, Aristotle proceeds to a brief discussion of the means whereby they are effected. They are brought about, he holds, by force and by fraud; [4] and they may be caused from within and from without.[5] In this latter discussion it is very evident that Aristotle thinks of a revolution primarily as an overthrow of the existing authority in a State, from which a modification in the form of the government follows more or less incidentally. This is perhaps logically compatible with a general thesis which seems to underlie much of the political thought of Aristotle, namely, that the content or functioning of a government is more important than its form, though some forms are to be preferred over others. Like a number of later writers, he follows his exposition of the causes and mechanism of revolutions by a series of prescriptions for avoiding them, a discussion, that is, of the art of governing so as to avoid revolutions.[6]

The notion that changes in governments obey a cyclical law reappears in Polybius, who is often classified with Roman writers, but was really a Greek by birth and training.[7]

Roman and Medieval Conceptions of Political Reform. Roman writers on political and legal theory had comparatively little to say about revolution or reform. As is well known, the Romans made little contribution to any sort of general

[3] *The Politics of Aristotle,* translated by Benjamin Jowett (Oxford, 1916), Bk. V, Chap. II.
[4] *Ibid.,* Chap. IV.
[5] *Ibid.,* Chap. VII, Sec. 14.
[6] *Ibid.,* Chaps. VIII and IX.
[7] See Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory,* p. 64.

theory or philosophy down to the time of the Empire, and from that time on the most important contributions to the general province of political theory were made by the jurisconsults, who gradually evolved something approximating a general theory of law. Being founded on the concept of a law of nature, that general theory of law tended to take the form of an ideal of government, to be approximated as closely as possible without itself needing alteration. It might be said, therefore, that there was no place in Roman politico-legal theory for a doctrine of revolution; while the only basis for a theory of political reform was that implied in the hope of approximating a perfect body of law. The first great political philosopher of Rome, however, and in the judgment of some students the greatest of them all, was Marcus Tullius Cicero, lawyer and statesman, who lived in the first century B.C., and was assassinated just as the Empire was coming into being. Cicero's political theory is found in his *Republic* and his *Laws,* both obvious imitations of the work of Plato, but characterized by their acceptance of the Stoic conception of nature, the source of the later juristic concept of a law of nature or a law of nations.[8] He thus anticipates the theory of political reform, if such it may be called, of the later juristic philosophers—the theory of approach to an ideal state, the principles of which are known intuitively to wise men from the beginning.

The other Roman writer who is perhaps most worth separate mention for his contributions to political theory is Seneca, who lived in the first century A.D. The most striking feature of his political theory is his anticipation of the social contract theory of Hobbes. In primitive times, he thought, men lived in an innocent state of peace, free from slavery and coercive government, but human nature became corrupt, and greed disrupted the primitive communism. Hence political organization is necessary to control the universal madness which sets man against man.[9] As we shall see presently, this idea that government rests upon some sort of compact made by men for their common benefit had in fact important con-

[8] Lichtenberger, *op. cit.,* pp. 65-68.
[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 69-70.

sequences for the development of a theory of revolution in the eighteenth century.

The notion of social betterment as approximation to a predetermined ideal was logically acceptable to Scholastic writers; hence this became virtually the only sort of theory of social reform which existed in the western world throughout the Middle Ages. It is a fact of some significance that the terms "revolution," "reform," and "revolt" are all lacking from the index of Bede Jarrett's *Social Theories of the Middle Ages.* The predominant political thesis of mediæval schoolmen was that the masses owed obedience to existing political authority, except when the commands of secular rulers came into conflict with the rules of the church. Hence revolution or thoroughgoing political reform is scarcely considered by these writers to be a topic worth extended discussion.

Machiavelli on the Art of Preventing Revolution. As we have noted previously, Machiavelli may be thought of as one of the earliest writers whose ideas are in some respects characteristically modern. At any rate, he is modern in his emancipation from theological and moralistic preconceptions which so greatly shaped and directed the political theory of the schoolmen. Although Machiavelli no more discusses revolution abstractly than he does any other topic, it is clear that he was greatly interested in the sort of revolutions which consist primarily in the displacement of one person or group from the place of authority in a State, by some other. Taking the term "revolution" in this sense, we may say that *The Prince* is a manual of prophylaxis against revolution. One cannot say with assurance that Machiavelli was not interested in the underlying causes of revolutions, but he takes them largely for granted.

The "Social Contract." In our own times the discussion of revolution as a practical problem and of the possibility or desirability of any and all fundamental political changes, turns to a considerable extent on the idea of a "right of revolution." Thomas Jefferson's assertion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and his statement that every political organization should be subjected to a fundamental reconsideration once every generation,

have served as texts for many discussions on revolution and political reform, and they are but typical of utterances and ideas that have been current in the western world since the eighteenth century. For all such ideas the primary antecedents are to be found in the writings of the social contract theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau being the most important proponents of the idea.[10] Hobbes and Rousseau drew opposite practical inferences as to the propriety of revolt from constituted authority from their general theories of the social contract; and Hobbes regarded the social contract as the means whereby mankind had been able to escape from a state of universal struggle of each against all, while Rousseau saw it as a misconceived plan for bettering a previously ideal society. But for the student of theories of revolution and political reform the important feature of the work of both is their popularization of the idea of "government by consent." If the mass of the people are those upon whose will the government rests, then the power of changing the government also rests with them by natural and logical right; so runs the reasoning of more than one political theorist since Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.

Modern Theories of Revolution. It is perhaps safe to say that Montesquieu ranks as the titulary founder of modern political science, and one turns naturally to his works to discover what contribution to any particular theoretic problem he has made. One finds, however, that Montesquieu wrote very little that has a direct bearing on the subject of revolution. He does in *The Spirit of the Laws* make certain suggestions which probably inspired later writers on revolution, in his discussions of the relation of "various causes," including laws, morals, and customs, to the spirit of a nation.[11] He intimates that it is undesirable that too many of these factors be modified in a short interval, if the stability of a political body is

[10] Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, Chap. VIII. See also *The New England Clergy and the American Revolution*, by Alice M. Baldwin (Durham, 1928). In the latter volume the author has marshaled a mass of evidence to show that the political leaders of the American Revolution as well as many of their followers had been familiarized with the ideas of eighteenth-century political theorists, particularly Locke, through the agency of the New England clergy.

[11] *The Spirit of the Laws*, translated by Thomas Nugent and revised by J. V. Prichard (New York, 1900), Bk. XIX, Chaps. IV and XII.

to be maintained, and in this he anticipates the theory of L. P. Edwards, that a political revolution, in the ordinary sense of the term, is the outward manifestation and consequence of a social change that has already occurred.

Montesquieu is said to have been influenced chiefly by two of his predecessors, Giambattista Vico and Jean Bodin.[12] In Vico's *New Science,* on which W. A. Dunning thinks Montesquieu drew extensively for the construction of his own theory, we find a general social theory which is essentially evolutionary, and which accordingly leaves little place for catastrophic changes or deliberate reforms.[13] In Bodin's *Six Books of a Commonweale,* however, there is a section dealing in a very definite and yet generalized fashion with the subject of revolution. He regards stability in government as theoretically desirable but practically unattainable, because a law of growth and decay is applicable to States as to organic life. The social philosopher ought, therefore, to study these processes for the purpose of understanding and controlling them. He distinguishes two types of transformations which States undergo, "Conversion of a Commonwealth, when as the State thereof is changed; as when a Popular estate is changed into a Monarchy; or an Aristocracy into a Democracy; or contrariwise; for as the change of customs, laws, religion or place, it is but a certain kind of alteration, the State and sovereignty continuing still; which may also to the contrary itself be changed, without any change of religion, or laws, or any other things also, besides them which belong unto sovereignty." The causes of political changes Bodin indicates as human and divine.[14] The significance of this exposition, if we take it as a landmark in the development of a scientific theory of revolutions, lies chiefly in the fact that it embodies both objectivity and abstractness or generalization, a combination which has been achieved in social science only with the greatest of difficulty.

Revolution, Reform, and the Mores. Among the social theorists whom we may classify, loosely, as *recent,* W. G.

[12] See Lichtenberger, *op. cit.,* p. 210.
[13] *Ibid.,* pp. 210-12.
[14] *Ibid.,* pp. 169-70.

Sumner was an outstanding pioneer in the treatment of revolution and reform, as he was in his discussions of a number of other topics. His discussion of revolution and reform is oriented with reference to his fundamental concept, the *mores*. Revolutions and reforms are interpreted as processes of liquidation, so to speak, of accumulated maladjustments in the mores.

> In higher civilizations crises produced by the persistence of old mores after conditions have changed are solved by revolution or reform. In revolutions the mores are broken up. . . . A period follows the outburst of a revolution in which there are no mores. The old are broken up; the new are not formed. The social ritual is interrupted. The old taboos are suspended. New taboos cannot be enacted or promulgated. They require time to become established and known. . . . Revolutionary leaders expect to carry the people over to new mores by the might of two or three dogmas of political or social philosophy. The history of every such attempt shows that dogmas do not make mores. Every revolution suffers a collapse at the point where reconstruction should begin. Then the old ruling classes resume control, and by the use of force set the society in its old grooves again.[15]

There appears to be something of an internal contradiction in the foregoing passage: At first the author seems to describe a revolution as a natural and more or less beneficent process; then he recedes to a position of unfavorable criticism. Other passages show, however, that Sumner was in fact extremely conservative in his opinion of the possibilities of social reorganization by revolution. It is possible, he says, to change the mores, but not to any great extent or suddenly; they can be modified slowly by minute variations.[16]

Sumner makes the further point that projects for reform must be adapted to the existing mores of the society in question:

> To this point all projects of missions and reform must come. It must be recognized that what is proposed is an arbitrary action on the mores. Therefore nothing sudden or big is possible. The enterprise is possible only if the mores are ready for it. The conditions of success lie in the mores. The methods must conform to the mores.

[15] *Folkways* (Boston, etc., 1906), p. 86.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

That is why the agitator, reformer, prophet, reorganizer of society, who has found out "the truth" and wants to "get a law passed" to realize it right away, is only a mischief-maker. He has won considerable prestige in the last hundred years, but if the cases are examined it will be found that when he had success it was because he took up something for which the mores were ready.[17]

He does not contend that reform is impossible. The mores, however, "are a phenomenon of society and not of the state"; while the "machinery of administration belongs to the state and not to society." Therefore, the administration of the mores presents peculiar difficulties, and in fact, strictly speaking, are not "administered." They are enforced by voluntary organs acting through moral suasion. Opinion and conviction are affected, however, by the observation and consideration of cases; and statesmen and social philosophers may facilitate this process. The true leaders of an epoch are those who discern tendencies already at work in the mores, voice the convictions which have become established, and propose measures which will realize interests of which the society has already become conscious.[18] Evidently we have in these passages the outlines of a comprehensive and penetrating theory of the relation of the fundamental and internal, to the external, aspects of revolution and reform.

Revolution as the Overthrow of a Ruling Class. The conception of revolution as a mere political overturning is of course as we have seen a relatively ancient one, having been the idea of revolution entertained primarily by Plato. This conception has found renewed support at the hands of a number of recent writers, among whom Brooks Adams has been prominent. He has been known for his formulation in various writings of the theory that law is the enacted will or policy of a ruling class. In keeping with this fundamental principle he has developed, in *The Theory of Social Revolutions,* the thesis that a revolution is essentially the overthrow of such a ruling class.[19] The composition of a ruling class, in his view, is never constant, but is continually shifting, to correspond with the changing environment. "When this movement is so rapid

[17] *Ibid.,* pp. 113-14.
[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 117-18.
[19] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1913), pp. 132-33.

that men cannot adapt themselves to it, we call the phenomenon a revolution." "A ruling class is seldom conscious of its own decay, and most of the worst catastrophes of history have been caused by an obstinate resistance to change when resistance was no longer possible." A revolution, then, Adams concludes, is a "problem in dynamics, on the correct solution of which the fortunes of a declining class depend." [20]

Somewhat the same theory of revolutions has been elaborated, with the brilliancy characterizing all his writings, by Walter Lippmann in *A Preface to Politics*.[21] Lippmann does not, however, regard class interests as essentially sinister or subversive.

> The lesson of it all, it seems to me, is this: that class interests are the driving forces which keep public life centered upon essentials. They become dangerous to a nation when it denies them, thwarts them, and represses them so long that they burst out and become dominant. Then there is no limit to their aggression until another class appears with contrary interests. The situation might be compared to those hysterias in which a suppressed impulse flares up and rules the whole mental life.
>
> Social life has nothing whatever to fear from group interests so long as it doesn't try to play the ostrich in regard to them. So the burden of national crises is squarely upon the dominant classes who fight so foolishly against the emergent ones. That is what precipitates violence, that is what renders social cooperation impossible, that is what makes catastrophes the method of social change.[22]

The mildly radical character of Lippmann's social philosophy is of course apparent in this passage, as well as its relationship to his theory of public opinion which we considered in a previous chapter. Evidently what the notion here presented implies is that reform is the alternative to revolution. He points out, however, that reforms must have a foundation in the culture of a people, and "creative statesmanship" is, accordingly, "the work of publicists and educators, scientists, preachers and artists," who are the agents by whose efforts culture is modified.[23]

[20] Adams, Brooks, *op. cit., loc. cit.*
[21] New York and London, 1914. See especially the concluding chapter, "Revolution and Culture."
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 282-83.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 302, 306-07.

Psychological Theories of Revolution. The theories of revolution and reform developed by Sumner, Brooks Adams, and Lippmann obviously have their basis, in part, in psychological assumptions and conceptions of human society and human nature. During the past two decades, however, several other writers have published works in which the subject is approached from a more explicitly psychological point of view. Gustave Le Bon, whose general theory of "crowd psychology" or "collective psychology" we have examined in a previous section of this volume, should be mentioned here for his special treatise, *The Psychology of Revolution.*[24] As we have previously noted, in his formal definition of the scope of his treatise, Le Bon takes the term "revolution" in a very broad sense "to denote all sudden transformations, or transformations apparently sudden, whether of beliefs, ideas, or doctrines." [25] As a matter of fact, he uses the term ambiguously, now to refer to the sudden or apparently sudden transformation, and now to designate the much more gradual changes which he considers to be really important.

> The true revolutions, those which transform the destinies of the peoples, are most frequently accomplished so slowly that the historians can scarcely point to their beginnings. The term evolution is, therefore, far more appropriate than revolution.[26]

Aside from this generalization that the real social changes which underlie sudden revolutions are much more gradual, Le Bon's most significant proposition is probably that which concerns the mechanism of collective psychology by which a revolution is accomplished. Political revolutions, he holds, are in themselves relatively superficial; "the great revolutions are those of manners and thought. Changing the name of a government does not transform the mentality of a people. To overthrow the institutions of a people is not to reshape its soul." What, then, is the process by which the soul of a people is reshaped? In origin, a revolution tends to be perfectly rational; it is aimed at the suppression of crying abuses or the

[24] *The Psychology of Revolution,* translated by Bernard Miall, New York, 1913.
[25] *Ibid.,* p. 23.
[26] *Ibid.,* p. 25.

overthrow of a detested ruler. The rational reasons that have originated a revolutionary movement do not influence the multitude, however, until they have been transformed into sentiments; "to move the multitude its hopes must be awakened." This can be done only through the operation of those "affective and mystical" elements which give men the power to act. The function of leaders, therefore, is to transform the rational motives which they themselves have in view into sentiments. "The multitude is . . . the agent of a revolution, but not its point of departure. The crowd represents an amorphous being which can do nothing, and will nothing, without a head to lead it. It will quickly exceed the impulse once received, but it will never originate it." [27]

Of similar but more extreme character is the psychological theory of revolution set forth by E. D. Martin in *The Behavior of Crowds*.[28] Martin agrees with Le Bon that the great revolutions have been achieved with relatively little crowd-thinking or mob violence, but in saying as much he is, like Le Bon, really making a distinction between two meanings of the term *revolution*. Ordinarily, he says, the existing social status is a balance of power among various contending crowds, "each inspired by the fiction of its own importance, by self-idealization, and desire to rule." This equilibrium is unstable, and is held in place for the time by some one dominant crowd. The dominant crowd secured its position through crowd spirit, and is able to maintain itself in power only through the aid of that spirit; hence it can deal with new situations only in the light of its own symbols and ideas. This involves, among other things, the imposition of a rôle of inferiority upon the members of other crowds, but this is something that people deeply resent. Since the Renaissance, moreover, such feelings of inferiority have tended to find compensation in hopes of earthly reform and change, rather than in the hope of heaven. "The injured self-feeling dwells upon the economic or political inequalities which flow from the dominance of the ruling crowd. The nat-

[27] Le Bon, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-25, *passim*.

[28] New York and London, 1920. See especially Chap. VII, "The Psychology of Revolutionary Crowds," from which the above paragraphs are abstracted.

ural result is some sort of program for the overthrow of the dominant crowd; except for their self-conferred power, we are as good as they; 'Down with the Aristocrats.'"

A revolution, then, according to Martin's theory, is a violent uprising against the existing order; it is a psychological crowd-phenomenon. It takes two crowds to make a revolution. The result of such a revolution is the dictatorship of a new crowd. "A true revolution occurs when the difference between the dominant crowd and the one which supplants it is so great as to produce a general social upheaval." "Revolutions do not occur from abuse of power; for in that case there would be nothing but revolution all the time, since every dominant crowd has abused its power. . . . A revolution occurs when the dominant crowd begins to weaken." . . . It follows that revolutionary propaganda is not directly the cause of insurrection. Such propaganda is itself an effect of the unconscious reaction between a waning and a crescent crowd." The author emphasizes the idealism of revolutionary crowds, which have essentially eschatological, Messianic ideas. "Social idealism of revolutionary crowds is a mechanism of compensation and escape for suppressed desires." In fact, Martin's theory of revolution is a *psychiatric* theory; revolution is for him a phenomenon of social psychopathology.

The rather large volume of recent literature dealing with revolution is of course the reflection of the general interest in the Bolshevist revolution in Russia. This interest is directly acknowledged by the title of a small volume by John Spargo, well known for many years as a writer on socialism, the volume in question being called *The Psychology of Bolshevism.*[29] Being written under the inspiration of a sort of religious conversion, from avowed socialism to some more conservative position, this essay displays considerable bias. It contains, however, an interesting description in generalized terms of the revolutionary as a personality type, and explains the revolutionary type of personality, in part, in terms of the mobility and lack of social status which accompanies the habitual performance of casual labor of the sort which requires the worker to follow the opportunity for employment from place to place.

[29] New York, 1919.

Sociological Theories of Revolution. Several writers of established academic reputation as sociologists have embodied theoretic expositions of revolution either in their general treatises or in specialized volumes. Spargo's description of the revolutionist as a type is paralleled by a passage in Ross' *Principles of Sociology,* in which he discusses the relation of professional reformers and agitators to popular movements.[30] Ross points out that this relationship is often one of exploitation of a popular interest which has already gathered sufficient momentum to have its eventual success assured; such, in fact, he believes to be the typical relation of professional politicians to reform movements. Ross, like Martin, thinks of revolutions as pathological, with the possible exception of cases where the government is not responsive to popular will. He formulates a series of rules to guide the reformer, all of which tend to contrast the tactics of reform with those of revolution. Reforms must not do violence to human nature; they must square with essential realities; they should be preceded by close study of the situation; they should if possible be first tried out on a small scale; they should arise from popular movements: these are the maxims which he proposes, supporting his rules by a citation of Ellwood's discussion of the impossibility of getting constructive programs set in motion by a revolutionary movement.[31]

A somewhat more abstract discussion of certain aspects of revolutions has been included by Thomas and Znaniecki in their general treatment of "social disorganization" to which we have referred in an earlier chapter.[32] It is significant for their general concept of revolution that they treat it under this heading; for in their view revolution is one form of that "decrease of the influence of existing social rules" which they designate generically as social disorganization. Much social disorganization is evidently no more than a sum of individual nonconformities; besides these, however, they distinguish two orders

[30] *Op. cit.* (New York, 1920), pp. 655-59.
[31] *Ibid.,* pp. 549-54.
[32] *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* New York, second edition, 1927. On revolution and reform, see Vol. II, Pt. II, Div. I, Sec. V, "Revolutionary Attitudes," and Div. II, Sec. I, "The Concept of Social Reorganization."

of collective or concerted resistance to existing rules, revolt and revolution.

> That kind of active opposition to existing rules which we term revolt is individualistic in its bearing, even if many members of a group happen to participate in it; it implies only, on the part of each individual, personal demands for some values which he could not have under the traditional system. A revolutionary tendency may also involve such personal demands and in so far be an act of revolt; but its essential feature is that it includes a demand for new values for a whole group—community, class, nation, etc.; each individual acting not only in his own name but also in the name of others.[33]

Continuing the thought, they point out further that revolt does not aim at the destruction of the old system, but only at the satisfaction, in each case, of some particular wish. Revolution, on the other hand, intends the destruction of the traditional system, or at least of some of the major schemes of behavior of which it is composed.[34]

It is further characteristic of revolutionary tendencies, according to Thomas and Znaniecki, that the method of connecting social rules with powerful systems of emotions and beliefs, so efficacious in enforcing the separate items of a social system, is of no avail in suppressing a revolution; for it is precisely the nature of the latter that it runs against the domination of a whole traditional system, including the traditional beliefs connected therewith. "The only efficient method of dealing with revolutionary attitudes is . . . the substitution of a new and more satisfactory system for the old one—a substitution in which the revolutionary elements of society shall be made to cooperate." [35]

Two sociologists of repute have recently published each an entire volume devoted to revolution in general. Professor Sorokin's *Sociology of Revolution,* having been written shortly after the author had been suffering various hardships and disillusionments under the Soviet régime in Russia, is marked by an evident bias, but contains some interesting suggestions concerning the general explanation of revolutionary phenomena. The author introduces his discussion with a com-

[33] *Ibid.,* Vol. II, p. 1265.
[34] *Ibid.,* Vol. II, p. 1266.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 1267.

parison of revolutions with reforms, not greatly different from that of Ross.[36] The main argument of the first part of the volume, however, consists of a series of chapters describing various "perversions" which are features of revolutions, such as "perversion of sexual reactions," "perversion of the reactions of ownership," and so on. Revolution is seen by this author, in other words, as a form of social behavior characterized by a variety of perversions. In the concluding chapter of Part I, "The Psychology of Revolutionary Society," he outlines an explanation in the language of behavioristic psychology of the general proposition that "Revolutionary society begins to see the world and its environment in a one-sided and false aspect." In a later part of the book, however, there occurs a discussion of the main causes of revolution in which is included the following suggestive passage:

> The question of causes put in a general form is always vague, and savors of metaphysics. I shall therefore qualify my statement. By causes I understand in this case the complex of conditions which form the nearest link preceding the revolution, in the causal chain whose beginning is lost in the eternity of the past and whose end is not discernible in the eternity of the future. Let us then at once answer the above question. The immediate cause of revolution is always the growth of "repression" of the main instincts of the majority of society, and the impossibility of obtaining for those instincts the necessary minimum of satisfaction. The remoter (causes) are whatever occasions such a growth of repression.[37]

It will be noted that the range of literature dealing with this subject of revolution is characterized by a striking disagreement among the different writers concerning the proposition that revolutions are due to what Sorokin terms "an increase of repression." Other writers have held that historical evidence goes to show that revolutions, in the sense of revolts against constituted authority, occur only when the one-time repression or abuse of power has commenced to weaken. Apparently the advocates of neither view are able to make out a case as yet that is altogether convincing to those who draw the opposite inference from their study of concrete material, though on the

[36] *Op. cit.* (Philadelphia, 1925), pp. 14-15.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 367.

face of the matter the proposition that revolt follows a weakening of authority seems the sounder empirical generalization.

The other recent treatise devoted entirely to the subject of revolution is *The Natural History of Revolution,* by Lyford P. Edwards.[38] We have had occasion to take notice of certain features of his discussion in previous paragraphs; here we may note briefly three generalizations which he lays down from his examination of a few concrete cases of revolutions of the first magnitude. First, assuming for working purposes the validity of Thomas' fourfold classification of human wishes, he explains the occurrence and intensity of revolutions in terms of the repression of one or more of these fundamental desires. Secondly, the much-dreaded "social revolution," if it comes, will probably not be associated with violence. The English Industrial Revolution, Edwards points out, "was probably the greatest social revolution which has occurred on this planet"; yet there was almost no violence connected with it. "The violent outbreaks commonly called revolutions are, in great measure, due to that conservatism which makes the economically favored classes unwilling to recognize the fact that a real and peaceable revolution has already occurred."[39] Thirdly, it usually takes at least three generations for a revolution to develop. The reason is that the first generation remember the successful working of the now badly functioning institution, and believe it can be restored to usefulness by means of minor reforms. They are likely, furthermore, to be able to inculcate this respect for the old order in their children. Hence not before the third generation, at the earliest, is it possible to overthrow and replace the defective institution.[40]

Revolution and Social Reform. From the foregoing it will be clear that in the existing literature dealing with revolutions there is by no means a clear consensus as to the place of political forces and political processes in the social changes which we term revolutions. The difference of opinion is of course in part a mere lack of uniformity in the use of language. As was suggested in an earlier chapter, the significance of the

[38] *Op. cit.* (Chicago, 1927), pp. 3-4.
[39] *Ibid.,* p. 9.
[40] *Ibid.,* p. 17.

study of revolution for *political* science lies, essentially, in the fact that, whereas we know of great social movements which have been essentially religious in character, and which, having this character, have been directed, in some stages at least, toward the modification of the "human nature," the attitudes, of the members of a society, revolution is our name for social movements which are more external in their bearing, which seem designed and aimed to produce political modifications in a society, modifications in the external pressures to which the members of a society are subjected, by the laws and by the authority of officials or a ruling class. This external and formal character is, however, even more marked in some of the movements for social and political reform which have been prominent features of the history of the past century. As Martin observes, revolutions, strictly so-called, have usually had a Messianic tendency; the psychology of revolution tends to involve what modern psychologists call a "flight from reality." Nineteenth- and twentieth-century reform movements, however, have been characterized by a frank and even excessive emphasis upon the facts of culture, of the existing economic order, and of the physical environment.

There is relatively little literature known to the writer in which the attempt is made to describe and analyze political reform in abstract terms, although there is a wealth of literature dealing historically or in the spirit of propaganda with particular reform efforts. The history of the Fabian Society, which has been narrated in strikingly intimate terms by the former secretary, Edward R. Pease, typifies very well the contrast between a revolutionary and a reform program.[41] Although the Fabian Society has ordinarily been regarded, by outsiders and by its own members, as an organization for the promotion of socialism, it has been as to tactics a reform organization rather than a revolutionary body, composed chiefly of "intellectuals," and proceeding on the basis of keen insights into existing situations. In contrast with Marxian socialists, the Fabians have placed their hopes in educational measures and in political

[41] *The History of the Fabian Society,* by Edward R. Pease, New York, n. d. (Preface dated January, 1916).

maneuvers calculated to secure legislation of a progressive character.

A similar conception of reform was presented in theoretic, quasi-scientific terms in a paper written by Bruno Lasker, himself an experienced reform leader, long connected in one capacity and another with the staff of the *Survey,* the outstanding American organ of social reform groups.[42] His definition of a reformer is, briefly stated, that he is one who seeks to combine the research attitude of the social scientist with the idealism of the revolutionary.

> It is a fact that the most resourceful and successful reformers of our time are scientists as well as practitioners. It is not in the medical schools alone that medical science is advanced but also in the hospitals, the clinics, and the consulting rooms of individual physicians. Even more so in social science, the world of study, laboratory, and workshop is linked up in a continuous process of diagnosis and treatment.[43]

The activities of the reformers have in fact become so well organized and standardized that they have given rise, as was noted previously, to a special type of politics, recognized in enlightened circles by a special name—"social politics." We shall be further concerned with this development in a brief separate chapter to follow.

[42] "What Has Become of Social Reform?" by Bruno Lasker. *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXVIII (September, 1922), pp. 129-59.
[43] *Ibid.,* p. 152.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE GEOGRAPHY OF POLITICS

It is even more true of political geography than of most of the other special subjects studied by social scientists that it is a specialty in process of formation, something predicted and hoped for rather than an established and standardized discipline. A chapter devoted to the development and literature of politico-geographic theory written at the present time must necessarily be, therefore, in large part a story of beginnings, tentative proposals, and tendencies. Nevertheless there is as we shall see ground for the expectation that the geography of politics and administration may become one of the recognized topics for study and research within the general range of social theory. The problems of political theory involve geographic factors and have geographic aspects, which must be taken into account if the study of politics is to become objective and reasonably comprehensive.

Geography and Political Organization. It was evident as soon as the concept of the State came into the social philosophers' universe of discourse that the political organization of human society had geographic aspects and was conditioned by geographic factors. The geographic observations and generalizations of Aristotle, Polybius, and other ancient writers which we have previously had occasion to note were almost without exception conceived with reference to political facts and their interpretation. What required more analysis and reflection before it could find clear statement was, in fact, the principle that political organization is not always and in every respect geographic in pattern. Although the rivalry and reciprocal adjustment of social classes and other non-territorial groups was a conspicuous phase of the political process in some of the earliest States of which we have historical record, it has been in the main the achievement of those who have written since

about 1800 to have reduced to abstract formulation some of the non-territorial aspects of political life. With these latter we shall be further concerned in the two following chapters. Here we may simply remark that the development of a line of inquiry called "political geography" during the nineteenth century and thus far in our own century is perhaps in part a reaction to the growing appreciation of the problems of political theory, and in particular of the importance of non-territorial groups in politics. Something of the nature, scope, and limits of political geography will be indicated as a basis for what follows, if we recall in the beginning the discussion provoked in recent years by Guild Socialists, Syndicalists, and other advocates of "functional" or occupational representation in national and local parliamentary, policy-forming bodies. When, for instance, it begins to be seriously urged that one house of a bicameral national legislature should be composed of representatives elected, not by those living in certain territorial areas, but by the members of occupational groups, the occasion is given for renewed and more searching inquiry into the actualities of political geography. It seems likely that certain types of geographic considerations will have a more prominent place in the future than in the past in the discussions of practical politicians, though the frequency of such political practices as the gerrymander and the "pork barrel" bear witness that practical politicians have long been alive to some of the geographic aspects of their problems.

It will be sufficiently accurate for our purposes to think of the more or less abstract treatment of political geography as beginning with Bodin and Montesquieu, modern pioneers in the larger domain of general political theory. Indeed neither of these writers contributed materially to the theory of political geography in any strict sense of the term; still it seems likely that their conjectures regarding the effects of climate, soil, and location upon national characteristics played some part in suggesting to their successors the further consideration of the same and related topics.[1]

[1] Lichtenberger, J. P., *Development of Social Theory,* pp. 170-72, 218-28. See also Thomas, Franklin, *The Environmental Basis of Society, passim;* Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws,* Chaps. XIV-XVIII.

Ratzel's "Political Geography." It seems to have been Friedrich Ratzel who first definitely formulated the name and the concept of "political geography," as he did the more inclusive term and concept of "anthropogeography," of which he evidently considered political geography a phase or part. Ratzel really laid the foundations for his discussion of political geography in sections of the *Anthropogeographie* (Volume I, 1882) which we have previously considered, where he discusses with many illustrations the relations of human beings and of states to soil, climate, and other geographic factors, the problem of boundaries, and the significance of "circulation" as a process whereby men and small areas are knit together into larger, political units.[2] In other words, from Ratzel's "anthropogeographic" point of view, the foundation of political organization, as of the economic and other aspects of social organization, is communication, regarded as a physical process; exchange, however, is, more specifically, the process which underlies economic organization, while communication brings about political unity. In his *Politische Geographie* (1897) Ratzel developed the theme further. A part of his reasoning in the latter volume has been summarized by Jean Brunhes.

> This book is characterized by the conception of the state-organism adhering to the terrestrial surface and at the same time being a human work. Each state is at once a bit of humanity and a bit of soil. Of its two essential elements, one is the peculiar value of the soil which the people constituting the state inhabit, where they work and move, a value which is derived from the physical totality and from the activity of the actions and reactions taking place there. The other is the value and number of the human beings that people the state, a complex whole in which the results of historical evolution, joined with the effects of geographical environment, are combined and totalled. The growth of the states is explained in Ratzel by means of the theory of space and position. The states occupy certain geographical positions and cover certain superficial areas the effects of which are different according as they are more or less favorable, more or less extended and more or less populated.[3]

[2] *Op. cit., passim;* see also Semple, Ellen C., *Influences of Geographic Environment, passim;* and Brunhes, Jean, "Human Geography," in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, pp. 60-62.

[3] "Human Geography," in Barnes, *op. cit.,* p. 64.

"This theory," Brunhes adds, "is surely too abstract and insufficient," and in this opinion of Ratzel's *Political Geography,* or equally unfavorable judgments, others have agreed. It must be admitted, however, that the genius and enthusiasm with which Ratzel attacked the study of human geography had at least the effect of stimulating others to pursue similar lines of research; Brunhes himself has without doubt been greatly influenced, directly and indirectly, by the work of Ratzel.

In the elaboration of the argument outlined above, Ratzel attempted to establish at least two general laws concerning the correlations between geographic and political phenomena, for summary statements of which we are indebted to Professor Sorokin.

1. Geographic conditions determine the size of a body politic and political, racial, national, and cultural frontiers. Areas separated by mountains or seas have separate political, racial, national, and cultural groups, while populations situated on large plains form a large body politic. The same correlation is claimed in regard to race, language, and culture.[4]

2. The population of states with large territories, because of the vastness of the abode, possesses a spirit of expansion and militarism, an optimism and youthfulness, and a psychology of growth. Within such social bodies there are much less racial and social conflicts than in those with a small territory. In the political units with small spaces the populations are more pessimistic, arrive earlier at a mature spirit of nationalism, have a psychology marked by the spirit of locality, are stagnant, and lack virility.[5]

Sorokin mentions various concrete cases which go to show the inadequacy of these generalizations; and he criticises similarly a less specific generalization concerning the relation of the peculiar physical conditions of the Nile, Mesopotamia, and other valleys to the political despotisms which arose in them, the latter generalization having been most definitely formulated by A. Matteuzzi in *Les facteurs de l'evolution des peuples* (Paris, 1900). This latter generalization, as Sorokin remarks, is so common that it may be found in the majority of the text-

[4] Sorokin, Pitirim A., *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, 1928), p. 176; summarizing Ratzel's *Politische Geographie* (1903), Chaps. XII-XV.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 178; Ratzel, *op. cit., loc. cit.*

books of sociology, yet he shows that it is by no means in accordance with the historic facts.[6]

Political Boundaries and Boundary Peoples. One of the most prominent topics in the anthropogeographic theory of Ratzel, and one which the foregoing discussion will show to be the basis of much of his treatment of political geography, is his treatment of natural and political boundaries. It is almost superfluous to add that the question of boundaries, in its concrete applications, is one of the utmost interest to the statesman and would probably be regarded by many thoughtful persons as the phase of political geography of greatest practical importance. The desirability of "natural frontiers," while probably it has been in many cases a mere rationalization devised to afford moral support and win favorable consideration from neutrals for expansionist projects of states, is certainly a theme which has been much discussed in modern times in Europe. In a recent paper Adolf Gunther has developed the thesis that the actual boundary between two great peoples is not as a rule a line, nor is it always an unoccupied space like the Mediterranean Sea. On the contrary, he calls attention to the existence in central Europe of a number of "boundary areas" occupied by "boundary peoples," some of the characteristics and tendencies of which he attempts to describe in generalized terms.[7] Boundary peoples, he concludes, are characterized by a feeling of inferiority, a disposition to strive to preserve their own identities rather than to merge with larger adjacent powers; hence these peoples represent to the political organization of the continent a permanent crisis-condition.

There is a certain analogy, and probably more than an analogy, between the problem of political boundaries and the subject of "frontiers" and "pioneer belts," in the sense of regions which are in process of first settlement and exploitation by highly civilized peoples. These situations have attracted special attention from geographers and social scientists for some time, and a comprehensive study of pioneer belts has recently been sponsored by the Social Science Research Council. Stated

[6] Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, p. 179.

[7] "Soziologie des Grenzvolks, erläutert an den Alpenländern," *Jahrbuch für Soziologie*, Vol. III (1927), pp. 200-234.

in general and abstract terms, the scientific interest in this type of frontier lies in its significance as a dynamic or critical element in the economic and political organization of a larger area. A frontier may be regarded as a region subjected to the impact of moving economic and political forces; it is a region in process of invasion by some economic organization with its accompanying and supporting political factors.

World Problems of Political Geography. From this point of view the studies of the frontier which have been made in recent decades might be considered as detailed researches which are tentatively correlated in a scheme of world-geography which is briefly outlined by Fairgreve in *Geography and World Power*.[8] This author starts from an interpretation of the physical, economic, and political geography of the "Eurasian parallelogram," which he describes as a vast, on the whole infertile but not valueless "heartland," inaccessible to water transportation but capable of being effectively unified by railways, surrounded by an "ocean border" of countries most of which have developed sea power and commerce. Between the heartland and the ocean border, according to this conception, lies a "crush zone," composed of countries having more or less antiquated economic and political organizations, but sufficient strength to withstand absorption by the sea powers. The states of the crush zone, therefore, function at present as buffer states, "precariously independent politically, and more surely dependent economically." The great political problem of the Eurasian parallelogram, in this view of the matter, is the organization and dominance of the heartland. Because of its relative infertility and unproductivity and its consequently low density of population, the heartland tends to lie open to organization from without, by one or more of the sea powers, rather than from within.

Fairgreve also points out, however, that the Eurasian parallelogram may be seen as a part, though a large part, of a relatively continuous belt of land running round the northern hemisphere, with South America and Africa, as well as Australia and New Zealand, as relatively unimportant appendages. The

[8] *Op. cit.* (London, 1924), Chap. XVIII.

problem of the organization of the Eurasian parallelogram may thus be interpreted as a phase of a still larger problem in world political geography—the problem of the organization of the great belt of land-masses surrounding the North Pole.

Such a conception of world political geography is thought-provoking, to say the least. Just how the practical and concrete questions which it involves may be subjected to orderly analysis with the aid of scientific abstractions and generalizations remains to be seen. We may note here, however, the possibility that the depiction of the *facts* of world political geography in sweeping outlines as Fairgreve has done may help to define the fruitful scientific approach to one special problem which has received considerable attention in the past, though mainly from either the practical or the purely historical point of view. I refer to the problem of colonies and their economic and political relation to their mother countries. It is well known that the disposition of colonies, protectorates, and "mandates" formed a very important feature of the treaty settlements following the World War, and the current interest in the whole subject will doubtless afford stimulus to researches by social theorists in the near future. One practical aspect of the colonial problem is that created by the tendency of colonies to become emancipated, first economically and culturally, but later, politically.[9]

Political "Regionalism." Recent tendencies in political geography have been influenced to a considerable extent by the earlier development of general "human geography," which, in turn, had its origins primarily in the study of physical geography. This developmental tendency may be partly responsible for the recent interest in "regionalism" as a solution for some of the practical problems of politics and administration. With the increase of these problems in magnitude and complexity there has arisen in various countries, but particularly in France, a movement toward what has been called "devolution" of administrative powers, from central governments to local units. But the task of devolution is hampered by the fact that existing local governmental units are in many cases ill-adapted to the practical needs of the occasion; they are either too small, or

[9] See "The Revolt of the Colonies," by Sir A. Maurice Low, *New York Times Magazine*, September 9, 1923.

they do not correspond to the present economic organization. Hence the suggestion that "natural regions" should be defined and made into working political and administrative areas. The relation of this proposal to the interest of students of human geography in natural regions as a purely scientific subject is obvious.[10] Attention has recently been attracted to the subject of political regionalism from a fresh angle through the discovery of new administrative problems created by the development of great hydro-electric power systems, coordinating the power resources of large areas, and supplying electric power to correspondingly wide regions.[11]

The Geography of Local Government. Closely connected in turn with the subject of political regionalism is the field of research and investigation constituted by the geographic problems of local government, urban and rural. As to rural local government, there has arisen in the United States a movement very similar to French regionalism, having as its general objective the discovery of a more efficient geographic basis for the political control and administration of rural areas. This has been accompanied, however, by considerable theoretic and impersonal research into the actual facts of a geographic and economic character which must be taken into account in devising new political and administrative organizations for rural populations. C. J. Galpin and J. H. Kolb have made important contributions in this field.[12] Other geographic researches which have a political bearing are those dealing with the decay of small towns and the increase of automotive transportation.

The geographic phase of urban government which has attracted most attention up to now is in fact another sort of regionalism. N. S. B. Gras has described the process which has resulted in the transformation of the economic organization

[10] I have not had access to literature dealing with regionalism in France. I am indebted to Professor Robert K. Gooch of the University of Virginia for an oral statement of the general problem, in which he has made special studies. See Febvre, Lucien, *A Geographical Introduction to History* (New York and London, 1925), 309 ff.; also A. P. Commandant in *Revue Politique et Parliamentaire*, Vol. XXX (June, 1926), pp. 348-63.

[11] Bruère, Robert W., "Giant Power—Region Builder," *The Survey*, Vol. LIV (May 1, 1925), pp. 161-64, 188.

[12] *Rural Life*, by Chas. J. Galpin, Chap. IV. *Rural Primary Groups*, by J. H. Kolb (Research Bulletin 31, Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of Wisconsin, 1921).

of society from a "town economy" to a state of affairs in which the essential geographic units are large areas, each centering in a metropolis. This has created political problems, however, and has already caused certain changes in the political organization of modern states.[13] The central problem is that relating to the development of a political organization which will be adapted to the economic dominance of the city over a region.[14] Large cities have also their own internal problems of political geography, however; the studies of Chicago tend to reveal the existence of actual groupings, racial, national, and cultural, of the population of the city which frequently fail entirely to be represented either by the administrative districts into which the central city government divides the city for various purposes, or by the alignment of wards, which determines the grouping of the people for the election of aldermen.

The Spatial Pattern of Public Opinion. From the viewpoint of the student of the fundamentals of politics and public opinion, the spatial distribution of votes cast in elections should be a most interesting field of research. Certain broad problems in this field have engaged the attention of historians and political scientists for some time, for instance the successive realignments of North, South, and West with reference to outstanding national issues in the United States throughout the past century and a half. The conflict of interest leading to the Civil War is a major example of the type of situation; Shay's Rebellion a minor case. Populism, and, more recently, the Non-Partisan League and the "Farm Bloc" are political manifestations which have been recognized as having a distinct geographic aspect. Most of these cases have been studied historically and descriptively; and the practical politicians have undoubtedly made their own analyses of the situations for working purposes, but they do not appear to have been studied with reference to fundamental hypotheses which might make it possible to derive from them insights which would make it possible to deal more intelligently with similar future in-

[13] Gras, N. S. B., *An Introduction to Economic History* (New York and London, 1922), pp. 316-22.

[14] See McKenzie, R. D., "The Concept of Dominance and World Organization," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIII (July, 1927), pp. 28-42.

stances. An interesting example of the type of study that might be made in large numbers is reported in a short article by Alvin H. Hansen, of the University of Minnesota, who investigated the correlation between rainfall and the distribution of the vote for governor of Minnesota in 1919.[15] Merriam and Gosnell's study of non-voting in Chicago took account incidentally of the geographic distribution factor, and it is evident that a similar plan of investigation might be applied in such a way as to focus the inquiry upon the spatial variation of the voting studied.[16]

The Scope and Problems of Political Geography. Although the foregoing survey is admittedly fragmentary and incomplete, it will suffice to show the tentative nature of present conceptions of the scope and objectives of political geography, or the geographic study of political forces and processes. That such is in fact the present status of the specialty is the testimony of two authorities in human geography who have discussed the present development and prospects of the broader science in recent papers. Jean Brunhes has collaborated with Camille Vallaux in the preparation of a volume of readings entitled *La Geographie de l'Histoire* (Paris, 1921), of which he states:

> This book on the geography of history deals in four chapters with the geographical facts which are directly related to the existence, development and conditions of stability of political societies. It is a question, in the first place, of the relations between the state and the material territory which this relatively new form of human aggregation covers. In the second place, it is a question of the networks of political routes, geographical as well as historical expressions of the life and survivorship of the states, and of the frontiers marking their limits. In the third place, it is a question of those political and material points in which the states place the central organs of their moral and economic vitality and which are their capitals. Another chapter . . . is entitled: "The New Solutions—Regionalism, Federalism, and Federations of States." [17]

[15] "The Effect of Rain on Politics," *The Independent,* August 28, 1920, p. 251.

[16] Merriam, Chas. E. and Gosnell, Harold F., *Non-Voting—Causes and Methods of Control,* Chicago, 1926.

[17] "Human Geography" in Barnes, *op. cit.,* p. 72.

Evidently this might be taken as a tentative definition by Brunhes of the scope of "political geography." Elsewhere, however, he states explicitly that political geography can only be a part of the broader group of studies which should be called "Geography of History," which deal with "the rôle of geographic facts in the development of history as a whole, not only political, but also economic and social." [18] It will be recalled that "geography of history" was the subject which Febvre preferred to deal with in his recent volume. It might be inferred that the consensus of opinion among geographers runs against the attempt to single out problems in political geography for special attention, and such an inference would not be far wrong.

In another recent paper dealing with the scope and present trend of human geography, however, Professor Carl O. Sauer, while emphasizing the difficulty of defining "political geographic family," [19] has none the less offered a definition of political geography "as a very modest field." Sauer conceives human geography as being, essentially, the study of the cultural landscape (*Landschaftskunde*), which "is fashioned out of the natural landscape by the cultural group." [20] In keeping with this definition of the broader science, then, he defines political geography as the study of the political landscape. "It would then include three main sets of facts: the administrative centres, the boundaries, and the defensive lines and positions." [21] The last of these three is of course the special province of military geography. Perhaps, with the addition of a fourth point, namely the study of the distribution and spatial "gradients" of political phenomena, especially votes, we might accept Sauer's definition as a reasonable one.

So long as it remains true that human beings live in space, and that many of their activities are manifested as movements and changing positions in space, it will probably be profitable as a method of research to study these observable, more or less accurately measurable movements and distributions. A funda-

[18] "Human Geography" in Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
[19] "Cultural Geography" in *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*, edited by E. C. Hayes (Philadelphia, 1927), p. 207.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 190 *et passim*.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 208.

mental demand of the social sciences is the demand for objective *indices* of those social phenomena which are not, in the form in which we are ultimately interested in them, directly observable. Movement in space and position in space affords indices of many of these phenomena. This is not less true of the kinds of facts which we call political than of other kinds of social happenings. The employment of a spatial or geographic approach to the study of politics may therefore be expected to continue for an indefinite future period.

CHAPTER XXXIV

SOCIAL POLITICS

The Scope of "Politics." It has been the fashion ever since the several social sciences began to emerge in their modern form, to proceed on the general assumption that "politics" and "political science" have to do with a relatively narrow range of phenomena, those of "government" in the narrow, strictly conventional sense of the term. Statements have occurred from time to time in the more general treatises which seemed to imply a broader scope for the science of politics; it has long been a commonplace that Aristotle's dictum, "Man is by nature a political animal," might be freely translated, "Man is a *social* animal," and that the field of the *Politics* is a somewhat broader one than that customarily assigned to politics by modern writers. Still, writers and teachers of political science, after paying their respects, perhaps, to a broad conception of their subject in an introductory chapter or a general treatise dealing with the "principles of political science," have usually confined their subsequent researches and discussions to the field of "government," strictly and narrowly so-called. We have previously observed, however, that a theoretic analysis of the concept of the political tends to indicate a broader field of inquiry; we find political processes going on in other phases of contemporary society than government or the State. G. E. Catlin, in his recent thoughtful treatise, *The Science and Method of Politics* (1927), concludes that the attitude of political science will be that of interest in "human conduct as dominated by the will to stand in a relation to other willing beings, which shall be a controlling, or at least not a subject relation." [1] In preceding chapters we have noted a somewhat similar recent tendency to conceive the political as the realm of social interaction wherein there is a struggle and adjustment, externally and formally, of

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 159 *et passim.*

competing group tendencies. All of this tends to suggest that there are other kinds of politics than the politics of States, and we have seen that a similar implication resides in the popular use of such expressions as "church politics," "club politics," and the like. In a similar manner there occurs frequently in the literature of the past quarter-century the expression "social politics," and it is with the tendencies and problems implied by that expression that we shall be concerned in the present chapter. Social politics is, however, a field in which social history and practice have moved in advance of social theory, even more strikingly than in some others; hence in surveying the development and scope of social politics as a topic of logical importance for social theory, we shall be compelled to attempt to outline the range of theoretic interest in the subject from such materials as can be found, mainly, in publications which have a primarily practical emphasis. The practical political problems of today, if they are of fundamental importance, are surely the objects of tomorrow's theoretic inquiry.

Governmental Activity in the Nineteenth Century. The conventional idea of the scope of politics appears to be the outgrowth of the *laissez-faire* theory and concrete tendency which set in in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Previous to that time, European statesmen and political philosophers do not appear to have had a general conviction that large segments of human life should be left outside the power of governments. Then, in response to the needs of expanding industry and commerce, governments came to be guided more and more by the maxim "that government is best which governs least." It came to be regarded as the business of governments to furnish protection against foreign invasions and to protect private property against internal dangers; otherwise they were to make way for the maximum exercise of freedom and private initiative. Bit by bit, however, during the nineteenth century, under the influence of certain English reformers and for somewhat different reasons in Germany, the scope of governmental activity was widened again. Robert Owen, John Bright, and others were instrumental in having various measures of "social legislation" enacted by the British Parliament; while Bismarck and others, through their policies of "state socialism," revived

the old paternalistic tradition of German governments. In propaganda for, and description of, these types of "social legislation," the term "social politics" seems to have been first used.

"Sozialpolitik" in Germany. It was in fact in Germany that the term originated. Small has described briefly the birth and early history of the movement which led to the organization of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (Society for Social Politics) in 1873.[2] It was presumably the result of the publicity attached to the meetings of this body, and of the many volumes published under its auspices, which made *sozialpolitik* a standard academic term in Germany, as it has been ever since. The only theoretic or general discussions of social politics, under that title, have been written by German authors. As an indication of the scope and trend of the German movement for the study of social politics, we may place in exhibition a brief abstract of an article on the subject written for a German reference work by Professor Leopold von Wiese. Von Wiese has also written a substantial volume on the same subject.[3]

The word *sozialpolitik* is peculiar to the German language; it has no equivalent in the theory or practice of other peoples. In fact it is scarcely a scientific term in German, but a vernacular expression used in parliament, in administrative circles, and in textbooks. The concept *sozialpolitik* is not well adapted to the purposes of science. Originally it meant the activity of the State as contrasted with that of bourgeois "interests." Later it came to be used mainly to refer to (1) the attempt to improve by governmental action the supposedly undesirable condition of the proletariat, and (2) an abstract conception of the political side of society in general. In the latter case, it can be made to serve as an abstract sociological concept. In any case, however, the term betrays its practical origin; it refers to *"sozialpolitische"* activities, and to theories constructed to explain such activities. Sociology has for its object of attention the relationships of men; *sozialpolitik* is concerned with the impulses and measures through which these relationships are influenced.

During the post-war period the practical problems and alignments of forces with reference to social questions have undergone rapid mutations: the social-democratic group came into political power, but under circumstances determined from without which rendered them powerless to carry out their cherished projects. The result was a

[2] *Origins of Sociology*, Chap. XV.

[3] "Sozialpolitik," *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften* (fourth edition, Jena, 1925), Vol. VII, pp. 612-22. See also *Sozialpolitik* (book, 1927).

political movement to the right. These events have led to theoretic discussion, and it has become customary to speak of a "crisis of *Sozialpolitik*." Discussion of the question culminated in a symposium in a number of German journals in April, 1923, and thereafter. The consensus seemed to lie with Herkner, who criticized the expression "crisis of *Sozialpolitik*" as misleading. He pointed out that *Sozialpolitik* represents no end in itself; it is concerned solely with the means of improving the conditions of life for the masses.

"Social Politics" in Contemporary Literature. The obvious conclusion one draws from von Wiese's discussion of *Sozialpolitik* is that to German social scientists the term means, primarily the aims and ideals of those interested in social reform and welfare legislation; secondarily it has reference to the struggles and discussions in political circles which have arisen as a result of these efforts to promote welfare legislation.[4] There is in his article, however, a clue to the possibility of a broader, more theoretic treatment of social politics, in his statement that the term *Sozialpolitik* may refer to "an abstract conception of the political side of society in general." As a matter of fact, the term "social politics" is beginning to be used by American writers to refer to three or possibly four distinct topics: (1) it may have reference to what we otherwise call "social legislation," and in general to governmental "welfare" activities; (2) it may have reference to the existence of a process of struggle and compromise, essentially political in character, *within* private or quasi-public welfare and social service organizations, and between such bodies; (3) it also refers to the participation by those who rate as "experts in social welfare," in their professional capacity, in the political processes by which "social legislation" is formulated and in the nation. There seems to be some tendency also (4) to the emergence of a general conception and theory of government and politics as the organization of public action to promote the general welfare; probably some would speak of this as a theory of social politics, or, alternatively, a social theory of politics. This last-mentioned conception is evidently similar to von Wiese's idea of *Sozialpolitik* as an abstract conception of the

[4] See also "Zum Schicksal der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland," by Otto von Zwiedineck-Sudenhorst, *Schmoller's Jahrbuch,* Vol. XLVII (Heft 1-4, 1924), pp. 77-142.

political side of society in general. In the following paragraphs we shall be concerned with a brief review of representative literature dealing with these various conceptions of social politics.

Social Politics and Social Welfare. Legislation and governmental administrative activity on behalf of "welfare" interests in the United States has a history as old as that of the Union itself. In the early years of the national history, however, political action along these lines was not sufficiently complex or dependent on sophisticated conceptions of the conditions and factors involved to bring about any substantial modification of the political theories inherited from the eighteenth century. Within the first half of the nineteenth century, however, the country was invaded by a variety of theories and doctrines of social reform and social reconstruction, mostly of European origin, which led eventually to a considerable revision of accepted ideas of the scope and purpose of government.[5] Professor Haynes refers to the resulting changes in party platforms as a "socialization of politics," and remarks that the two major parties have taken up one social policy after another as a means of defending themselves against the successive radical and socialistic political movements with which their status has been threatened, and of appealing to the "labor vote."[6] As these trends came to be sensed by academic students of politics they gave the stimulus to the preparation of a number of books and papers of a somewhat general and discursive type, in which the writers sought to lay down, chiefly on philosophical and ethical grounds, the principles which should guide the new tendencies. *The New Basis of Civilization,* by Simon N. Patten; *Standards of Public Morality,* by A. T. Hadley, and *Governmental Action for Social Welfare,* by Jeremiah W. Jenks are representative works of this type. Haynes' *Social Politics in the United States* is a comprehensive summary of the whole process of development.

One of the most definite results of the new trend of govern-

[5] Haynes, Fred E., *Social Politics in the United States* (Boston and New York, 1924), Chaps. I-IV.

[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 18, 20-21.

ment activity was the formation in a number of states and cities of administrative departments of public welfare, in which the various "welfare" activities of the governments in question were centralized to a greater or less degree. The demand for intelligent guidance of these developments has led to research and publication by trained men of a body of literature dealing with some of the underlying conditions and problems with which public welfare administrators are confronted. It so happens that charitable activities under private and religious auspices developed earlier and more rapidly in the cities of the North than in the Southern states; so that in the former section of the United States the more refined and discriminating activities which have been carried on in the field have remained to a considerable extent in the hands of private agencies, with public agencies and institutions performing supplementary functions primarily and assuming the care of the totally destitute and the permanent outdoor relief of the aged poor. It is partly for this reason, no doubt, that some of the most important contributions to a general theoretic literature dealing with public welfare administration have been published by southern writers, particularly by Professor Howard W. Odum, of the University of North Carolina; for in this region, welfare activities arose in the main later, and to a greater extent as "public," that is *governmental,* functions.[7]

From the standpoint of the student of social theory and its development, there are two tendencies of especial interest in this growing body of literature dealing with public welfare administration and its problems. One is the tendency to devote a great deal of space to problems of "organization"—what should be the form of a state department of public welfare? what is and what should be the relation of public to private social agencies and institutions? and what sort of relationships should exist between the various private social agen-

[7] *Public Welfare and Social Work,* by Howard W. Odum (Chapel Hill, 1926). *Systems of Public Welfare,* by Howard W. Odum and D. W. Willard (Chapel Hill, 1925). *Public Welfare in the United States, The Annals,* Vol. CV (January, 1923), edited by Howard W. Odum. See also Steiner, Jesse F., *Community Organization* (New York, 1925); and *Man's Quest for Social Guidance,* by Howard W. Odum (New York, 1927). Professor Odum is the founder and editor-in-chief of *Social Forces,* a journal devoted largely to problems of public welfare.

cies in a city, county, or state? Secondly, there is a strong tendency to emphasize the need and specifications for training of those who are to serve professionally in this field, and the desirability of research and investigation into existent conditions as a basis for the practical efforts of public and private social agencies. The last-mentioned tendency is correlated with the social-political interest in the rôle of the expert in the formulation of public welfare policies, with which we shall be concerned in a later paragraph. The amount of attention given to the organizational problems of public welfare administration is an index of the magnitude of the problems of "social politics" of the second type named above, those relating to the forces and processes, essentially political in their character, which are in operation *within* the domain of public welfare organization and activity.

The Problem of Organization in Welfare Work. As soon as social work and public welfare administration became developed to the point where a considerable body of persons derived their living and their status in the community from their professional services in these agencies, the same thing happened that has happened in the case of other social institutions; "vested interests" came into being. Because most welfare activities originated spontaneously and independently, out of the responses of individuals and small groups to their perception of particular existing needs, there naturally arose in many a community and state a considerable duplication of effort; different agencies were attempting to deal with cases and needs of the same kind. This led to a rivalry of organizations and institutions for funds, and, eventually, to the perception by governmental executives and public-spirited citizens of the need for some sort of coordination and integration of the welfare institutions and activities of any given community or state. But coordination and integration typically mean that some one's hopes are to be disappointed; some executives are to be subordinated to others, and some social workers may find themselves out of a job entirely. Hence the problem of organization in public welfare work and in private social work proves to be a very substantial one, and a body of literature has grown up dealing with it. One topic of perennial interest

has been the comparative study of the merits and shortcomings of the various local schemes for the "federation" of private charitable agencies and institutions, for the development of "social service exchanges," and for the administration of "community chests" as a means to the efficient and economical financing of the private social agencies of a community. The study of the problem from this angle makes it appear as a problem of community organization, and it is from that angle that it has been most systematically and abstractly discussed. A representative work is Professor Jesse F. Steiner's little volume, *Community Organization*.[8] Steiner has summed up a fundamental aspect of the matter, and one which is particularly significant from the viewpoint of the theory of social politics, in the following passage:

> Fundamentally community organization has to do with problems of accommodation and social adjustment. More specifically it is concerned with the interrelationships of groups within communities, their integration and coordination in the interests of efficiency and unity of action. In a wider sense it may also include the adjustment of a local community to the larger social unit of which it is a part. In order to understand the problem with which community organization is dealing, we must think of society as made up of elements more or less antagonistic to each other, which must through a process of accommodation develop a working arrangement that will resolve the conflicts and make consistent progress possible. Community organization is, therefore, not merely an essential process; it is also a continuous process in which adjustments are being made and remade to keep pace with changing conditions.[9]

In an earlier volume of this series, entitled *The American Community in Action,* Professor Steiner has sought to contribute to our understanding of the processes involved in "community organization" by publishing a number of case histories of particular communities. These studies tend to show, as their title indicates, what some of the factors are which determine or condition the achievements of communities—achievements which arise out of the attempt to deal with concrete problems as they arise. No sort of evidence could show more

[8] See especially Chaps. I-III, VII, VIII, XI, XV, and all of Pt. III, "Theories and Principles of Community Organization."

[9] *Op. cit.,* p. 323. See also Leroy E. Bowman in *Social Forces,* Vol. IV (September, 1925), pp. 103-04.

clearly than Steiner's case histories of communities do, the superficial character of the distinction which is commonly made in popular speech between the political and the non-political.

Another problem of "organization" in welfare administration to which a great deal of space has been devoted in the literature is that of the relations of public and private welfare agencies.[10] It is difficult to discover in this literature analyses as fundamental as Steiner's description of the essential task of community organization; there have been formulated, however, certain working principles having reference to the respective capacities of both types of agencies, as, for example, that public agencies should in general assume the burden of cases where permanent relief is needed, and that it should be the responsibility of private agencies and organizations, with their greater freedom of self-determination, to investigate and experiment with novel means and methods of social service and welfare work.[11]

The Rôle of the Expert in Social Politics. No phase of social politics is of greater theoretic interest and importance than that which is constituted by the growing professionalization of social service and public welfare administration. It is well known that, whereas the qualifications considered to be necessary for efficiency in social service and public welfare administration, if any, typically consisted of "good Christian character," a "passion for service," and, in the case of public agencies and bureaus, party loyalty or personal influence with some party leader, today the standards of training for social workers are probably on the whole at least as exacting as those imposed on public school teachers in most parts of the United States. What is not so well known, however, is that those actively engaged in social service and public welfare administration, whether they are of the younger generation

[10] See for example *The Annals*, Vol. CV, pp. 21-25, 31-35, 42-45, 88-92; also Odum, *Public Welfare and Social Work*, pp. 161-65; also "Bureaucratic and Political Influences in Neighborhood and Civic Problems," by Jane E. Robbins, M.D., *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work*, 1925, pp. 391-95.

[11] "The Contribution of American Social Agencies to Social Progress and Democracy," by Frank D. Watson, *Journal of Social Forces*, Vol. I (January, 1923), pp. 87-90.

of professionally trained workers, or of the older, self-taught group of administrators and settlement-house residents, have had an increasingly influential part in the formulation of social legislation in cities, states, and nation. "Social politics," in this sense is a name for the participation of the social agencies, public and private, and their leaders as experts, in the formation of welfare policies to be enacted into law.[12] From one point of view this may be described as a special manifestation of the much-discussed tendency to "political pluralism," or the representation of "interest groups" in the government. The professional social workers, in other words, are tending to constitute a special interest group playing a distinctive rôle in the formulation of public policies through a process of equilibration of the pressure and influence they are able to bring to bear with that exerted by other political group-forces.[13] This tendency has been only briefly discussed in the published literature, as yet, and scarcely finds a place in the general treatises on social and political theory, but enough attention has been paid to it to show that it is a tendency which social and political theorists will be forced to take into account in the future. A special manifestation of the general tendency is to be noted in the growing influence which psychiatrists are exerting upon the formulation and administration of criminal law. The significance of this tendency has been extensively discussed in the popular press, and, by Sheldon Glueck among others, in a number of semi-technical papers.[14]

Social Politics and General Political Theory. Naturally, the growing appreciation of what is taking place in the politics of public welfare, in the sense just indicated, has found and will find a reflection in studies and discussions of the general theory of political process and government. The viewpoint of

[12] Lindeman, Eduard C., "The Social Worker as Statesman," Survey LII (May 15, 1924), pp. 222-24. Bruno, Frank J., "Cooperation of Social Workers with Public Officials in the Enforcement of Law," *The Family,* Vol. IV (October, 1923), pp. 145-51.

[13] Haynes, *op. cit.,* pp. 19-20. Groves, Ernest R., "Government by Group Pressure," *North American Review,* Vol. CCXVIII (October, 1923), pp. 447-83.

[14] "Reformers and Crime," *New Republic,* Vol. XLIV (September 23, 1925), pp. 120-23. "A Tentative Program of Cooperation Between Psychiatrists and Lawyers," *Mental Hygiene,* Vol. IX (October, 1925), pp. 686-98.

the thoughtful social worker as regards the underlying problem has been well stated by J. K. Hart.

> The futility of thinking of community organization and government in terms of antithesis must now be apparent. They are, in reality, but two parts of the same process, namely, the process of bringing about a working relation between the specialist and the democratic group. In a completely organized collectivist state, one might conceive of government as the all-embracing reality within which this process might be included. But, to think of such a state is to feed the cynic who knows that self-government is a snare and a delusion. Or, it is to launch forth on a new political theory which looks upon government or politics as *the* social process. For the purposes of appraising the evolving stage of civilization in which we find ourselves, both views are unessential. We have hitherto failed to see anything but antithesis in the spectacle of the eager and wise expert forcing his mystic medicine down the throats of an ignorant and unwilling public simply because we have not had eyes to see; there has been no satisfactory technic for the process and hence no satisfactory psychology to give us the right sort of eyes. But both are now, in part, at least, available.[15]

In this version of the matter, the theorist emphasizes the idea that the function of the expert in welfare administration as the person who can state what *can* be done, and how it can be done efficiently, is regarded simply as a natural and, in a complex society, an inevitable part of the political process in which the forces and resources of government are brought to bear upon the problems of public welfare.

Several great political theorists have emphasized, however, the principle that democratic government has two great phases, the determination of public policies and the administration of those policies. That experts should be employed in the administration of public functions is, from this point of view, perfectly logical.[16] When, however, the expert invades the field of policy-determination it appears to be a perversion of the natural order of things. Recognizing the force of this criticism, there have been those who have advocated a quite different type of method for insuring that governmental bodies shall be responsible to the needs of public welfare, namely, the

[15] *Annals*, Vol. CV, pp. 86-87.

[16] Goodnow, F. J., *Politics and Administration.* Lowell, A. Lawrence, *Public Opinion and Popular Government.*

reconstitution of the neighborhood as a unit in which public opinion may find its first expression and consolidation. We have noted Dewey's approval of this idea in *The Public and Its Problems;* it is, however, a doctrine which has been advocated by many others, notably by M. P. Follett in *The New State.* Those who favor this plan for the reconstruction or revival of public interest in welfare problems are disposed to look to the social settlements and similar institutions as the instrumentalities whereby neighborhood spirit may be cultivated in the otherwise disorganized districts of large cities, and it is significant that one significant paper on the theme was written by Robert A. Woods from South End House in Boston, one of the older social settlements.[17] Still another scheme based on similar conceptions of the needs of social politics is that of education of citizen leaders through city clubs. The Chicago City Club carries on a variety of research and educational activities designed to keep its members in touch with the welfare needs of the city, and it announces as one of the purposes of the organization, "to make investigations into municipal conditions and urge their improvement."

The study of social politics is still too young to enable us to make a very confident or explicit statement of the contribution which research in this field may be expected to make to the general theory of political process and political organization. It is certain, however, that the attention which has already been paid to these topics has shown that the politics of the future will be a much more complex affair than the eighteenth-century political philosophers anticipated. Not only do we find extensions and elaborations of the political process taking place in the administration of welfare activities, but it is beginning to be apparent that there is a political process in modern business and industry. With these we shall be concerned in the following chapter.

[17] "The Neighborhood in Social Reconstruction," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XIX (March, 1914), pp. 577-91. See also "Community Forces: A Study of Non-Partisan Elections," by R. D. McKenzie, *Journal of Social Forces,* Vol. II (January and May, 1924), pp. 266-73, 560-68.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRY[1]

Employer-Employee Relations. Although the subject of industrial relations, or "the labor problem," as it is commonly called, is now recognized as an important phase of social science and is represented by a voluminous literature, it is possible to outline the history of this phase of social theory down to recent years in a relatively simple form. Aristotle's justification of slavery is well known to all students of the history of social thought; and almost equally familiar is the general tendency visible in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient social philosophers, and, for that matter, in the Biblical writings, to the acceptance and justification of a social régime of *status,* in which human beings are arranged in more or less hierarchical fashion in relationships of subordination and authority. We may say without serious distortion of the facts that the "labor theory" of ancient times was simply the rationalization of a society in which each person had his place and his lord—individuals in general being subjected to the overlordship of some *paterfamilias,* citizens to rulers, who in turn were assumed to be answerable to the gods for their sovereignty, perhaps also to the corporate sanction of the community. Much the same theory persisted, with only sporadic manifestations of dissent, down through the Middle Ages, and until the eighteenth century. Bede Jarrett summarizes the findings of his research into medieval social theories, as regards slavery and serfdom, in the following brief statement:

> From Aquinas to Antonio of Florence (1389-1459), and thence to Savonarola (1452-1498), we can describe the medieval attitude to serfdom in two sentences from the *Summa Theologica,* the first of

[1] I have frankly plagiarized the title of this chapter, because of its adaptability to the subject-matter, from Glenn Frank's book of similar title (New York, 1919).

which . . . remains as the simplest key to the whole of medieval social thought:

I. "The distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by Nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life"—that is, the introduction of slavery is due to the *Jus Gentium.*

II. "Without the *Jus Gentium* men cannot live together, which (living together) is a point of the law of nature since man is by nature a social animal as is proved in *Politics* i."—that is, the institution of some sort of servitude was contained in the natural law and could never wholly be abolished.[2]

Slavery is of course one form of industrial relationship, and has been so described by Nieboer and Oppenheimer, among other modern writers.[3] As such, it was integrated into the life of civilized societies until the nineteenth century, to a greater or less degree, and the social thought of the western world from its beginnings down to fairly recent times simply reflected and rationalized, in the main, this existing state of affairs, the conservation of which was felt to be essential to the general welfare, though the justification was usually couched in theological terms. Indeed it might be said that one of the first great achievements of modern social science in dealing with the theoretic problems of industrial relationships was that involved in setting aside the working assumption of the moral obligation of servants to be obedient to their masters—since God had seen fit to place them in that status or relationship—as a first principle of the whole subject.

Eighteenth-century Social Idealism. The Protestant Reformation did not operate immediately to modify this general conception of the master-servant relationship. Luther himself repudiated and condemned the revolt of some of his peasant followers against their feudal overlords in 1522. However Jean Bodin, writing in the latter part of the same century, embodied in his *Six Books of a Commonweale* an argument against slavery,[4] and we may think of him as a precursor of the eighteenth-century doctrine of liberty. It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss the causes of the

[2] *Social Theories of the Middle Ages* (Boston, 1926), p. 121.

[3] Nieboer, H. J., *Slavery as an Industrial System,* The Hague, 1900. Oppenheimer, Franz, "Die Sklaverei," *Kolner Vierteljahrahefte für Soziologie,* Vol. V (1925), pp. 1-12.

[4] Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory,* pp. 168-69.

eighteenth-century social idealism; apparently they were several. They are symbolized, however, by the famous opening sentence of Rousseau's *Social Contract,* "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains." Montesquieu repeated Bodin's depreciation of slavery, but he has little else to say that bears directly upon our present subject. As regards the development of theories of industrial relations, the most important consequence of the eighteenth-century social philosophy, with its emphasis on liberty, was the direction it evidently helped to give to the theory of economic individualism which took shape at the hands of the Physiocrats and Adam Smith in the latter part of the century. For this phase of the theory we have again, in Adam Smith's famous statement concerning the "invisible hand," a familiar quotation which may serve us as a symbol of a major trend in the history of social thought. Economists and statesmen alike, during the nineteenth century, favored the abolition of the feudal restraints and the Elizabethan guild-system regulations of industry, and in general, the establishment of the right of the individual to contract freely for the sale of his labor, as of his goods, in the best market. Without doubt, the underlying reason for this change of attitude in the course of a century was the changes which were going forward in the actual—physical and technological and geographic—environment of industry, so that it began to be apparent that the removal of traditional restrictions upon the "liberty" of the individual as a producer and trader was in the interest of national prosperity. Be that as it may, however, we may safely say, in general, that the predominant labor theory of the nineteenth century was a theory of free individual contract. Maine's dictum to the effect that the evolution of law has been a movement from status to contract summarized the thought of the times and gave another apt formula for those who might wish a rational reason for the policy they were asked to support. Professor Commons has lately restated the same doctrine as a "commodity theory of labor"; labor is regarded as a commodity, to be bought as cheaply as possible, and sold as dearly as possible.

Spencer on "Industrial Institutions." One of the earliest manifestations of a newer and more penetrating conception of

industrial relations on the part of a writer of importance is that to be found in the third volume of Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Sociology.* Spencer quotes with approval Maine's "status to contract" formula,[5] and is in this respect a representative of his times, as indeed he was in his general inclinations shown in his other writings and in the concluding chapter of the same discussion. A great deal had happened in the economic world, however, between the time when Maine wrote *Ancient Law* and the time when Spencer wrote the concluding part of his *Principles of Sociology,* and Spencer was too good an observer and thinker to allow the significance of some of these changes to escape him. Furthermore, the first edition of Sidney and Beatrice Webb's *History of Trade Unionism* had appeared, to provide him, as he frankly admits, with a body of material which he could use in his briefer but more comprehensive discussion of developments in industrial institutions. Consequently we find him calling attention to a number of tendencies which were not in accord with the individualistic tendency from "status to contract" which he regarded as fundamentally natural and desirable. Evolution, he says, is a rhythmic process.

> After centuries during which coercive rule had been quietly diminishing and had been occasionally made less by violence, there was reached in the middle of our century, especially in England, a degree of individual freedom greater than ever before existed since nations began to be formed. Men could move about as they pleased. But the movement which in so large a measure broke down the despotic regulations of the past, rushed on to a limit from which there has commenced a return movement. Instead of restraints and dictations of the old kinds, new kinds of restraints and dictations are being gradually imposed.[6]

The foregoing passage is Spencer's attempt at an interpretive summary of a number of changes in industrial organization which he had noted as taking place during the century in which he wrote (nineteenth), and likely to go further in the near future. He describes the tendency to progressive division of labor, accompanied by and furthered by the "com-

[5] *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, Pt. VIII, Chap. XVIII, "Free Labor and Contract"; see especially, p. 493.
[6] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 607.

pounding of capital" and the development of large-scale industrial enterprise. This movement, he points out, while tending to increase production and thus to benefit the worker as a consumer, has been of considerable damage to his interests as a producer; it makes him dependent upon a single, highly specialized occupation for his living, and indeed reduces him to a status resembling serfdom, though in a special manner.[7] Similarly, however, and due in part as he thinks to the disturbing effects of the new economic order upon the workers, he describes the increasing tendency of the workers to unite in Trade Unions, a tendency already well advanced when he wrote at the turn of the century. He regards the unionists' hope of raising their wages by combination as, in general, unfounded; here the influence of the mechanistic, individualistic economic theory of Smith and Ricardo is apparent, for he clearly indicates that he believes the wages to be determined in the main and in the long run by natural law which cannot be affected in its operation by the combination of the workers.[8] He concludes, on the other hand, that trade unions have been of benefit to the wage-workers by establishing a check to the greed and shortsightedness of the employers, securing prompter wage increases when the market permits them, and in general improving the *status* of the workers.[9] As was intimated above, Spencer concludes his discussion of "Industrial Institutions" with a prediction of increasing collectivism in the near future, a tendency possibly to be checked later under the influence of world peace. Combination he regards as a natural reaction to war conditions, but wars may be expected to create, eventually, some sort of world state or world federation which would end wars, and thus make possible a relaxation of that reglementation of the individual which he sees as the chief tendency of the recent evolution of industrial institutions.[10] It is a significant fact that Spencer regards industrial *institutions* as a special topic within the broader subject of government or control.[11]

[7] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. III, pp. 523-25.
[8] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 548-51.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 551-52.
[10] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, Pt. VIII, Chaps. XXIII and XXIV.
[11] *Ibid.*, Chap. X, "The Regulation of Labour."

Recent Tendencies in Industrial Relations. Just how much influence, or what influence, Spencer's chapters on industrial institutions have had on those who have written on similar topics since the first publication of the third volume of *Principles of Sociology* in 1896, it is manifestly impossible to ascertain. It is demonstrable, however, that Spencer's writings were very popular within educated circles in the United States during the decades when they were first appearing, and on through the first ten years of our century. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the generalizations we have just been reviewing had a considerable part in stimulating thought and investigation on the part of others who began to write in the new special field of "labor problems" at about this time. It is an interesting fact that Mrs. Webb was closely associated with Spencer in her early years, and although she subsequently became connected with the Fabian group and the writings on which she has collaborated with her husband are distinctly collectivistic in tendency, it is to be supposed that she gained certain ideas of viewpoint and method from her early mentor in social science.

Certainly one must say that the recent history of theories of industrial relations is dominated by the figures of the Webbs, whose *History of Trade Unionism,* several times revised and brought down to date since first appearance, and *Industrial Democracy* (1897, 1902, 1920) have been the standard general treatises on trade unionism and collective bargaining for a quarter of a century. In the United States John R. Commons' numerous writings constitute the equivalent of the Webbs' work, with special reference to American conditions. Mention should be made also, however, of the fact that some years ago the proper authorities at Johns Hopkins University decided to concentrate the research to be done in economics in the special field of trade unionism and industrial relations, as a consequence of which a steady stream of monographs in this field have come from the Johns Hopkins University Press.

It can scarcely be doubted that the most important and impressive feature of the contributions to a scientific knowledge and theory of industrial relations which these writers and their followers and rivals have been making has been the marked

concentration of effort and attention upon the examination and recording of factual data. The general field of inquiry is coming to be one well provided with authentic "documents" which the research workers of the future can use, and in the compilation of which trade unions, government commissions and bureaus, and private or university research workers have all cooperated.[12]

The quarter-century just ended has seen the publication also, however, of a great deal of literature of more theoretic interest. For present purposes, the range of this body of theory may be indicated by the enumeration of several more or less distinct points of view toward the problem of industrial relations, to which, for the most part, typical treatises and articles correspond.

Angles of Approach to the Labor Problem. During the nineteenth century, it may be said that there were on the whole about three angles of approach to the labor problem: It was studied and discussed (1) from the point of view of the State, as a problem in the maintenance of public order and prosperity, to be solved by appropriate legislation and by the proper judicial application of existing common and statutory law. It was seen also (2) from the viewpoint of the employers and the members of their class, as a problem in status and in personal relations, with implied obligations and rights on both sides, but particularly with a right on the part of the employer and a duty on the part of the employee, arising out of the nature of the relationship of master and servant, which relationship, it may be added, was also subjected to a theological interpretation and rationalization. Since the publication of *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776, the labor problem had also been discussed (3) as an *economic* problem, to be studied in terms primarily of the labor market, which from this point of view is further represented as connected with and reciprocally determined by the market for commodities of all kinds, and the capital market.

[12] See for outstanding examples the publications of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor, and the published proceedings of the American Federation of Labor and of the various national and international unions. Most of the Johns Hopkins University Studies in this field have been monographic arrangements of factual data with a minimum of interpretation.

Down to the end of the nineteenth century, the application of these points of view did not give rise to any very important separate treatises on labor problems. Since then, however, the three viewpoints indicated above have been continued and their implications restated from time to time by competent authorities, with reference to contemporary conditions. Commons and Andrews' *Principles of Labor Legislation* is a representative and influential presentation of the governmental, legalistic approach, which has been used also in other works.[13] The employers' viewpoint is represented by a great number of textbooks, treatises, and articles on "labor management," "employment management," "personnel administration," and "open shop." The economic point of view has been set forth at some length by Solomon Blum in *Labor Economics,*[14] as well as in sections and chapters in the various standard textbooks in "Principles of Economics"—Taussig's section being a good illustration.[15]

During the same recent period, furthermore, several other approaches to the study of labor problems have become well developed and differentiated from the older ones. There is (4) an employees' trade unionist or "collective bargaining" theory of labor, which is taken into account by Commons and Andrews, Blum, and other economists but which has also been separately presented by the Webbs in *Industrial Democracy,* by R. F. Hoxie in *Trade Unionism in the United States,*[16] and by John Mitchell, himself a prominent labor leader for many years, in *Organized Labor.*[17] Historical studies of trade unionism in America have been written by John R. Commons (editor), George Gorham Groat, Selig Perlman, and others.[18] Special unionist viewpoints have been presented by Marion Dutton Savage in *Industrial Unionism* (1922) and by David

[13] New York and London, 1916, 1920. Contains an excellent bibliography.
[14] New York, 1925.
[15] *Principles of Economics* (third edition, New York, 1921), Vol. II, Pt. VI.
[16] New York and London, 1917-20.
[17] Philadelphia, 1903.
[18] *History of Labor in the United States* (two vols., New York, 1921), by John R. Commons and others. *Organized Labor in America,* by George Gorham Groat, New York, 1920. *History of Trade Unionism in the United States,* by Selig Perlman, New York, 1922.

J. Saposs in *Left Wing Trade Unionism* (1926). The speeches of Samuel Gompers, for many years president of the American Federation of Labor, have been collected in several volumes as an expression by an official spokesman of the viewpoint of the Federation; while a number of volumes of concrete case materials illustrating typical trade union policies and arrangements have been published.[19] The viewpoint represented, in the main, by these studies is the point of departure for the study of trade unionism as workers' group organization, and of trade union assumptions, theories, and doctrines.

There has also been developed (5) as a special point of view what Commons calls "the machine theory of labor," [20] a special version of the employers' theory of labor, arising out of the application of engineering methods and "scientific management" as outlined by Frederick Winslow Taylor to the problems of labor management.[21] Of this point of view Commons says—

> This I call the machine theory of labor. Labor is not a commodity—its value determined by demand and supply—but each laborer is a machine—its value determined by the quantity of its product. The commodity is the merchant's theory of buying and selling. The machinery theory is the engineer's theory of economy and output.[22]

It seems necessary to mention as another approach to the study of industrial relations, (6) what we may call the *revolutionary* approach, represented by the syndicalists and the American I. W. W., by the American communists and the Russian Bolshevists, by the Marxian socialist organizations of various countries, and, in a modified form, by the official theory of labor of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. By the revolutionary approach to the study and consideration of labor problems we may understand that ap-

[19] *Trade Unionism and Labor Problems,* edited by John R. Commons. First Series, Boston, etc., 1905; Second Series, Boston, etc., 1921. *Industrial Government,* by John R. Commons and others, New York, 1921. *Studies in American Trade Unionism,* by Jacob Hollander and George E. Barnett, New York, 1907.

[20] *Industrial Goodwill* (New York, 1919), pp. 13-14.

[21] Gantt, H. L., *Organizing for Work,* New York, 1919. Hoxie, R. F., *Scientific Management and Labor,* New York, 1918. Taylor, Frederick Winslow, *Principles of Scientific Management,* New York, 1913.

[22] *Industrial Goodwill, loc. cit.*

proach which is based upon the acceptance of some vision of a future state of industrial and political organization when private ownership of industrial enterprises shall no longer exist, and industrial control shall be based upon some more or less democratic organization of the workers in the various industries. Interpretations of particular industrial situations and problems by those who share this point of view are in general determined by their conception of the bearing of the particular situation upon the prospects of achieving the revolution. The viewpoint is particularly well represented in a passage from a speech on the Paterson strike delivered by Elizabeth Gurley Flynn before the Liberal Club of New York:

> What is a labor victory? I maintain that it is a twofold thing. Workers must gain economic advantage, but they must also gain revolutionary spirit, in order to achieve a complete victory. For workers to gain a few cents more a day, a few minutes less a day, and go back to work with the same psychology, the same attitude toward society is to have achieved a temporary gain and not a lasting victory. For workers to go back with a class-conscious spirit, with an organized and a determined attitude towards society, means that even if they made no economic gain they have made the possibility of gaining in the future. In other words, a labor victory must be economic and it must be revolutionizing. Otherwise it is not complete.[23]

One conclusion reached almost inevitably from the examination of the literature of the trade unionists and revolutionaries is that, in spite of the attempts of employers and specialists in labor management to formulate a theory of industrial relations based on the proposition that employers and employees have their fundamental interests in common, these relations continue to contain in fact large elements of conflict, compromise, and more or less external, formal agreement on working arrangements. The perception of this fact may serve us as the introduction to a somewhat more extended consideration of (7) the *political* theory of industrial relations. This theory has been influenced in its formulation, no doubt, by many specialized studies and conceptions, but it seems to have been derived more particularly from the analysis of certain schemes

[23] From an unpublished stenographic report.

of so-called "industrial democracy," on the one hand, and from the extension of the meaning of "democracy" proposed by the Webbs and by Cole, Laski, and other proponents of the pluralistic theory of sovereignty.[24] It is with this theory that we shall be more particularly concerned in the remainder of this chapter.

The Rise of Trade Unionism. It is impossible to make any adequate statement of the emergent political theory of labor without some reference to the rise of trade unionism and the resulting actual status of employer-employee relations in many modern industries.[25] To develop this theme adequately would require far more space than is available here; we may, however, gain a foundation for the consideration of the tendency of industrial relations to become political, in theory and in fact, from a very brief statement concerning the objectives, the assumptions, and the organization of modern trade unions. Very generally, the *objectives* of modern "orthodox" trade unions may be named as (a) a continually improving standard of living for wage workers, to be gained both in respect of wages and hours, and as regards the conditions surrounding the work as actually performed, (b) participation through their own organizations in the determination of the labor contract, and (c) freedom from legal bonds which tend to prevent the exercise of combined force in collective bargaining.[26] The two latter objectives are intelligible only when considered in the light of certain fundamental *assumptions* commonly made by trade union leaders, summarized by Hoxie as follows:

1. The interests of the employers and workers of the group are generally opposed.
2. The wages and working conditions of the workers are deter-

[24] Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, *Industrial Democracy* (New York, 1926); see especially Pt. III, Chap. IV, "Trade Unionism and Democracy." Cole, G. D. H., *Social Theory*, New York, 1920. Laski, Harold J., *Foundations of Sovereignty*, and *Authority in the Modern State*.

[25] On the rise of trade unionism in the United States, see, in addition to the general historical works cited above a concise summary in Hoxie, *Trade Unionism in the United States*, 81 ff.

[26] The objectives of trade unionism have been stated many times. For one representative version, see "Labor: Its Grievances, Protests, and Demands," a pamphlet reporting the Labor Conference at Washington, D. C., December 13, 1919, published by the American Federation of Labor at Washington, 1920.

mined by their bargaining strength, exerted in negotiating with employers over the division of the product of industry.

3. The bargaining strength of the employer is always greater than that of the individual worker, and the full bargaining strength of the employer is always exerted against the individual worker because of the competitive situation in which the employer is placed as regards his relations with other employers who are producers of the same commodity. Therefore individual bargaining between the employer and the worker, which is competition between the individual workers in the group for work and wages, tends to result in lowering wages and conditions of employment and keeping them down to the minimum.[27]

John Mitchell makes the additional assumption clear, that the average wage-earner in industry today must expect always to remain a wage-earner; he has given up the hope that he may some day himself become a capitalist and employer.[28]

The validity of these assumptions, their correspondence with the realities of the modern industrial situation, is not of importance so far as the present discussion is concerned. What is important is that a large proportion, if not the majority, of the wage workers in modern industry have come to believe that these assumptions are sound, and to be determined by them in their attitudes toward employers and toward their union leaders, with some wavering in times of prolonged strike, unemployment or, paradoxically, prolonged prosperity. The obvious inference from these assumptions, if the previously stated objectives of organized labor are to be realized, is that workers should associate themselves into organizations—trade unions—for the purposes of bargaining to the best advantage with the employers or their associations concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of labor. It has been found in experience, also, that the carrying out of such a program of "collective bargaining" necessitates the compact, effective organization of the workers, and the delegation of authoritative leadership and power to deal with employers to a few union officials, paid by the unions and therefore not liable to lose their jobs when they present union demands to the employer. The conditions and

[27] Adapted and abridged from Hoxie, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-86. See also the preceding chapter of the same volume.

[28] *Organized Labor,* Preface, p. ix. See also pp. 2-4 for a statement of trade union assumptions similar to that summarized above from Hoxie.

problems of internal organization in the modern trade unions, however, constitute of themselves a complex subject, and one outside our scope here.[29] It is necessary here only to make the generalization that the effect of the trade union movement has been to draw large groups of wage workers together in well-organized groups, more or less effectively controlled by official leaders.

It should be added, however, that the phenomena of trade unionism here described are not peculiar to the United States. With the local variations that might be expected, they are found also in the various highly industrialized countries of Western Europe, and there are signs of the emergence of similar movements in the Orient.[30] In other words, the "labor movement," with its concomitants of organization, which tends to appear inevitably when the economic technological and commercial development of industry reaches a certain point of specialization, large-scale enterprise, and consequent separation of employer from individual employee. So long as industrial relationships remain close and intimate, the working group being relatively small, and the employer has more or less personal contact with his employees, and the small amount of intercommunication and personal mobility makes it possible for industry to be controlled by custom and personal authority—so long a personal-relations theory of labor, or a paternalistic conception of the employer-employee relationship may be expected to obtain, and, furthermore, to be substantially correct as an interpretation of the existing industrial situation. When, on the other hand, the working group becomes large, the area of competition wide, and the relations of employer with employee remote and impersonal, it is but natural that a different theory of industrial relationships should be required to account for the facts.

Government in Industry. Now there were in the beginning two possible directions which the wage-workers' movement might have taken. It might follow the road of organiza-

[29] See Hoxie, *op. cit.*, Chap. VII, "The Leaders and the Rank and File."

[30] European labor conditions are described in many publications. For a brief account of the Chinese labor movement, see "Beginnings of a Labor Movement," by H. C. Shen, *World Tomorrow*, Vol. VI (November, 1923), pp. 340-42.

tion of the labor supply, with a view to collective bargaining, or, on the other hand it might become a "political" movement in the conventional sense of the term, seeking to bring about the realization of its objectives through the exertion of political pressure upon the existing governmental bodies and the enactment of appropriate legislation. As a matter of actual history, workers' organizations have made use of the latter method, or have sought to do so, to no small extent, as well as the former. While the main trend of the labor movement seems to be in the direction of the establishment of "politics" and "government" *in* industry, it has been a political movement, and has involved political processes also in the sense that there has been a great deal of interaction between workers' organizations *and* politics and government. The theoretic study of industrial relations has, consequently, taken at the hands of a number of authors the form of investigation and interpretation of the relation of government to industry. This has been a viewpoint developed with particular thoroughness by Commons and some of his associates, not only as shown in the *Principles of Labor Legislation,* which he in collaboration with Professor John B. Andrews prepared and revised, but also in his fundamental theoretic study, *The Legal Foundations of Capitalism.*[31] In the last-mentioned work the author's central purpose is to show how the economic relations of "capital and labor," or employers and employees, have been conditioned by legal institutions. Recent volumes by Requa and Carroll are representative of a simpler, more external approach to the subject of labor and politics.[32] So long as law is enacted and administered by sovereign states—states which are sovereign in contemplation of law and by consensus of the majority of their citizens—the government and the law will evidently have a bearing on workers' interests and projects, and workers' organizations will show a corresponding interest in state and national politics. It naturally becomes a part of the task of the social theorist, then, to study the forces and the processes through which the two

[31] New York, 1924.

[32] *Labor and Politics*—The Attitude of the American Federation of Labor Toward Legislation and Politics, by Mollie Ray Carroll, Boston and New York, 1923. *The Relation of Government to Industry,* by Mark L. Requa, New York, 1925.

elements of modern society, "political" organization and industrial organization, affect each other.

Politics "Within" Industrial Organization. There is nothing about the participation of workers' organizations or employers' organizations in ordinary politics to require any striking modification of familiar theories of politics. It is no more than a special case of the struggle of "interests" which was clearly recognized as of the essence of politics by Ratzenhofer and Jhering, if not, indeed, by Machiavelli. From the study of the processes of conflict and adjustment, compromise and arbitration, adjudication and legislation which go on to an ever-increasing extent *within* the industrial organization, between employers and employees, and, for that matter, between trade unions,[33] we are able to derive, however, a new and broader theory of the political process than has until recently been known. We have anticipated this theory in previous chapters; let us recall simply the proposition that the essence of the political is the conflict and adjustment of group forces which remain relatively external to each other and which have primarily formal, impersonal relationships. What theoretic writers on industrial relations are pointing out is that this is exactly the sort of relationships which exist in modern industry.[34] "Collective bargaining" is not simply an aim of workers' organizations; it is to no small extent an accomplished fact. Not only that, in at least one of the major industries of the United States, the garment industry, development has gone forward to the point where there may be said to be, as one writer has expressed it, "Law and Order in Industry."[35] The idea has in fact been gaining recognition by those who have had to deal with labor problems in a practical way as rapidly as it has by theorists, and has been made the basis of a number of schemes actually tried, in America and in Eng-

[33] See Whitney, *Jurisdiction in American Building Trades Unions, Johns Hopkins University Studies,* Vol. XXXII.

[34] Webb, *Industrial Democracy,* pp. 140-41, 840-41. See also "The Passing of Politics," by William K. Wallace, *North American Review,* Vol. CCXIX (June, 1924), pp. 783-92.

[35] Cohen, Julius Henry, *Law and Order in Industry,* New York, 1916. See also Leiserson, William M., "Constitutional Government in American Industries," *American Economic Review Supplement,* March, 1922, pp. 56-70.

land, for the regulation of employer-employee relations.[36] Many of these schemes have proved abortive, but several are apparently operating successfully in the United States at the time of writing.

The Limitations of Industrial Government. When the attempt is made to reduce the organization of modern industry to a generalized description in terms of the progressive development of "constitutional government in industry," however, certain fundamental questions present themselves for consideration. Can the trade union become an organization genuinely cooperative in its relations with the employers, really cooperating in production? Or, is the trade-agreement, which is the typical bargain between a union and an employer or an employers' association, almost inevitably of the type of an armed truce, or a treaty between two sovereign states? If it is possible for the trade agreement to pass beyond the armed truce stage, what is the process by which this can happen? Is it a process of education, in a broad sense of the term, or is something else needed?[37] Going back, by implication at least, to some such general theory of competition as we have considered in earlier chapters, R. F. Hoxie, William M. Leiserson, and other contemporary students of labor problems have pointed out reasons for believing that, for some phases of modern industry at any rate the second of the above questions must be answered in the affirmative.[38] There are, as Hoxie shows, types of trade unions which seem to be in their very nature fighting organizations, and this militant attitude, furthermore, is susceptible of explanation, not as mere perversity, but as a natural and not illogical response of the workers' group to the situation. The politics of industry, in other words, is being interpreted as a type of phenomena analogous to international

[36] For a representative account of some of these plans, see Hoopingarner, Dwight Lowell, *Labor Relations in Industry* (Chicago and New York, 1925), Chaps. VI and VII. See also Benn, Ernest J. P., *Trade Parliaments and Their Work*, London, 1918.

[37] I am indebted to Professor H. A. Millis, of the University of Chicago, for the substance of these questions.

[38] Hoxie, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51, 335-37. Leiserson, "War and Peace in the Industrial World," *American Review*, Vol. I (January-February, 1923), pp. 17-30.

politics, rather than to the political process which goes on between the major political parties within a state.

In a revealing though partisan volume dealing with the topic of this chapter with reference particularly to the recent industrial history of the United States, W. E. Walling has said, "Organized labor will undoubtedly contribute largely to shaping the political government of the future, but it will contribute still more largely to shaping the industrial government." [39] It may conceivably prove in the end to be most helpful to study the broader aspects of the political process in the light of a hypothesis of political evolution. The sort of government which involves a reign of law and order would then be seen as a form of social control which is first established in certain phases of the common life of a people, and is then gradually extended to cover the other parts of the social struggle. Meanwhile, the relations of workers' organizations and the managements of large industrial concerns will perhaps frequently prove to be one which the social theorist can make intelligible only as the sort of armed truce which is preserved with certain interruptions because of a mere common interest in peace and continuity of operation of the industry, not by virtue of any very inclusive common vision of joint aims and purposes.

[39] *American Labor and American Democracy* (two volumes bound as one, New York, 1926), Vol. II, p. 82.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT

Political "Process" and Political "Evolution." As we have seen previously, "process" is a predominant concept in contemporary social science, and by social process theorists are coming to understand more and more the forms or types of social interaction which are, from one point of view, timeless. Spengler has criticized the trend of contemporary science and philosophy in that very respect; he feels that in reducing the movement of affairs in time to explanation or generalized description in terms of timeless forces and processes, the scientists have exercised a pernicious influence upon the course of social and historical philosophy. The revealing philosophy of history, he believes, must be expressed in terms of "destiny" rather than in terms of scientific causality.[1] A somewhat similar critique of the scientific type of modern social thought is expressed by Teggart in *Theory of History.* Nevertheless it is true that political theory, as well as other phases of modern social theory, bears the marks of a pervasive influence by the concept of evolution, so conspicuous a feature of the thought of the western world since Darwin. Even writers on political theory who advance no particular theory of political development will frequently be found to make use of some *assumption* regarding the trend or stages of political evolution as a methodological hypothesis underlying their discussion of particular problems in their field. We shall recur to this latter point in a subsequent paragraph. It is the general purpose of the present chapter, however, to review briefly some of the more conspicuous and apparently significant manifestations of evolutionary thought which are found in the literature of political theory.

General Theories of Political Evolution. A number of prominent writers on political theory have formulated general

[1] *The Decline of the West,* Chap. IV.

theories of an evolutionary type. Thus the general theory developed by Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, which we considered in previous chapters, is in essence an evolutionary theory, and contains a definite theory of the course or direction of political development. Very briefly stated, they regard the political process, on its developmental side, as a progressive aggregation of smaller racial and cultural elements—states, tribes, and classes—into larger ones, by means of a process of conquest, accommodation and assimilation, culminating in the formation of national states with stable bodies of law.[2] Herbert Spencer, guided throughout his discussion of the various phases of social science by a general theory of social evolution, naturally applies this formula to the interpretation of political change. Although he acknowledges and even emphasizes the rôle of a continuing process of intersocietal *selection* as a process whereby the evolution of states is effected,[3] it is with the *trend* or direction of political evolution that he is mainly concerned. That trend he describes, first of all, as a process of integration, in which individuals are united into groups, and groups are compounded, re-compounded, and so on until great nations are formed.[4] The progressive integration is paralleled, however, by differentiation, the political group being differentiated first of all into three parts—a predominant man, a superior few, and an inferior many. Subsequently the differentiation becomes more complex, and involves the horizontal division of the regulating organization into executive, legislative, and judicial bodies, as well as a further stratification of the whole.[5] Along with these changes goes "an advance from indefiniteness of political organization to definiteness of political organization," manifested in the increasing distinctness of class-divisions, the more rigorous allocation of powers, and the increasing definition of laws.[6] Spencer is particularly well-known for his special theory of evolution from a militant to an industrial type of society; this development, he says, is accompanied by the "retreat of the State from the greater part

[2] See Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory*, pp 439-40.
[3] *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 241.
[4] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 643; see also Pt. V, Chap. III.
[5] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 644-45; see also Pt. V, Chaps. IV-X.
[6] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 645-46.

of the regulative actions it once undertook," and "increasing adaptation of political agencies to the protecting function, and better discharge of it." [7] He adds that recent development in political society has been marked by decreasing reliance on "paper constitutions" and formal legislation as means of changing the character of a society, and increasing recognition that political institutions cannot be modified faster than the characters of citizens, also that the normal relations among institutions must not be disregarded.[8] We have noted in the foregoing chapter his prediction that the near future will witness an increase of collectivism—dominance of the individual by the many, but that, eventually, with the coming of world peace, a movement back to greater individual liberty may be expected. All of this, however, to reiterate, is in the nature of a description of a complex *trend* which Spencer believes it possible to discern in political changes. No theory of *stages* of evolution plays any prominent part in his discussion.

Walter Bagehot may be mentioned as another influential nineteenth-century writer on political evolution, but in this case, one which takes the form, in part, of a description of a simple series of stages in the development of governments. It will be recalled from an earlier chapter that Bagehot assumes that the first stage in the evolution of human society was one of absence of regulation of all kinds, and that escape from the limitations of this state of affairs is achieved through the formation of a "cake of custom," which makes it possible for men to act collectively in the struggle for existence. Through a process of conflict, then, the groups having on the whole the most advantageous customs have their customs established, and other groups are subordinated to them. The third stage, if we may so term it, is, in his theory, the stage of "nation-making," the formation of nations in the modern sense being due to the consolidation of small culture-groups into larger ones by conquest and the establishment of hierarchical authority. The final stage, down to the present time, Bagehot calls "the age of discussion," marked by the change from a fixed social order

[7] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 659-60.
[8] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 661-62.

to a plastic one through the institution of "government by discussion." [9]

Space precludes our considering the Marxian theory of political evolution except most hastily. We may recall that Karl Marx propounded in the *Communist Manifesto,* and elaborated in *Capital,* a general theory of social development which involves a theory of political development although he thought of it as *economic,* and which we may without too great straining of the point classify with Bagehot's theory as one characterized in particular by its picture of a series of stages in the development of socio-political organization, to culminate in the collectivistic state. (For the purposes of the present discussion the most interesting feature of Marxian theory is the use of the Hegelian dialectic as a method of accounting for the successive replacements of slavery by feudalism, feudalism by capitalism, and so on.)

Among contemporary writers it is Hobhouse who is better known to English-speaking people than any other for his treatment of social and political evolution. Hobhouse's theory of political evolution, however, is no more than a part of his general theory of social evolution, and a part not at all clearly marked off from the whole for purposes of discussion. Furthermore, such ethical postulates as "the good" and "social harmony" are used in formulating the theory of evolution. It is impossible for us within our space limits to review this whole line of thought adequately; we can only note that the theory of social evolution developed by Hobhouse stresses the idea of a process of development which is something else than biological evolution as ordinarily understood, being, in his terminology, a development of the "social mind." [10] By social mind, however, Hobhouse does not mean a mystical entity such as is suggested by Hegel's philosophy of the state,[11] but simply a convenient name for the obvious fact of the conditioning of individual thought and behavior by social tradition, and the

[9] *Physics and Politics* (New York, 1879), Chaps. IV and V.

[10] *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (New York, 1911, 1913), Chaps. I-IV.

[11] In fact Hobhouse has subjected the Hegelian theory of the state to a searching criticism in *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (London, New York, 1918).

consciousness, however imperfect, of social unity in the minds of the individual members of that society.[12] The task of the student of social evolution, he states in one passage, is, first of all, to "endeavor to grasp the broad trend of social evolution, . . . a synthesis of its successive phases," and, secondly, to seek to discover "the permanent conditions upon which such movement depends." [13] This implies the formulation of a "social morphology," that is, "a systematic arrangement of the types that we find in accordance with their affinities," for the purpose of throwing light upon the genesis of successive types.[14] Applying this principle to the problem of political evolution, Hobhouse concludes that there are three "principles of union" which serve as bonds of human society, each of which may at successive stages be regarded as the leading force which gives its character to the social union; they are the principles of kinship, authority, and citizenship.[15] Without expressly saying so, he implies in his discussion of "The Growth of the State" that the state is to be considered simply as an evolved form of social union; in other words he makes no sharp distinction between political organization and other phases of social organization. His general synthesis of the evolution of the state, then, runs in terms of (1) the principle of kinship engendering (a) the small local group, (b) the clan, and (c) the tribe; (2) the principle of authority in the form of the kingship giving rise to far larger aggregations of human beings, with a more regular order; and (3) the principle of citizenship, making possible a form of union as vital as the clan, as wide as the empire, and one having "a measure of freedom and elasticity which are peculiarly its own." [16]

The general objective Hobhouse has in view in his inquiry into social and political evolution is evidently, as he says in one place, "to plot the orbit" of social evolution, to make out its general direction, and thus, if possible, to determine whether progress is a reality, and whether it is a certainty, in other words, to determine what the movement of social change in

[12] *Op. cit.*, Chap. IV.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 107-08.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 111-12.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 128.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 147-48.

general is, for the purposes of estimate of any particular social problem in relation to this general trend of things. Just exactly in what way this general insight into the direction and certainty or uncertainty of political change is to be of service, he does not make explicitly clear. The general assumption is evidently that if we know the main trend of social change we are in a better position to decide what the bearing of any proposed measure is upon that general harmonization of interests and purposes which is Hobhouse's concept of the social good. It is interesting to observe that this conception is almost directly opposed to the theory of the rôle of the political state in progress which is stated by Weatherly. "The political state," he says, "functions best in those lines where economic or class interests are at issue; it is not a competent agency for coordinating and fusing ideals into a vital whole." [17] Weatherly, in other words, assumes some such general theory of politics as that which has been indicated in previous chapters—that it is a process of interaction and accommodation among conflicting groups and their interests, but one which leaves them still external to one another. The contrast between the two points of view, difficult to make more explicit in few words, is on the whole a very good illustration of the difference between the philosophical and the scientific approaches to the study of social change. Hobhouse is concerned fundamentally with the inner meaning and the ideal ends of change; he does not greatly concern himself with the problem of formulating logical classifications and objective descriptions of concrete cases. The interest of the social *scientist,* strictly so-called, in the evolution of politics and government, is essentially a methodological interest; he desires to know what trend of change must be assumed, if any, as a base line from which to measure the particular happenings which he seeks to bring within the purview of scientific, timeless laws,[18] but beyond this he is interested in types and kinds, in the *differences* between the "political" and the "moral," for example. With

[17] *Social Progress* (Philadelphia, 1926), p. 246.

[18] See, however, for an indication of Hobhouse's appreciation of the scientific point of view, *op. cit.,* 102 ff.

this methodological aspect of the problem of political evolution we shall be further concerned in a later paragraph.

Types of Theories of Political Evolution. Meanwhile we can clarify our present inquiry somewhat by subjecting some of the well-known theories of political evolution to a working classification, without reference to differences of detail among them. We may distinguish five types, as follows: (1) theories which represent the evolution of government and the state as a general trend, illustrated by the writings of Ratzenhofer and Gumplowicz, Spencer, and Durkheim;[19] (2) theories which represent political development as a series of stages, such as those of Comte, Oppenheimer,[20] and N. S. B. Gras;[21] (3) the representation of political development as a cyclical movement (Plato and Aristotle, Spengler); (4) the theory of political development as "progress" or movement toward an ideal or utopian state; and (5) conceptions of politics as a natural process, implying evolution or change, but interesting primarily as regards its constant aspects. Evidently the theories of many writers can be classified under more than one of these headings; it is the distinction between the underlying concepts rather than between the details of the theories in which we are interested for present purposes.

What, now, is the methodological significance of the evolutionary idea that appears in so many political theories, not only those just mentioned, but others which we have surveyed in preceding chapters? We have set it down as the general aim of science "to make the experience in one case tell us what can and should be done in another." Normally, the research procedure to be employed for the realization of this aim would be a comparative one; we study the concrete cases comparatively and analytically with the hope of seeing in them universal forces in varying but measurable combination. If, however, the phenomena to be described and analyzed are caught up in long-run changes, the operation of the universal, timeless

[19] Barnes, Harry Elmer, *Sociology and Political Theory* (New York, 1924), p. 55.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 56, citing Oppenheimer, *The State, passim.*
[21] *Introduction to Economic History*, p. 317.

forces is obscured. It is necessary then to allow for the general long-run trend in order to get the desired measurement or abstract description of the cases to be studied comparatively. Statisticians have a method of doing just this, the method of "historical correlations," in which the relationship of two variables is measured with allowance for a main trend of change. But nothing is more obvious than that the phenomena of politics and government are involved in certain long-run changes. The processes which may be regarded, when described abstractly, as timeless and universal and the evolutionary modification of political institutions are no doubt reciprocally determined. This is why even a writer like G. E. G. Catlin, who has emphasized in great detail the possibility of making politics a natural science, concedes the value of historical studies to the political scientist, not only as a source of *data* to be studied comparatively, but as a background for comparative and abstract studies.[22]

When we reexamine the theories of politics and government propounded by those modern writers who have been least "historical" or "evolutionary" in their methods, we see that they have indeed felt themselves constrained to take into account certain conceptions of trends and stages of development as a foundation for their more abstract hypotheses and concepts. Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer place considerable emphasis upon the progressive compounding of political groups; and Spencer, always the philosopher of evolution above all else, has ably developed a similar view. Jhering and Pound take into account a trend of change in the character of the law, even while emphasizing that the juridical process is always an equilibration of competing interests. The theory of public opinion can be made universal only in the light of an interpretation of the development of communication. The geographic interpretation of political organization and political process is similarly dependent upon an appreciation of the extension of communication, making possible the collective functioning of larger and larger political areas. The extension of a theory of the political process to cover industrial and other

[22] *The Science and Method of Politics* (New York, 1927), Chap. III, "The Uses of History."

phases of social organization is made possible only by means of an interpretation of the enlarging size of industrial and other groups, and other changes incidental to the industrial and commercial evolution of human society.

The study of politics is well on the way to becoming an abstract science—the science which deals with the interaction of more or less distinct social groups with rival interests and purposes. Like other special social studies, however, it must continue to have the study of social development as its corollary and supplement.

PART IV. THE TREND OF SOCIAL THEORY

CHAPTER XXXVII

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

The Evolution of Social Theory. In certain previous chapters we have reviewed certain types of theories of social change. Here at the conclusion of our survey, however, it will be profitable to subject this phase of social theory to a further examination, in the light of certain considerations which have, in part, been brought out in the course of our study. There are two features of the history and trend of social theory which may be related by more than a mere punning verbal tie, namely, the theory of social evolution and the evolution of social theories. If the two are causally interrelated, the matrix in which they are both embedded must be the fact of social change. Nothing is more certain than that the march of historical time is accompanied by continuous change in human social life, a change, moreover, which is apparently always in one direction. History never repeats itself concretely and in detail, even if it be held to obey some general, cyclical, law. This fact of continuous social change is, as we noted in the last chapter, a fact with which social science must reckon in its search for tenable generalizations.

In Chapter II we saw how the early conceptions of human geography had to be modified, first, to take account of the increasing fund of geographic information, and secondly, to give a place for the increasing power of societies to modify their environment. The earliest form of geographic knowledge was, in fact, essentially what we today call "news"; it consisted of the impressive, curious or shocking features which were remembered and retold from the accounts of travelers, plus a certain amount of systematized knowledge of trade routes and the like. The latter might be compared to the specialized news to be found on the inside pages of a modern newspaper—sporting news and market reports; it represents a

more advanced stage in the development of knowledge. It was only with the progressive completion of the fund of information about the earth that was available to western peoples that some more systematic account, and eventually a more or less analytical treatment, of geographic data became possible. In Chapter III we found theories of population taking shape and undergoing revision in response to changing conditions of subsistence and the increasing emancipation of reflective thought concerning birth-rates from the influence of dogmatic, authoritarian theology. In fact, the study of the development of "population theory" throws light upon the development of the methods and viewpoint of natural science in the social studies generally. As long as the western world continued more or less static and stable, being divided into relatively isolated culture areas, "social problems," in so far as they could be said to exist at all, could be met by the reiteration of the rules and interpretations contained in group custom and tradition. The ordering and forbidding technique, as Thomas and Znaniecki have termed it, worked fairly well. But when the increase of commerce and communication brought divergent cultural practices and traditional rules of conduct into juxtaposition, some more objective method of dealing with problems became necessary. This was really where modern social science started. The question of population, so far as it was considered at all, was once met by the iteration of the scriptural injunction, "Be fruitful and multiply," and by guarded allusions to the sin of Onan. When, however, the Industrial Revolution gave a new hope of improved standards of living to millions of people, and the commercial revolution broke down cultural isolation, the population problem and similar questions began to assume a new appearance.

Similarly, ideas of race and nationality became systematized under the influence of the classificatory development in biological science, but this phase of social theory has also been influenced in its evolution by the increasing frequency and extent of contacts between members of different races and nationalities, and by the apparent extension and intensification of interracial and international competition. The theoretic concept "assimilation" obviously could not develop until the fact of

assimilation could be observed on a large scale. The development of public education, with its consequences in the shape of movement of individuals out of their "station in life," doubtless facilitated recognition of the difference between racial and cultural traits. Theoretic conceptions of community organization have had to be revised to take into account the development of modern metropolitan communities. Modern economic theory was scarcely possible until the extension of transportation and the improvement of methods of production made the elaborate subdivision of labor and the large-scale type of production possible, and extended the area of competition. Similar observations might be made with reference to many other special fields of social theory surveyed in previous chapters. It is, in fact, in a changing *milieu* that the phenomena which social scientists seek to describe in general terms take place. There arises, therefore, a need of taking account of this phase of the problems in hand.

History and Social Theory. To meet the need thus created, social theorists have ventured upon a great many general formulas intended to describe or to plot the course of social evolution. But social theories, like everything else in this world, are apparently undergoing a continuous, irreversible change. Certain questions then arise, for instance, How closely is the development of social theory connected with the fact of social change? And is the quest for an abstract social science necessarily doomed in advance to failure? Must the generalizations and abstractions of social science be permanently limited by a principle of relativity, since they must always be related to a changing reality? As a matter of fact, there has been a noticeable disposition on the part of the cultural anthropologists to answer these questions, and in particular the last, in the affirmative. No doubt the same attitude may be said to be generally characteristic of the professional historians; and something of the sort seems to be implied by the phrase "Historical School" as applied to a certain group of American anthropologists and to certain economists. Despairing of being able to establish any general truths or concepts which have any empirical value and which will not be invalidated by the continuing historical development of human society, these scholars

have proposed to confine social science to the task of outlining purely historical trends or cycles by reference to which the concrete particulars of given social happenings and situations may be made intelligible.[1] It may be added that "making social facts intelligible," from the historians' point of view, means showing "how they have come to be as they are," rather than accounting for them in terms of universal, timeless forces and processes.[2] The latter, however, represents exactly the ambition of those who hope to see a natural science, or an abstract science, of society develop. We thus have an issue quite sharply defined, the issue as to the possibility or impossibility of achieving more and more accurate *timeless,* un-historical generalizations concerning social processes and social forces.

Trends of Change in the Social Sciences. One way to meet the issue, if it can be met, is through the examination of the actual development, and the trend or trends of change, which the social sciences exhibit. Obviously it would be possible to make out an indefinitely long list of developmental tendencies visible in the history—particularly the *recent* history—of the social studies. Space limitations, however, permit us only a few summary observations. In the first place, we may observe certain tendencies of change which are affecting primarily the *content* or *subject-matter* of the social studies. Some of these changes are obviously a reflection of the increase which continually takes place in the general fund of common human information. Thus for example we have noted a great increase in the bulk of concrete material handled by those interested in "human geography" and related problems, and there has been a similar accumulation of concrete studies by economists, economic historians, political scientists, and sociologists. Manifestly such an accumulation of published, more or less fully analyzed, information and case material may be in many cases treated from the viewpoints and by the methods previously developed. On the other hand, additions to the subject matter of the social studies reflect changes in the interests of social scientists, changes, that is, in the definition of prob-

[1] Spengler, Oswald, *The Decline of the West.* Teggart, Frederick J., *Theory of History* (New Haven, 1925).
[2] Teggart, *op. cit.,* pp. 64-66, 74-75, 162-63, 171, 188.

lems, or in "methodology." These changes are in part the result of processes of development internal to the various social sciences, and in part the result of the progress of other, related sciences. August Comte, it will be recalled, pointed out that the problems of one science are the data of another, by which paradoxical statement he meant, one may infer, that the *findings* of one science, held by the devotees of that science merely as tentative results, as hypotheses to guide further research, are by the specialists of other fields accepted provisionally as information. The increasing attention paid to the study of "economic institutions" and to statistics and concrete case-records of business enterprise, by contemporary economists, probably results from a process of development which has gone on *within* the field of economic science, due to "reflection" and experimentation by the economists themselves. On the other hand, the increasing proportion of space and time devoted to studies of personality based upon concrete case histories, and in particular upon the individuals' "own stories" taken as data susceptible of objective analysis, probably results mainly from the reaction of progress in psychology and psychiatry upon sociological methods and objectives. Certain recent tendencies in political science are possibly due in part to the same influence; this seems to be the case, for instance, with Lasswell's study of propaganda techniques used in the World War.

Timeless Elements of Social Phenomena. Confining our inquiry now for the moment to other changes noticeable in the special field of sociology, we may note the progress of at least one other general type of changes which has, in some respects, a different significance from that of any that have been mentioned. Changes of this last sort are illustrated by (a) von Wiese's treatment of types of human relationships and Ross' discussion of social processes, (b) the University of Chicago studies in the "natural history" of the urban community, and (c) Durkheim's study of elementary religious phenomena. These several instances may appear to have little in common, but they are alike in this: they all tend to establish generalizations which, in the measure of their validity, appear to be independent of historical setting and change. It is developments of this last-mentioned sort that appear to indicate a movement of

social science toward concepts and theories which are not in every respect subject to continuous revision because of their historical relativity. Doubtless social scientists, if in their efforts they hew to the line of objectivity and empirical applicability, will in the future as in the past be compelled frequently to content themselves with generalizations of which they must say, "These are true for the conditions in which they were observed; whether they will hold in entirely different cultural situations remains to be seen." [3] Still, we can observe in various phases of sociological thought a movement in the direction of a content which is more or less independent of historical setting. It is probable that similar tendencies could be shown to exist in economics and political science.

The Processes of Social Change. The form which such non-historical features of social science tend to assume, however, is that of generalizations regarding the *processes* or mechanisms by which social change is effected. We have touched upon this point previously; it will be worth while, however, to consider it further in the present connection. Professor Teggart, who is himself very skeptical as to the possibilities of reaching generalizations in social science which will hold without reference to historical conditions and changes, has nevertheless made a very adequate statement of the scientific ideal of describing processes. Continuing a discussion in which he calls attention to the fact that social science is concerned with customs, he points out that this is in fact the avenue by which social science approaches the status held up by the natural or physical sciences as ideal, since the physicist's "natural law" is similar to a statement of custom; it is a description of the way things regularly act.

> Considered more strictly, a scientific "law" is a formula, expressed in words or in symbols, describing the behavior of a selected group of phenomena; and scientific investigation is the effort to find out "how things act." The basic interest of science is in the relations of things. The implication in all scientific inquiry is that things "work" or "act" with sufficient regularity to permit of this "working" being described. For convenience in discourse we may speak of these regular or cus-

[3] See *Suicide*, by Ruth Shonle Cavan (Chicago, 1928), for illustrations of this attitude on the part of a scientific investigator.

tomary modes of working as *processes.* Obviously it would tend to clarify thought if we were to employ the word "process," a term for the actual operation described, in place of the word "law," a term for the verbal description. . . .[4]

In support of his own critical attitude, Teggart makes a distinction between two kinds of descriptions of observed processes.

If . . . we compare the work of the different sciences, it will be found that all processes are not of one general type. Newton's law of gravitation and Darwin's theory of natural selection are alike in being descriptions of "how things work," but they do not refer to the same order of phenomena. The difference, indeed, is marked, for in experimenting with the action of falling bodies we consider data apart from any historical setting or circumstance . . . whereas, in the study of evolution, the theory of natural selection is one attempt to show how something new could have emerged in the course of time.[5]

This distinction is undoubtedly a significant one, taken with reference to its bearings upon certain problems of method. One may inquire, however, whether it is in point as a criticism of the universal validity of Darwin's theory of natural selection. Granted that Darwin conceived the theory as a solution of the problem of the emergence of "something new," the importance of that aspect of the Darwinian contribution to biological science should not be allowed to obscure the other point, that *whenever* a certain set of conditions, which he described, might occur, a certain *type* of result might be expected, namely, the survival of the fittest. Seen from that angle, the theory of natural selection may be so stated that it holds good quite independently of circumstances of time and place. In so far as the Darwinian hypothesis of natural selection is a generalized description of a type of *process,* in just the sense in which Teggart has defined the term, its non-historical quality is apparent, and the fact that it will also explain how something new emerges from the interaction of existing factors is beside the point. For that matter, the "law of gravitation" may be

[4] *Op. cit.,* p. 158.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 163.

used also to explain how something new emerges—a new topographical system, for example.[5a]

When we inquire more precisely into the rôle of the process concept in *social* science, we may observe that social theory has use for two fairly distinct types of theories of process, to explain some of the facts of social change. On the one hand, there are those theories of which the theory of natural selection is the prototype, that is, theories of societal selection, competition, conflict, accommodation, assimilation, diffusion, and the like. The general formula for theories or concepts of this type is that they explain social changes with reference to certain forms and types of social *interaction;* through the interaction of two or more given social factors—groups, individuals, attitudes, sentiments—a new social situation is created. The other type of theories of social process which are also useful for the explanation of social change is that type the foundation for which is to be found in Durkheim's discussion of "collective representations." These are, in other words, the theories which explain or describe the *process of valuation*—the process in which the members of social groups come to have certain ideas, visions, aims, purposes, or the like *in common,* and form common or collective attitudes with reference to them. The literature dealing with this type of "process" theory of social change is at present much less abundant than the literature dealing with the various processes of interaction; we have reviewed some of it in our survey of sociological theories of religion.[6] It appears, however, that there is outlined here an important province for future sociological research and reflection. The theoretic problem of social valuation, in the sense in which the term is used here, is to be seen, also, as the logical and objective elaboration of the topic "social telesis," concerning which Lester F. Ward and Giddings have had so much to say, but with

[5a] Although this notion of "social process" is not a conspicuous feature of Professor Giddings' later works, it was very clearly set forth by him in his early monograph, *Theory of Sociology* (*Supplement* to the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. V, No. 1, July, 1894), p. 41.

[6] Undoubtedly there is social interaction in the process of collective valuation. For practical purposes of discussion, however, it has seemed desirable to use the term "interaction" to characterize the first-mentioned type of process.

which they dealt, for the most part, in a purely speculative or cursory fashion.[7] Purposive or telic behavior is obviously one of the most important characteristics of the human species, both as regards the individual, and as regards the social, aspects of life. The mechanism by which purposive social action is carried out has, however, been subjected to comparatively little study. The study of social telesis, therefore, is probably just at the beginning of a new period of development, which may result in a much more objective and discriminating knowledge of the process of purposive social behavior than exists at present.

"Background Studies." In a general discussion of the trend of development of the social sciences in its relation to the trend of social change, one tendency of recent social research deserves especial mention, namely, the development of what have been termed "background studies." The term has been developed by the department of sociology of the University of North Carolina, with particular reference to the study of the particular cultural traits characteristic of Southern Negro, white mountaineer, and mill village groups. It is thus related primarily to a comparative and anthropological, rather than a historical, research precedent. What the use of the *term* in reference to the scheme of intensive and objective studies of types of culture seems to suggest, however, is an extension and refinement of the concept implied in familiar but relatively uncritical allusions to "historic backgrounds." Professor Odum of the University of North Carolina has the idea that it is necessary to have a systematic knowledge of the cultural *background* on which the social drama is played in any given society, before the more general concepts and hypotheses of social theory can be adequately applied or tested in their application to that society.[8] This idea is a suggestive one, to say the least, and if valid, it ought apparently to have the same applicability in the task of theoretic research with materials separated in historic time, that it has in the study of coexistent but culturally

[7] Ward's conception of social telesis runs through all of his general works. Giddings' recent conception of the problem is presented in a section of his *Scientific Study of Human Society* (Chapel Hill, 1924), pp. 140-170.

[8] Outlined in a letter to the writer.

heterogeneous social situations. The essential problem in either case is that of detecting and if possible measuring uniformities in the presence of differences. It is possible that professional historians and sociologists, economists, and political scientists may be able to cooperate in the future more effectively than they have done in the past, by the light of this distinction between the study of background and the study of universal forces and processes.

In the following chapter, which is the final one of this volume, we shall be concerned with the trend and meaning of the frequently mentioned, but little understood, problem of "methodology." As we shall see, this term has been used, to the great mystification of many readers, to refer to the technical vocabulary of a social science. The justification for the practice of calling the vocabulary of a special science its "methodology" may be deferred to the next chapter. While we are dealing with the general subject of trends in social theory, however, some mention should be made of the trend of development in the terminology of the social sciences. So long as it does not prove possible to reduce the generalizations and abstractions of social theory to a mathematical form of expression, we are evidently dependent upon the technical vocabulary of the various special sciences in dealing with particular problems. There is reason to believe that more than one capable social theorist has cherished the hope of establishing fundamental technical terms which might be valid and usable for all time to come. Since the researches of the social scientist must be carried on in a changing world, however, it is necessary to maintain contacts between the technical concepts of the specialist and the vernacular of everyday life, in which the materials to be studied are largely embodied. This is perhaps why the problem of "methodology" is, as Sumner said, "eternal."

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES[1]

The Evolution of Formal Logic. The history of efforts to formulate a body of principles to guide men in the systematization of knowledge—perhaps also to guide them in the discovery of new knowledge—goes back to a relatively early date. We may consider that so far as the western world is concerned, it begins with the Sophists, who have been spoken of as the first college professors, since they accepted remuneration for giving instruction in various subjects which were supposed to be useful to young men planning to enter public life. The Sophists, however, held that all knowledge is relative to the knower; "Man is the measure of all things" is an aphorism credited to Protagoras. Socrates and Plato objected to this view, and set about it to discover by "dialectic" some concepts or principles which were not dependent upon the viewpoint of the individual, but which had independent existence and could be depended on as permanent and fixed, in spite of the flux and change which seemed to characterize the ordinary experiences of life. An outcome of the Platonic quest for "ideas" was the logic or *Organon* of Aristotle, in which he presented in orderly form not only the rules of deductive reasoning from supposedly eternal first principles, but also a body of directions for the derivation of general principles from experience data. That Aristotle remained always a Platonist at heart and that he denied the possibility of obtaining the most trustworthy sort of knowledge by this latter method are facts which should not be allowed to obscure the other historical fact that his work has served, to some extent, as the model for all later works on

[1] A considerable part of the content of this chapter was first printed in the *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* Vol. XXI (1927), pp. 165-73, under the title "General Methodology." Used by permission. See also the writer's bibliographic article, "The Logic of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXXII (September, 1926), pp. 271-87.

"inductive reasoning" and "scientific method." Kept alive by occasional contributions and discussions in the Middle Ages, this tradition was revived and given fresh emphasis by Francis Bacon in his *Novum Organum* and *Advancement of Learning.* The theory of inductive reasoning was restated and elaborated with great acumen in John Stuart Mill's *Logic* and in the writings of a number of nineteenth-century German logicians. Meanwhile, however, a new note was introduced into the discussion of the methods of science by the invention of the concept "methodology." Modern scientific and philosophical works by German authors are frequently introduced by a discussion of the *"Methodologie"* or *Methodik* which has been used.

The "Methodology" of Science. This term "methodology" seems to have been devised by the writers on logic of the nineteenth century to meet the need for a category under which they might deal with the general procedure by means of which new scientific truth is discovered and arranged. For the newer philosophy which has evolved by grappling with some of the problems created by the development of the natural sciences, logic has come to be seen, more and more, as an *instrumental* science,—instrumental, that is, not in the defense of cherished beliefs, but in the systematization of knowledge derived from experience and held subject to verification by further observation and experiment. This type of revision of logical theory, as it has developed down to the present time, may be considered to reach a culmination in John Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic.*

Now the newer type of theory of scientific method, or "methodological" theory, or logic of science, as it is variously termed, has been in its most familiar forms the outcome primarily of efforts to devise a general theory of method which would correspond to the practice of research going on in the physical and biological sciences. Those studies have, however, reached a much more advanced stage of development than have the social studies, and in them it is quite feasible to lay down formal rules and directions which are of considerable use as guides in some of the more stereotyped investigations which workers in these sciences must carry on to fill out gaps in the

several systems of knowledge. While a body of philosophers have been occupying themselves with the task of adapting formal logic to the demands created by the advance of the physical and biological sciences, however, other students have paid some attention to the underlying problems of method which have arisen in connection with the newer studies called the social sciences. To meet these needs, it is being found necessary to give a somewhat different emphasis in the formulation of general principles of method.

The Development of the Social Sciences. At about the beginning of the twentieth century, social thought received fresh impetus from new sources, and the general effect of this impetus has been, among other things, to direct the efforts and methods of the students of political and social problems into channels more like those taken by research in the older, physical and biological sciences, though with specific differences. The social changes which we designate collectively as the Industrial Revolution had created during the nineteenth century a series of practical problems—problems connected with the rise of new forms of poverty, social unrest, and new types of crime and vice. Social and political reform movements arose in response to the feeling of humanitarian responsibility for these evils, and a new profession began to develop among those who were most actively and directly engaged in dealing with them—the profession of the "social worker." The earlier forms of social reform and social work were characterized by naïve faith in the virtue and power of "charity" to relieve the unfortunate, and of punitive justice to restrain the anti-social. It was soon discovered, however, and it has become increasingly apparent with greater experience, that these naïve measures were based upon entirely too simple a conception of the causes of the evils in question. From about the time when Charles Booth's studies of the people of East London appeared, and perhaps influenced by them, social workers and philanthropists have felt the necessity of studying the conditions with which they were trying to cope before attempting to prescribe the constructive and remedial measures to be used. Gradually social agencies have adopted the practice of studying their problems more objectively and of modifying their techniques

and policies in the light of their own and others' past experience as recorded in agency files. Social surveys are beginning to be made, if not for strictly scientific research purposes, at least with the sincere purpose of discovering existing ineptitudes and wasteful duplications in the practice and organization of social case work. In the measure in which changes of this sort have taken place, social reform and social work have come to be supplemented and guided by social research. It is now being said that investigation of the problems at hand and of the existing machinery for dealing with them should be supplemented by fundamental knowledge of social science, based on disinterested research, carried on without direct reference to immediate practical exigencies. If social science is to have the same validity as physical and biological science, it must be based on the findings of objective research.

"News" and "Facts." It is possible to distinguish several steps or phases of the process whereby a general or abstract science is built up from concrete and practical experience. The starting-point is "news," in the sense in which the term is used to describe what is printed on the first page of a modern newspaper. Things happen which attract attention and must be taken into account, and naïve reports of what happened, as seen or heard by certain individuals, are circulated. If, now, something that has happened is felt to be important to many people in a society, it is certain to be further investigated; efforts will be made to ascertain what "the facts" really are or were. To establish the facts of an event so that different people can agree on them—which is what we really mean by establishing facts—is quite impossible except by reference to some universe of discourse. The difficulties encountered in any attempt to establish "what really happened" in any given case are brought out fairly well by a consideration of the legal practice of assuming that, "for the purposes of the present discussion" the facts of this case are so and so. The courts of review and appeal in the civilized countries today will deal with any case only on the basis of the facts of that case as certified by some lower court. The point is still more specifically illustrated by the difficulties experienced by some of our criminal courts in their efforts to secure testimony from psychiatrists

as to the "insanity" or "moral responsibility" of a certain person, and to secure it in the form of an unqualified yes or no answer. The psychiatrist insists that there is no such thing as "insanity" in an absolute, unqualified sense.

What is needed, therefore, in dealing with important events and types of events, is to establish the "facts," in the sense of establishing certain propositions about the event which can be depended upon for the purposes which those interested may be assumed to have in common. Anything is defined for our purposes when it is placed in relation to the other aspects of the purpose or action which it is supposed to affect. The psychiatrist says to the court, I can tell you with a substantial degree of assurance whether this man is crazy or not if you mean by that what the chances are that he will injure some one in the future by his irrational behavior, but I cannot tell you whether he is insane or not in the sense of being "morally accountable," for that is not a conception to which I can relate what I know about him with any confidence. There are, however, two quite distinct methods of relating an event to a context and thus making it intelligible in terms that can be communicated and shared by those who are interested together in it. The historian's method is to place it in a historical continuum, a time series, to relate it to what went before and what came after. This method of interpreting events is undoubtedly useful to human beings in several ways, which space prevents our considering here; it is, however, at just about this stage of an inquiry that the historian and the natural scientist part company. The natural scientist is not interested in what went before and what came after, except in so far as he can see in the series of events something which he can deal with as a *typical* sequence, and he cannot, in general, determine the typical character of a sequence until the events in it have first been subjected to analysis.[2]

Natural Science and History. At any rate, the natural scientist is interested in the typical. Like the historian, he wishes to develop an account of the facts which all, or those

[2] For a recent critical discussion of the differences of method and objective between natural science and history, see Rice, Stuart A., *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928), Chap. IV. Professor Rice supports a view somewhat at variance with the one here set forth.

who share his interest and purposes at least, can agree upon. But his first step, as a rule, in reaching the account he wishes to give, is *comparison.* He asks, What was it like? And since, as the historian or the newspaper may be prompt to assure him, it was not exactly like anything else, he will seek to break up the event, or to analyze it, into elements or factors which he can name or describe in somewhat general terms. The factors can then perhaps be recognized to be of the same kind as those that have been discovered in other events, and from his knowledge of the way such factors act and interact with one another, the natural scientist hopes to be able to predict the further developments which may be expected in the given case, or, perhaps, to indicate how the recurrence of a similar case may be prevented or modified. The second step in the series which leads from "pure experience" to natural science is, then, the description of the experience as a type. As a matter of fact, this usually takes place, in the earlier stages of the development of a certain form of scientific inquiry, on the basis of more or less informal and half-conscious comparison of the given case with what general information the inquirer may have regarding similar cases. He formulates an account of each case or type of case in which he is interested with reference to the purpose at hand, in terms which neglect what he believes to be unique or aberrant in those cases, and which describe only what he looks upon as the *characteristic* or typical features.

Natural History. The collection and publication of generalized descriptions and narratives of this sort is in fact a recognizable stage in the development of the sciences; it may be termed the natural history stage. This is indeed the stage in which the social sciences now are for the most part, in so far as their content does not consist of *a priori* speculations having only the vaguest reference to empirical data. In the special field of sociology, the natural history method is illustrated fairly well by Healy and Bronner's *Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies,* and by Park and Miller's *Old World Traits Transplanted.* Professor Gras' *Introduction to Economic History* is an excellent illustration of the application of the method in the special field of economics. The studies of cul-

tural anthropologists seem to lie mainly in the category of "news" which has been subjected to preliminary, common-sense verification, and, in a measure, to historical interpretation; Malinowski's *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* is, however, a study of the natural history type. Among well-known works by political scientists, Bryce's *Moden Democracies* is perhaps the best exemplification of the same procedure.

Scientific Classification. The step in the development of natural science methods in the social sciences which may be said, in general, to come third, is classification. When descriptions of types of cases have been generalized, and the features which are regarded as common and therefore significant have been abstracted from what is believed to be adventitious and unimportant, it is possible to arrange the cases which have been so treated in series, and, eventually, to classify them on some significant basis. Of course the trouble with the classifications which have been made or assumed in the social sciences in the past has been that too commonly they have been based on superficial resemblances and have frequently ignored fundamental differences. A familiar illustration is the confusion which exists in most treatises between political control and control through the mores. Classification, of course, leads to the refinement and perfection of the generalized description which can be given of each type of case.

Scientific "Concepts." We have noted that the natural scientists' method of dealing with experience data tends to involve from the beginning some *conceptualization* of the account given. To say that a case is treated as a type necessarily means that it is described as a *kind* of thing, and similarly, that the factors or elements into which it is resolved by analysis are treated as kinds. In the stage of classification, the names given to the classes are of course the names of concepts. In a stricter sense, however, the development of concepts for dealing with the materials and problems in question is the culmination, and, so far as the science itself is concerned, the *aim* or purpose of research. Now it is possible to distinguish two or three different orders of concepts which are used in the method of natural science, and which are beginning to emerge in the course of the development of natural science methods in the social

sciences. In the first place, scientific concepts differ in their degree of abstractness or artificiality. Doubtless it is true, as Vaihinger asserts, that all scientific concepts are *fictions;* they are *constructed* or invented by the scientist to aid him in dealing with the material in hand with reference to some purpose. Ernest W. Hobson, among others, has pointed out, however, that the concepts employed in a science differ in abstractness: "Some concepts have direct perceptual counterparts, such concepts have been formed by a direct process of abstraction, in which what are, for the purpose of formation of the scheme, irrelevant characteristics of the perceptual objects or processes have been removed by abstraction." "Concepts of the other species," he continues, "have no such direct perceptual counterparts, or it is not assumed *a priori* that they have such; they are formed by an effort of constructive imagination, for the purposes of the representative system." [3] The function of scientific concepts of this latter sort is that of elements in a frame of reference by means of which the concrete data with which the science is concerned may be explained and described in terms which make them comparable, so that the experience which is had in one case, in spite of its uniqueness, may be made to reveal to some extent what can be expected in another.

Social Science Concepts. Now, as a matter of fact, the social sciences have made progress in recent decades toward the establishment of a standardized equipment of conceptual tools for handling their subject matter and problems. To consider first the special science of sociology, it seems that in this science we have developed a number of concepts, each of which serves to define a *point of view,* from which almost the entire range of phenomena in which we are interested may be studied. "The economic process," "competition," "population," and "human ecology" are terms which tend to define a point of view from which sociology proceeds as a physical science, or at least as a biological science. With the aid of the viewpoint defined by these terms we study the distribution and movement of human beings in space, and their organization into economic structures. "Collective behavior" or "collective

[3] *The Domain of Natural Science* (New York, 1923), p. 32.

psychology" is a concept invented by French writers to indicate a point of view from which social happenings are studied with particular reference to their corporate or collective character. A point of view has also been defined from which we study the social interaction by a distinctly psychological technique, with due regard for the motives which animate the actors and the imaginations which they have of one another. At present, however, we have no standardized general term by which to designate this point of view, since the "social process" is usually understood to include the physical and economic as well as the psychological aspects of the social interaction. "Human nature," "social attitudes," and "personality" are terms which represent one or more points of view which are likewise psychological, but which involve the focusing of attention upon the interacting units—the persons and their socially determined or socially significant attitudes, wishes, and ideas.

Next, it can be pointed out that we are developing, under each of these points of view, concepts for the classification and analysis of the materials which are treated. Classificatory concepts may be of the first sort described by Hobson; if they do not, strictly speaking, have "direct perceptual counterparts," they are at any rate derived "by a direct process of abstraction." Concepts designed for use in the analysis of materials are almost inevitably of the fictional type, however; they are manufactured for the uses which the sociologist has in mind. The use of the terms "conflict," "accommodation," and "assimilation" to designate social processes is a good example of the sociological employment of scientific fictions; for in a given social situation the three will be found going on side by side, or rather, what we find is one process of interaction, for aspects of which these three terms afford convenient names. The persistent attempts which American sociologists have made to draw up and use lists of wishes, interests, desires, or "social forces" seems to indicate the felt need for a scheme of disjunctive concepts—clearly of the fictional type—by means of which social phenomena may be analyzed into simple, homogeneous elements, even though such elements are not empirically observable in the experienced cases.

In much the same way the science of economics has devel-

oped special points of view, designated by such terms as "institutional economics," "marginal economics," and "welfare economics"; while it is true at least of the older, "marginal" or "classical" economics that the specialists have evolved an elaborate and well-systematized outfit of analytical concepts, designated by such terms as "utility," "value," "price" "marginal utility," "supply," "demand," "land, labor, and capital," and the like. Developments along similar lines do not seem to have progressed so far in political science. The beginnings of a system of analytical concepts for use in political science are visible, however, in the distinction which is made between "politics," as the formation of public policies through the equilibration or compromise of rival interests, and "administration," as the execution of determined policies. It can easily be shown that this is a fictitious distinction, but its utility to the political scientists and to practical statesmen seems to have been considerable. If we regard "social biology" or "population theory" as a special social science, then we can easily see in this specialty the development of the concepts of "population" (as numbers), "birth rate," "death rate," "refined birth rate," "standards of living," "ethnic groups," and the like as tools of analysis of the materials under investigation. It is in fact in this latter field that the development of analytical concepts to the point where valid quantitative analysis is possible has most definitely been carried out.

Techniques of Investigation. What the foregoing discussion tends to show is that the evolution of the social sciences has been on the one hand, as in the case of the older sciences, a matter of the development of conceptualized definitions of the objects to be studied, and of the elements or units into which they may be analyzed with advantage to the purposes of the scientist. The process in which this conceptualization is accomplished has been referred to by Professor Stuart A. Rice as the "logical method" of science.[4] The term "scientific method" has, however, been widely used in another sense, and this has been particularly true of the discussions of method in the social sciences which have been published. By

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

"scientific method" in the latter sense is generally understood the "tricks of the trade," the devices by means of which the research worker deals with his material, together with the more or less standardized techniques for the manipulation of data which have been developed to that stage of abstractness and generality where they can be used in a wide range of fields of study. The techniques of investigation are in fact particularly important in the social sciences, where the data cannot as a rule be secured under closely controlled laboratory conditions.

It is, indeed, only metaphorically, for the most part, that we can speak of "sociological laboratories" or "economic laboratories." The research worker in social science must secure data by the aid of whatever objective and critical methods he may be able to devise for the observation, recording, and measurement of events which occur in the world of everyday experience, where factors in which we are not for the time being interested, nevertheless cannot be excluded. It is helpful in this connection to have in mind two different possible classifications of the methods which may be used in the social sciences for dealing with available concrete materials.

One plan of classification arranges the techniques of investigation with reference primarily to the empirical character of the objects or events studied. Some of the largest contributions which have been made to the social sciences in the past have been made by students who have been interested in particular social problems, usually practical problems, and who have set to work to find out more about the forces and the persons involved—what the relevant facts really were, or, rather, what the facts might be assumed to be for the purpose of understanding or dealing with the problem in question. By pursuing these inquiries, such students have gradually gained more and more knowledge of their problems. But at the same time they have gradually developed facility in the collecting and recording of the facts needed; that is, they have perfected *techniques* of investigation serviceable in their particular fields of inquiry, and adapted to the nature of the sources of information in those fields. The study of every particular class of concrete phenomena and every type of practical problem in the

general field of the "social," therefore, represents in a certain sense a special technique of research. Up to now, it is in the special fields of economics and political science that such techniques have been most elaborately worked out. Classifying from this point of view, however, one may enumerate the following types of recent and contemporary social research, each of which is, or involves, in some sense a special *technique* of research: (1) the study of public opinion and political behavior; (2) the study of the determination of market prices and wages, business cycles, and related topics; (3) the study of economic *institutions,* and of the relation of law, custom, and social organization to economic phenomena; (4) the study of population—its growth, composition, movements, birth and death rates, etc.; (5) the study of communities and other territorial groups—the "community survey" method in the broadest sense of the term; (6) the study of social conflicts and conflict groups, illustrated by studies of race relations, industrial relations, and international relations; (7) studies of social unrest and social "movements"; (8) the study of single phases of institutional life, as in the sociological study of religion, "sociological jurisprudence," and in the study of cults and of festivals; (9) studies of personality types, political leaders, personal experiences and case histories, and "personality problems"; (10) the comparative study of cultures and culture traits, and the intensive study of particular culture systems; (11) the study of group symbols and group ideals, as illustrated by the study of folk-lore and literature, and the sociological study of art; (12) the study of language in its relation to group culture and social organization. It will readily be seen that most of the preceding chapters of this volume constitute, to a certain extent, a survey of research techniques as classifiable from this point of view but with greater particularity.

Generalized Research Techniques. Finally, by another method of classification, we can distinguish several specialized techniques of investigation—specialized, that is, from one point of view, while from another point of view they are generalized to a relatively high degree. These are the techniques which have been perfected and standardized to the point where

they are applicable in the study of many or all of the special classes of problems, though for more or less obvious reasons each of them has been more useful in some researches than in others. Three of these generalized techniques have been much discussed, namely, (1) the statistical method, (2) the method of case study or case analysis, and (3) the method of cultural analysis, as developed by contemporary anthropologists. In the nineteenth century, two other more or less generalized techniques of research (not *investigation*) were widely experimented with, namely, the analogical method, as illustrated by Spencer's comparison of a society to an organism, and the "comparative method, as exemplified by Westermarck's studies of "moral ideas" and of human marriage. Comparison is of course a fundamental feature of all scientific research, but as conceived by Westermarck and some other students of social institutions, it involved the extraction of the objects studied from their cultural setting in such a way as to destroy their essential meaning. Such, at least, has been the criticism of modern anthropologists, and the "comparative method" as practiced by Westermarck has now been largely abandoned. The same can be said of the use of the "organic analogy," and of other analogies in the interpretation of social data, although here the earlier practice is more persistent. The fact is that the vernacular does not seem to contain terms directly applicable in the description of some types of social phenomena, and the scientists, in discussing these topics, are accordingly constrained to choose between analogies or metaphors on the one hand, and neologisms on the other. It is difficult to say which is the lesser of the two evils, and custom does not appear to have determined as yet which shall be the preponderant usage.

There is some question whether one ought to add one or two other techniques of a generalized sort to the list of general research methods useful in the social sciences. We have paid some attention in the preceding chapter to Professor Teggart's provocative volume in defense of the "historical method" as a method of research in social science, and he is not alone in naming this as one of the general methods of research. It is doubtless true, as we have seen, that the primary objectives of history and of most of the other social studies are essentially

distinct. Still, it is also true that in the tasks of social research historical methods are needed as auxiliary aids; for in many cases it is only by investigating the process by which particular social situations have come to be what they are that we can comprehend them as they are. Possibly we should include likewise in this enumeration the natural history method as a generalized technique of research. It is perhaps not to be sharply distinguished from the method of case analysis on the one hand, and Professor Rice holds that the method of case analysis is essentially the same as the method of history, on the other hand. Still there is in practice a great difference between the intensive analysis of particular cases, usually cases of personal behavior, and the method involved in gathering a quantity of concrete information about religious sects, for example, to the end that one is enabled to describe in generalized terms the manner in which any sect is formed, grows, and decays or alters its character. Apparently the latter is a method which can be made widely applicable in the study of the factors and processes of social life as seen from a certain point of view, namely, that of organization pattern.

Summary. In summary, this chapter has attempted to show, first, that the general method of research in the social sciences is not fundamentally different from that of any other natural science; it involves techniques for the assembling and analysis of empirical data, and a conceptual system which is the instrument whereby the experience represented by the data can be made to shed light upon problems which subsequently arise. Secondly, the methods of social research, like those of other sciences, have to be adapted in detail to the character of the materials to be studied. Some account of the progress which has been made in the recent past in developing the methodology of the social sciences is given in the preceding chapters of this volume. As a matter of fact one who is familiar with developments in the field cannot but be impressed with the increasing emphasis which is being placed upon research and research methods in the journals and at the conventions of social scientists. It would be profitable in this connection, did space limits permit, to place in exhibition an analysis of the history of the Social Science Research Council, which was or-

ganized in 1923 by representatives of seven national learned societies of the United States. The purpose of the Council is declared to be the encouragement, coordination, and assistance of research which involves the fields of two or more of the societies, but in practice it has functioned as an agency to promote and facilitate research in the social sciences generally. Since 1925 the Council has sponsored summer conferences at Dartmouth College, at which research supervisors and workers exchange ideas and information. At the 1926 summer conference there developed a lively discussion of certain general questions of research *method,* and it was partly as a result of this discussion that the Committee on Scientific Method of the Council undertook the preparation of a case-book of materials on the methodology of social research. This volume is now in preparation. A further result of the discussion at the 1926 summer conference, however, was a noticeable revival or stimulation of interest among leading American social scientists concerning questions of general methodology.[5]

It may safely be said that the most important and most conspicuous general trend in the general field of the social sciences today is that which consists of joint and individual efforts on the part of authors and teachers to redefine the field as a field of research, rather than as a field primarily of philosophic speculation or of practical reform efforts and ethical guidance. As we saw in the opening chapter of this volume, the social studies unquestionably had their origins, in large part, in men's feeling of need for social guidance. Thomas and Znaniecki have pointed out that actual problems "cannot be solved adequately as long as theoretical reflection has their immediate solution in view." "We must," they hold, "be able to foresee future situations and prepare for them, and we must have in stock a large body of secure and objective knowledge capable of being applied to any situation."[6] It is with the survey of this body of knowledge, in so far as it now exists, that we have been mainly occupied in the foregoing chapters: it is exactly that existing body of knowledge, however, which constitutes,

[5] See *Research in Humanistic and Social Sciences,* by F. A. Ogg (New York, 1928), pp. 164-68.

[6] *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (two-volume edition, New York, 1927), Vol. I, p. 15.

in a fundamental sense, the content of the logic of the social sciences. The logical structure of any science is found in its body of working concepts and hypotheses. Every scientific concept really involves one or more hypotheses, and it is no small part of the task of social research to achieve clear consciousness of the assumptions which are implied in the concepts which it is using. For this reason it is useful from time to time to make the range of social theory itself an object of reflective scrutiny.

INDEX

Abbott, Edith, 310
Accommodation, 50, 97, 305, 314 f., 538
Acculturation, 307
Acquired Characteristics, 101, 163, 175 f.
Adams, Brooks, 481 f.
Adaptation, 97, 153, 405
Addams, Jane, 368
Adler, Alfred, 131 f.
Administration, 264, 512 ff.
Agriculture, economic revolution in, 425 f.
Alexander, H. B., *Space, Time, and Deity*, 174
Allen, C. K., 455 n.
Allport, Floyd H., 167, 202
Amalgamation, 305, 308
American Federation of Labor, 522, 524
"American Science," 322
Ammon, Otto, 376
Ancestor worship, 247 f., 255 f.
Anderson, Nels, 183 n.
Anderson, W. L., 80
Andrews, John B., 523, 529
Angell, Norman (Ralph Norman Angell Lane), 442
Animal behavior, study of, 127, 135
Anthropogeography (*see also* Human geography), beginnings of research in, 20 f.; problems of, according to Ratzel, 22 f.; contrasted with social morphology, 295 ff.; political phase of, 494 ff.
Anthropology, 258 ff., 288 ff.; cultural anthropology as the study of custom, 146 f., 265 ff., 376. *See also* Ethnology, Culture, and Custom
Anthropomorphism in religion, 241
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 88, 108, 123 f., 186 f., 393 f., 516 f.
Areas. *See* Natural areas, Marketing areas, Regions, Communities, Neighborhoods, Trading Areas
Aristotle, *Politics*, 4, 15, 16, 28, 42, 75 f., 86, 87, 107, 123 f., 159 f., 186, 203, 338, 392 f., 474 f., 504, 516, 539; *Ethics*, 157 f.; *Organon*, 535; cathartic theory of tragedy, etc., 352
Art, 283 ff.
"As If" philosophy, 280
Assimilation, 48 ff., chap. xxii; factors affecting assimilation, 313
Attitudes, 165, 176, 185, 191 ff., 215; as behavior patterns, 196, 315 f.
Augustine, St., 42 f., 75, 88, 221, 245 f., 393
Austrian school of economic thought, 90

Background studies, 553
Bacon, Francis, 125, 160, 556
Bacon, Roger, 20
Bagehot, Walter, *Physics and Politics*, 87, 248 f., 252, 254 f., 258, 274, 289, 305, 377, 401, 535; *English Constitution*, 439
Bakeless, John, 420
Baldwin, Alice M., 478 n.
Baldwin, James Mark, 139 f., 150, 151, 167, 170
Barnes, Harry Elmer, *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, 15 n., 20 n., 89 n., 91 n., 105 n., 108, 140 n., 146 n., 406, 455 n., 494 n., 501 n., 502 n.; *Sociology and Political Theory*, 539
Barnett, George E., 524 n.
Barth, Paul, *Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, 7 n.
Bastian, Adolphe, 146
Beard, Charles A., 439
Bechterew, W. von (V. M. Bekhterev), 166 n.
Beers, *The Old Colonial Policy*, 60 n.
Behaviorism, 132 f., 220, 488
Beliefs, 214 f., 220, 226 ff., 256. (*See also* Religion)

Benn, Ernest J. P., 531
Bergson, Henri, 362 f.
Bernard, L. L., 178
Bernhard, Ludwig, 48 f., 319
Bernstein, Edward, 191
Beuchat, Henri, 295 f.
Bible, 234 ff.
Bigelow, Carl Worth, 89 n., 105 n., 108, 110 n.
Birth control, 416 ff.
Blum, Solomon, 523
Bluntschli, J. K., 397
Boas, Franz, 47 f., 135
Bodin, Jean, 479, 493, 517
Bogardus, Emory S., 51 n., 196 n.
Bohemian type of personality, 171
Bolshevism, 485, 487
Bonger, Adrian, 324 f.
Bonnet, Charles, 124
Boodin, J. E., 174 f.
Bosanquet, Helen, 140 f.
Bouglé, Charles, 261, 277 ff., 280
Boundaries, 24, 298; and boundary peoples, 496 f.
Bowman, Leroy E., 511 n.
Branford, Victor E., 283
Brentano, Lujo, 96
Bright, John, 505
Bristol, L. M., 373
Bronner, Augusta F., 560
Bruère, Robert W., 499 n.
Brunhes, Jean, 15, 22, 25, 35, 37, 59, 65, 66, 70, 71 ff., 79, 296, 494 ff., 501 ff.
Bruno, Frank J., 513 n.
Bryce, James, 439 f., 561
Bücher, Karl, *Industrial Evolution*, 36 n., 58, 89 n., 96, 97, 99, 114 f., 423 f.; *Arbeit und Rhythmus*, 354 f.
Buckle, Henry Thomas, 20, 63
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 522 n.
Burgess, Ernest W., 65 n., 66 f., 71, 83, 99 n., 101, 140 n., 142 f., 169 n., 170, 176, 183 n., 191, 204 n., 213 n., 244, 269, 309, 314, 349, 390 n.
Bury, J. B., 372
Bushee, F. A., 33 n., 310, 373
Bye, Raymond T., 130 n.

Cabell, James Branch, *Beyond Life*, 279
Cady, Vernon M., 163 n.
Cæsar, Julius, 42, 108
Cairnes' theory of non-competing groups, 102
"Cake of custom," 249, 289, 535
Campanella, 75
Capitalism, 92 f., 112 f.
Carr-Saunders, A. M., 28 n.
Carroll, Mollie Ray, 529
Carter, John, 418 f.
Carver, Thomas Nixon, 38 n., 373, 413, 417
Case studies and case analysis, 566, 567, 568
Caste, 98
Cathartic theory of tragedy, etc., 352, 366
Catlin, G. E., 504, 540
Cavan, Ruth Shonle, 550 n.
Ceremony and ceremonial, 244, 339 f., 353
Chapin, F. Stuart, 275
Character, 138, 165 f.
Child, Charles M., 71
Children, studies of (*see also* Infants), 138 ff.
Christianity and the development of social theory, 27 f., 42 f., 108 f., 351
Church, 227 f.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 476
City, 182 f., 302 f.; as marketing center, 82, 111 f., 115 ff.; as a natural community, 75; the city-state, 75 f., 240 f.; urbanization and fashion, 340 f.
City planning, 84 f., 283
Civilization, contrasted with culture, 381
Clark, J. B., 102 n.
Clark, J. M., 91 n., 92 n., 105 n., 130 n.
Clarke, *The Mediæval City-State*, 77 n., 88 n.
Classes. *See* Social classes
Classification, as a phase of scientific method, 561
Climate, influence on civilization, 16 f., 43 f.
Cohen, Julius Henry, 530 n.
Cole, G. D. H., 526 [530
Collective bargaining, 523, 526, 527,

Collective behavior, and collective psychology (*see also* Crowds), 10, 63, chap. xvi, 230, 263 f., 277, 312, 328 ff., 435, 483
Collective representation, 207, 230, 263 f., 277 f., 284, 327
Collectivism, 520, 535
Colonization, 59 f., 498; immigrant colonies, 311
Color line, 308
Commandant, A. P., 499 n.
Commerce, 10, 59, chap. ix; and social contact, 309
Commodity theory of labor, 518, 524
Commons, John R., 310, 518, 521, 523, 529
Communication, 97, 122, 126, 269 ff., 309, 336 f., 345, 383, 449, 494, 540; and the formation of communities, 79; as a creative process, 270; as a geographic concept, 24; effect on a city according to Aristotle, 107
Communism as a theory of primitive social organization, 77; as a theory of labor, 524
Community, 72, chap. vii, 333 f., 449 f.; as a geographic unit, 79 f.; ancient communities, 75; mediæval communities, 77; relation to economic organization, 81 f.; "Rurban" communities, 83; social differentiation in, 83 f., studies of rural communities, 81 f.; Tönnies' conception of, 78 f., 257
Community organization movement, 84, 511 f.
Community surveys, 566
Comparison, as a feature of scientific method, 64, 76, 500
Compensation, psychic, 281
Competition, 10, chap. viii, 318, 389 ff., 405, 408; and welfare, 91; of races, 33 f., 50; "competition of life," 410 f., 466
Comte, August, 5 f., 63, 96, 97; 220 f., 246, 375 f., 539, 549
Concepts of social science, 23 f., 561 ff.
Conflict, 86, 188 ff., chap. xxvii; of races, 50
Consciousness. *See* Group consciousness, Mind, Will, Emotion
Consensus, 264
Conspicuous waste, 347 ff.
Contact (*see also* Social contact), of races, 49; of cultures, 49, 53
Control. *See* Social control
Conventionality, chap. xxiv
Cooley, Charles H., 99 n., 101, 138, 141 f., 168 f., 176, 179, 203, 216 f., 335 f., 344 ff., 367
Cooperation, 97, 436
Corrobori, 229 f.
Crime, 258 ff., 323 ff., 458 f., 471; trend of criminal jurisprudence, 467 f.
Crisis, 384, 445, 496
Crosby, Oscar T., 419 f.
Crowds and crowd psychology, chap. xvi, 483 ff.; the chance crowd, 204; classification of crowds, 208 f.; the psychological crowd, 203 ff.
Cult, 228, 236 ff.
Culture, 10, 21, 122, 126, 164 f., 169, chap. xx, chap. xxi, 376 ff., 566; culture area, 298, 302 f.; culture conflicts, 323, 330 ff.; culture complexes, 289, 290 ff., 297; culture contacts, 305; culture groups, 294 f.; culture patterns (*see also* Social Patterns), 289 ff., 299 ff.; culture traits, 48 f., 53, 265, 276 f., 288 ff., 297; cultural analysis, 292, 567; cultural attitudes, 193 f.; cultural epochs, 380 f.; cultural evolution, 53, 153 f., 274 ff., 298 f.; cultural backgrounds, 553; cultural ideals, 276 ff.; cultural lag, 154; cultural selection, 99; cultural landscape, 502; type of culture, 291, 297; structure of culture, 288; life histories of cultures, 379; geography of culture, 289 ff., 297 f.; megalopolitan culture, 117; relation of culture to law, 460 f.; universal culture pattern, 291; cultures as organisms, 379
Cultus, 285
Curiosity and the development of social science, 4

Custom (*see also* Culture, Folkways, Mores), 122, 144, chap. xii, 247, 253 ff., 258 ff., 263, 271, 290, 376; contrasted with conventionality and fashion, 340 f.
Customary law, 77, 236 ff., 245, 457 f.
Cycles in social change, 216 f., 341 f., 545; cycles in culture origins and diffusion, 298 f.; race relations cycle, 49 ff.

Dance, 230, 256, 284, 353 ff.
Darwin, Charles, 122, 127, 174, 187, 248, 274, 375, 390 f., 397 f., 551; *Descent of Man*, 20, 40; influence on theories of race, 44 ff.; influence on economic thought, 91, 98
Darwin, Leonard, 40
Definition of the situation, 270, 313, 332
De Greef, Guillaume, 96
Delinquency. *See* Crime; *also* Juvenile delinquency
Dell, Floyd, 279
Democracy, 434
Demolins, Edmond, 60
Descartes, René, 122, 124, 160 f.
Desires, 134, 147, 186, 187 f., 195 f., 214 f., 291 f.
Devine, Edward T., 327 f.
Dewey, John, 150 f., 166, 167, 168, 178, 267 ff., 275, 277, 279, 336 f., 447 ff., 515, 556
Dialectic of personal growth, 139 f.
Dicey, A. V., 349, 439, 440
Diffusion, 147 f., 149, 264 ff., 293, 306 f., 384
Diminishing return, law of, 31 f.
Discipline, 329, 336
Discussion, 390, 535 f.
Disorganization. *See* Social disorganization
Dispersion, 59
Displacement of population, 58
Division of labor, 10, 21, 66, 71 f., chap. vii, 112, 179, 261, 383, 462, 519; in the community, 82 ff.; in savage society, 301 f.; and social contact, 309; geographic division of labor, 22, 37
Dixon, Roland B., 55
Dogma, 222
Domestic economy, 114
Dominance, as an ecological concept, 79; dominance of the city, 117
Douglass, Harlan P., 61 n., 80
Drachsler, Julius, 319
Dubois, Pierre, 76, 394 f.
Dugas, L., 364
Duguit, Leon, 461 f.
Durkheim, Emile, 63, 65, 97 f., 148 f., 151, 164, 167, 225 ff., 243, 256, 261, 269, 277 f., 280, 284, 295, 337, 353 f., 363, 462, 539, 549

East, Edward M., 29 n., 32 n., 417 f.
Ecological organization, 95 f.
Ecology, human. *See* Human Ecology
Economic geography, 22
Economic interpretation of society, 121 f., 423
Economic law, 431 f.
Economic organization, 10, 50, 81 f., 90, chap. viii, chap. ix, chap. xxix, 519 f., 528
Economic process, 10, 104 f., 107; chap. xxix
Economic theories, chap. viii, chap. ix, 547; influence of instinct theory upon, 129 ff.
Economics as a natural science, 104 f., 115, 422 f., 563 f.
Edie, Lionel D., 38 n., 117 n.
Education, 101, 159, chap. xx, 317, 384; as a process of transmission, inculcation, and communication, 264 f., 267 ff.; formal education, 270 f.
Educational sociology, 272 ff.; *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 274
Edwards, Lyford P., 214 n., 473, 489 f.
Ego, 161
Ellis, Henry Havelock, 284
Ellwood, Charles A., 179, 275 f., 374, 378, 382 ff., 423, 486
Emotion, 128, 187, 192
Empire, as a political unit, 76
Empiricists, 160 f.
Employers, 522, 523
Ends, as related to means, 151, 263 f. (*see also* Social ends)

Environment, 21, 26, 32, 37, 73, 74, 97, 122, 126, 164, 168, 178, 191, 271, 301, 373, 518 (*see also* Social environment)
Epicureanism, 242
"Establishments," human, 79
Ethical problems, and the development of social science, 4 ff.; ethical element in religion, 251
Ethnology (*see also* Anthropology, Culture, Custom), 45, 228 f., 247, 253, 258 ff., 289, 376, 409; ethnological school of jurisprudence, 460
Eugenics, 40
Evolution, biological (*see also* Social evolution, Cultural evolution), 44 f., 375; evolutionary school of anthropology, 147 f., 149, 265, 519
Exchange, chap. ix, 494; in savage societies, 301 f.
Exogamy, 258 f.
Expert, rôle of in social politics, 512 f.
Exploration, and the development of knowledge, 19 f.; and contact of races, 50
Externality, as a feature of social control, 244
Extravert, 171

Fabian Society, 490, 521
Facts, 559
Fads, 215, 342
Fairchild, Henry Pratt, 191, 310, 319
Fairgreve, James, 497 f.
Family, 138, 140 f., 142 f., 203, 247 f.
Faris, Ellsworth, 144, 149 n., 169, 194 f., 468 ff.
Fashions, 215 f., chap. xxiv; circumstances affecting fashion, 345
Fear as a factor in social control, 250
Febvre, Lucien, 63, 64, 69, 296, 499 n., 502
Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 126
Ferguson, Adam, 89
Fertility rites, 234, 241
Fictions, theory of, 279 f.
Finot, Jean, 48
Fiske, John, 267
Flint, Robert, 374 n.
Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley, 525
Folk Psychology, 47 f., 87, 376
Folkways, 151 ff., 253 ff., 397
Follett, M. P., 515
Formalism, 335 f.
Frame of reference, 562
Frank, Glenn, 516 n.
French revolution, 208, 213, 438
Freud, Sigmund, 131 f., 164, 361
Freund, Ernst, 466
Frontiers, 496
Functional psychology, 178 f.
Future, imagination of, 224 f.

Gahlbeck, Pontus E., 99 n.
Galpin, Charles Josiah, 68, 80 f., 83, 143, 499
Gangs, boys' (*see also* Play, Play groups), 362, 367 f.
Gantt, H. L., 524 n.
Garnett, William E., 219 n.
Gaultier, Jules, 284
Geddes, Patrick, 283
Geography, development of, 15 ff.; comparative geography, 64; geography of culture, 289 ff.; geography of history, 17 ff., 502; geographic concepts, 23 f. (*See also* Economic geography, Human ecology, Human geography, Political geography, Anthropogeography)
German social thought, in the nineteenth century, 5; philology in Germany, 45; German historical economists, 91 ff.; *Religionssoziologie*, 256 f.; influence of Simmel on German social science, 451
Gestalt theory of psychology, 169, 280, 359 f.
Ghost-fear, 152, 254 f.
Giddings, Franklin H., 102 n., 250, 269, 303, 328 f., 330, 364 f., 404 ff., 525 f.
Gillin, John L., 325 f.
Glueck, Sheldon, 513
God, idea of, 223, 226 f., 233 f., 239 ff., 261
Goddard, E. H. and P. A., 374 n., 377 f., 382

Goldenweiser, A. A., 146 n.
Goldmark, Pauline, 368 n.
Gooch, Robert K., 499 n.
Goodnow, F. J., 514 n.
Gordon, R. G., 166, 169
Gosnell, Harold F., 501
Government, 244, 248 f., chap. xxx; evolution of, chap. xxxvi; local government, 499 f.; government in industry, 528 ff.
Gradients in ecological formations, 71, 502
Grant, Madison, 41 n., 47, 99
Gras, N. S. B., 36 n., 81 f., 115 ff., 422, 424, 499 f., 539, 560
Greeks, physical philosophy of, 16; conception of the relation of societies to their environment, 75; conception of original nature of man, 122 f., conceptions of the soul, 158 ff.; conceptions of religion, 221 f., 231 f., 246 f.; conception of law, 246 f.; theory of a stable universe, 52; Greek writers on revolutions, 474 f.
Greer, Guy, 97 n.
Gregory, J. W., 47, 99
Groat, George Gorham, 523
Groos, Karl, 353, 355 ff., 366
Grosse, Ernst, 231
Grotius, Hugo, 397
Groups, 75, 188 ff., 263 f., 346 f., 410 ff., 450, 470; culture groups, 294 f., ethnic groups, 188; non-competing groups, 100; territorial groups, chap. vi; non-territorial groups, 63 f.; play groups, 367 f.; relation of the individual to the group, 172, 181 f., 205, 466; groups as source of religious feeling, 229 f.; inter-group struggle, 248, 252 f.
Group consciousness, 94
Group mind, 209 f.
Group will. *See* Social Will
Groves, Ernest R., 513 n.
Guidance, social. *See* Social Guidance
Guild system, 428 f., 518
Gumplowicz, Ludwig, 46 f., 87, 93 f., 98, 188, 375 f., 401, 534, 539, 540
Gunther, Adolf, 496
Habit, chap. xii, 263, 280
Hadley, Arthur T., 508
Halbwachs, Maurice, 167 n.
Hall, Arthur Cleveland, 325
Hall, G. Stanley, 366
Hammond, J. L. and Barbara, 36 n., 424 ff.
Hamsun, Knut, 144
Hankins, Frank H., 47 n., 49 n., 51 n.
Hansen, Alvin S., 501
Harmonization of interests, 538
Harper, E. R., 172
Harrison, Jane, 231 ff., 239, 246, 255, 353
Hart, Joseph K., 514
Hayes, Edward Cary, 130 n., 198 f.
Haynes, Fred E., 508, 513 n.
Healy, William A., 560
Hearnshaw, F. J. C., 88 n., 395 n.
Hegel, G. W. F., 461, 536
Helmholz, Hermann von, 126
Heredity, 21, 99 ff., 132, 134, 176, 266. *See also* Social heredity
Herodotus, 15
Herskovits, Melville J., 299 ff.
"Higher criticism," 222 f.
Hippocrates, 15
History, contrasted with social science, 547 f.; anthropology as a historical science, 148; philosophy of history, 374; geographic factors in history, 177 ff., 502; "History repeats itself," 545; historical school of anthropology, 547; historical school of economics, 91 ff., 423, 547; historical studies in politics, 540; historical method, 567; historical movements, 56; historical process, 276
Hobbes, Thomas, 124, 125, 395 f., 478
Hobhouse, Leonard T., 536 f.
Hobo, 182 f.
Hobson, Ernest W., *The Domain of Natural Science*, 562 f.
Hollander, Jacob, 524 n.
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., 463 f.
Holt, E. B., *The Freudian Wish*, 165 n.
Hoopingarner, Dwight Lowell, 531 n.

House, F. N., previous papers cited, 121 n., 134 n., 187 n., 555 n.
Hoxie, Robert F., 523, 526 f., 531
Human ecology, 10, 64 ff., 297 ff.; limitations of, 72 f., 121 f.
Human geography, 10, chap. ii, 296, chap. xxxiii, 545 f.
Human nature, 10, 86, 122, 137, 142, 147, 391
Human traits, 156
Huntington, Ellsworth, 56, 60 f.
Huxley, Thomas Henry, 20 f., 375
Hypothesis in scientific method, 570

Ideas, group-making rôle of, 303; and social evolution, 376
Ideals. *See* Social Ideals
Idealization, 275. (*See also* Social ideals, Social ends, and Values)
Ihering, Rudolph von. *See* Jhering
Imagination in social process, 384
Imitation, 148, 149, 249, 339, 344
Immigration (*see also* Migration), 61, 309 ff.; immigrant groups, 145; disorganization in, 331 ff.
Impersonality, 244, 346, 528
In-groups and out-groups, 151 f., 410 ff.
Incest, 259
Inculcation, 101, 149, 265 f., 384
Individuality and the individual; individualism, individual differences, etc., 132, 133 f., chap. xi, 145, 156 f., 169 f., chap. xiv, 302, 334, 335, 340, 425, 432; individual and group, 172, 181 f., 205, 466; individuality and crime, 325, 471; and poverty, 327
Industrial organization, 10, 92 f., 400 f., chap. xxix
Industrial relations, chap. xxxv
Industrial Revolution, chapter xxix
Industrialization, chap. xxix
Infants, study of, 132 f.
Infancy, prolongation of, 267
Innate ideas, 124, 160 f.
"Inner enemies," 327
Innovation, 341
Instinct, 127 ff., 146, 147, 186 ff., 278, 280, 355 ff.; instinct of pugnacity, 403; influence of instinct theory on economics, 129 f.; on political science, 130 f.
Institutional economics, 105, 117 f., 549
Institutions. *See* Social institutions
Instrumental process, 197
Intelligence tests, 133 f.
Interaction (*see also* Social interaction), 174; as a geographic concept, 25; as an economic process, 93; of individual and environment, 126; of elements in a social process, 145
Interdependence, 97, 183 f., 269, 399
Interests, 134, 188 ff., 445 f., 460; social or group interests, 466, 482
Intermarriage of races, 308
International law, 396 f.
International relations and diplomatic history, 97
Interstitial groups, 144
Intimate relationships, 137 f., 316, 528
Introvert, 171
Intrusive factors or forces affecting social process and social change, 52 f.
Investigation, techniques of, 564 ff.
"Invisible hand," 90, 94, 431, 518
Isolation, as a geographic concept, 24, 67. (*See also* Social contact)
I. W. W., 524

James, William, 124, 127 f., 131 f., 187, 445 f., 465
James-Lange theory of emotion, 187
Jarrett, Bede, *Social Theories of the Middle Ages*, 108 n., 109 n., 352, 393 f., 477, 516 f.
Jefferson, Thomas, 477 f.
Jenks, Jeremiah, 310, 508
Jerusalem, Franz, 167
Jesus, teachings of, 245
Jews, 181
Jhering, Rudolph von, 406, 459 f., 530, 540
Johns Hopkins University Studies, 521 f.
Johnson, R. H., 40 n.
Jung, Carl G., 132, 171
Jurisprudence, chap. xxxi
"Just Price," 88, 108

Justice, 236 ff., 246 ff., 447
Juvenile delinquency, 368

Kant, Immanuel, 124, 161, 460
Kantor, J. R., 163 n., 177
Keller, Albert Galloway, 60 n., 151 ff., 274 f.
Khaldun, Ibn, 16
Kidd, Benjamin, 153 f., 248, 252 f., 261, 274, 289, 377
Knies, Karl, 96
Kocourek, Albert, 454 n., 455 n., 460 n., 469 n.
Koehler, Wolfgang, 135
Koffka, Kurt, 359 f.
Kohl, J. G., 19, 24
Kohler, Joseph, 460 f.
Kolb, J. H., 81, 143, 219, 499
Kretschmer, *Physique and Character,* 171
Kropotkin, P., 399

Labor problems, chap. xxxv; angles of approach to, 522 f.; labor management, 523; labor market, 522; labor movement, 526 ff.
Laissez-faire, laissez passer, 110, 505
Lange, F. A., 20 n., 385
Language, study of, 566; and race, 45 f.; and assimilation, 313
Large-scale industry, 520
Lasker, Bruno, 491
Laski, Harold J., 526
Lasswell, Harold D., 443, 549
Latham, R. G., 45
Lauck, William A., 310
Laughter and the comic, 362 f.
Law, 94, 248, chap. xxx, chap. xxxi; as distinguished from politics, 436 f., 453, 454; customary law, 77 f., 246 ff.; origins of law, 457 ff.; law and culture, 460 f.; law and order in industry, 530
Law of nature, 457, 550 f.
Lazarus, Moritz, 376
Leadership, 451, 481, 484, 512 f., 527 f.
Le Bon, Gustav, 45 n., 203 ff., 213 f., 443, 473 f., 483 f.
Legal fictions, 458
Legislation, 264, chap. xxx, 535
Leiserson, William M., 530 n., 531
Le Play, Frederic, 283
Levy-Bruhl, Lucien, 135
Liberalism, 431 f.
Lichtenberger, J. P., *Development of Social Theory,* 6 n., 46 n., 124 n., 186 n., 245 n., 250 n., 252 n., 323 n., 390 n., 396 n., 475 n., 476 n., 479 n., 493 n., 517 n.
Life organization, 332
Like-mindedness, 269 f.
Lilienfeld, Paul von, 96
Lindeman, Eduard C., 513 n.
Linné, Carl (Carolus Linnæus), 44 f.
Lippman, Walter, 281, 442, 443 ff., 482 f.
List, Friedrich, 96
Litt, Theodor, 167
Local Government, 499 f.
Locke, John, 122, 125, 478
Locomotion and mind, 182 f.
Logic as a systematic study, 555 f.
Logic of the social sciences, chap. xxxviii
Looking-glass self, 170 f.
Lombroso, Cæsare, 323
"Lost soul," 170
Lotze, Rudolph Hermann, 126
Low, A. Maurice, 498 n.
Lowe, Sidney, 439
Lowell, A. Lawrence, 438, 439 ff., 452, 514 n.
Luther, Martin, 245, 517

McDougall, William, 41 n., 47, 99, 127 n., 128 ff., 166, 187, 201, 358, 403
Maciver, R. M., 79
McKenzie, J. S., 9 n.
McKenzie, R. D., 65, 83, 500 n., 515 n.
Machiavelli, Niccolo, 76, 88, 111, 394 f., 477, 530
Machine theory of labor, 524
Magic, 227 f., 259 f.
Maine, Henry Sumner, 77 f., 146, 147, 246 ff., 250, 254, 289, 377, 457 ff., 462, 518 f.
Malinowski, Bronislaw, 258 ff., 266 n., 301 f., 561
Malthus, Thomas, 27, 28, 29 ff., 37, 397 f.; Neo-malthusianism, 39

Mana, 228 ff.
"Manchester school" of economic thought, 95
Mann, Delbert, 143
Manorial system, 426
Mantoux, Paul, 66
Maps in ecological research, 68, 70 f., 80
Marginalist school of economic thought, 90
Marketing areas, 68
Markets, organization of, 10, 81 f., chap. ix, 426 ff.
Marshall, Henry R., 404
Martin, Everett Dean, 208 n., 484 f.
Martineau, Harriet (translator). *See* Comte.
Marvin, F. S., 372 f.
Marx, Karl, 324, 423, 536 f.
Masses and mass movements, 212, 215; mass migrations, 218 (*see also* Social movements)
Master-servant relationship, 516 ff., 522
Matteuzzi, A., 495 f.
Mauss, Marcel, 295 f., 301 f.
Mead, George H., 171
Meaning, 280, 313
Mediæval social thought, 4, 27 f., 42 f., 75 f., 87 f., 108 f., 160, 352, 392 ff.
Megalapolitan culture, 117
Memory, 126, 315 f.
Mental conflicts, 149, 178, 263, 317
Mental complexes, 163 f.
Mental traits, 133 f.
Mercantilism, 28, 109, 111
Merriam, Charles E., 451 n., 452 f., 501
Merz, Charles, 385
Messianic hope, 238 f., 485, 490
Metaphysical theory of religion, 342 ff.
Methodology, 10 f., 376 f., 378 f., 538 f., 548, 554, chap. xxxviii; intuitive method, 379, 539 ff.
Metropolis, as a form of community organization, 82; metropolitan economy, 115 ff., 500
Meusel, Alfred, 179
Michels, Robert, 451 f.
Migration, chap. v, 304; as a geographic concept, 24; early explanations of human migration, 53 ff.; migration and social change, 52 f.; and contact, 309; and culture distribution, 61; and war, 58; mass migrations, 218
Militant and industrial societies, 400 f.
Mill, John Stuart, 96, 556
Miller, Herbert A., 48, 154, 177 n.
Millis, Harry A., 531 n.
Mind, 169 ff., 209 f.
Mishpat, 236 ff., 245
Missionary, as an agent of culture diffusion, 306 f.
Mitchell, John, 523, 527
Mobility, 57 f., 62, 79, 93, chap. xiv, 217 f., 303, 326, 528; mobilization of the individual, 422 f.
Modern social theory, origins of, 5 ff., 160 ff.
Moities in the structure of savage societies, 301 f.
Monogenetic vs. polygenetic theories of racial origins, 45 ff.
Monroe, Arthur Eli, 88 n.
Montesquieu, 146, 438, 439, 478 f., 493, 518; on differences between peoples as affected by climate, 43
Moral regions, 302 f.
Morale, 239, 329
Morals (*see also* Mores), 94, 144, 150, 220, 223, 225, chap. xix
Mores, 150 ff., 253 ff., 258 f., 301; mores of self-maintenance, 275; fashion and the mores, 342 ff.; mores and the criminal law, 468
Morgan, C. Lloyd., *Emergent Evolution*, 174
Morgan, Lewis Hunt, 147
Moroney, Timothy B., 160
Morphology of world history, 378 ff. (*See also* Social morphology)
Morrow, Dwight W., 451 n.
Morse, Anson D., 451 n., 452
Movements (*see also* Social Movements), historical, 56; of population, chap. v
Mowrer, Ernest R., 143
Mueller, Johannes, 126
Mukerjee, Radahakamal, 65 f.

Mumford, Lewis, 281 ff., 371
Munro, W. B., 439
Murray, Gilbert, 211 n., 239 ff., 294, 353
Myth, 224 f., 233 f., 371

National economy, 114, 116
Nationality, chap. iv, 98; sentiment of nationality, 49; trend of theory of race and nationality, 51
Natorp, Paul, 256
Natural areas, chap. vi, 283, 302; regions as natural areas, chap. vi; areas of geographic uniformity, 69
Natural barriers and natural roadways, 24, 55
Natural frontiers, 496
Natural history, compared with natural science and with history, 560 f.
Natural law. *See* Law of nature
Natural science, viewpoint and method of, 378 f., 550 f., 556 f.
Natural selection, 20, 98, 266, 391, 401
Negro problem in America, 49, 308, 316 ff.
Neighborhood, 72, 138, 142 f., 515
New experience, desire for, 171, 195, 362
News, as the prototype of scientific data, 545, 558 f.
Nicolai, G. F., 403
Nieboer, H. J., *Slavery as an Industrial System*, 99 n., 517
Nineteenth century, social thought of, 5 f.
Nomadic peoples, 236 ff.
North, Cecil C., 99 f.
Novicow, J., 98
Nurture, 266

Odum, Howard W., 433, 509, 512 n., 553
Official acts, contrasted with private acts, 448
Ogburn, William F., 151, 154, 275, 377, 385 f.
Ogden, C. K., 163 n.
Ogg, F. A., *Research in the Humanistic and Social Sciences*, 569 n.
Old Testament, 223, 235 ff.
Olympian deities, cult of, 239 ff.
Oppenheimer, Franz, 517, 539
Opposition, as a sociological concept, 148
Oresme, Nicholas, 88 n.
Organic analogy, as an interpretation of human society, 96 f., 567; mind as an organic whole, 168; cultures as organisms, 379
Organism as personality, 162 f.
Original nature of man, chap. x, 168, 263
Ostrogorski, Morsei, 438
Owen, Robert, 505

Pareto, Vilfredo, 117
Park, Robert E., 48 ff., 65, 83, 95 f., 99 n., 101, 140 n., 142 f., 154, 170, 176, 182 f., 188, 191 f., 204, 206, 210 n., 211 n., 213 n., 217 f., 269, 275, 309, 314, 349, 362, 390 n., 443 f., 468 n.
Parker, Carlton H., 130
Parker, Cornelia Stratton, 130 n.
Parmelee, Maurice, 328
Participation, 312
Paton, Stewart, 163 n.
Patrick, G. T. W., 356 n., 358, 364 ff., 404
Patten, Simon N., 508
Paul, St., on slavery, 42; conception of "faith," 245
Peace, ideal of, 393 f.
Pearl, Raymond, 38 f., 62
Pearson, Karl, 40
Pease, Edward R., 490
Perlman, Selig, 523
Perry, W. J., 293
Personality, social aspects of, 10, 102 f., 137, chap. xiii, 175 f., 311, 566; growth of, 139 f.; as the subjective aspect of culture, 169; types of, 171 f.; divided and multiple personality, 163 f.; personal attitudes, 194; personal relationships, 137 f., 528
Peschel, Oscar, 46
Petronius Arbiter, 338
Philistine type of personality, 171
Philological approach to the study of race, 45 f.

Philosophy, social. *See* Social Philosophy
Philosophy of history, 374
Physiocrats, 28, 89, 110 f., 518
Physiological psychology, 126
Pietro-Tonelli, Alfonso de, 117
Pioneer belts, 496
Pitt-Rivers, George Henry Lane-Fox, 307 f., 335
Pittard, Eugene, 266 n.
Plato, 4, 28, 52, 74 f., 86, 87, 123, 158 f., 186, 203, 222, 245, 391 f., 474, 516, 539, 555
Play, sociological theories of, chap. xxv; the child's play world, 359 f.; play groups, 138, 362, 367 f.; the play movement, 368; evolution of play, 368 f.
Police power, 466
Policy, social. *See* Social policy
Political evolution, 533 ff.; types of theories of, 539 f.
Political geography, 64, 448, chap. xxxiii
Political organization, 10, chap. xxx, 494
Political parties, 441, 450 ff.
Political process, 10, 389 f., 438, 504, 515, 530, 533, 538 f.
Political science, 130 f., 146, 389 f., 396 f., 438 f., 504, 533, 539 ff., 564; distinguished from political philosophy, 437, 538
Politics, 244, 264; social politics, chap. xxxiv
Politics of industry, chap. xxxv
Polybius, 17 f., 475
Popenoe, Paul, 40 n.
Population, theories of, chap. iii, 546, 564; and food supply, 30 f., 39; and the "state of the industrial arts," 32 ff.; and standards of living, 33, 39; and war, 414 ff.; and social differentiation, 37 f.; movements of, chap. v; displacement of, 58; population policies, 27 f.; "moral restraints" on growth of population, 30, 33; population regions, 36 f.; curve of population growth, 38 f.
Position as a geographic concept, 24, 297
Positivism, 246
Post, Albert Hermann, 460 f.
Pound, Roscoe, 406, 445, 454, 455 n., 456 f., 460 ff., 540
Poverty, 327 f.
Power, Eileen, 395 n.
Practice theory of play, 336 ff.
Prejudice, 48 f., 316 ff.
Prestige, 347 ff.
Primary groups, chap. xi, 203, 210 f., 244, 326
Primitive peoples, chap. xxi, 146 ff.; laws of, 247, 258 ff.; crime among, 324; punishment among, 469; religion of, 226 ff.; recreation of, 352 f.; social disorganization of, 333 f.; war and peace among, 409 f.
Prince, Morton, 163 f., 176
Process and processes (*see also* Social process), 92, 95 f.; evolutionary process in the formation of personality, 166; instrumental process, 197
Production, large-scale methods of, 32
Progress, 252 f., 371 ff., 538, 539
Propaganda, 442 f.
Property, 248
Prophets, 237 ff.
Protagoras, 122, 555
Psychiatry, 161 f., 164, 471, 513, 549
Psychology, collective. *See* Collective psychology
Psychology, social. *See* Social psychology
Public, the, 326, 443 ff.
Public interests, 466
Public opinion, 259, 349, 434, chap. xxxi, 500 f.
Public welfare, 507 ff.
Public will. *See* Social will
Puffer, J. Adams, 367
Punishment, 325, 468 ff.
Pythagoreans, 15

Quantitative analysis of social processes, 219
Quantitative measurements in the study of human nature, 133 f., 175

Quantitative Methods in Politics, 559 n.
Queen, Stuart A., 143

Race and race differences, 21, chap. iv, 98, 307 f., 316 ff., 546 f.; ancient theories of race, 42; early Christian theories, 42 f.; Montesquieu's treatment of, 43; influence of Darwin and Linnæus on theories of, 44 f.; philological approach to the study of, 45 f.; Gumplowicz' treatment of, 46 f.; monogenesis vs. polygenesis, 45 ff.; folk psychology and theories of, 47 f.; recent studies of race traits, 48 ff.; race consciousness, 40; race prejudice, 48 f.; race relations cycle, 49 ff.
Rainwater, Clarence E., 368
Rand, Benjamin, 123 n., 124 n.
Randall, J. H., 385
Random movements, 133
Rapport, 206 f.
Rational sanctions, 251, 252
Rationalization, 243, 278
Ratzel, Friedrich, *Anthropogeographie*, 22 ff., 25 f., 55, 63, 64 f., 77, 296 f., 422, 494 ff.; Ratzel as a pioneer student of culture, 146
Ratzenhofer, Gustav, 63, 188 ff., 375, 401 f., 530, 534, 539 f.
Reckless, Walter C., 133 n., 302
Recognition, desire for, 195
Reconstruction. *See* Social reconstruction
Recreation, sociological theories of, chap. xxv
Reform, 349 f., chap. xxxii; reform and the mores, 479 f.
Region, as a geographic concept, 24 f.; as an ecological concept, 65 ff.; as a closed system of forces, 66 f.; as a physiographic concept, 68; regional study of North America, 67 f.; as the habitat of a community, 77; regionalism in political science, 498 f.
Regional sociology, 68 f., 283
Relations and relationships. *See* Social relationships
Relaxation, 361 f., 364 ff.
Religion, chap. xviii, chap. xix, 263 ff.; religious activities and religious beliefs, 220; metaphysical theory of religion, 242 ff.; relation of religion to morality and social control, 244 f.; religion and economic organization, 257; art and religion, 284 f.; religion and recreation, 352 ff.; religion as relaxation, 366
Religionssoziologie, 256
Rent, 31, 130
Repression, 132, 488 f.
Requa, Mark L., 529
Response, desire for, 195
Reuter, Edward B., 27 f., 49 n.
Revivals, 216
Revolution, 213 f., 224, 349, chap. xxxii; definition of the term, 474; revolution and the mores, 479 ff.; revolutionary approach to the labor problem, 524 f.
Rhythm in social change, 217, 383
Ribot, Theodule, 162 f., 176, 180
Ricardo, David, 31, 90, 431
Rice, Stuart A., 559 n., 568
Richmond, Mary E., 103
Rickert, Heinrich, 378 n.
Rights, 411 f.
Ripley, William Z., 47
Rites and ritual, 220, 223, 225 ff., 240 ff., 247 f., 256, 284
Ritter, Karl, 19, 24
Rivers, W. H. R., 61, 292 f.
Roads, 79
Roback, 163 n.
Robbins, Jane E., 512 n.
Robinson, James Harvey, 385
Rohde, Erwin, 158
Roman social theories, 4, 42, 475 ff.; attitude of Roman writers toward commerce, 108
Romans as lawgivers, 248
Romance, 279 f.; romantic impulse, 362
Roscher, Wilhelm, 92, 96
Ross, Edward A., 148, 190 f., 256, 274, 310, 344, 358 f., 486, 549
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 438, 478, 518
Route, influence of, 60
Rural communities, 80 ff., 181, 340 f.

Rural sociology, 80 f.
"Rurban" communities, 83

Sacred things, 227 f.
Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de, 5
Saposs, David J., 524
Sauer, Carl O., 502
Savage, Marion Dutton, 523
Savages. *See* Primitive peoples
Scheler, Max, 167, 256
Schiller, F. C. S., 374 n., 378, 382
Schmoller, Gustav, 92, 96, 99
Scholasticism, social theories of, 42 f., 75 f., 88, 108 f., 160, 245 f., 392 f., 477
School as a social institution, 270 f.
Secondary groups, 142, 244
Sects, 211, 265 f., 303
Security, desire for, 195, 240 f.
Segregation, 303, 334
Selection, natural. *See* Natural Selection
Self. *See* Social Self
Semple, Ellen C., 56 ff., 64, 69, 422, 494 n.
Seneca, political theory of, 476 f.
Sentiments, 315 f., 411 ff.
Sentiment of nationality, 295, 372 f.
Settler, as a social type, 180
Shaler, Nathaniel S., 80 n., 174, 316
Shand, A. F., 129
Shen, H. C., 528 n.
Sighele, Scipio, 204, 208
Simmel, Georg, 18, 93 ff., 129, 180 f., 198, 327, 346 f., 390, 406 f.
Simons, Sarah E., 308
Sins, 459
Skepticism, 242
Slavery, 42, 316, 429 f., 516
Slum, 362
Small, Albion W., 5, 91 n., 92 n., 154 n., 188 ff., 222 n., 309, 402
Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, 141 n.
Smith, Adam, *Wealth of Nations*, 86 f., 89 f., 106, 111 ff., 431, 518; *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, 171
Smith, G. Elliott, 266 n., 293 n.
Smith, Joseph Russell, 68
Smith, W. Robertson, 222 f., 225, 231, 253

Social acts and social actions, 197
Social adjustment, 314 f.
Social aims. *See* Social ends
Social atom or element, 145, 185, 190, 287 f., 389, 560
Social attitudes, 194 (*see also* Attitudes)
Social biology, 564
Social change, 152 ff., 214 ff., 274, 394 f., chap. xxvi, chap. xxxii; and migration, 52 f.; and social science, 5 f., 76 f., chap. xxxvii
Social classes, 38, 98, 179, 324, 339 f., 481 f.
Social conflict, 94, 305, 316 ff., 451, chap. xxiii, chap. xxvii, chap. xxviii; and religion, 235 ff.; and law, 465 f.; conflict as socialization, 406 f., 535
Social consciousness. *See* Group consciousness
Social contact, 103, 122, 183, chap. xxii; economic basis of, 305
Social contract or compact, 396, 477 f.
Social control, 10, 144, 244 ff., 260 f., 328, 390, 423 ff., 435 ff.
Social cycles. *See* Cycles
Social Darwinism, 98, 399
Social Differentiation, 10, 37 f., 83 f., 98 ff., 189, 251, 261, 389 f., 534
Social disorganization, 217, 305, chap. xxiii
Social ends, 271 ff., 307, 334, 436, 441, 459, 464, 532
Social environment, 164, 180; and the development of social science, 547
Social equilibrium, 218, 400, 481 f., 484 f., 540
Social evolution (*see also* Social change, Cultural Evolution), 152 f., 214 ff., 274 ff., chap. xxvi, 472 f.; and social theory, 545 ff.; evolution of forms of migration, 57 f.; evolution of government, chap. xxxvi; of law, 463; of play, 368 f., 400; of religion, 250 ff.; of war, 413 ff.
Social experience, 197

Social forces, 134, 147, chap. xv, 389, 412
Social guidance, quest for and its influence on the development of social science, 6, 433 ff.
Social heredity and social inheritance, 99, 266 f., 277
Social ideals, 224 f., 261, 263 f., 276 ff., 313, 371; influence on social theory, 87 f., 97; primary ideals, 142; ideal of savage law, 259. *See also* Social ends
Social institutions, 202, 249, 278, 332 f., 397, 566
Social integration, 390
Social interaction, 126, 137, 145, 156, 183 f., 185 f., 287, 297, 303, 309, 346 f., 401, 451, 504, 538, 552
Social legislation, 505 f., 513
Social mind, 168 ff., 209 f., 336
Social morphology, 295 f., 537
Social movements, chap. xvii, 263, 473 f.; types of, 216; tentative movements, 218 f.
Social order, 94, 241, 244 f.
Social organization, 221, chap. xxi, 311, 329, 339, 376, 494; early study of, 76; technological organization, 97
Social origins, 260, 457 ff.
Social patterns, 263, 299 ff. (*See also* Cultural patterns)
Social philosophy, eighteenth-century, 5, 518
Social policy, problems of, and social science, chap. i
Social politics, chap. xxxiv
Social problems, and social science, 3 ff., 63, 322 f., 557 f.
Social process (and processes), 63, 77 f., 95 f., 148, 153, 168, 188, 225, 231, 244, 252, 261, 264 ff., 275 f., 287, 305, 314 f., 329, 339, 346 f., 376, 383 f., 389 f., 464 f., 533, 550 ff.
Social progress. *See* Progress
Social psychology, 10, 105, 151, 201, 364, 470
Social purpose. *See* Social Ends, Social ideals
Social reconstruction, 434; Utopias of reconstruction, 281 f.
Social reform, interest in during nineteenth century, 5, 434, 508. (*See also* Reform)
Social relationships, 198, 282, 292
Social research, 318 ff., 407, 521 f., 553, 558, 566 ff.; as affected by city planning, 84 f.
Social science, distinguished from practical and ethical rules, 7 f.; from social philosophy, 8 f., 538; relation to social changes, chap. xxxvii; distinguished from history, 547, 559 ff.; trends of change in the social sciences, 548 f., 557 ff.
Social Science Research Council, 568 f.
Social selection, 99, 153, 274 f., 325, 397
Social self, 170 f.
Social settlements, 515
Social solidarity, 324, 354, 462
Social status, 100, 311 f.
Social structure (*see also* Social organization), 288, 292 f., 295, 376
Social survey, 558, 566
Social technique, 94
Social telesis, 552 f.
Social tendencies, 197
Social tensions, 407
Social theory, evolution of, 545; problems of, 9 f., 288, 435 f.; relation to practical social problems, 322 f.
Social unity, experience of, 142; fact of, in the crowd, 205; ideal of, 373
Social unrest, 217 f.
Social valuation, 276 f.
Social values. *See* Values
Social welfare, 431, 507 ff.
Social will, 257, 437 f.
Social work, 509 ff.
Socialism, 94, 408, 505, 508
Socialization, 406 f.; and competition, 93 ff.
Society, Tönnies' conception of, 78, 257; primary groups as a phase of, 142
Sociological analysis, 122, 145, 156, 185, 200, 215, 287 f., 560
Sociological jurisprudence, 445, 463 ff.

Sociological laboratories, 565
Sociological laws, 186
Sociological theories of revolution, 486 ff.
Sociology, as the study of practical problems, 5; as a fundamental science, 137, 155, 246, 389 f., 549 ff.; as the science of collective behavior, 200; as the "American science," 322; sociology and anthropology, 148
Sociology as a university study, 5; educational sociology, 272 ff.; rural sociology, 80 f.
Socrates, 555
Sombart, Werner, 36 n., 58, 92 f., 94 n., 95 f., 108 n., 113 f., 180 f., 423 f.
Sophists, 555
Sorel, Georges, 224 f.
Sorokin, Pitirim A., *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, 7 n.; 256 f., 376 n., 495; *Sociology of Revolution*, 487 ff.
Soul, 123, 157 ff., 257
Spargo, John, 485
Spencer, Herbert, 134, 147, 158, 177, 187, 221, 244, 250 ff.; 255, 260, 267, 269, 323, 339 f., 365, 375, 399 ff., 436 f., 462 f., 518 ff., 534 f., 539, 540, 567; influence on the development of sociology, 5 f.; *The Study of Sociology*, 6; *Principles of Sociology*, 21, 82 f.; organic analogy, 96
Spengler, Oswald, 117, 374, 377 ff.; 461, 533, 539, 548 n.
Spykman, Nicholas J., 18 n., 93 n., 129 n., 406 n.
Stability, desire for, 171
Standards of living, 33 f., 38
State, as a form of social organization, 189, 202 f., 393, 481; "theory of the state," 396 f.; evolution of the state, 534, 537
Statistical studies of social phenomena, 69 ff., 79, 540, 567
Status (*see also* Social status), 249, 516
Steiner, Jesse F., 509 n., 511
Steinthal, H., 376
Stern, William, 139, 172
Stoddard, Lothrop, 41 n., 47, 99
Stoicism, 242
Stranger, as a social type, 180 f.
Strikes, 218
Struggle for existence, 77, 152, 248 f., 252, 391, 397 ff., 405 f., 408
Suburban trend, 61
Suggestion, 149
Suicide, 258 f.
Sully, James, 363
Sumner, William Graham, 150 ff., 167, 253 ff., 258, 260, 301, 342 ff., 361 f., 369, 408 ff., 479 ff.
Supernatural sanction, 153, 246 f., 249 f., 252, 258 ff., 463
Sutherland, E. H., 325 ff.
Symbols (*see also* Collective representations), 278, 449 f.

Taboo, 228
"Tabula rasa," 125, 160 f.
Tacitus, 42
Taking the rôle of the other, 171, 270
Tarde, Gabriel, 148, 151, 214 f., 227 n., 249, 274, 305, 323, 339, 346 ff., 443
Taussig, F. W., 38 n., 523
Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 524
Taylor, W. Cooke, 213 n.
Tead, Ordway, 130
Teggart, Frederick J., 53 n., 148 n., 533, 548 n., 550 f., 567
Territorial groups. *See* Groups
Thales, 122
Themistes, 246, 457
Theology, influence on the development of social science, 20, 27 f., 108 f.; influence on psychology, 125; as an aspect of religion, 220 ff., 235
Thomas, Franklin, *Environmental Basis of Society*, 15 n., 16, 20 n., 35 n., 493 n.
Thomas, William I., 7 f., 48, 144, 145, 151, 154, 165 n., 169 n., 171, 181, 188, 191 ff., 215, 311, 314, 319, 331, 362, 383, 404, 486 f., 489, 569
Thorndike, Edward L., 100, 132, 175
Thought, 128; as a social phenomenon, 168

Thrasher, Frederic M., *The Gang*, 143, 362, 367 f.
Three Problem Children, 104, 143
Thucydides, 15, 54, 203
Timeless element in social phenomena, 549
Todd, A. J., 373 f.
Tönnies, Ferdinand, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, 78 f., 96, 145 n., 257, 378 n.; *Die Sitte*, 257; *Kritiken und Studien*, 258 n., *Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung*, 441 f.
Totemic groups, 63, 353 f.
Town, as a type of community, 80 ff.; as a form of economic organization, 81 f., 114 f., 500
Trade unions, 520 ff.; assumptions of, 526 f.
Trader, as a type of migrant, 59
Tradition, 122, 303, 313, 376
Transportation, 97; relation to the formation of communities, 79, 303
Trend in social change, 214, 535
Troeltsch, Ernst, 256
Tugwell, Rexford Guy, *The Trend of Economics*, 105 n., 117 n., 130 n.
Tylor, Edward B., 147, 158, 255, 260, 289

University of Chicago, studies of the urban community, 549
University of North Carolina, program of social research, 553
University of Virginia, early sociological teaching at, 5 n.
Urbanization, 422
Utopia, 274 f., 280 ff., 371

Vacher de Lapouge, 98, 376
Vaihinger, Hans, 280, 284, 562
Vallaux, Camille, 501
Values, 192 f., 215, 241, 307; valuation as a social process, 276 ff., 552
Vaughan, R. B., 124 n.
Veblen, Thorstein, 4, 99 n., 347 ff.
Verein für Sozialpolitik, 506 f.
Verkehrsgebiete, 36 f.
Vested interests, 453
Vices, 468
Vico, Giambattista, 479
Vidal de la Blache, Paul, 22, 24, 34 ff., 37, 65, 79 f.
Village, 80 ff., 426
Vogt, Von Ogden, 284 ff.

Wages, theory of, 526
Walker, Francis A., 33 f.
Wallace, Alfred Russell, 375
Wallace, William K., 530
Wallas, Graham, 101 n., 130 f., 266 f., 277, 360, 369, 403 f., 423
Walling, William E., 532
Wallis, Louis, 234 ff., 245, 294 n.
War, 390 ff., 398, 401, chap. xxviii; and migration, 58, 218; selective effect of, 100, 252 f.; economic interpretations of, chap. xxviii; motives underlying war, 403 ff., 412 f.
Ward, Lester F., 6, 187 f., 221, 375 f., 402, 552 f.
Watson, Frank D., 512 n.
Watson, John B., 132 f., 134
Weatherly, U. G., 374, 538
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 519, 521, 523, 526, 530 n.
Weber, Ernst Heinrich, 126
Weber, Max, 96, 256 f.
Westermarck, Edward, 124, 134, 140, 265, 567
Whitehead, Alfred North, *Religion in the Making*, 242 ff., 261
Whitney, *Jurisdiction Disputes in American Building Trades Unions*, 530 n.
Wiese, Leopold von, 172, 198, 208, 218, 549, 506 f.
Wigmore, John H., 454 n., 455 n., 460 n., 469 n.
Willey, Malcolm M., 299 ff.
Will, 125, 128 f., 151, 161 f.; in relation to law, 460. (*See also* Social Will)
Will and testament, 247 f.
Willard, D. W., 509 n.
Williams, James Mickel, 143, 154 f.
Windelband, Wilhelm, 378 n.
Wirth, Louis, 78 n., 302
Wishes, 184, 195 f., 198, 413, 489
Wissler, Clark, 61, 289 ff., 294, 297 ff., 306 f., 376 n., 377
Wolff, Christian, 124
Woods, Robert A., 515
Work, fused with play, 354 f.

World economy, 116, 497 f.; world state, 418
Worms, René, 96
Worship, 251, 285
Wundt, Wilhelm, 126, 376

Xenophon, on fashion, 338

Yahweh, 236 ff.
Yale University, sociological teaching in, 5 n.
Young, Erle Fiske, 49 n.
Young, Kimball, 140, 163 n., 171 n., 194 n.

Zane, J. M., 455 n.
Znaniecki, Florian, 7 f., 48, 144, 154, 171, 191 ff., 215, 311, 486 f., 569; *Laws of Social Psychology*, 196 ff., 331 ff.
Zorbaugh, Harvey W., 121 n., 183 n., 302
Zwiedineck-Sudenhorst, Otto von, 507 n.

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